FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 01 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IVAN RENE MOORE, No. 13-55935
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-03140-ODW-OP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RICHARD FRUIN, an individual;
HONORABLE RICHARD FRUIN, in his
official capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 22, 2015**
Before: GOODWIN, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Ivan Rene Moore appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and equal protection
violations by the state court judge who presided over an unlawful detainer action
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
involving Moore. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul,
547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Moore’s claims for damages because
defendant is immune from damages liability for his judicial actions. See Sadoski v.
Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (judges are absolutely immune from
suits for damages based on judicial conduct unless acting “in the clear absence of
all jurisdiction” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). We reject
Moore’s contention that he alleged non-judicial conduct that would not be covered
by judicial immunity.
The district court properly dismissed Moore’s claims for injunctive relief
because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a declaratory decree
was violated. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Saldana v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 774 F.3d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“We . . . need not accept as
true legal conclusions contained in the complaint.”).
Dismissal of Moore’s claims for declaratory relief was proper because the
requested declaratory relief would not clarify any legal relations or resolve any
controversy between the parties. See United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353,
1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (per curiam) (“Declaratory relief should be denied
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when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal
relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the
uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend after
concluding that amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that leave to amend should be given unless amendment would be
futile).
Because we affirm on the grounds discussed above, we do not reach
Moore’s contentions regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh
Amendment immunity, or the merits of his underlying claims.
AFFIRMED.
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