MEMORANDUM DECISION
Apr 30 2015, 10:00 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frederick Vaiana Gregory F. Zoeller
Voyles Zahn & Paul Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James Currin, April 30, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1410-CR-709
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle,
State of Indiana, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable Stanley M. Kroh,
Magistrate
Cause No. 49G03-1405-FB-27808
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 1 of 8
[1] On the afternoon of Memorial Day, 2014, Anthony Moffit was enjoying a
barbeque at his Indianapolis home with Veronica Alexander, his partner of
eighteen years and with whom he had three children. Appellant-Defendant
James Currin drove by with Shante Bowie screaming at Anthony and
Alexander. When Anthony confronted James, the two began a fistfight that
lasted two to three minutes, after which all dispersed.
[2] A short time later, James and Shante returned, accompanied by several others,
the men in the group armed with two-by-fours and the women with knives.
Veronica was attacked and was stabbed four times, while Anthony was struck
in the head with a two-by-four and knocked unconscious. While Anthony was
on the ground, James kicked and stomped him. The fight continued until
police arrived, at which point the attackers fled. Anthony suffered a broken jaw
which had to be wired shut.
[3] Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana charged James with Class B felony
aggravated battery and Class D felony battery. Following a bench trial, the trial
court found James guilty as charged and sentence him to an aggregate sentence
of eight years with two suspended, one to probation. James contends that the
State failed to introduce evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction for
aggravated battery under a theory of accomplice liability. Because we disagree,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 2 of 8
[4] In the afternoon of May 26, 2014, Memorial Day, Anthony, Veronica, and
their children were having a barbeque with family and friends on the porch of
their family home in Indianapolis. James and Shante, with whom James had
children, drove by in their grey Kia minivan, yelling profanities at Anthony and
Veronica’s daughter and throwing something at her as well. When the van
returned, Anthony ran beside the van and confronted James. When James
emerged, he and Anthony engaged in a fistfight for approximately two to three
minutes. When police were called, the altercation ended and all returned to
their homes.
[5] What occurred next can best be described as a free-for-all. Approximately
twenty to twenty-five minutes later, James, Shante, Vicky Brooks (Shante’s
mother), Lamont Brooks (Shante’s uncle), Shawn Patrick Bowie (Shante’s
brother), Darnell Wilson (Shante’s uncle), Sheila Brooks (Shante’s sister), and
others approached across a vacant lot. The men were armed with two-by-fours
and, after the group crossed the street into Anthony and Veronica’s yard, Vicky,
Shante, and Sheila produced knives and stabbed Veronica four times.
[6] Meanwhile, Lamont punched Anthony, and James, Shawn, and Darnell began
to hit Anthony as well. As James and Anthony fought, Shawn “whacked”
Anthony in the head with a two-by-four. Tr. p. 27. Anthony was knocked
unconscious and fell to the ground, where Darnell and James continued to hit,
kick, and stomp him. When Anthony’s eleven-year-old daughter K.A. grabbed
a broom and ran to his aid, James kicked her in the chest. Additionally, Vicky
stabbed Veronica’s cousin Kenny Brown and one of Shante’s uncles knocked
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 3 of 8
him unconscious, Anthony’s sixteen-year-old son was stabbed in the arm, and
Darnell hit Anthony’s fourteen-year-old son J.A. in the side with a two-by-four.
The group dispersed when police arrived. Anthony suffered a broken jaw that
had to be wired shut. At the time of trial, Anthony was still having trouble with
his jaw and had had to return to the hospital often.
[7] On May 30, 2014, the State charged James with Class B felony aggravated
battery on Anthony and Class A misdemeanor battery on Anthony’s daughter.
James’s case was tried to the bench on August 27, 2014. While several
witnesses testified regarding the events of Memorial Day, the trial court stated
on the record that it found J.A. to be particularly credible. J.A. had testified
that he saw Anthony being struck with a two-by-four, but could not say by
whom, only that it was not James. J.A. added that he did not see James
wielding a two-by-four. J.A. did testify that he saw James “stomping” Anthony
after he was on the ground. Tr. p. 125. At the trial court’s request, the parties
argued their cases regarding the aggravated battery charge on a theory of
accomplice liability. The trial court found James guilty as charged. On
September 9, 2014, the trial court sentenced James to eight years for aggravated
battery, with one of two suspended years to be spent on probation, and two
years for battery, the sentences to be served concurrently.
Discussion and Decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 4 of 8
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[8] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither weigh the evidence
nor resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind.
1995). We look only to the evidence of probative value and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Id. If from that
viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
we will affirm the conviction. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind.
1993).
[9] If James’s conviction for aggravated battery of Anthony is to be affirmed, it will
be on an accomplice-liability basis, as the trial court seems to have specifically
found that James was not the person who struck Anthony in the head with a
two-by-four. Consequently, the State was required to establish that James was
an accomplice to “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally inflict[ed] injury
on a person that create[ed] a substantial risk of death or cause[d] … serious
permanent disfigurement [or] protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member or organ[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5. “A person who
knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit
an offense commits that offense, even if the other person … has not been
prosecuted for the offense;… has not been convicted of the offense; or … has
been acquitted of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4.
In determining whether there was sufficient evidence for
purposes of accomplice liability, we consider such factors as: 1)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 5 of 8
presence at the scene of the crime; 2) companionship with
another at the scene of the crime; 3) failure to oppose
commission of the crime; and 4) course of conduct before,
during, and after occurrence of the crime. [Ind. Code § 35-41-2-
4]. A defendant’s mere presence at the crime scene, or lack of
opposition to a crime, standing alone, is insufficient to establish
accomplice liability. Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ind.
2000). Flight shows consciousness of guilt. State v. Torphy, 217
Ind. 383, 387-88, 28 N.E.2d 70, 72 (1940).
These factors may be considered in conjunction with a
defendant’s course of conduct before, during, and after the crime,
and a defendant’s companionship with the one who commits the
crime. Id. Furthermore, accomplice liability applies to the
contemplated offense and all acts that are a probable and natural
consequence of the concerted action. Wieland v. State, 736
N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ind. 2000). Moreover, an accomplice is
equally culpable as the one who commits the actual crime. Hauk
v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. 2000). Finally, it is not
necessary for [James] to have participated in every element of the
crime under a theory of accomplice liability. Bruno v. State, 774
N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ind. 2002).
Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[10] We conclude that the State has produced sufficient evidence to sustain James’s
conviction for aggravated battery based on accomplice liability. James’s
presence at the scene of the aggravated battery is supported by the testimony of
no fewer than seven witnesses and is not seriously in dispute. The State also
produced ample evidence to establish companionship with others who were
also participating in the attack. The State produced evidence that James walked
back to Anthony’s house with several others, almost all of whom were blood
relatives to Shante, the mother of James’s children. James participated in the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 6 of 8
initial beating of Anthony, along with Shawn, Darnell, and Lamont. Just
before Shawn struck Anthony in the head with a two-by-four, James “swung”
at Anthony with his fists. Tr. p. 122. After Anthony had been felled by
Shawn’s blow, James proceeded to kick and stomp him. The evidence indicates
James’s full participation in the group attack on Anthony, from beginning to
end.
[11] As for the third factor, the evidence just discussed is more than sufficient to
establish that James, far from opposing the crime, was an active participant.
Finally, James’s actions before and after the aggravated battery on Anthony
support a finding of accomplice liability. The event that ultimately led to the
pitched battle in Anthony’s yard was the earlier fistfight between James and
Anthony, which was provoked by James. James told Anthony that he was
going to “F [him] up” and told Shante that he was going to “beat [Anthony’s]
a[**].” Tr. pp. 57, 168. After the initial fistfight, James and Shante gathered
Shante’s family and friends, armed themselves, and returned to Anthony’s as a
group. After kicking and stomping Anthony as he lay unconscious, James
kicked K.A. in the chest when she attempted to come to Anthony’s aid. James
fled from the scene as police arrived, indicating culpability. See Torphy, 217
Ind. at 387-88, 28 N.E.2d at 72.
[12] James’s argument seems to be that an affirmance of his conviction for
aggravated battery on Anthony would be an absurd result, because he could
have just as easily been prosecuted and convicted of attacks on the other victims
under a theory of accomplice liability, but was not. First, the record seems to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 7 of 8
indicate that James only had significant involvement in the crimes against
Anthony and K.A., for which he faced charges. Second, the State was free to
prosecute James in any way it saw fit, and we will not second-guess its decision
in this regard. James has failed to establish that his conviction for aggravated
battery is unsupported by sufficient evidence.
[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 8 of 8