J-A14027-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ALHAJI BAKARIE SARR-DAFFEE
Appellant No. 1851 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 21, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004420-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MAY 22, 2015
Appellant Alhaji Bakarie Sarr-Daffee appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas following his
jury trial convictions for robbery,1 theft by unlawful taking or disposition,2
receiving stolen property,3 resisting arrest or other law enforcement,4 and
false identification to law enforcement authorities.5 We affirm.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), and (vi).
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
5
18 Pa.C.S. § 4914.
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The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
On August 21, 2013, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Appellant entered the
Riverfront Federal Credit Union bank, located on South 4th Street in Reading,
Pennsylvania. N.T., 3/7/14, at 4-5. Appellant approached pregnant bank
teller Samantha Dix and handed her a note that demanded she give him “all
the money” because he had a gun. Id. at 5-6. Dix gave Appellant the
contents of her register, later determined to be $2,200.00. Id. at 7, 21.
Appellant asked Dix if that was all of the money, Dix told Appellant that it
was, and Appellant left the bank. Id. at 7. Dix then pressed the panic
button to alert police of the robbery. Id. at 8.
Officer Wilfredo Ramirez of the City of Reading Police Department
responded to the radio call and arrived at the bank approximately one-to-
two minutes after Dix pushed the panic button. N.T., 3/7/14, at 34-36. Dix
provided the following description of Appellant: a dark-skinned black male
with “craters on his face” wearing a dark sweater, polarized sunglasses, and
a dark colored baseball hat with white lettering. Id. at 37-38, 59. On his
way to the bank, Officer Ramirez had noticed a black male wearing a dark
colored baseball hat with white lettering, about a block away from the bank.
Id. at 38. He left the bank to search for Appellant and broadcasted over the
police radio that he had seen a black male who fit Appellant’s description
walking north on Wood Street. Id. at 39.
Officer James Thomas reported to the area, having heard Officer
Ramirez’s broadcast and the description of Appellant as a “black male, dark
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skinned” with “craters on his face.” Id. at 59. While he was driving to the
area in his patrol car, Officer Thomas noticed a black male walking north on
5th Street. Id. at 60. The male, later identified as Appellant, turned and
looked at Officer Thomas about four or five times as the officer sat in his
patrol car waiting for a stoplight to turn green. Id. Just as Officer Thomas
was about to pass Appellant, Appellant turned abruptly and began to walk
south on 5th Street. Id. Officer Thomas turned his vehicle around and
parked about 20 feet behind Appellant, who was still walking quickly. Id. at
61. Officer Thomas followed Appellant and said, “Excuse me, can I talk to
you?” Id. When Appellant turned toward Officer Thomas to respond, Officer
Thomas noticed bumps on Appellant’s face and neck. Id. Appellant told
Officer Thomas that he did not want to talk to him and proceeded to walk
quickly away from him. Id.
Officer Thomas continued to follow Appellant and verbally attempted to
get him to stop to talk with him regarding a bank robbery. Id. at 62.
Appellant again stated that he did not want to speak with the officer and
continued to walk away. Id. When Officer Thomas caught up to Appellant,
Appellant started to run. Id. Officer Thomas then tried to grab Appellant’s
arm to stop him, but Appellant pushed the officer away and refused orders
to stop and get on the ground. Id. at 64. Eventually, four or five officers
managed to stop Appellant. Id.
Police detained Appellant until Dix arrived to identify him. N.T.,
3/7/14, at 72, 90. Dix could not immediately identify Appellant, so the
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police moved him closer so that he was within a few feet from her. Id. at
90-91. Dix noted that Appellant was no longer wearing black clothing, a hat
or sunglasses. Id. at 90. After she “had him put the sunglasses on,” 6 Dix
made a positive identification of Appellant, noting that he appeared to have
the same acne as the person who robbed her. Id. at 11, 91. The
identification took place approximately twenty minutes after the initial radio
broadcast of Appellant’s description.7 Id. at 72.
After Dix identified Appellant, Officer Ramirez searched Appellant for
weapons and found $2,200.00 in his pocket. Id. at 44.
On February 7, 2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which
included a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to suppress out-of-
court identification. On May 14, 2014, after a hearing on May 7, 2014, the
court denied Appellant’s motion. Additionally, on July 2, 2014, Appellant
____________________________________________
6
After Dix pointed out that Appellant was not wearing sunglasses, as he had
been during the robbery, police officers placed a pair of sunglasses on
Appellant. N.T., 3/7/14, at 11. The sunglasses belonged to Officer Ryan
Smith, who helped apprehend Appellant. Id. at 96-98. The sunglasses
were broken during the apprehension and laying on the sidewalk when other
officers placed them on Appellant. Id. at 98. Officer Smith was nearby on
the sidewalk with a group of officers during the identification when he
realized that his sunglasses were not in his pocket but on Appellant’s face.
Id.
7
Dix identified Appellant again at the omnibus pretrial hearing on March 7,
2014 and based her identification on her memory of seeing him at her bank
teller window. N.T., 3/7/14, at 19.
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filed a motion for release pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, which the court
denied on July 15, 2014.
On July 17, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned
charges. On August 29, 2014, the court sentenced him to 6-15 years’
imprisonment for robbery and 1-2 years’ imprisonment, consecutive, for
resisting arrest or other law enforcement.8 On September 2, 2014,
Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which the court denied on
October 7, 2014, after conducting a hearing on October 3, 2014. On
November 3, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The same day, the
court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and he timely complied on
November 20, 2014.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
1. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AS: (A)
THERE WAS AN INSUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION OF THE
ASSAILANT TO SUPPORT REASONABLE
SUSPICION/PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFYING AN
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION/ARREST OF ANY PERSON LET
ALONE APPELLANT AND/OR (B) THE APPELLANT DID NOT
SUFFICIENTLY MATCH THE DESCRIPTION OF THE
ASSAILANT THAT WAS PROVIDED SO AS TO SUPPORT
REASONABLE SUSPICION/PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFYING
HIS INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION/ARREST?
____________________________________________
8
The trial court imposed no further penalties on Appellant’s remaining
convictions and granted him 365 days credit for time served.
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2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT[’]S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE OUT OF COURT
IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT MADE BY SAMANTHA
DIX AS THE IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE BASED ON A
PAIR OF SUNGLASSES THAT ACTUALLY BELONGED TO A
POLICE OFFICER WHO PLACED THEM ON THE APPELLANT
WHO WAS CLEARLY IN POLICE CUSTODY DURING A
SHOW-UP AS WELL AS ANY IN COURT IDENTIFICATION AS
SUCH WAS TAINTED BY THE SAID OVERLY SUGGESTIVE
OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION?
3. DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] IN DENYING APPELLANT’S
RULE 600 FOR RELEASE ON NOMINAL BAIL AS 180 DAYS
NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE APPELLANT HAD ELAPSED
SINCE THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT PRIOR
TO TRIAL AND THIS ISSUE IS ONE CAPABLE OF
REPETITION AND LIKELY TO EVADE REVIEW?
Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.
In his first issue, Appellant challenges the court’s denial of his motion
to suppress evidence. Appellant argues the police did not have reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to warrant an investigative detention of his
person. He claims the description upon which the police acted was vague
and generic, and that it did not fit Appellant’s description when they
apprehended him. Appellant concludes that the seizure of his person was
unconstitutional, and that any evidence flowing from that seizure, including
the cash seized from his person and the out-of-court identification must be
suppressed. We disagree.
Our standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a suppression
motion is as follows:
In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a
suppression motion we are limited to determining whether
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the factual findings are supported by the record and
whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. Since the Commonwealth prevailed in the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of
the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 325 (Pa.Super.2010) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (Pa.2003)). “Our standard
of review is restricted to establishing whether the record supports the
suppression court’s factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review
over the suppression court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v.
Guzman, 44 A.3d 688, 692 (Pa.Super.2012) (citation omitted).
Pennsylvania recognizes three types of interactions between police
officers and citizens. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123,
1126-27, (Pa.Super.2003). “Interaction between citizens and police officers,
under search and seizure law, is varied and requires different levels of
justification depending upon the nature of the interaction and whether or not
the citizen is detained.” Id.
The first category, a mere encounter or request for
information, does not need to be supported by any level of
suspicion, and does not carry any official compulsion to
stop or respond. The second category, an investigative
detention, derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88
S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny: such a
detention is lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion
because, although it subjects a suspect to a stop and a
period of detention, it does not involve such coercive
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conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an
arrest. The final category, the arrest or custodial
detention, must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 884 (Pa.Super.2009) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa.Super.2008) (en banc)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 836 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa.2003))).
A “mere encounter” can be any formal or informal
interaction between an officer and a citizen, but will
normally be an inquiry by the officer of a citizen. The
hallmark of this interaction is that it carries no official
compulsion to stop or respond.
In contrast, an “investigative detention,” by implication,
carries an official compulsion to stop and respond, but the
detention is temporary, unless it results in the formation of
probable cause for arrest, and does not possess the
coercive conditions consistent with a formal arrest. Since
this interaction has elements of official compulsion it
requires “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful activity. In
further contrast, a custodial detention occurs when the
nature, duration and conditions of an investigative
detention become so coercive as to be, practically
speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.
Stevenson, 832 A.2d at 1127-29.
We analyze whether a “mere encounter” has risen to the level of an
“investigative detention” under the following standard:
To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure
has been effected, the United States Supreme Court has
devised an objective test entailing a determination of
whether, in view of all surrounding circumstances, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was free to
leave. In evaluating the circumstances, the focus is
directed toward whether, by means of physical force or
show of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in
some way been restrained. In making this determination,
courts must apply the totality-of-the-circumstances
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approach, with no single factor dictating the ultimate
conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.
Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa.Super.2012), appeal
denied, 50 A.3d 124 (Pa.2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19
A.3d 1111, 1116 (Pa.Super.2011)).
“Police must have reasonable suspicion that a person seized is
engaged in unlawful activity before subjecting that person to an investigative
detention.” Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 306
(Pa.Super.2011), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 442 (Pa.2012) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Cottman, 764 A.2d 595 (Pa.Super.2000)).
Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able
to articulate specific observations which, in conjunction
with reasonable inferences derived from those
observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of
his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that
the person he stopped was involved in that activity.
Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court
must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts
available to the officer at the moment of intrusion warrant
a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116
(Pa.Super.2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Police must have probable cause that a person is engaged in criminal
activity before subjecting that person to an arrest or “custodial detention.”
Goldsborough, 31 A.3d at 306.
Probable cause is made out when the facts and
circumstances which are within the knowledge of the
officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has
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reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to
warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that
the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. The
question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was
correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require
only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity. In determining whether probable cause
exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances test.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 2 A.3d 611 (Pa.Super.2010) (en
banc), appeal denied, 19 A.3d 1051 (Pa.2011)) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
The key difference between an investigative detention and
a custodial one is that the latter involves such coercive
conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an
arrest. In determining whether an encounter with the
police is custodial, the standard is an objective one, with
due consideration given to the reasonable impression
conveyed to the person interrogated rather than the
strictly subjective view of the troopers or the person being
seized and must be determined with reference to the
totality of the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987-88 (Pa.2006) (internal
citations omitted).
The court considers the totality of the circumstances to
determine if an encounter is investigatory or custodial, but
the following factors are specifically considered: the basis
for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the
suspect was transported against his will, how far, and why;
whether restraints were used; the show, threat or use of
force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or
dispel suspicions.
Goldsborough, supra at 306 (quoting Commonwealth v. Teeter, 961
A.2d 890, 899 (Pa.Super.2008)).
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Instantly, the interaction between Officer Thomas and Appellant began
as a mere encounter. Officer Thomas was operating his police vehicle and
looking for a bank robber who matched the description of a dark-skinned
black male with “craters” on his face wearing certain articles of clothing
when he saw Appellant. He noticed Appellant glance at him four or five
times while he was stopped at a red light. Officer Thomas then noticed
Appellant abruptly turn around when he drove his police vehicle beside him.
Officer Thomas got out of his police vehicle and called out to Appellant,
requesting to speak with him. When Officer Thomas asked Appellant to
speak with him, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, as
Appellant obviously did because he told the officer that he did not wish to
speak with him and continued to walk away. See Downey, supra. The
level of interaction was therefore a mere encounter, and Officer Thomas did
not need any suspicion to make a request for information. See Gonzalez,
supra.
When Appellant turned around and said that he did not wish to speak,
Officer Thomas observed the bumps on Appellant’s face. At this point,
Officer Thomas obtained reasonable suspicion to subject Appellant to an
investigative detention. Officer Thomas observed Appellant within blocks of
the bank where a robbery had occurred only minutes earlier. Although
Appellant was not wearing the same hat, sunglasses, or jacket, he was a
dark-skinned black male with severe acne on his face and neck, matching
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key components of the description radioed to Officer Thomas. These facts,
along with Appellant’s nervous behavior, furnished reasonable suspicion that
Appellant was the bank robber and authorized Officer Thomas to detain him
for further investigation. See Goldsborough, supra. The police properly
detained Appellant for less than twenty minutes, without transporting him to
another area, while awaiting Dix’s arrival for identification purposes. See
Goldsborough, supra.
When Dix identified Appellant, the police had probable cause to arrest
him. Upon patting him down for weapons, the police discovered the money
in Appellant’s pocket. Because the record supports the trial court’s factual
findings, and the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct, we
hold that the court properly denied Appellant’s suppression motion.
In his second issue, Appellant argues Dix made the out-of-court
identification under suggestive and tainted circumstances. He claims that
Dix’s identification of him was not reliable because police transported Dix to
him while he was surrounded by police officers. Additionally, Appellant
contends that because police officers placed sunglasses on him to aid Dix in
identification, the admission of Dix’s out-of-court identification into evidence
violated his due process rights. Further, Appellant contends that the
subsequent in-court identification was tainted by the out-of-court
identification and should also be suppressed. Again, we disagree.
In reviewing the propriety of identification evidence, the
central inquiry is whether, under the totality of the
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circumstances, the identification was reliable. The purpose
of a “one on one” identification is to enhance reliability by
reducing the time elapsed after the commission of the
crime. Suggestiveness in the identification process is but
one factor to be considered in determining the admissibility
of such evidence and will not warrant exclusion absent
other factors. As this Court has explained, the following
factors are to be considered in determining the propriety of
admitting identification evidence: the opportunity of the
witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime,
the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior
description of the perpetrator, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between
the crime and confrontation. The corrupting effect of the
suggestive identification, if any, must be weighed against
these factors. Absent some special element of unfairness,
a prompt “one on one” identification is not so suggestive
as to give rise to an irreparable likelihood of
misidentification.
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 65 (Pa.Super.2014), appeal
denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa.2014).
Here, Dix viewed Appellant from the bank window when he committed
the robbery. He was standing only feet away from her while she gathered
the money in her register and while she assured him that it was all of the
money. The encounter was brief, but she was very alert because she feared
for her life and the life of her unborn child. Less than twenty minutes later,
she identified Appellant on the street. Concededly, Dix identified Appellant
while he was in police custody and after she asked the police to put
sunglasses on him, which she admitted made it easier for her to identify
him. Nevertheless, she made the identification based on Appellant’s facial
features that she could see at the time of the robbery, especially his acne.
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Upon viewing Appellant again, in close proximity, Dix was certain that
Appellant was the man who robbed her. Any corrupting effect of the
sunglasses and the police presence is outweighed by the other indicia of
reliability. Further, Dix testified that her subsequent in-court identification
was based on her memory of Appellant when he robbed the bank.
After considering the factors, the trial court reasoned:
[B]ased on these factors, [Dix’s] identification of
[Appellant] at the out-of court identification is reliable. In
addition, even if the pretrial identification procedures
contained some element of suggestiveness, this [c]ourt
finds the circumstances surrounding the encounter
provided an independent basis for [Dix’s] subsequent in[-]
court identifications of [Appellant.]
Trial Court Opinion, filed December 2, 2014, at 14. The trial court’s findings
are supported by the record and its legal conclusions are correct.
In his third issue, Appellant argues the court erred by denying his Rule
600 motion. Appellant claims the trial court miscalculated the delay period
by 18 days, and that his actual delay period of 186 days entitled him to
nominal bail because it was six days past the period for a speedy trial,
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. This issue merits no relief.
Rule 600 provides, in pertinent part:
Rule 600. Prompt Trial
* * *
(B) Pretrial Incarceration
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Except in cases in which the defendant is not entitled to
release on bail as provided by law, no defendant shall be
held in pretrial incarceration in excess of
(1) 180 days from the date on which the complaint is filed;
* * *
(C) Computation of Time
* * *
(2) For purposes of paragraph (B), only periods of delay
caused by the defendant shall be excluded from the
computation of the length of time of any pretrial
incarceration. Any other periods of delay shall be included
in the computation.
(3)(a) When a judge or issuing authority grants or denies a
continuance:
(i) the issuing authority shall record the identity of
the party requesting the continuance and the
reasons for granting or denying the continuance; and
(ii) the judge shall record the identity of the party
requesting the continuance and the reasons for
granting or denying the continuance. The judge also
shall record to which party the period of delay
caused by the continuance shall be attributed, and
whether the time will be included in or excluded from
the computation of the time within which trial must
commence in accordance with this rule.
* * *
(D) Remedies
* * *
(2) Except in cases in which the defendant is not entitled
to release on bail as provided by law, when a defendant is
held in pretrial incarceration beyond the time set forth in
paragraph (B), at any time before trial, the defendant’s
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attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a
written motion requesting that the defendant be released
immediately on nominal bail subject to any nonmonetary
conditions of bail imposed by the court as permitted by
law. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney
for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge
shall conduct a hearing on the motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
In evaluating Rule 600 issues, we recognize the following principles:
In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a
trial court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity
with law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before
the court, after hearing and due consideration. An abuse
of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in
reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied
or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or
the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown
by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.
The proper scope of review…is limited to the evidence on
the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the
findings of the trial court. An appellate court must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this
Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind
Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important
functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial
rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining
whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been
violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to
effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain
those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
However, the administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not
designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
prosecution delayed through no fault of the
Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of
the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental
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speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be
construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to
punish and deter crime. In considering these matters…,
courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not
only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the
collective right of the community to vigorous law
enforcement as well.
Commonwealth v. Tickel, 2 A.3d 1229, 1233 (Pa.Super.2010), appeal
denied, 23 A.3d 541 (Pa.2011) (internal citations omitted).
Appellant concedes that all of the trial court’s time calculations are
correct except for the continuance from December 19, 2013 to January 7,
2014. See Appellant’s Brief at 37. Appellant’s counsel requested a
continuance to review discovery on these dates. Although Appellant
contends he only requested the continuance because the Commonwealth
failed to produce discovery before December 18, 2013, this time period is
still attributable to Appellant because he requested the continuance. We see
no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade
Appellant’s fundamental speedy trial rights. See Tickel, supra. Thus, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion
for release on nominal bail.9
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9
Further, because the court granted Appellant credit for all time served,
including the six days Appellant alleges were improper, this issue is moot.
See Commonwealth v. Sloan, 907 A.2d 460, 465 (Pa.2006) (“[g]enerally,
a case will be dismissed if at any stage of the judicial process it is rendered
moot.”).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/22/2015
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