MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this May 11 2015, 10:39 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Lisa M. Johnson Gregory F. Zoeller
Brownsburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jonathan R. Sichtermann
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Bruce Jackson, May 11, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1410-CR-698
v. Appeal from the Marion County
Superior Court Criminal Division 16
State of Indiana, Cause No. 49G16-1404-FD-02175
Appellee-Plaintiff
The Honorable Helen Marchal,
Judge
Friedlander, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-698| May 11, 2015 Page 1 of 8
[1] Bruce Jackson appeals his convictions of two counts of Intimidation1, a class D
felony, and Possession of Paraphernalia2, a class A misdemeanor. Jackson
presents the following restated issues for review:
1. Did the State present sufficient evidence to establish intimidation?
2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Jackson’s conviction for
possession of paraphernalia?
[2] We affirm in part and reverse in part.
[3] On April 26, 2014, Phillip Wright was working as the night manager at Allied
Liquors on East 38th Street in Indianapolis. Joe Klein, the store owner, was also at
the store working in his office. At approximately 1:00 a.m., Wright observed
Jackson loitering outside in front of the store. Wright told Jackson he was not
supposed to be there and asked him to leave the premises. Jackson told Wright
that he would leave, and when Jackson was still in the parking lot twenty-five
minutes later, Wright called the police.
[4] When the police arrived, Jackson was in the back seat of a vehicle with two
women. The responding officer asked Jackson to exit the car, which he finally did,
although he was agitated and angry. Another officer eventually handcuffed
1
The version of the governing statute in effect at the time this offense was committed classified it as a class D
felony. See Ind. Code Ann § 35-45-2-1 (West, Westlaw 2013). This statute has since been revised and in its
current form reclassifies this offense as a Level 6 Felony. See I.C. § 35-45-2-1 (West, Westlaw current with
legislation of the 2015 First Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly effective through March 24,
2015). The new classification, however, applies only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014. Because
this offense was committed before that date, it retains the former classification.
2
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-48-4-8.3 (West, Westlaw current with legislation of the 2015 First Regular Session of
the 119th General Assembly effective through March 24, 2015)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-698| May 11, 2015 Page 2 of 8
Jackson because he would not calm down. After Jackson was in handcuffs,
Wright and Klein came outside. Jackson began to yell at Wright and Klein that he
was going to shoot Klein with an AK 47 assault rifle, cut off Wright’s head, and
shoot up the store. Police officers on scene repeatedly asked Jackson to stop
yelling, but he did not stop for some time. Before transporting Jackson to jail,
police conducted a search of his person, which revealed a brass fitting with a steel
wool pad in Jackson’s pocket. The officers knew these items to be typically used as
a makeshift crack cocaine pipe.3
[5] Jackson was charged with two counts of class D felony intimidation, one count of
invasion of privacy as a class A misdemeanor, one count of possession of
paraphernalia as a class A misdemeanor, one count of trespass as a class A
misdemeanor, and one count of class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. On
August 14, 2014, a jury found Jackson guilty on all counts. The trial court
subsequently sentenced Jackson to a three-year aggregate sentence. Jackson now
appeals.
1.
[6] Jackson argues there is insufficient evidence to sustain his two convictions of class
D felony intimidation. Specifically, Jackson argues the evidence fails to establish
3
The steel wool is used as a filter to prevent burning narcotic embers from being sucked into the body when
the pad is lit.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-698| May 11, 2015 Page 3 of 8
that he intended to place the victims in fear when he made the statements. Our
standard of review is well settled.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. The evidence—
even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it
are viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction. “[W]e
affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value
supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind.
2004).
Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).
[7] To convict Jackson of intimidation as a class D felony the State was required to
prove Jackson communicated a threat to Klein and to Wright with intent that they
be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act, i.e., calling the police. See I.C.
§ 35-45-2-1(a)(2). As pertinent here, I.C. § 35-45-2-1(d)(1), (3) defines threat as, an
expression, by words or action, of an intention to unlawfully injure the person threatened
or another person, or damage property, or commit a crime.
[8] Jackson argues that although he threatened to commit a number of violent acts
against Wright and Klein, he did not intend to place them in fear of bodily harm.
Jackson asserts that he was simply, “engaging [in] verbal grandstanding.”
Appellant’s Brief at 9.
[9] In Brewington v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held that it does not matter
whether the speaker intends to carry out the threat, but rather whether he intends
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-698| May 11, 2015 Page 4 of 8
to “plac[e] the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” 7 N.E.3d 946, 963 (Ind.
2014) (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)). A determination of
intent is a mens rea determination that, “is almost inevitably, absent a defendant’s
confession or admission, a matter of circumstantial proof.” Hampton v. State, 961
N.E.2d 480, 487 (Ind. 2012). As for the inferential nature of circumstantial
evidence, the mens rea determination will often depend on whether a reasonable
person would recognize the statements threatening potential. Brewington v. State , 7
N.E.3d 946.
[10] Here, Jackson was agitated and angry from the initial encounter with the police
officers. After being placed in handcuffs, he did not calm down or cooperate
despite repeated requests by the officers. Jackson continued to yell, curse, and
threaten for twenty-five to thirty minutes to commit violent acts towards Wright
and Klein. Jackson threatened to return to the store and use an AK 47 to shoot
Wright and to “shoot up” the store. Transcript at 99, 163. Jackson told Klein that
he was “going to cut off his head and make him suck his own dick.” Id. at 98.
Jackson also told the police officers that they were going to have to come back and
“recover[] bodies in body bags.” Id. at 203. Klein testified that, “I believed what he
said” and believed that the threats were meant to put him in fear of Jackson. Id. at
144. Jackson’s specific statements, combined with his conduct, clearly implied
credible threats to the victims’ safety and were more than an outburst of
frustration. See Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 969. Based upon the foregoing, we
conclude that there is sufficient evidence to sustain Jackson’s convictions for class
D felony intimidation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-698| May 11, 2015 Page 5 of 8
2.
[11] Jackson argues that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for
possession of paraphernalia because there is no evidence that he had specific intent
to use the object to pass a controlled substance into his body. To convict Jackson
of a class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia as charged, the State was
required to prove that Jackson knowingly or intentionally possessed a raw
material, instrument, device, or other object with the intent to introduce a
controlled substance into his body. See I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(a)(1), (b).
[12] The intent to introduce a controlled substance into one’s body may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence. See Dabner v. State, 258 Ind. 179, 279 N.E.2d 797 (
1972) (puncture marks over the veins of the defendant’s forearm evincing recent
injections, were sufficient to establish intent); Trigg v. State, 725 N.E.2d 446 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000) (residue-encrusted crack cocaine pipe found where defendant was
sitting was sufficient to establish intent to use the pipe to smoke crack); McConnell
v. State, 540 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (expert testimony that paraphernalia
contained drug residue was sufficient to establish intent). Intent may not be
inferred, however, merely from proof that the instruments possessed were normally
used or adapted for use with illegal drugs. McConnell v. State, 540 N.E.2d 755.
[13] In Taylor v. State, the Supreme Court held that intent was not sufficiently
established despite the evidence that the defendant possessed a hypodermic needle,
an eye-dropper covered with an unknown sticky substance, a bottle cap that had
been burned on the bottom, and an empty Excedrin bottle. 256 Ind. 170, 267 N.E.
2d 383 (1971). The Court observed “there was no evidence of flight or any other
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-698| May 11, 2015 Page 6 of 8
behavior indicating consciousness of guilt.” 256 Ind. 170, at 172, 267 N.E. 2d 383
at 385 (Ind. 1971). There was no evidence that the defendant had previous
convictions for the use or possession of narcotic drugs. Id. Applying an earlier
version of the statute,4 the Court explained:
To permit such a conviction [without proving intent] would be in
effect to amend the statute. We assume the Legislature did not do a
useless act in including the element of intent; if they had intended to
punish the mere possession of adapted instruments they would not
have included that element. The fact that the Legislature included the
requirement that intent be proved necessarily implies that they
recognized that there could be cases of possession of adapted
instruments which would not be punishable under the statute.
Id.
[14] In the present case, the evidence showed Jackson was in possession of an adapted
instrument commonly known to be used for ingesting drugs. The State, however,
presented no evidence bearing on the element of intent. The State’s only evidence
was the testimony of Officer Drew Sedam, who has experience with over 100 cases
involving narcotics, in which he identified the device. He further testified that the
steel wool was burnt and blackened, meaning that it had been used. As noted
above, however, mere possession of an adapted device does not establish the
element of intent. The State did not introduce any evidence that Jackson was a
crack cocaine user or had previous drug convictions. There is no evidence that he
4
The statute discussed in Taylor, I.C. § 35–24–1–2 (1971), was repealed in 1976. P.L. 148–1976, Sec. 24. An
earlier version of the statute under which Sluder was charged was added to the Indiana Code in the same
Act. See P.L. No. 148–1976, Sec. 8.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-698| May 11, 2015 Page 7 of 8
was given a drug test, and he did not admit to being an addict or using a controlled
substance. There is no evidence the adapted device contained any residue, and
there is no evidence that it was tested to determine if it contained a controlled
substance.
[15] Under these circumstances the State presented insufficient evidence to establish
that Jackson intended to use the pipe to introduce a controlled substance into his
body. Accordingly, we reverse his conviction for possession of paraphernalia.
[16] Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-698| May 11, 2015 Page 8 of 8