IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 13–1877
Filed May 22, 2015
JOHN BAKER and VALERIE BAKER,
Appellants,
vs.
CITY OF IOWA CITY, IOWA and IOWA CITY HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Paul D.
Miller and Marsha M. Beckelman, Judges.
Plaintiffs asserting a federal civil rights claim against a city and a
human rights commission appeal a district court grant of summary
judgment in favor of the city and the commission. The city and the
commission cross-appeal the district court’s decision to allow the
plaintiffs to amend their petition. AFFIRMED.
Michael J. Pitton of Pitton Law P.C., Iowa City, for appellants.
Susan M. Dulek, Assistant City Attorney, Iowa City, for appellees.
2
WIGGINS, Justice.
Employers appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to a city and a human rights commission based on the conclusion that
the city and the commission did not violate the employers’ constitutional
rights when the city and the commission attempted to enforce an
antidiscrimination ordinance. The city and the commission cross-
appealed the district court’s decision to allow the employers to amend
their petition before the court granted the city and the commission’s
motion for summary judgment.
The employers allege the city and the commission’s enforcement of
an antidiscrimination ordinance, which we previously held was
unconstitutional as exceeding the city’s home rule authority, violated
their federal constitutional rights of freedom of association, freedom of
speech, due process, and equal protection. Although we previously
found the ordinance as an unconstitutional extension of the city’s home
rule authority under the Iowa Constitution, in this appeal, we find the
ordinance did not violate the employers’ federal constitutional rights.
Thus, the city and the commission are not liable for damages or attorney
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988 (2012). We also find the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the employers to
amend their petition. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the city and the commission and we affirm
the court’s grant of the motion to amend in favor of the Bakers.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This case is before us for the second time. See Baker v. City of
Iowa City (Baker I), 750 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 2008). 1 The facts of the case
1In Baker I, only John Baker appealed. In this case, both John and his spouse
Valerie appealed. In this appeal, we refer to the Bakers, even though Valerie did not
participate in the first appeal.
3
have not changed. The Bakers own property in Iowa City and employ
one or two people to manage the property because the Bakers live out of
state. Id. at 95. In 2003, the current resident managers were moving
out and the Bakers posted a job opening for a new resident manager. Id.
The Bakers turned down one applicant for the position because
she failed to provide requested references and she indicated her eleven-
year-old son would perform the outside property maintenance required
by the position. Id. The Bakers were concerned for the child’s safety and
worried about violating Iowa’s child labor laws. Id. After the Bakers
rejected the woman for the position, she filed a complaint with the Iowa
City Human Rights Commission claiming employment and housing
discrimination. Id.
The City 2 claimed the Bakers’ rejection of the woman for the
position violated the City’s ordinance making it unlawful for
any employer to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify,
upgrade or refer for employment, or to otherwise
discriminate in employment against any other person or to
discharge any employee because of age, color, creed,
disability, gender identity, marital status, national origin,
race, religion, sex or sexual orientation.
Iowa City, Iowa, City Code § 2-3-1(A). The ordinance applied to
employers who employ one or more employees. Id. § 2-1-1.
During the pendency of the civil rights case the Bakers filed a
petition against the City seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Bakers claimed the city ordinance was unconstitutional under the home
rule provisions of the Iowa Constitution due to the irreconcilable conflict
between the ordinance and the provisions of the Iowa Code. Baker I, 750
2For the sake of brevity, we refer to the City of Iowa City and the Iowa City
Human Rights Commission collectively as the City.
4
N.W.2d at 95. The Code provision exempted an employer who regularly
employed fewer than four individuals, while the ordinance did not
contain such an exemption. Id. at 96. The Bakers also claimed the
enforcement of the ordinance against them violated their federal
constitutional rights of due process and equal protection. Id. at 98.
Initially, the Bakers’ lawsuit did not include a claim for a violation of
their rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech under the
First Amendment.
After the Bakers filed their initial petition, they filed a motion to
amend the petition to include claims that the City also violated their
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. The Bakers also
filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the ordinance was
unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 96. The City resisted the motion and
filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment. Id. at 96–97.
During the pendency of the district court proceedings and prior to
the court ruling on the outstanding motions, the Bakers settled the civil
rights proceeding. Id. at 96. Thereafter, the district court held the
settlement of the underlying civil rights proceeding rendered all pending
motions moot and did not rule on the Bakers’ motion to amend and
entered summary judgment for the City. Id. at 97.
The Bakers appealed this ruling. We reversed the district court
finding the Bakers’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was not moot. Id. at 98. We
also held the city ordinance prohibiting discrimination by all employers
unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution because the ordinance
exceeded the City’s home rule authority. Id. at 99–102. We remanded
the case for further proceedings. Id. at 103.
On remand, the Bakers refiled their motion to amend the petition
to include First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of
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association claims. The City resisted the amendment arguing (1) the
amendment substantially changed the issues before the court and (2) the
Bakers waived their right to add the new issues on remand because they
failed to brief the dismissal of their motion to amend in the initial appeal.
The district court granted the Bakers’ motion to amend.
The parties again filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
Bakers argued the City was liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a matter of
law for attempting to enforce the antidiscrimination ordinance in
violation of the Bakers’ First Amendment rights of freedom of association
and freedom of speech, and their federal constitutional rights of due
process and equal protection. The district court denied the Bakers’
motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor
of the City, finding a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation did not occur. The
Bakers appealed the decision finding the City did not violate their
constitutional rights under the Federal Constitution. The City cross-
appealed the district court ruling allowing the Bakers to amend their
petition to include the First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom
of association claims.
II. Issues.
We must first decide if the district court was correct in allowing the
Bakers’ amendment adding First Amendment freedom of speech and
freedom of association claims. Then we must decide whether the City
violated the Bakers’ federal constitutional rights of freedom of
association, freedom of speech, due process, and equal protection such
that the City is liable for these violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
liable for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
6
III. Scope of Review.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to amend the parties’
petition for abuse of discretion. Rife v. D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761,
766 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court
bases its decision on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable. Id.
We review summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at
law. Baker I, 750 N.W.2d at 97. The moving party is entitled to
summary judgment if there are no disputed issues of material fact. City
of Fairfield v. Harper Drilling Co., 692 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 2005). “We
can resolve a matter on summary judgment if the record reveals a
conflict only concerns the legal consequences of undisputed facts.” Id.
IV. Whether the District Court Was Correct to Allow the
Bakers to Amend Their Petition to Include First Amendment
Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Association Claims.
We must first address the City’s claim that the Bakers’
constitutional arguments regarding freedom of association and freedom
of speech are not properly before the court. The City claims the district
court erred when it granted the Bakers’ motion to amend their petition
upon remand. The City also argues the Bakers failed to appeal the
original denial of their motion to amend in the 2008 appeal and
therefore, waived the opportunity to amend thereafter.
District courts have considerable discretion to allow amendments
at any point in the litigation, and we will only reverse the district court’s
decision if it has abused that discretion. See Bd. of Adjustment v. Ruble,
193 N.W.2d 497, 507 (Iowa 1972). A district court has the same
discretion to grant a party’s amendment on remand as it did in the initial
proceedings. See Webber v. E.K. Larimer Hardware Co., 234 Iowa 1381,
7
1389, 15 N.W.2d 286, 290 (1944) (“[U]pon the remand of this case . . .
the lower court will have the same discretion to permit plaintiff to amend
his petition as if the case had not been tried. We have so held in a long
line of decisions.”).
We have recognized in numerous cases that permitting
amendments should be the rule and denial should be the exception. See
Chao v. City of Waterloo, 346 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 1984); Ackerman v.
Lauver, 242 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa 1976). The district court should
allow amendments so long as the amendment does not substantially
change the issues in the case. Rife, 641 N.W.2d at 767. We also permit
amendments that substantially change the issues “if the opposing party
is not prejudiced or unfairly surprised” by the changes. Id. Further, we
permit amendments at any stage of the litigation, and we even permit
amendments to conform to the proof offered at trial. See Allison-Kesley
Ag Ctr., Inc. v. Hildebrand, 485 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Iowa 1992).
The Bakers moved to amend the initial petition in 2005 with these
exact claims and addressed the claims in their brief to this court in
2008. Additionally, the district court in its 2005 dismissal declined to
rule on the amendment on the incorrect determination that the Bakers’
claims were moot. Our 2008 decision determined the case was not moot
but did not rule on the issue of the amendments, thus we did not
prohibit the Bakers from renewing the motion to amend on remand.
Given this, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion because
the district court’s decision to grant the amendment on remand did not
prejudice or unfairly surprise the City. Therefore, the issues of whether
the City violated the Bakers’ First Amendment rights of freedom of
speech and freedom of association are properly before us.
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V. Federal Civil Rights Claim.
The Bakers brought their action against the City under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. This section of the United States Code allows redress for
individuals “whose constitutional rights were deprived by persons acting
under color of state law.” Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 393 (Iowa
2012). To be successful on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim a plaintiff must
show
(1) that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured
by the constitution and laws of the United States, (2) that
the defendant acted under color of state law, (3) that the
conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage, and
(4) the amount of damages.
Leydens v. City of Des Moines, 484 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1992). The
fighting issue between the Bakers and the City is whether the City
violated the Bakers’ federal constitutional rights by enforcing the
ordinance. The district court concluded in its ruling on the City’s motion
for summary judgment that the City’s enforcement of the ordinance that
failed to contain an exemption for small employers from the City’s
employment discrimination laws did not violate the Bakers’
constitutional rights.
A. Freedom of Association. The First Amendment embodies the
freedom of association, the right to “enter into and maintain certain
intimate human relationships [without] undue intrusion by the State.”
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3249, 82
L. Ed. 2d 462, 471 (1984).
[T]he constitutional shelter afforded such relationships
reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting
these relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s
identity that is central to any concept of liberty.
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Id. at 619, 104 S. Ct. at 3250, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 472. This court has
recognized the notions of freedom of association guided the general
assembly’s policy decision behind the exemption for small employers
found in Iowa Code section 216.6(6)(a) (2003). See Baker I, 750 N.W.2d
at 101–02. In Baker I, however, we did not hold that the Iowa City
ordinance, which failed to exempt small employers, violated the right of
freedom of association under the Federal Constitution. Rather, we held
the ordinance was unconstitutional under the home rule provision of the
Iowa Constitution. Id. at 99–102.
Iowa Code section 216.6 exempts employers employing fewer than
four individuals from the state employment discrimination laws, while
the exemption found in federal law exempts employers employing fewer
than fifteen individuals. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e–2(a)
(2012), with Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(a). The purpose of the federal
exemption “is to spare very small firms from the potentially crushing
expense of mastering the intricacies of the antidiscrimination laws,
establishing procedures to assure compliance, and defending against
suits when efforts at compliance fail.” Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d
937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs.,
P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1678, 155 L. Ed. 2d
615, 624–25 (2003) (“[T]he congressional decision to limit the coverage of
the legislation to firms with 15 or more employees has its own
justification that must be respected—namely, easing entry into the
market and preserving the competitive position of smaller firms.”).
In Iowa, the general assembly chose to exempt fewer employers.
This policy decision granting exemptions is a reflection of the state’s
determination that the costs to those employers with fewer than four
employees would be prohibitive and reflects the legislative body decision
10
that “notions of freedom of association should preponderate over
concepts of equal opportunity in these situations.” Arthur Bonfield,
State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 1067, 1109
(1964) [hereinafter Bonfield] (emphasis added).
The Bakers assert the City’s ordinance as applied to them violated
their freedom of association as a small employer. While it is true the
ordinance was in direct conflict with the state law, the ordinance as
applied to the Bakers does not rise to the level of violating federal
constitutional rights. The First Amendment protection of freedom of
association is not absolute and as the Supreme Court recognized in
Roberts, the Constitution does not afford protection to those associations
lacking in the qualities intrinsic to the freedom of association. 468 U.S.
at 619–20, 104 S. Ct. at 3250–51, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 472–73.
The exemption for small employers exists “because the smallness
of the employer’s staff is usually likely to mean for him a rather close,
intimate, personal, and constant association with his employees.”
Bonfield, 49 Iowa L. Rev. at 1109. However, the Bakers employ a
resident manager for the property they own in Iowa City because the
Bakers live out of state and are not able to manage the property
remotely. We do not believe the City’s application of its
antidiscrimination ordinance to this primarily nonpersonal relationship
between parties who reside hundreds of miles apart violates the Bakers’
First Amendment right of freedom of association. Mr. Baker attempts to
create a constitutionally protected relationship with his resident manager
because he has close intimate ties with the property, his childhood
home. However, the freedom of association protects personal
relationships, not sentimental feelings towards one’s property. See
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20, 104 S. Ct. at 3250–51, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 472–
11
73. The Bakers do not have close, intimate, personal, and constant
contact with their employee from across the country. Therefore, the
City’s ordinance did not deprive the Bakers of their right to freedom of
association.
B. Commercial Speech. The Bakers next argue the City violated
their First Amendment right to freedom of speech because they feared
additional enforcement of the ordinance by the City if they posted a job
opening for a resident manager and then declined to hire an individual.
In other words, they claim the City’s ordinance directly regulated their
speech. However, the City did nothing to prevent the Bakers from
posting the job opening for a new resident manager. The City has a right
to prevent discrimination by enacting an antidiscrimination ordinance or
enforcing the state statute. As long as the Bakers comply with a
constitutional ordinance, such as the state statute, they would not be
subject to future enforcement actions.
Even if we were to find the Bakers’ argument has some merit, we
reject it. The Supreme Court has recognized advertisements for
employment are commercial speech. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S. Ct.
2553, 2559, 37 L. Ed. 2d 669, 677 (1973). However, the Constitution
affords commercial speech less protection than other forms of protected
speech. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 562–63, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341, 348–49
(1980). If the state forces a person to modify his or her speech to avoid
prosecution, the law in question may violate the person’s First
Amendment rights. See St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner,
439 F.3d 481, 487 (8th Cir. 2006). An individual can establish injury by
proving he or she would have engaged in protected speech but that the
12
existence of the statute prevented it. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638
F.3d 621, 627 (8th Cir. 2011).
The City was in the process of enforcing the ordinance when the
Bakers filed this claim. Thus, it was reasonable for the Bakers to believe
if they discriminated against another applicant, the City would again
enforce the ordinance, as the ordinance did not contain an exemption for
small employers. Therefore, the Bakers have standing to challenge the
ordinance on First Amendment grounds. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers
Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392–93, 108 S. Ct. 636, 642–43, 98 L. Ed. 2d
782, 793–94 (1988).
The Supreme Court in Central Hudson lays out a four-part test to
determine if a state action deprives the right to commercial speech.
[W]e must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S. Ct. at 2351, 65
L. Ed. 2d at 351.
We agree with the Bakers that the speech in question concerns the
posting of a job opening, a lawful and nonmisleading communication.
Thus, the Bakers’ job posting is a type of protected speech. See id.
Next, we must determine if the City’s interest is substantial. Id.
As one author noted, “Antidiscrimination law is the primary means by
which organized society protects individuals against disadvantageous
treatment on the basis of their membership in certain groups,
archetypally racial or ethnic minority groups.” Peter J. Rubin, Equal
13
Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 Mich.
L. Rev. 564, 568 (1998). We find the City has a substantial interest in
ensuring all its citizens receive equal treatment in the area of
employment.
Finally, we must determine if the ordinance advances the City’s
goal of ending discrimination, and if so, whether it is more extensive than
necessary. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S. Ct. at 2351, 65 L. Ed.
2d at 351. The City did not place requirements on employers regarding
who they must hire or attempt to dictate how the employer must run his
or her business. The City was only telling its employers that if they were
going to hire a person for a position, the employer could not discriminate
based on age, color, creed, disability, gender identity, marital status,
national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. The employer
still has the prerogative of employing the best person qualified for the
position as long as his or her employment decision does not discriminate
based on the age, color, creed, disability, gender identity, marital status,
national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation of the employee.
For this reason, we find the ordinance was not more extensive than
necessary to serve the interest of prohibiting discrimination.
Therefore, when we apply the Central Hudson test to the City’s
ordinance, we find it did not deprive the Bakers of their exercise of
commercial speech.
C. Due Process. The Bakers also argue the City violated their
procedural and substantive due process rights under the United States
Constitution.
1. Procedural due process. The Constitution provides no state
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In deciding what process is due a
14
party, we balance three competing interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976). The
Supreme Court has stated these interests are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.
Id. We have previously said even though an alternative procedure may be
wiser or fairer, the procedure the government entity provides does not
necessarily violate due process. Ghost Player, L.L.C. v. State, 860 N.W.2d
323, 330 (Iowa 2015).
The private interest affected by the enforcement of the ordinance
through the administrative hearing gives the Bakers substantial due
process throughout the proceedings. The City first engaged in an
impartial probable cause hearing prior to bringing the action against the
Bakers. After finding probable cause, the Bakers were entitled to a
hearing in which the City would have to prove a violation of the
ordinance. At that hearing, the Bakers could have raised their
constitutional arguments. If the ordinance was unconstitutional and the
City attempted to enforce it after the administrative hearing, the Bakers
had a meaningful right of appeal to contest the administrative findings.
See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(a) (acknowledging a party to an
administrative proceeding can raise the constitutionality of an agency
action or rule). The probable cause hearing, followed by a hearing on the
merits and a meaningful right of appeal process, satisfies the Bakers’
procedural due process rights.
15
The Bakers chose not to let the administrative proceedings play
out, but instead chose to shortcut the administrative process set up by
our legislature and file their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Just because the
Bakers chose to file their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim before the
administrative proceedings concluded, does not mean the Bakers’
procedural due process rights were violated.
2. Substantive due process. The Bakers next argue that the City’s
enforcement of the ordinance violated their substantive due process
rights of association and free speech under the First Amendment. We
have already determined in this opinion that the City’s enforcement of
the ordinance did not violate the Bakers’ rights of association and free
speech under the First Amendment. Thus, the right to hire a person in
violation of the City’s antidiscrimination ordinance is not a fundamental
right.
Because the rights implicated are not fundamental, the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the City’s ordinance is rational
basis. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S. Ct. 939, 942–43, 59
L. Ed. 2d 171, 176 (1979). Under the rational basis test, the ordinance
is valid so long as “it is rationally related to furthering a legitimate state
interest.” Id. at 97, 99 S. Ct. at 943, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 176 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The City’s purpose in enacting the ordinance was to prevent
employment discrimination in the city. The City has a legitimate interest
in attempting to eradicate discrimination in employment so that its
citizens do not receive disadvantageous treatment because of their
identification within certain groups. The City’s antidiscrimination
ordinance furthered the City’s legitimate interest to eradicate
16
employment discrimination in Iowa City. Thus, the enforcement of the
ordinance did not violate the Bakers’ due process rights.
D. Equal Protection. Lastly, the Bakers argue the City violated
their equal protection rights under the United States Constitution
because the ordinance includes an exemption for religious institutions,3
employers hiring persons to work within the employers’ home, 4 and
employers hiring persons to perform personal services, 5 but did not
include an exemption for small employers in the ordinance.
The Federal Equal Protection Clause provides no state may “deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
The first step in determining whether a statute violates equal
protection is to determine whether the statute creates different
classifications between similarly situated persons. See City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87
L. Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985). For the purposes of this appeal, we will
assume the Bakers are similarly situated to other small employers in the
3TheIowa City ordinance provides an exemption from the ordinance to an
employer who meets the following:
Any bona fide religious institution or its educational facility, association,
corporation or society with respect to any qualifications for employment
based on religion when such qualifications are related to a bona fide
religious purpose. A religious qualification for instructional personnel or
an administrative officer, serving in a supervisory capacity of a bona fide
religious educational facility or religious institution shall be presumed to
be a bona fide occupational qualification.
Iowa City, Iowa, City Code § 2-3-1(F)(1).
4The Iowa City ordinance provides an exemption from the ordinance for “[t]he
employment of individuals for work within the home of the employer if the employer or
members of the family reside therein during such employment.” Id. § 2-3-1(F)(3).
5The Iowa City ordinance provides an exemption from the ordinance for “[t]he
employment of individuals to render personal service to the person of the employer or
members of the employer’s family.” Id. § 2-3-1(F)(4).
17
City who receive an exemption under the ordinance. See LSCP, LLLP v.
Kay-Decker, 861 N.W.2d 846, 860 (Iowa 2015) (assuming without
deciding the two proffered groups were similarly situated for the
purposes of an equal protection claim).
If the statute treats similarly situated persons differently, we must
then determine what level of scrutiny is required. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 799 (1982)
(“[W]e would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth
Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every
classification.”). Therefore, it is necessary to determine the appropriate
level of scrutiny to apply to the ordinance.
The Supreme Court has stated that
[u]nless a classification trammels fundamental personal
rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such
as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the
constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require
only that the classification challenged be rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 2516–
17, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511, 517 (1976) (per curiam).
In their brief, the Bakers argue the ordinance infringes on their
fundamental right to freedom of association under the First Amendment,
and we should apply a strict scrutiny analysis. However, we have
previously decided in this opinion the ordinance does not infringe on
their fundamental right to freedom of association. Thus, we will not
apply strict scrutiny. Therefore, rational basis review applies to the
Bakers’ federal equal protection claim.
The United States Supreme Court explained the federal rational
basis test as follows:
18
We many times have said, and but weeks ago
repeated, that rational-basis review in equal protection
analysis “is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Nor does it authorize
“the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the
wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations
made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor
proceed along suspect lines.” For these reasons, a
classification neither involving fundamental rights nor
proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong
presumption of validity. Such a classification cannot run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose. Further, a legislature that
creates these categories need not “actually articulate at any
time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.”
Instead, a classification “must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.”
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce
evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification. “[A] legislative choice is not subject to
courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data A
statute is presumed constitutional and “[t]he burden is on
the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it,” whether or
not the basis has a foundation in the record. Finally, courts
are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a
legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect
fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail
rational-basis review because it “ ‘is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.’ ” “The problems of government are practical
ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.”
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–21, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642–43,
125 L. Ed. 2d 257, 270–71 (1993) (citations omitted).
The ordinance had the legitimate government interest of
eliminating discrimination against the citizens of Iowa City. The City
also had a legitimate interest in exempting certain employers from the
ordinance. The purpose of the religious exemption was for the City to
promote the free exercise of religion by “bona fide religious organizations”
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so that those organizations would locate in the city and provide religious
services to its citizens. As to the exemptions regarding persons working
within the employers’ home, and employees hired to perform personal
services, the City’s interest was to provide these employers greater
latitude in hiring because of the close personal relationships and greater
security risks these employees pose to the employer.
Although the Bakers may disagree with the City’s interest in
providing certain exceptions, the rational basis test allows a City to
legislate based on their concerns. The Bakers had the burden to negate
every conceivable basis that may support the ordinance. They have
failed to do so. Thus, the classifications included in the ordinance do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
E. Attorney’s Fees. In addition to claiming the City is liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Bakers are also seeking attorney’s fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because of the claimed federal constitutional
violations. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court may award attorney’s fees
to a prevailing party in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
However, “a plaintiff who loses on the merits of his federal claims is not a
‘prevailing party’ for § 1988 purposes, just because he prevails on a
related pendent state-law claim.” Skokos v. Rhoades, 440 F.3d 957, 962
(8th Cir. 2006). Here, the Bakers were successful in invalidating the
City’s ordinance under the home rule provision of the Iowa Constitution.
The Bakers have not shown the City violated any of their rights under
the Federal Constitution. As they were not successful on any of their
federal claims, the Bakers are not a prevailing party for the purposes of a
42 U.S.C. § 1988 claim for attorney’s fees.
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VI. Conclusion and Disposition.
We find the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
allowed the plaintiffs to amend their petition. We also find the City did
not violate the Bakers’ constitutional rights, and therefore, the City is not
subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or liable for attorney’s fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.