MEMORANDUM DECISION
May 11 2015, 10:49 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark S. Lenyo Gregory F. Zoeller
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Harlan T. Praul, May 11, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1412-CR-422
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Roland W.
Appellee-Plaintiff Chamblee, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 71D08-1107-MR-008
Friedlander, Judge.
[1] Harlan T. Praul appeals the sentence he received as a result of his plea of guilty
to the offense of murder. Praul presents the following restated issues for review:
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1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its identification
of mitigating circumstances?
2. Is Praul’s sentence inappropriate in light of the offense and
his character?
[2] We affirm.
[3] The facts are that in late May or early June 2011, Praul began dating Christine
Freeman. On June 9 of that year, the two were drinking inside a home in
South Bend, Indiana. After drinking seven or eight beers, Praul and Freeman
began to argue about a previous relationship, and Praul struck Freeman in the
face. Freeman attempted to leave and Praul followed her outside. When
Freeman expressed a desire to call 911, Praul became enraged. He picked her
up by the throat and threw her to the pavement, causing Freeman to lose
consciousness. At that point, Praul tried to suffocate Freeman with an article of
clothing and she stopped breathing. Praul stopped choking Freeman because
he believed she was dead. When a subsequent gasp for air revealed that she
was still alive, Praul began striking and kicking her in the head and body.
Freeman coughed up a large amount of blood and began convulsing before she
again stopped breathing. Once again believing that Freeman had died, Praul
left the scene, walked to a nearby church, and called 911. He told the operator
that he had killed Freeman and left her lying on the street.
[4] Officers from the South Bend Police Department responded, arriving at the
scene at 1:30 a.m. When they arrived, they observed Freeman lying on the
ground. They detected no vital signs. The officers and paramedics who had
arrived on the scene began life-saving efforts, after which Freeman began
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breathing again. She was transported to Memorial Hospital. An examination
revealed that Freeman had suffered multiple fractures to her face and ribs, and
severe blunt-force trauma to her head and torso. Doctors performed an
emergency tracheotomy to restore Freeman’s breathing.
[5] Officers found Praul sitting on the steps of the church. He waived his rights and
confessed that he had tried to kill Freeman and that he had kicked and choked
her. Praul was placed under arrest and initially charged with aggravated battery
as a class B felony and attempted murder, as a class A felony.
[6] After several weeks in the hospital, and despite around-the-clock care, Freeman
died of her injuries on July 4, 2011. An autopsy revealed that she had died as a
result of blunt-force injuries to her head and chest.
[7] Following Freeman’s death, the pending charges against Praul were dismissed,
and he was charged with murder. On October 11, three weeks before the
scheduled trial date, Praul pleaded guilty to murder without the benefit of a plea
agreement. At the guilty plea hearing, Praul admitted that he knowingly
“picked [Freeman] up by the throat and … slammed her to the ground.”
Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 at 14. He also admitted that while Freeman was on the
ground he “kicked her and the like” and that such resulted in her death. Id.
The trial court sentenced Praul to sixty-five years imprisonment, which is the
maximum sentence for murder.
1.
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[8] Praul contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to identify several
mitigating circumstances. Specifically, Praul claims the trial court failed to find
as mitigators: (1) the fact that he called 911 to report what he had done; (2) the
fact that he confessed and accepted responsibility for his actions; (3) his history
of mental illness; and (4) the fact that he pleaded guilty.
[9] The identification of mitigating circumstances at sentencing rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.
2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the
decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.’” Id. at 491 (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)).
A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in several ways, including the
failure to cite significant mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482.
To prevail on a claim pertaining to mitigators, a defendant must establish that
the excluded mitigating circumstances are both significant and clearly
supported by the record. Id. A sentencing court is not obligated to find a
circumstance to be mitigating merely because it is advanced as such by the
defendant, nor is it required to explain why it chose not to make a finding of
mitigation. Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
Also, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to find a mitigating
factor that is highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance. Id.
[10] There is no question that the trial court was aware of the facts that Praul
contends should have been cited as mitigating circumstances. In fact, the court
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stated that it had “gone back and forth between trying to figure out how much
credit I give to you in terms of your having made that 911 call.” Petitioner’s
Exhibit 2 at 12. The court expressed similar deliberations with respect to Praul’s
claim of remorse and his plea of guilty. The court also stated that it took “into
account” Praul’s history of mental illness, which it explained “can cut both
ways[.]” Id. at 13.
[11] The trial court’s remarks could plausibly be interpreted as reflecting either that
it found these facts to be mitigating but accorded them little weight, or that it
declined to find them as mitigating at all. If it was the former meaning, we
cannot review it. Under the current statutory sentencing scheme, the relative
weight assigned to an aggravating or mitigating factor is not subject to review
for an abuse of discretion. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. 2008); see
also Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (“[b]ecause the trial court no longer
has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each
other when imposing a sentence, … a trial court cannot now be said to have
abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors”).1
[12] On the other hand, if we interpret the court’s remarks as a rejection of these
proffered mitigators, such would not constitute an abuse of discretion if they
were highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance. See Healey v. State, 969
N.E.2d 607. In view of the brutality of the attack upon the victim, and the
1
This principle applies as well to defeat Praul’s claim that “the trial court failed to properly balance
aggravating and mitigating circumstances”. Appellant’s Brief at 8.
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benefit that Praul derived from his guilty plea (i.e., the State would forego filing
a habitual offender enhancement), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to cite these as mitigating factors, if indeed its statements may be
interpreted as having declined to find them as such. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in the finding of mitigating circumstances.
2.
[13] Praul contends his sentence “should be revised under Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B) as inappropriate because the trial court failed to properly weigh mitigating
circumstances.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana
Constitution grants our Supreme Court the power to review and revise criminal
sentences. See Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S.Ct. 978 (2015). Pursuant to App. R. 7, the Supreme Court authorized this
court to perform the same task. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219. Per App. R.
7(B), we may revise a sentence “if after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offense and the character of the offender.” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190,
203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7). In order to challenge a sentence on these
grounds, however, it is incumbent upon a defendant to present arguments on
both elements, i.e., character and the nature of the offense. Gilliam v. State, 901
N.E.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Praul has not offered any argument
concerning the nature of his offense and how that renders the maximum
sentence inappropriate. Therefore, the argument is waived. Waiver
notwithstanding, however, we proceed to review his claim.
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[14] The determination of whether we regard a sentence as appropriate “turns on
our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
case.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d at 1224). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to
attempt to leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 989 N .E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind.
2013). It is not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the perceived “correct”
sentence in each case. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274. Accordingly, “the
question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more
appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is
inappropriate.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(emphasis in original). Our Supreme Court has indicated that, when analyzing
the appropriateness of a criminal sentence, there is “no right answer ... in any
given case.” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cardwell v. State,
895 N.E.2d at 1224). Rather, appellate review and, where appropriate, revision
“ultimately boils down to the appellate court’s ‘collective sense of what is
appropriate, not a product of a deductive reasoning process.’” Id. (quoting
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d at 1225). Ultimately, we “focus on the forest—the
aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number
of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id.
[15] In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the
statutory ranges established for the classification of the relevant offenses. Praul
was convicted of murder, for which the advisory sentence is fifty-five years,
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which lies midway between the maximum (sixty-five) and minimum (forty-five)
sentences for this offense. Praul received the maximum sentence.
[16] We next consider the nature of Praul’s offense. “In considering the nature of
the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the
Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Fuller v. State, 9
N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). The trial court imposed a sentence based upon its
finding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We are not limited to
those mitigators and aggravators, however, in analyzing a claim under App. R.
7(B). Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653.
[17] Praul murdered the woman with whom he had very recently begun a romantic
relationship. The nature and circumstances of the murder are particularly
brutal. After slamming Freeman to the ground, Praul strangled her until he
thought he had killed her. When a subsequent gasp for air revealed that she
was still alive, Praul commenced beating her and kicking her in the head and
body with such violence that she began convulsing and coughing up a large
amount of blood. It was the injuries sustained during the beating – a beating
administered while Freeman was incapacitated from having been strangled
almost to death – that ultimately were the cause of her death. We agree with
the trial court’s characterization of the facts and circumstances of this murder as
“gruesome”. Petitioners Exhibit at 12.
[18] Turning now to Praul’s character, it is true that he pleaded guilty. The decision
was likely a pragmatic one, however, in view of the strength of the evidence
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against him and the benefit he received by pleading guilty. The record reveals
that Praul has an extensive criminal history. Since 1992, Praul has been
arrested approximately sixty-nine times in five different states. He has
accumulated approximately eight previous felony convictions, eighteen
misdemeanor convictions, and twenty-nine driving violations. At least nine of
those previous convictions involved some type of threat to or assault upon
others. Previous attempts at leniency have been unsuccessful, in that he has
violated probation on at least three previous occasions and has been discharged
from probation unsatisfactorily at least twice. Moreover, while jailed for the
present offense, he committed another felony, i.e., threatening to kill a jail
nurse. In view of the brutal nature of Freeman’s murder and Praul’s long-term
pattern of criminal behavior, we are not persuaded that the sixty-five-year
sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate.
[19] Judgment affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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