MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this May 20 2015, 8:56 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David M. Payne Gregory F. Zoeller
Ryan & Payne Attorney General of Indiana
Marion, Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler Michael Cottrell, May 20, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
27A02-1409-CR-681
v. Appeal from the Grant Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff
Cause No. 27D01-1105-FB-93
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Tyler Michael Cottrell’s (“Cottrell”) probation was revoked by the Grant
Superior Court. Cottrell appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he violated the terms of his probation and that the trial court abused
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its discretion when it ordered him to serve three years of his previously
suspended sentence.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On March 5, 2012, Cottrell pleaded guilty in Grant Superior Court to Class B
felony burglary resulting in bodily injury and Class A misdemeanor resisting
law enforcement. Cottrell was ordered to serve an aggregate sentence of twelve
years. The trial court ordered seven years executed in the Department of
Correction and five years suspended to formal probation.
[3] On May 28, 2014, Cottrell completed the executed portion of his sentence, and
he was released to formal probation. As a condition of his probation, Cottrell
was required to participate in and successfully complete the Grant County
Reentry program.
[4] Cottrell failed to successfully complete the reentry program, and his
participation was terminated. Specifically, June 4 and 9, 2014, Cottrell failed to
attend appointments scheduled with his probation officer, and on June 10,
2014, he was not present for a curfew check. Appellant’s App. p. 64. Cottrell’s
last contact with the Reentry Court Staff was June 2, 2014. Id.
[5] On August 18, 2014, the State filed a petition requesting revocation of Cottrell’s
probation because he violated the terms of his probation and was terminated
from the reentry program. A hearing was held, and Cottrell admitted that he
missed appointments with his probation officer. He also stated that he began
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using the prescription drug Lortab1 without a valid prescription shortly after he
was released from prison.
[6] On September 15, 2015, the trial court issued an order revoking Cottrell’s
probation. The court ordered Cottrell to serve three years of his previously
suspended five-year sentence. The trial court ordered Cottrell returned to
formal, supervised probation for two years after serving his executed sentence.
Cottrell now appeals.
Standard of Review
[7] We review a trial court’s probation violation adjudication using an abuse of
discretion standard. Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial
court misinterprets the law. Id. In determining whether a trial court has abused
its discretion, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Mogg v.
State, 918 N.E.2d 750, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider
conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id.
Because a probation-revocation proceeding is civil in nature, the State need
only prove the alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Holmes v. State, 923 N.E.2d 479, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
1
Lortab is a brand name for a combination of acetaminophen and hydrocodone. See Wells v. State, 904
N.E.2d 265, 272 n. 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; see also http:// www.drugs.com/lortab.html (last
visited on May 4, 2015).
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I. Sufficient Evidence to Support the Probation Revocation
[8] First, Cottrell argues that the State failed to prove that he violated the terms of
his probation. To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a probation
revocation, we use the same standard of review as with any other sufficiency
matter. Martin v. State, 813 N.E.2d 388, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We will
consider only the evidence most favorable to the State, along with the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
[9] Cottrell’s probation officer characterized Cottrell’s actions as absconding, a
term the trial court adopted in its order revoking Cottrell’s probation. See
Appellant’s App. p. 71. Specifically, Cottrell’s probation officer and case
manager for the reentry program testified that Cottrell “failed to have any
contact with” him “or any other member of the Reentry Court Staff for an
extended period of time.” Tr. p. 11. The probation officer then characterized
Cottrell’s conduct as absconding from the Reentry Court.
[10] Citing to dictionaries defining the term “abscond,” Cottrell claims that his
failure to report “does not necessarily rise to the level of having departed
secretly or suddenly or an attempt to conceal himself.” Id. The probation
officer’s use of the term “abscond” does not negate the fact that Cottrell failed
to report and participate in the reentry program, which resulted in his
termination from the program. Completion of the reentry program was a special
condition of Cottrell’s probation.
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[11] The trial court also found that Cottrel violated rule number two of the
conditions of his probation, which required him to report to his probation
officer as directed. Cottrell admitted to this violation. See Appellant’s Br. at 11.
[12] Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that the State proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that Cottrell violated the terms of his probation.
II. Sentencing
[13] Probation serves as an alternative to incarceration and is granted at the sole
discretion of the trial court. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999).
“Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.
2007). If the trial court finds that an individual has violated a condition of
probation, the court is empowered to “[o]rder execution of all or part of the
sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-
2-3(h). Importantly, “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering
probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway
in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.
[14] Cottrell lists several reasons in support of his argument that “something short of
a three-year sentence should have been imposed.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. Cottrell
cites his age (twenty-one-years-old), that other treatment options were available,
this was his first probation violation, in the past he successfully completed and
graduated from a therapeutic community, his home life is not stable, he
acknowledged that he “messed up,” and he wants to obtain a job. Cottrell also
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acknowledges his history of substance abuse and cites his testimony that he
needs “help in outpatient services to beat” his drug and alcohol use. Tr. p. 23.
[15] The trial court considered Cottrell’s arguments during the revocation hearing
before ordering him to serve three years of his previously suspended sentence.
The State established that Cottrell made little or no attempt to comply with the
conditions of his placement in the reentry program and supervised probation.
Because probation is a matter of grace, the individual who benefits from this
grace is expected to strictly comply with the conditions of probation. See Woods
v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ind. 2008).
[16] It was well within the trial court’s discretion to reject Cottrell’s request for
leniency in light of Cottrell’s disregard for the grace afforded him. We therefore
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked
Cottrell’s probation and ordered him to serve three of the previously suspended
five years in the Department of Correction.
[17] Affirmed.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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