UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________
No. 01-50765
Michelle SATTERWHITE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jo Anne B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
(A-99-CV-754-SC)
June 6, 2002
Before DAVIS, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Michelle Satterwhite appeals from the Social
Security Administration’s (“the Administration’s”) decision denying
her disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”).
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Satterwhite alleges that she is disabled within the meaning of
the Act primarily because of her gross obesity, back pain, and
mental impairments. Satterwhite argues that she is mentally
impaired because she has a Full Scale I.Q. of 80, and suffers from
depression, social phobia, and schizoid personality disorder.
After a hearing on the matter, an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) denied Satterwhite benefits. The ALJ found that
Satterwhite’s physical impairments were “severe,” but did not
prevent her from performing all jobs in the national economy. The
ALJ specifically evaluated Satterwhite’s low I.Q. under category
12.05 Mental Retardation and Autism. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.
P, app. 1. The ALJ concluded, however, that this impairment was
not “severe.” The ALJ made no express findings on Satterwhite’s
depression, social phobia, or schizoid personality disorder. The
district court affirmed the Administration’s denial of benefits.
This court reviews the Administration’s denial of social
security disability benefits to determine whether the ALJ applied
the proper legal standards and whether the decision “is supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Anthony v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). The only issue that
Satterwhite raises that merits discussion is whether the ALJ erred
in not specifically evaluating Satterwhite’s claim that she was
mentally impaired due to depression, social phobia, and schizoid
personality disorder.
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An ALJ’s determination of whether an individual is disabled
must be based on “the combined effect of all of the individual’s
impairments, without regard to whether any such impairment, if
considered separately, would be of such severity.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(B). The Act’s implementing regulations provide a five-
step sequential process for determining whether a claimant is
disabled and entitled to benefits under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520. The regulations outline in even greater detail the
procedure that an ALJ is to follow in evaluating a claimant’s
mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. Section 404.1520a
requires the ALJ to identify specifically the claimant’s mental
impairments, rate the degree of functional limitation resulting
from each in four broad functional areas, and determine the
severity of each impairment. Furthermore, § 404.1520a(e) provides
that the ALJ must document his application of this technique to the
claimant’s mental impairments.
In this case, the ALJ followed this procedure with respect to
Satterwhite’s low I.Q., evaluating Satterwhite’s condition under
category 12.05, entitled “Mental Retardation and Autism.” See 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. He then documented these
findings in a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”) appended
to his decision.
The ALJ made no express findings, however, on Satterwhite’s
claims of depression, social phobia, and schizoid personality
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disorder. Evidence of these impairments came from two primary
sources: (1) Ruthann Curtis; and (2) Dr. Kevin McFarley. Curtis,
a cognitive rehabilitation therapist, evaluated Satterwhite in
March 1997. Curtis found that Satterwhite was “clinically
depressed.” The ALJ discounted Curtis’ testimony as “out of the
realm of her expertise.”
Dr. McFarley examined Satterwhite in February 1997. He
described her as having a flat affect and a depressed mood. Dr.
McFarley diagnosed Satterwhite with social phobia, dysthmic
disorder, and schizoid personality disorder. The ALJ did not
discuss Dr. McFarley’s diagnoses in his opinion or in the PRTF.
Although the ALJ noted in his opinion that Satterwhite had
difficulty in maintaining social functioning and preferred to be
alone, he did not engage in the detailed technique that § 404.1520a
prescribes. The PRTF contained no findings with regard to category
12.04 “Mood Disorders,” which include “depressive syndrome,” the
listed symptoms of which appear to describe Satterwhite’s
condition. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.
Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ erred in not evaluating
Satterwhite’s claims of depression, social phobia, and schizoid
personality disorder according to the procedures described in §
404.1520a. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand the case to that court, which, in turn, should
remand the case to the Secretary, for further proceedings
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consistent with this opinion. We express no opinion on whether
Satterwhite will prevail on the merits of her mental impairment
claims. We hold only that the regulations require the ALJ to
specifically evaluate these claims and document its findings
accordingly.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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