FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD L. PORTER, No. 13-16208
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:06-cv-00880-LJO-SMS
v.
MEMORANDUM**
RAY MABUS, Secretary of the
Department of the Navy;* et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2015***
Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Ronald L. Porter appeals pro se from the district court’s order awarding
*
Ray Mabus has been substituted for his predecessor, Donald C.
Winter, as Secretary of the Department of the Navy under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, we deny
Porter’s request for oral argument set forth in his reply brief.
attorney’s fees and costs in his employment action alleging retaliation and gender
discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The record supports the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) (“the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee”); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e) (an award of
reasonable attorney’s fees allowable only for “services performed . . . after the
filing of a written complaint, provided that the attorney provides reasonable notice
of representation to the agency . . . , except that fees are allowable for a reasonable
period of time prior to the notification of representation for any services performed
in reaching a determination to represent the complainant”); see also Kay v. Ehrler,
499 U.S. 432, 435-38 (1991) (pro se plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees).
Contrary to Porter’s contentions, the district court reviewed de novo the
administrative award of attorney’s fees and costs.
The district court properly denied Porter’s motion to compel discovery
because Porter did not require documents from defendant to establish either his
costs incurred in the administrative proceedings before he was represented by
counsel or his attorney’s fees and costs. See Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc., 357
F.3d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review).
We reject Porter’s contentions that the district court was required to hold a
2 13-16208
trial, and that he was prejudiced by not receiving notice of the requirements to
oppose summary judgment. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957-58 (9th Cir.
1998) (en banc) (special notice requirements do not apply to non-prisoner pro se
plaintiffs).
Porter’s requests for fees and costs on appeal, as set forth in his reply brief,
are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 13-16208