FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN RYGG, a single woman and No. 12-35753
CRAIG DILWORTH, a single man,
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01827-JLR
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
DAVID F HULBERT, retired, formerly
Judge of the Snohomish County Superior
Court; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
CAROLYN RYGG, a single woman and No. 12-35855
CRAIG DILWORTH, a single man,
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01827-JLR
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
DAVID F HULBERT, retired, formerly
Judge of the Snohomish County Superior
Court,
Defendant,
LARRY MCKEEMAN, Presiding Judge
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
of the Snohomish County Superior Court;
et al.,
Defendants,
and
RALPH J MCCARTY,
Defendant - Appellant.
CAROLYN RYGG, a single woman and No. 12-35866
CRAIG DILWORTH, a single man,
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01827-JLR
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
DAVID F HULBERT, retired, formerly
Judge of the Snohomish County Superior
Court,
Defendant,
LARRY MCKEEMAN, Presiding Judge
of the Snohomish County Superior Court
and STEVEN GOFF, Commissioner,
Washington State Supreme Court,
Defendants,
J ROBERT LEACH; et al.,
Defendants,
2
ANN SCHINDLER, in her official
capacity as President Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals of the State of WA; et
al.,
Defendants,
and
RALPH J MCCARTY,
Defendant - Appellee,
G. GEOFFREY GIBBS,
Defendant - Appellee,
MERVIN W SCHINDELE and
BARBARA SCHINDELE,
Defendants - Appellees.
CRAIG DILWORTH, a single man and No. 13-35600
CAROLYN RYGG,
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01827-JLR
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
DAVID F HULBERT, retired, formerly
Judge of the Snohomish County Superior
Court; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
3
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 6, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
Before: WALLACE, KLEINFELD, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Carolyn Rygg and her son, Craig Dilworth, engaged in extensive
state court litigation with their next-door neighbors, Larry and Kaaren Reinertsen,
to resolve a property line dispute. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s rulings in favor of the Reinertsens. See Reinertsen v. Rygg, No.
64661-3-I, 161 Wash. App. 1037 (2011), petition for review denied, 268 P.3d 224
(Wash. 2011).
Dissatisfied with the result of the state court proceedings, appellants filed an
action in federal court. Their 200-page amended complaint asserted 50 claims
against 21 defendants, including Ralph McCarty, the former owner of appellants’
property; the Reinertsens; the Reinertsens’ attorneys in the state court proceedings;
and numerous state court judges. The district court dismissed all but two of the
claims in a thorough, well-reasoned order. The case proceeded to trial on the
remaining two claims: a federal claim for electronic eavesdropping and a state
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
4
claim for invasion of privacy, both against the Reinertsens. The jury found in
favor of the Reinertsens on both claims, and the district court entered judgment
accordingly.1
Rygg and Dilworth appeal from the district court’s order dismissing 48 of
their claims and the jury verdict on the remaining two claims, and challenge
numerous other rulings entered by the district court. McCarty cross appeals from
the district court’s decision not to grant his motion for sanctions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. We affirm.
1. Contrary to appellants’ assertion, the district court’s dismissal order was
final. It contemplated no further action, and the district court certified it as a final
judgment. This court therefore has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2. “We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim
or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004,
1008–09 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court properly concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine over the claims
asserted in Counts 5–10, 12–21, 23, 30, 34, 38–41, 43–44, and 46–47 of the
amended complaint, as those claims amount to “a forbidden de facto appeal” of a
1
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we recount only an
abbreviated version of them here.
5
state court judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). The
district court properly dismissed the claims asserted in Counts 1–3 because public
records show Judge Hulbert was a judge when he entered his findings of fact and
conclusions of law in 2005. The district court properly dismissed the remaining
claims—with the exception of the electronic eavesdropping and invasion of
privacy claims against the Reinertsens—because they fail to show a plausible
entitlement to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the
complaint on the ground that permitting amendment would impose a significant
and prejudicial burden on the defendants. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2011).
4. Although the district court would have been justified in granting McCarty’s
motion for Rule 11 sanctions, it did not abuse its discretion by declining to do so.
See Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 675–76 (9th Cir. 2005). The court also did
not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ cross motion for sanctions.
5. The jury verdict in favor of the Reinertsens with respect to the electronic
eavesdropping and invasion of privacy claims is supported by substantial evidence.
See Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A jury’s verdict must be
upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence adequate to
6
support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary
conclusion.”). Appellants raise numerous challenges to the district court’s
scheduling orders, discovery rulings, trial rulings, and jury instructions, as well as
the district court’s denial of appellants’ motions for a default judgment, judicial
estoppel, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial. After careful
review, we find no error that warrants remand.
6. Appellants’ motions to strike portions of the appellees’ answering briefs are
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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