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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ZACKARY ELKING POLL
Appellant No. 1448 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered August 6, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No: CP-02-SA-0001467-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 27, 2015
Appellant, Zackary Elking Poll, appeals from the August 6, 2014 order
dismissing his summary appeal.1 We vacate and remand.
On April 15, 2014, a Pittsburgh police officer cited Appellant for
reckless driving, operating a vehicle without a valid certificate of inspection,
operating a vehicle without valid evidence of an emission inspection, and
failing to ensure use of a seatbelt by persons under age eighteen.2
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1
This order is final and appealable. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2); Pa.R.Crim.P.
720(D); see Commonwealth v. Dixon, 66 A.3d 794, 795 (Pa. Super.
2012).
2
75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3736, 4703(a), 4706(c)(5) and 4581(a)(2)(i),
respectively. We note that § 4703 has been amended effective May 1,
2015.
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Appellant contested the charges but was found guilty of each after a
summary trial on July 2, 2014. That same day, Appellant filed an appeal,
and the trial court proceeding was scheduled for August 6, 2014. The trial
court dismissed the appeal when Appellant failed to appear.
“Our standard of review from an appeal of a summary conviction heard
de novo by the trial court is limited to a determination of whether an error of
law has been committed and whether the findings of fact are supported by
competent evidence.” Commonwealth v. Marizzaldi, 814 A.2d 249 (Pa.
Super. 2002). Appellant argues the trial court erred in dismissing his
summary appeal without inquiring into the reasons for Appellant’s absence
from the proceeding. He cites Marizzaldi for authority that a trial court
must do so.
In Marizzaldi, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s summary
appeal without explanation when the defendant failed to appear. Id. at 250-
51. Furthermore, the trial court’s opinion did not reflect any inquiry into the
reasons for the defendant’s absence. Id. at 251. This Court concluded the
trial court failed to comply with Rule 462 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
That Rule provides in relevant part as follows:
(A) When a defendant appeals after the entry of a guilty
plea or a conviction by an issuing authority in any
summary proceeding, upon the filing of the transcript and
other papers by the issuing authority, the case shall be
heard de novo by the judge of the court of common pleas
sitting without a jury.
[…]
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(D) If the defendant fails to appear, the trial judge may
dismiss the appeal and enter judgment in the court of
common pleas on the judgment of the issuing authority.
[…]
Comment: […] Paragraph (D) makes it clear that the trial
judge may dismiss a summary case appeal when the
judge determines that the defendant is absent
without cause from the trial de novo. If the appeal is
dismissed, the trial judge should enter judgment and order
execution of any sentence imposed by the issuing
authority.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(A), (D), and comment (emphasis added). The Marizzaldi
Court also noted that Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) does not permit post-sentence
motions after a trial de novo after a summary appeal. Marizzaldi, 814 A.2d
at 252. Thus, the facts of Marizzaldi were distinguishable from cases
decided under an earlier version of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
permitting such a motion and, thereby, affording the defendant an
opportunity to establish good cause for failing to appear. Id. The defendant
in Marizzaldi filed an affidavit along with his appellate brief explaining that
he missed his bus and thus arrived ten minutes late for his hearing, at which
point the trial court had already dismissed his appeal. Id. at 251. Given the
trial court’s failure to conduct any inquiry into the cause of the defendant’s
absence and the absence in the record of anything contradicting the
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defendant’s assertions on appeal, the Marizzaldi Court remanded for a trial
de novo. Id. at 252.3
In Dixon, this Court summarized Marizzaldi as follows:
We understand Marizzaldi to require a new trial
when: (1) a trial court dismisses a summary appeal
without considering whether the absentee defendant had
cause to justify the absence; and (2) the absentee
defendant presents an affidavit on appeal that (assuming
the assertions delineated in the affidavit are true) presents
at least a prima facie demonstration that cause existed for
the absence, rendering that absence involuntary.
Dixon, 66 A.3d at 797.
Here, as in Marizzaldi, the record fails to reflect any inquiry into the
cause of Appellant’s absence. At the August 6, 2014 hearing, the trial court
stated the following: “Okay, we will dismiss the appeal, defendant not
appearing.” N.T. Hearing, 8/6/14, at 2. Thereafter, the trial court imposed
fines and the proceeding concluded. Id. The trial court’s opinion likewise
contains no mention of any inquiry into the cause of Appellant’s absence:
“The Summary Appeal hearing was conducted on August 6, 2014, at which
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3
In a concurring statement, Judge Beck wrote that she believed the
defendant was entitled to a hearing to establish the reason for his absence,
but that missing a bus and failing to make a timely communication with the
court would not constitute sufficient cause for missing the hearing. Id. at
253 (Beck, J. concurring). Judge Beck found the circumstances of
Marizzaldi distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Doleno, 594 A.2d 341
(Pa. Super. 1991), where the defendant missed his hearing due to his
attorney’s error, and Commonwealth v. Parks, 768 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Super.
2001), where the docket failed to reflect the clerk of courts provided notice
of the hearing. Id.
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time the Defendant failed to appear. In his absence, judgment was entered
on the judgment of the issuing authority, pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.
462(D)].” Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/14, at 1.
In accordance with Marizzaldi, Appellant attached an affidavit to his
appellate brief. He states:
I was not present because my car battery died. I
was not represented by counsel at the time and did not
know who to call. Once my vehicle was operational again,
I went to the Clerk of Courts where I was informed that
my appeal had been dismissed and my only option was to
file an appeal with the appellate courts, which I filed
myself.
Appellant’s Brief at 20.
The Commonwealth concedes that Marizzaldi is on point, inasmuch as
the record does not reflect any inquiry into the cause of Appellant’s absence
from the summary appeal hearing, as required by the holding in Marizzaldi
and the comment to Rule 462. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-9. The
Commonwealth deems Appellant’s proffered excuse dubious, as did Judge
Beck in her concurring statement in Marizzaldi. Id. The Commonwealth
ultimately takes no position on the outcome of this appeal, but defers to the
judgment of this panel.
In our judgment, Marizzaldi is controlling. Nothing in the instant
record evinces any inquiry into the cause of Appellant’s absence from his
summary appeal hearing. Likewise, the record contains nothing to refute
Appellant’s assertion that he missed the hearing because of a dead car
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battery. The trial court committed an error of law in failing to inquire into
the cause of Appellant’s absence from the summary appeal.4 Though we are
not without sympathy to the concerns of Judge Beck in Marizzaldi and the
Commonwealth in this case concerning the sufficiency of the proffered
excuse for the absence, we discern no meaningful distinction between a
missed bus and a dead car battery, insofar as either scenario constitutes
prima facie cause for an involuntary absence.5 We therefore vacate the
order on appeal and remand for a new trial de novo.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/27/2015
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4
Our holding notwithstanding, we appreciate the procedural predicament
trial courts face where the summary appellant fails to appear. As we stated
in Dixon, “[t]he trial court cannot question an absent defendant regarding
the cause of the absence, and the defendant cannot file post-sentence
motions to explain the absence.” Dixon, 66 A.3d at 797.
5
The Dixon Court declined to award a new trial de novo where the
appellant averred that he appeared at the wrong location for his hearing and
was unable to find the correct location in time. Dixon, 66 A.3d at 795-96.
In Dixon, the record confirmed that the appellant received notice of the
time, date and location of the hearing. Thus, unlike Marizzaldi and the
instant case, the record in Dixon contained information contradicting the
appellant’s excuse for his absence.
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