UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4848
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NAKIA MONICA BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:12-cr-00020-RLV-DSC-1)
Submitted: May 19, 2015 Decided: May 22, 2015
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sandra J. Barrett, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jill Westmoreland Rose, Acting United States Attorney, Anthony
J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Nakia Monica Brown appeals her sentence for conspiracy to
commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012), and
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), (b) (2012). Brown argues that the district court
lacked an adequate factual basis for determining the loss and
restitution amounts and that counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise this issue. The Government argues that Brown’s
sentencing challenges are barred by the appeal waiver in her
plea agreement. We dismiss the appeal.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive her
appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2012). United States
v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 1579 (2015). A waiver will preclude an appeal of “a
specific issue if . . . the waiver is valid and the issue . . .
is within the scope of the waiver.” Id. Whether a defendant
validly waived her right to appeal is a question of law that we
review de novo. United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528
(4th Cir. 2013). Our review of the record leaves us with no
doubt that Brown knowingly and voluntarily waived her appellate
rights and that the sentencing claims raised on appeal fall
within the scope of her valid waiver.
The waiver, however, does not preclude our consideration of
Brown’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Brown
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asserts that counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the
loss and restitution amounts at sentencing. Unless an
attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of
the record, ineffective assistance claims are not generally
addressed on direct appeal. United States v. Galloway, 749 F.3d
238, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 215 (2015).
Instead, such claims should be raised in a motion brought
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit
sufficient development of the record. United States v.
Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the
record does not conclusively establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984), we decline to review this claim in this direct appeal.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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