J-S18046-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MARVIN LYNDELL HARPER, JR.
Appellant No. 2583 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 31, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006039-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MAY 4, 2015
Appellant, Marvin Lyndell Harper, Jr., appeals from the July 31, 2014
judgment of sentence of one year’s probation, imposed after he was found
guilty of one count of firearms not to be carried without a license. 1 After
careful review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this case
as follows. On June 3, 2013, at 8:33 p.m., Trooper Sergio Colon of the
Pennsylvania State Police was patrolling on Interstate 95 northbound
towards Philadelphia in Delaware County. N.T., 4/2/14, at 6. Trooper Colon
observed a burgundy Ford vehicle traveling in front of his marked patrol car.
Id. at 7. Trooper Colon followed the vehicle for approximately three tenths
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(2).
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of a mile and determined the vehicle was travelling at 70 miles per hour in a
55 miles per hour zone, based on the speed at which Trooper Colon was
following the car. Id. at 7-8. Based on his observation, Trooper Colon
initiated a traffic stop for speeding. Id. at 8. The vehicle pulled over, and
Trooper Colon approached the vehicle on the passenger side. Id. Upon
approaching the vehicle, Trooper Colon asked its sole occupant, later
identified as Appellant, for his driver’s license, registration, and proof of
insurance. Id. at 10. “During the course of him gathering his
documentation, [Appellant and Trooper Colon] ha[d] [a] small conversation
relative to [Appellant’s] course of travel throughout the day[.]” Id. During
said conversation, Trooper Colon asked Appellant if he had any firearms in
the vehicle, to which Appellant responded, “yes, just mine.” Id. Trooper
Colon asked Appellant if he could retrieve said firearm for the duration of the
stop, to which Appellant replied, “sure[.]” Id. Trooper Colon retrieved the
firearm and took it back to his patrol car and secured it therein. Id. at 12.
Upon returning to Appellant, Trooper Colon asked him if he had a permit for
the firearm, to which Appellant replied that he did not. Id. At this point,
Trooper Colon placed Appellant under arrest. Id. at 13.
On October 23, 2013, the Commonwealth filed an information charging
Appellant with one count of firearms not to be carried without a license.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the firearm on December 12, 2013. The
trial court conducted a suppression hearing on April 2, 2014, at which
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Trooper Colon testified as the sole witness for the Commonwealth. Appellant
did not present any evidence at said hearing. On April 4, 2014, the trial
court entered an order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant
then proceeded to a one-day bench trial on July 31, 2014, at the conclusion
of which the trial court found Appellant guilty of the above-mentioned
offense. The trial court immediately imposed a sentence of one year’s
probation. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. On August 21,
2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.2
On appeal, Appellant presents the following two issues for our review.
1. Whether Appellant’s conviction for [p]ossessing
a [f]irearm without a [l]icense should be
vacated, because the [trial] court abused its
discretion in denying Appellant’s suppression
motion, where [the] firearm attributable to
Appellant’s possession was recovered as a
result of a coerced consensual search,
conducted during the course of an
investigatory traffic stop, without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause that Appellant had
engaged in criminal activity, which violated
Appellant’s constitutional right to a fair search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, by and through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
State Constitution?
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2
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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2. Whether Appellant’s conviction for [p]ossessing
a [f]irearm without a [l]icense should be
vacated, because the [trial] court abused its
discretion in denying Appellant’s suppression
motion, where Appellant admitted that he
possessed [the] firearm, without a carry
permit, during the functional equivalent of a
custodial interrogation, while being subjected
to a routine traffic stop, without being advised
of his Miranda[3] rights, which violated
Appellant’s constitutional rights against self-
incrimination and to have the presence and
advice of counsel during police questioning,
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, by and through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
State Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
As Appellant’s issues on appeal both pertain to the trial court’s denial
of his suppression motion, we begin by noting our well-settled standard of
review regarding suppression issues.
[I]n addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of
a suppression motion [we are] limited to determining
whether the factual findings are supported by the
record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct. Since the [Commonwealth]
prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider
only the evidence of the [Commonwealth] and so
much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the
record as a whole. Where the record supports the
factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by
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3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 802 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(some brackets and citation omitted). We elect to address Appellant’s issues
together for ease of analysis, as we dispose of both issues on the same
ground. In his first issue, Appellant argues that his consent for Trooper
Colon to search his glove compartment for his firearm was coerced.
Appellant’s Brief at 16. However, Appellant’s developed argument, does not
depend on whether his consent was voluntary. Rather, Appellant devotes
his argument on this issue to whether the traffic stop in this case “was
elevated to an investigatory detention, when Appellant was asked if there
was a firearm inside the vehicle.” Id. In his second issue, Appellant avers
that his statements to Trooper Colon should have been suppressed because
he was subjected to a custodial interrogation and not given his Miranda
warnings. Id. at 18. As this illustrates, both of Appellant’s arguments on
appeal are premised on the type of detention to which Appellant was
subjected.
The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides, “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
….” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Likewise, Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution states, “[t]he people shall be secure in their
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persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and
seizures ….” Pa. Const. art. I, § 8.
Under Pennsylvania law, there are three levels of
encounter that aid courts in conducting search and
seizure analyses.
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or
request for information) which need not be
supported by any level of suspicion, but carries
no official compulsion to stop or respond. The
second, an “investigative detention” must be
supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects
a suspect to a stop and period of detention,
but does not involve such coercive conditions
as to constitute the functional equivalent of
arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial
detention” must be supported by probable
cause.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 613
(Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied,
87 A.3d 320 (Pa. 2014).
Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc).
The law is clear that Miranda is not implicated
unless the individual is in custody and subjected to
interrogation.
Police detentions only become custodial when,
under the totality of the circumstances, the
conditions and/or duration of the detention become
so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent
of formal arrest … [T]he test focuses on whether the
individual being interrogated reasonably believes his
freedom of action is being restricted.
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Commonwealth v. Snyder, 60 A.3d 165, 170 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original), appeal denied,
70 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2013).
The factors a court utilizes to determine, under
the totality of the circumstances, whether a
detention has become so coercive as to constitute
the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis
for the detention; its length; its location; whether
the suspect was transported against his or her will,
how far, and why; whether restraints were used;
whether the law enforcement officer showed,
threatened or used force; and the investigative
methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.
The fact that a police investigation has focused on a
particular individual does not automatically trigger
“custody,” thus requiring Miranda warnings.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019-1020 (Pa. Super. 2011),
affirmed, 78 A.3d 1044 (Pa. 2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Mannion,
725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc) (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, Appellant does not contest the constitutionality
of the initial traffic stop. This Court has noted that “[t]raffic stops, like
Terry stops, constitute investigative rather than custodial detentions, unless
under the totality of circumstances the conditions and duration of the
detention become the functional equivalent of an arrest[.]”
Commonwealth v. Schatzel, 724 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 740 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1999); see also
Rodriguez v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 2015 WL 1780927, at *5 (2015)
(stating, “a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop
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... than to a formal arrest[]”) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998).
“The key difference between an investigative
and a custodial detention is that the latter ‘involves
such coercive conditions as to constitute the
functional equivalent of an arrest.’” Commonwealth
v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d
983, 987 (Pa. 2006)).
The court considers the totality of the
circumstances to determine if an encounter is
investigatory or custodial, but the following
factors are specifically considered: the basis for
the detention; the duration; the location;
whether the suspect was transported against
his will, how far, and why; whether restraints
were used; the show, threat or use of force;
and the methods of investigation used to
confirm or dispel suspicions.[4]
Commonwealth v. Teeter, 961 A.2d 890, 899 (Pa.
Super. 2008).
Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 306 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(parallel citation omitted), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 442 (Pa. 2012).
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4
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate that courts employ a totality
of the circumstances analysis in determining whether a citizen is in custody,
we stress that this is not an exhaustive list. See generally J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) (stating, “[r]ather than demarcate
a limited set of relevant circumstances, we have required police officers and
courts to examine all of the circumstances surrounding the [alleged
custodial] interrogation, including any circumstance that would have affected
how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would perceive his or her
freedom to leave[]”).
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Applying this framework, we conclude the trial court did not err when
it concluded Appellant was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
Here, as noted above, Appellant was subject to a routine traffic stop for
speeding, which is classified as an investigative detention. There is no
indication that the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged, it took place on
the side of a major interstate highway, Appellant was not restrained nor
transported, nor did Trooper Colon employ any threat or use of force against
him. See generally id.
Appellant argues that he was subject to a custodial detention because
Trooper Colon “testified on cross-examination that Appellant was not free to
leave, during the traffic stop, when he asked Appellant if he possessed a
firearm.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant also argues that the encounter
escalated to a custodial detention “[o]nce Appellant disclosed that there was
a firearm inside the Ford, [because] he was subject to arrest.” Id. We
conclude that neither of these factors viewed in light of the totality of the
circumstances escalated the traffic stop to a custodial detention.
It is already incumbent in a traffic stop, or any other investigative
detention that the individual is not free to leave. See generally
Commonwealth v. Santana, 959 A.2d 450, 452 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal
denied, 989 A.2d 916 (Pa. 2010). In addition, it is not legally accurate to
presume that Appellant was automatically subject to arrest when he
disclosed the existence of a firearm in the vehicle. The statute giving rise to
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Appellant’s conviction in this case, states that a person is not guilty of the
offense if that individual has a license for the firearm in question. See
generally 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a), 6109. Also, Section 6106(b) gives a list
of 16 exceptions to which the statute does not apply. See generally id. §
6106(b). Regarding Appellant’s first issue, as we have explained, traffic
stops are investigative detentions for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. See Schatzel, supra. In addition, the Supreme Court has
concluded that law enforcement may question drivers about unrelated
matters during a traffic stop, as long as said questioning does not
unreasonably prolong the stop. See Rodriguez, supra (stating, “the
Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that d[o] not
lengthen the roadside detention[]”); accord Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.
323, 333 (2009) (stating, “[a]n officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to
the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert
the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop[]”). Based on
these considerations, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief on either
issue.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly denied
Appellant’s motion to suppress. See Washington, supra. Accordingly, the
trial court’s July 31, 2014 judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/4/2015
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Com. v. Harper, M.
Combined Opinion