MEMORANDUM DECISION
Apr 30 2015, 10:21 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Gregory F. Zoeller
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Karl M. Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles J. Davis, Jr., April 30, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
16A01-1411-CR-480
v. Appeal from the Decatur Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Timothy B. Day,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff
Case No. 16C01-1405-CM-379
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Charles J. Davis, Jr., was convicted in a bench trial of resisting law enforcement
as a Class A misdemeanor. He now appeals and argues that the evidence is
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insufficient to support his conviction. We find sufficient evidence to support
Davis’s conviction because a complete review of the transcript reveals that
Davis intentionally fled from a police officer after the officer identified himself
and ordered Davis to stop. We therefore affirm the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 28, 2014, Greensburg Police Department Officers Jarod McCalvin and
Jordan Craig went to a mobile home to execute a search warrant. While
Officer McCalvin knocked loudly at the front door and announced that he was
from the Greensburg Police Department and had a search warrant, Officer
Craig stood at the corner of the home with his dog to help in the capture of
suspects. After Davis crawled out a window and landed on the ground, Officer
Craig announced “police canine” and ordered Davis to stop. Tr. p. 43. When
Davis failed to comply with the officer’s command, Officer Craig again ordered
him to stop and threated to release his dog. Davis stopped after the second
order. A trial court convicted Davis of resisting law enforcement, and Davis
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[3] Davis argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Gorman v. State, 968 N.E.2d
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845, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. We consider only the probative
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the conviction.
Id. We will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences from that
evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[4] To convict Davis of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the State
had to prove that Davis knowingly or intentionally fled from Officer Craig after
the officer identified himself by visible or audible means and ordered Davis to
stop. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1; Appellant’s App. p. 4. In addition, the order
to stop had to rest on probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Gaddie v. State, 10
N.E.3d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2014).
[5] Here, Davis argues that the “State did not present substantial evidence of
probative value to show he fled from a police officer.” Appellant’s Br. p. 4. In
support of his argument, Davis points to an excerpt from the transcript where
Officer Craig testified that he ordered Davis to stop one time. Tr. p. 44.
However, we agree with the State that Davis has taken this testimony out of
context. Specifically, “[t]his testimony is directed to the subject of time at
which [Davis] chose to stop. It is not directed to the subject of whether [Davis]
had disregarded [a prior] order to stop.” Appellee’s Br. p. 4.
[6] A complete review of the transcript reveals that Officer Craig identified himself
as a law-enforcement officer and ordered Davis to stop by audible means.
Davis, however, continued to flee from the officer. Officer Craig ordered Davis
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to stop a second time and threatened to release his dog. It was only after
Officer Craig’s second order that Davis stopped. Tr. p. 47-48. This evidence is
sufficient to support Davis’s conviction of resisting law enforcement as a Class
A misdemeanor.1
[7] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
1
Davis’s argument that he did not hear the first order to stop is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence,
which we cannot and will not do. See Gorman, 968 N.E.2d at 847.
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