FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 12 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RENEE STEPHENS, No. 13-35426
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00736-MO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NIKE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 27, 2015**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Renee Stephens appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his employment action alleging violations of Title VII and other federal and
state laws. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2004), and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stephens’s federal
race discrimination claims because Stephens failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the relevant decision maker was aware of his race or
whether defendant continued to seek applications from other similarly qualified
individuals outside the protected class. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (setting forth elements of a prima facie failure to hire
employment discrimination claim under Title VII); Fonseca, 374 F.3d at 850
(discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 share the same legal standards);
Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985), amended by 784
F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (for a failure to hire claim under Title VII, “a plaintiff
must offer evidence that give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the federal
retaliation claims that were not barred by res judicata, because Stephens failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the relevant decision maker
was aware of his protected activity. See Westendorf v. W. Coast Contractors of
Nev., Inc., 712 F.3d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth elements of a prima
facie retaliation claim under Title VII); Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch.
2 13-35426
Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2003) (decision maker’s knowledge of
protected activity necessary for causation); Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d
792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1981 share the
same legal standards).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stephens’s motion
for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Stephens
did not establish any ground warranting reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J,
Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993)
(setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration); Kona Enters.,
Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[a]
Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the
first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation”).
We do not address matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 13-35426