FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 22 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RODNEY L. GARROTT, No. 14-35076
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00887-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PAT GLEBE,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 6, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Rodney Garrott appeals the district court’s denial
of his habeas corpus petition. Garrott alleges that a Department of Corrections
official falsely accused him of prison infractions, resulting in a loss of Earned
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Release Time (ERT) without due process of law. The Washington Supreme Court
found that Garrott’s loss of ERT was not the result of disciplinary proceedings, and
that he had received the limited due process to which he was entitled under
Washington state law. The district court denied Garrott’s petition and dismissed
the action. This court granted a limited certificate of appealability to consider (1)
whether Wash. Rev. Code §§ 72.09.130 and 9.94A.729 create a protected liberty
interest in the eligibility to earn early release credits, and (2) whether appellant
received due process. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
2253 and we affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
1. Although a district court’s denial of a habeas petition is reviewed de
novo, Hernandez v. Holland, 750 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom. Hernandez v. Biter, 135 S. Ct. 253 (2014), the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) prevents this court from reversing a state
court’s denial of habeas relief unless the relevant state court decision is (1)
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
2. We do not reach the issue of whether Wash. Rev. Code §§ 72.09.130
and 9.94A.729 create a protected liberty interest in the eligibility to earn early
2
release credits because the Washington Supreme Court found that Garrott’s loss of
ERT was not the result of the challenged disciplinary proceedings. ER 46.
Department of Corrections records reflect that Garrott failed to earn ERT between
March 1, 2011 and May 1, 2011 because he failed to participate in available
education and work programs. See Wash. Rev. Code § 72.09.130(2); Wash.
Admin. Code § 137-30-030(3). The record contains no convincing evidence to the
contrary.
Garrott attempts to attribute this loss to sanctions imposed as a result of an
April 12, 2011 disciplinary infraction, however, his sixteen-day stay in segregation
cannot explain his ten-day loss of ERT. If an inmate spends twenty days or more
in segregation in one calendar month, he is ineligible to earn ERT for that month.
Wash. Admin. Code § 137-30-030(3)(c)(ii)–(iv). Although Garrott spent only
sixteen days in segregation, beginning April 12, 2011, he lost ERT for the months
of March and April. It is implausible to attribute Garrott’s loss of ERT to his
disciplinary sanctions. Accordingly, the state court’s factual determination is not
unreasonable and therefore may not be disturbed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
3. Garrott has not shown that he was denied due process. The
Washington Supreme Court held that Garrott’s disciplinary proceedings provided
the minimal due process required by Washington state law. See In re Grantham,
3
227 P.3d 285, 292 (Wash. 2010) (en banc). Although Garrott alleges that false
testimony was provided against him during these proceedings, Garrott provided no
convincing evidence to contradict the hearing officer’s credibility determinations
or to show that the state court’s reliance upon those determinations was
unreasonable. Nor has Garrott shown that it is clearly established federal law that
a prisoner has a right to be free from false accusations. See, e.g., Freeman v.
Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951–52 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The prison inmate has no
constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of
conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”);
Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1139–41 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[A]n allegation that a
prison guard planted false evidence which implicates an inmate in a disciplinary
infraction fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted where the procedural
due process protections . . . are provided); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452
(8th Cir. 1989) (“Sprouse’s claims based on the falsity of the charges and the
impropriety of Babcock’s involvement in the grievance procedure, standing alone,
do not state constitutional claims.”).
The district court’s denial of habeas relief is AFFIRMED.
4
FILED
Garrott v. Glebe, Case No. 14-35076 APR 22 2015
Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I concur in the result.