UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1592
MICHAEL A. WATT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RAY MABUS, Secretary, Department of the Navy,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:12-cv-00128-LO-JFA)
Submitted: April 27, 2015 Decided: May 1, 2015
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas F. Hennessy, VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY LAW OFFICE,
Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael A. Watt appeals the district court’s order granting
the Secretary of the Navy’s motion for summary judgment on
Watt’s Title VII ∗ employment discrimination and retaliation
claims. We affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v.
Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]
against any of [its] employees . . . because [the employee] has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
[Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). Because Watt did
not present direct evidence of retaliation, the district court
analyzed his retaliation claim under the familiar burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff
∗
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
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establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating
“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and
the employment action.” Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626
F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). If the plaintiff makes such a
showing, “the burden shifts to the employer to establish a
legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the action.” Price v.
Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). If the employer
does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “show that
the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual.” Id.
Throughout this process, the employee bears the ultimate burden
of establishing that his protected activity was a “but-for”
cause of the alleged adverse action and was not merely a
motivating factor. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133
S. Ct. 2517, 2532-34 (2013). We have reviewed the record in
this case and find no reversible error in the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Watt’s retaliation claim.
We next turn to Watt’s claim that the district court erred
in holding that his claims of a hostile work environment and
constructive discharge were barred by Watt’s failure to exhaust
his claims through the administrative process. Absent
exceptional circumstances, this Court generally does not
consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. See In re
Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014). Watt offers no
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explanation, exceptional or otherwise, for his failure to
address the issue of exhaustion either in his brief in response
to the motion for summary judgment or upon questioning by the
district court at the hearing on the motion. Accordingly, we
decline to address the issue on appeal.
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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