J-A10045-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROY LEE SNYDER
Appellant No. 1423 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 18, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0005704-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JUNE 02, 2015
Roy Lee Snyder (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas following his jury trial
conviction for escape.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the events underlying Appellant’s
conviction as follows:
On August 21, 2013, [Appellant] was transferred from
SCI-Frackville to the [Alcohol Drug Addiction Probation Parole
Treatment ([ADAPPT[)] Halfway House for purposes of being
placed under parole supervision. Mr. Christopher Bardwell was
assigned as [Appellant’s] state parole supervisor at the time. On
September 30, 2013, [Appellant] was released to parole and
discharged with an unsuccessful completion of the ADAPPT
Halfway House program for being disrespectful to staff.
[Appellant] was held at Berks County Prison until the Board of
Probation and [P]arole made a determination in response to
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(a).
J-A10045-15
[Appellant’s] discharge from ADAPPT. On November 8, 2013,
the Board of Probation and Parole made the decision to detain
[Appellant] in a secure community corrections center and to hold
the violation hearing in abeyance pending completion of the
parole violator’s program at the correction center.
On November 19, 2013, in the afternoon, [Appellant] was
transported to Wernersville Community Corrections Center
(WCCC) to complete the parole violator’s center program in
Building 30. On that date, Mr. Brandon Smith, Community
Correction Monitor for WCCC, was assigned to patrol Building 30,
which is a locked parole violator facility. At approximately 11:00
p.m., Mr. Smith heard a fire alarm sound, indicating that one of
the fire exits in Building 30 was opened. As soon as the alarm
went off, Mr. Smith notified all staff in the building that the fire
alarm had been activated. Mr. Smith then confirmed that no
members of the staff tripped the alarm. Mr. Smith immediately
went down to inspect the alarm area and reset the fire alarm.
An emergency head count was then conducted by Mr. Smith and
additional staff to make sure all parole violators were still
present inside Building 30. Each parole violator was instructed
to return to their assigned bunk for purposes of performing the
“head count.”
To determine whether or not an individual is in fact
missing, Mr. Smith utilized a checklist which spells out every
parole violator[’]s name and Department of Corrections (DOC)
number. Mr. Smith was then able to cross-reference this
checklist with the door cards located on each bunkroom door.
The door cards exhibit a photo of each violator assigned to the
room and indicate the violator’s assigned bunk number. Mr.
Smith testified that the only individual not accounted for was
[Appellant]. Mr. Smith then proceeded to inspect [Appellant’s]
wall locker next to his assigned bunk. Mr. Smith confirmed that
all of [Appellant’s] personal items were missing from his
assigned bunk. The only materials left inside [Appellant’s] wall
locker were the issued items given to him by the WCCC at his
time of entry. At approximately 11:51 p.m., Trooper Jason Hope
of the Pennsylvania State Police was then notified that
[Appellant] had pulled the fire alarm and exited the west side of
Building 30. At no time had [Appellant] returned to WCCC.
On November 22, 2013, at about 4:20 p.m., Officer David
Samsel was dispatched to Redners Warehouse Market on North
5th Street, Muhlenburg Township, Pennsylvania. Officer Samsel
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J-A10045-15
proceeded to question [Appellant] regarding his identity.
[Appellant] did not have identification with him at the time, but
informed Officer Samsel that his name was Roy Lee Snyder.
[Appellant] then told Officer Samsel that he was court
committed at [WCCC]. [Appellant] was then recommitted due to
his parole violations.
Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed October 8, 2014 (“1925(a)
Opinion”), pp. 2-4.
Following a trial conducted on June 18, 2014, a jury convicted
Appellant of escape. On July 22, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
30 months to 7 years of incarceration. After the trial court denied his post-
sentence motion on July 29, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
on August 25, 2014. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a jury verdict
of guilty for the crime of [e]scape charged against [Appellant]
because a) he was on parole and not committed to a parole
violation center as required by 61 Pa.C.S.[] Section 5006 and b)
the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that [Appellant] acted recklessly when he left [WCCC]?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
Commonwealth to introduce evidence concerning the
circumstances that led to [Appellant’s] expulsion from ADAPPT
as that situation was not related to the charge of [e]scape for
which he was on trial?
3. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the
definition of “official detention” excludes only “active”
supervision of probation or parole?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
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J-A10045-15
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Thomas G.
Parisi, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. See 1925(a) Opinion, pp. 4-20 (finding: (1) Commonwealth
proved Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where evidence
illustrated Appellant was officially detained within WCCC and consciously and
willfully removed himself from official detention; (2) trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing Commonwealth to elicit details of Appellant’s
expulsion from ADAPPT Halfway House where such details described
chronology of events leading to escape and explained Appellant’s detention
status; and (3) viewing jury instruction as a whole, trial court properly
instructed jury on concepts of “official detention”). Accordingly, we affirm
on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/2/2015
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',::,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
BERKS COUNTY,PA
v. . CRJMINAL DIVISION
NO. CP-06-CR-5704-2013
ROY LEE SNYDER,
Defendant JUDGE THOMAS G. P ARJSI
Amy Shaffer, Esquire, Attorney for the Defendant
Alisa R. Hobart, Esquire, Appeal Attorney for the Commonwealth
MEMORANDUM OPINION, Thomas G. Parisi~ October 8, 2014
Following a jury trial on June 18, 2014, Defendant was convicted ofEscape.1 On July
18, 2014, this Court imposed a sentence of not less than 30 months nor more than 7 years to the
Bureau of Corrections for confinement in a state correctional facility.
On August 25, 2014 Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. On September 15, 2014,
Defendant filed a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal and raises the
following issues for review:
J. The Court erred in denying Defense's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of
the Commonwealth's case in chief because there was insufficient evidence to establish
that Roy Snyder had physically arrived at Wernersville Community Corrections Center
on November 19, 2013 thereby making it factually impossible for Roy Snyder to escape
that facility.
2. There is insufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict of guilty for the crime of
Escape against Roy Snyder because the Commonwealth did not establish that Roy Snyder
was subject to official detention where he was, in fact, on PEtf?!~-,~4J:R~.~ppunitted to a
parole violation center as required by 61 Pa. C.S.A. Section! 5006 wllicn1was enacted in
2012 thereby changing the statutory landscape regarding the law of Escape since the
2009 decision in Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 2009 Pa. Super. 15.
· · r '1· t -l .~- l ~G vL
.. :.:J(,· ·- 0 -·
3. The evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain the jury verdict of guilty for the
crime of escape against Roy Snyder because the, Commonwealth failed .. !!? prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Roy Snyder acted recklessly wlienJi@foft Werner.hl1tle Correction
Community Center when he believed that he had been released from commitment at
118PaC.S.A.
§ 512l(a).
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Berks County Jail and reinstated onto his original parole to an approved program at the
correction community center.
4. The trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Defense's objection to the
Commonwealth eliciting testimony from Roy Snyder concerning the circumstances that
led to his expulsion from ADAPPT as that situation is irrelevant to the crime of Escape
that was charged against Roy Snyder and the introduction of such evidence is not
harmless 'error because it is prejudicial against Defendant and the evidence has no
probative value.
5. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that the definition of "official detention"
excludes only "active" supervision of probation or parole because 18 Pa. C.S.A. Section
5121 makes no distinction in type or status of supervision.
Defendant's Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 9/15/14.
FACTUAL IDSTORY
On August 21, 2013, Defendant was transferred from SCI-Frackville to the ADAPPT
Halfway House for purposes cifbeing placed under parole supervision. Mr. Christopher Bardwell
was assigned as Defendant's state parole supervisor at this time. On September 30, 2013,
Defendant was released to parole and discharged with an unsuccessful completion of the
ADAPPT Halfway House program for being disrespectful to staff. Defendant was held at Berks
County Prison until the Board of Probation and parole made a determination in response to
Defendant's discharge fromADAPPT. On November 8, 2013, the Board of Probation and Parole
made the decision to detain Defendant in a secure community corrections center and to hold the
violation hearing in abeyance pending completion of the parole violator's program at the
correction center.
On November 19~ 2013, in the afternoon, Defendant was transported to Wernersville
Community Corrections Center (WCCC) to complete the parole violator's center program in
Building 30. On that date, Mr. Brandon Smith, Community Correction Monitor for WCCC, was
assigned to patrol Building 30, which is a locked parole violator facility. At approximately 11:00
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;~
~).
p.m., Mr. Smith heard a fire alarm sound, indicating that one of the fire exits in Building 30 was
opened. As soon as the alarm went off, Mr. Smith notified all staff in the building that the fire
alarm had been activated. Mr. Smith then confirmed that no members of the staff tripped the
,..i,
.,,,.
~ alarm. Mr. Smith immediately went down to inspect the alarm area and reset the fire alarm. An
'
·qi,
·~ emergency head count was then conducted by Mr. Smith and additional staff to make sure all
()
parole violators were still present inside Building 30. Each parole violator was instructed to
return to their assigned bunk for purposes of performing the "head count."
To determine whether or not an individual is in fact missing, Mr. Smith utilized a
checklist which spells out every parole violators name and Department of Corrections (DOC)
number. Mr. Smith was then able to cross-reference this checklist with the door cards located on
each bunkroom door. The door cards exhibit a photo of each violator assigned to the room and
indicate the violator's assigned bunk number. Mr. Smith testified that the only individual not
accounted for was Defendant. Mr. Smith then proceeded to inspect Defendant's wall locker next
to his assigned bunk. Mr. Smith confirmed that all of Defendant's personal items were missing
from his assigned bunk. The only materials left inside the Defendant's wall locker were the
issued items given to him by the WCCC at his time of entry. At approximately 11:51 p.m.,
Trooper Jason Hope of the Pennsylvania State Police was then notified that Defendant had pulled
the fire alarm and exited the west side of Building 30. At no time had Defendant returned to
wccc.
On November 22, 2013, at about 4:20 p.m., Officer David Samsel was dispatched to
Redners Warehouse Market on North 5th Street, Muhlenberg Township, Pennsylvania. Officer
Samsel proceeded to question Defendant regarding his identity. Defendant did not have
identification with him at the time, but informed Officer Samsel that his name was Roy Lee
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!.
Snyder. Defendant then told Officer Samsel that he was court committed at Wernersville
Community Corrections Center. Defendant was then recommitted due to his parole violations.
DISCUSSION ·
I. Insufficient Evidence
Defendant first claims that the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to establish that
he had physically arrived at Wernersville Community Corrections Center on November 19, 2013
thereby making itfactually impossible for Defendant to escape that facility.
The standard of review of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is as follows:
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial, together with all reasonable
inferences therefrom,· in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier
of fact could have found that each element of the offense charged was supported
by evidence and inferences sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 636 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 1994).
The reviewing court must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to have
permitted the trier of fact to find that each and every element of the crimes charged was
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 580
(Pa. Super. 2004 ). The facts established by the Commonwealth need not be absolutely
incompatible with the defendant's innocence so long as the evidence against the
defendant is not "so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact
can be drawn from the circumstances." Id. The Commonwealth may meet its burden by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Craybill, 926 A.2d 488, 490
(Pa. Super. 2007). The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the
evidence produced are matters within the province . of the trier of fact, who is free to
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believe all, some or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 908 A.2d 928 (Pa.
Super. 2006).
In support of his first question, Defendant argues that the evidence adduced failed
to establish that he had physically arrived at WCCC on November 19, 2013. However, at
trial, Witness Kerry Kerschner, Facility Director at WCCC, testified that Defendant
arrived at Building 30 on November 19, 2013, at approximately I:30 in the afternoon.
Notes of Testimony [hereinafter N.T.J, p. 40, 6/17/14. Furthermore, Defendant testified at
trial that he was in fact present at WCCC on November 19, 2013.
ADA WEST: Mr. Snyder, you want the jury to believe that you
didn't know that when you pulled that fire alarm on
November 19th that it was something different
than walking out of ADAPPT? That's what you
want the jury to believe? That you didn't know the
. difference?
DEFENDANT: No, there isn't much of a difference if you are on
parole, yes.
N.T., pp. 131-132, 6/18/14.
ADA WEST: So at what point during November 19th did you
decide you were going to leave because you wanted
to go home?
DEFENDANT: Well I think that, you know, I was a little upset
about the conditions that I was violated under while
I was at ADAPPT in the first place. Yeah, I was
pretty upset about that; and I felt as if I know they
had no reason to actually put me under these
conditions in the first place and because of that, you
know, I just took off.
N.T., p. 139, 6/18/14.
Defense counsel even admitted to identification of Defendant after Defendant's testimony
concluded.
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I
!
DEFENSE COUNSEL: On the identification point at this point obviously
Mr. Snyder has stated he was there. That judgment
of acquittal would be moot.
N.T., p. 170, 6/18/14.
Based on the testimony provided at trial, sufficient evidence was presented at trial to
establish.that Defendant had physically arrived at WCCC on November 19, 2013.
In support of Defendant's second question, Defendant argues that the evidence adduced
failed to establish that he was in "official detention" as defined by section 512l(e), as he was on
parole at the time he left WCCC. In this case, the trial court convicted Appellant of Escape
based upon his failure to return to a Community Correction Center after he left a locked facility
building subsequent to his pulling of a fire alarm. The provision of the Crimes Code applicable
under such circumstances provides as follows: .
§ 5121. Escape
(a) Escape.-A person commits an offense ifhe unlawfully removes himself from
official detention or fails to return to official detention following temporary leave
granted for a specific purpose or limited period.
****
( e) Definition.-As used in this section the phrase "official detention" means
arrest, detention in any facility for custody of persons under charge or conviction
of crime or alleged or found to be delinquent, detention for extradition or
deportation, or any other detention for law enforcement purposes; but the phrase
does not include supervision of probation or parole, or constraint incidental to
release on bail.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121.
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§ 5006. Escape
An individual committed to a community corrections .center or a community
corrections facility shall be deemed to be in official detention under 18 Pa.C.S. §
5121 (relating to escape).
61 Pa. C.S.A. § 5006.
Defendant's argument is based on the fact that by leaving WCCC, he committed a
violation of parole rather than the crime of Escape. Defendant asserts that when he
committed a violation of parole at ADAPPT, instead of recommitting him to jail, the
parole board gave him a break by sending him to WCCC as a subsequent condition of his
parole. Defendant concedes that he failed to comply with the program at WCCC.
However at the time he left Building 30 at WCCC, Defendant argues he was under parole
supervision and was therefore not subject to "official detention" as defined by the Escape
statute, section 5121(e).
Mr. Charles Fox, Chief Hearing Examiner for the Board of Probation and Parole,
testified that on November 8, 2013, administrative action was taken by the Board of
Probation and Parole, where it was ordered that Defendant be detained in a secure
community corrections center and to hold the violation hearing pending completion of the
parole violator's center program. N.T., pp. 84-85, 6117/14; see Defendant's Exhibit 1.
The record verifies that when Defendant was sent to Building 30 at the WCCC parole
violation center, Defendant's parole status changed from active parolee to detaine
parolee. Mr. Fox explained that when a defendant is being committed to a parole
violation center the parolee's status changes from the status previously in effect when
supervised by a parole agent at ADAPPT. Mr. Fox testified to the following:
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We refer to them in this status as a detained parolee. They are essentially waiting
a violation decision. At the Wernersville Center, as in the other parole violation
centers throughout the Commonwealth, they assign a different agent there for
monitoring of this individual while they are there. But they are not - they actually
close the field case while they are in the center because they are not considered to
be out under active supervision in the community. In other words, they cannot
. leave the center. They are pretty much restricted to the center while they are there.
N.T., p. 91, 6/17/14.
When asked if Agent Bardwell supervised active street time for people as opposed to
someone who is detained in Building 30, Mr. Fox confirmed the supervision by Agent
Bardwell is different from detained parolee supervision. N.T., pp. 90-91, 6/17/14. Mr.
Fox stated that for the time Defendant is in custody at the parole violator center (WCCC),
Defendant would receive credit for jail time for he was in detained parolee status. N.T.,
pp. 91-92, 6/17/14. Mr .. Fox confirmed that if a defendant is in detained status, a
defendant gets credit for the time that defendant is detained just as if he was incarcerated.
If a defendant is in a halfway house like ADAPPT, Mr. Fox testified that the time spent
counts towards parole time, not jail time. N.T., p. 92, 6/17/14.
Mr. Kerry Kerschner,· Facility Director at the Wernersville Community
Corrections Center, testified that there are three buildings at the WCCC. N.T., p. 37,
6/17/14. Mr. Kerschner confirmed that Building 30 is the parole violator center and
Building 18 and Building 27 are general housing for offenders who do not have approved
home plans through the Board of Probation and Parole. N.T., p. 38, 6/17/14. Mr.
Kerschner stated that Building 30 houses those placed there under a board action or a
warrant by parole, and that the facility is locked at all times. N.T., pp. 38-39, 6/17/14. Mr.
Kerschner testified that the only circumstances under which offenders can leave Building
30 is either due to a medical emergency or to be returned to prison. N.T., p. 39, 6/17/14.
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The record verifies that Defendant's parole status was that of detained parolee
when he left Building 30, distinguishable from active, supervised parole. Mr. Fox
confirmed at trial that the Board of Probation and Parole issued an administrative action
on November 8, 2013, ordering Defendant be "DETAIN[ED] IN PV CENTER." N.T., p_.
87, 6/17/14; see Defendant's Exhibit 1.
In Commo'!wealth v. Maldonado, 966 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. 2009), the
Pennsylvania Superior Court held:
Once a parolee is arrested and detained for failing to report, and acknowledges he
is essentially in prerelease status, he is in official detention for purposes of section
5121 just as any other person placed in custody is. As such, he can hold no
reasonable expectation that he retains the liberties and freedoms customary to a
person operating under "supervision of parole.
Id at 1148.
In Commonwealth v. Davis, 852 A.2d 392 (Pa. Super. 2004), the Pennsylvania Superior Court
affirmed judgment of sentence under section 5121 for an inmate who had been removed from
prison and housed at Penn Capp in "prerelease" status at the time he left the facility without
permission. The Superior Court found that a parolee in an in-patient treatment program such as a
halfway house is "not deemed to be in official detention, but rather at liberty on parole." A
parolee at a halfway house will not be charged with escape as they are not similarly situated with
the "pre-release" inmates, who are deemed to be in "official detention" for purpose of credit for
time spent at the halfway house. Id. at 397-98; see Jackson v. Pennsylvania Bd. Of Probation
and Parole, 568 A.2d 1004 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). However, "pre-release" inmates at the halfway
house are considered to be in custody, not at liberty on parole. If a "pre-release" inmate was to
leave the halfway house, the "pre-release" inmate could be convicted of Escape under section
5121. Defendant claimed when he was out of prison, he was on parole, and thus eligible for the
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"supervision of parole" exclusion while atthe halfway house. Id. at 397~98.The Superior Court
rejected this claim, reasoning that "prerelease" translates to "prior to release," finding parole
could not have commenced as long as the defendant was in "prerelease" status. Id. at 396. The
Superior Court held defendant was not on parole when housed at the halfway house due to the
fact he was receiving credit for jail time and was facing restricted liberties. The Superior Court
found his unauthorized departure from the institution constituted removing himself from "official
detention."
Looking at the testimony and exhibits provided at trial, Defendant's status while
in Building 30 is distinguishable from his active parole status while housed at ADAPPT.
Defendant's status runs parallel to the "pre-release" status found in Davis and
Maldonado. Building 30 is a specific locked facility for parole violators. Offenders
cannot leave Building 30 except for medical emergency or to be returned to prison. Once
placed in Building 30, Defendant was no longer supervised by a field parole agent nor
was Defendant receiving parole credit time. While Defendant was under detained parolee
supervision in Building 30, Defendant was to receive jail time credit, similar to the
defendant in "pre-release" status in Davis. Additionally, Defendant's liberty to leave the
facility was severely restricted.
Based on these facts, while under detained parolee supervision in Building 30,
Defendant could hold no reasonable expectation that he retained the liberties and
freedoms customary to a person operating under "supervision of parole." Consequently,
Defendant was properly subject to a charge of Escape upon leaving the WCCC facility
while under such detained supervision. Therefore, his unauthorized departure· from
WCCC constituted removing himself from official detention. As Defendant does not
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dispute his conduct in leaving the facility without authorization, the evidence is sufficient
to sustain his conviction for Escape.
Defendant next · contends that · the evidence presented at trial is insufficient
because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Roy Snyder
acted recklessly when he left WCCC when he believed that he had been released from
commitment at Berks County jail and reinstated onto his original parole to an approved
program at the correction community center.
The Escape statute itself fails to specify the level of scienter necessary to sustain a
conviction. Consequently, we apply the .default standard specified by 18 Pa.C.S. § 302,
which provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 302. General requirements of culpability
****
(c) Culpability required unless otherwise provided.-When the culpability
sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law,
such element is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
with respect thereto.
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c).
Section 302 also defines the applicable degrees of culpability:
(b) Kinds of culpability defined.-
(3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and
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the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3).
Defendant argues that he did not receive the November 8, 2013 Board of
Probation and Parole administrative action until discovery was provided in this case.
N.T., p. 133, 6/18/14. Although Defendant confirmed at trial that he admitted to
violating his parole at ADAPPT, Defendant claims no one informed him of the conditions
to be imposed as a result of such violations. N.T., pp. 163-64, 6/18/14. Defendant stated
that he believed he was going to do nine (9) months in a state correctional institution.
considering this was his second time violating the conditions of his parole. N.T., p. 163,
. 6/18/14. Defendant testified that he "never had a chance to get any rules or regulations
from anybody [at WCCC]." N.T., p. 167, 6/18/14.
Although Defendant claimed he did not receive a letter from the Parole Board
informing him of its decision and change in parole status, Mr. Fox testified otherwise.
MR.FOX: The Defendant would have been served with this [Parole
Board Administrative Action] as well copies go -to the
agent involved in the case. It goes to - there is copies to the
file copies to the prison where he is being· sent and
essentially what it is telling the prison or if he was in a
secure facility like a county jail or a SCI it would tell them
that at that point to move him to this secure community
corrections center.
** **
ADA WEST: What is the message to him? What is the conveyance?
MR.FOX: It tells them that they have to remain in that parole
violation center and to complete this program. And if they
complete the program,' then essentially they would not be
recommitted on the technical parole violations.
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N.T., pp. 87-89, 6/17/14.
Moreover, this was not Defendant's first time at WCCC and he testified to his knowledge
that Building 30 was a locked facility.
DEFENDANT: I was at Wernersville two other occasions but different
building, yes,
ADA WEST: What other buildings were you in?
DEFENDANT: I was in Building I K
ADA WEST: And in Building 18 could you sign out?
DEFENDANT: Yes, in order for you to leave you are going to have to get
permission from the place to leave, yes.
ADA WEST: But you could just walk out the door?
DEFENDANT: No, you can't just-
ADA WEST: You don't have to pull an emergency alarm?
DEFENDNAT: No, you cannot walk out them doors either. All of them
doors are locked under the same conditions as Building 30.
N.T., pp. 151-52, 6/18/14.
THE COURT: Based upon your prior experience in another building at
Wernersville you knew that the only way that people came
in and out are the front door, correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: There were other doors whichwere fire exits?
DEFENDANT: There is many doors, yes, yeah.
THE COURT: You are not allowed to go out those doors, you know that,
correct?
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DEFENDANT: Well, I mean someone stated that they were locked, yes,
yeah. I knew you couldn't get out the doors unless you
pulled the handle on the alarm, yes.
THE COURT: That was not just based on what you were told that day but
it was based upon your prior experience on a similar
building elsewhere on the campus?
DEFENDANT: Yeah, that the doors were all locked on the sides, yes.
N.T., pp. 167-68, 6/18/14.
The jury in this matter was free to accept or reject Defendant's testimony concerning his
understanding of his parole status at the time he was transferred to WCCC. "While the
sufficiency of the evidence is for the court, the weight thereof is a matter exclusively for the fact
finder." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282 A.2d 693, 697 (Pa. 197l)(citations omitted). Based on
the evidence provided at trial, this Court is bound by findings that result from resolutions of
credibility and conflicting testimony. The jury found Mr. Fox's testimony to be more credible
and the mere fact that Mr. Fox's testimony was contradicted will not take the question of its
credibility from the jury. Defendant testified at trial that he was not of the understanding that his
parole supervision or status was any different from the time he left ADAPPT for WCCC. N.T.,
pp. 131-32, 6/18/14. Defendant stated his understanding at the time he was taken to WCCC was
that he had merely violated conditions of his parole, and would not be charged with escape for
leaving WCCC, rather he would be charged with absconding. N.T., pp. 129-132, 6/18/14.
However, Mr. Fox's testimony and Defendant's prior experience suggest otherwise. Mr. Fox's
testimony indicated that Defendant was served with notice of the administrative action taken by
the Board of Probation and Parole.
Although Defendant claims he was unaware of his status at WCCC, Defendant had been
placed in Building 18 on two prior occasions. Defendant explained his understanding that one
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could only leave Building 18 with signed permission, and that exit and entry was only allowed
through the front door of each facility building. Defendant had knowledge that the doors were
triggered with alarms, and that exiting through the fire exits was not a proper form of exit from
the facility. Furthermore, not only was Defendant aware that the facilities were locked, but likely
understood that Building 30 was a facility specifically housing parole violators, who are charged
with Escape if they leave without authorization. When Officer Samsel encountered Defendant at
Redners after his fleeing ofWCCC, Defendant even told Office Samsel he was "court committed
to WCCC." N.T., p. 60, 6/17/14.
Based on Defendant's known prior experiences at WCCC and admission of commitment,
the jury found Defendant's testimony to be less credible. This Court is well within its discretion
to reject the Defendant's claim that he believed he was reinstated onto his original parole.
Additionally, it is apparent Defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that he would be charged with Escape as a result of his conduct. Defendant's placement in
Building 30 and notice of his detainment in the parole violator's center served as a warning to
Defendant that his supervision status had changed. Defendant chose to disregard these warnings,
involving a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe
in his situation, thereby acting recklessly when making the decision to leave WCCC in an
unauthorized manner. Thus, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the
Defendant's conviction of Escape.
II. Abuse of Discretion
Defendant claims this Court abused its discretion when it overruled Defense's objection
to the Commonwealth eliciting testimony from Defendant concerning the circumstances that led
to his expulsion from ADAPPT as that situation is irrelevant to the crime of Escape that was
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charged against Roy Snyder and the introduction of such evidence is not harmless error because
it is prejudicial against Defendant and the evidence has no probative value.
The scope and manner of cross-examination are within the trial court's discretion, and
that discretion will not be disturbed absent its abuse or an error of law. Commonwealth v. Wilson,
649 A.2d 435, 445 (Pa. 1994). "The rightof cross-examination includes the right to examine the
. . .
witness on any facts tending to refute inferences or deductions arising from matters the witness
testified to on direct examination." Rafter v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 632 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa.
Super.1993) (quoting Kemp v. Qualls, 473 A.2d 1369, 1371 (Pa. Super. 1984)). "Generally,
[ e]very circumstance relating to the direct testimony of an adverse witness or relating to anything
within his or her knowledge is a proper subject for cross-examination, including any matter
which might qualify or diminish the impact of direct examination." Jacobs v. Chatwani, 922
A.2d 950, 965 (Pa.Super. 2007) .
. During trial, Defendant was questioned by Defense Counsel about his technical parole
violations resulting in his removal from the ADAPPT program. N.T., p. 127, 6/17/14. Defense
Counsel also questioned Agent Bardwell about Defendant's violation of parole conditionsat
ADAPPT as well. N.T., p. 67, 6/17/14. Commonwealth's Exhibit 1 was introduced at trial,
which is a copy of Defendant's Discharge Summary from ADAPPT. Agent Bardwell testified to
the following about the Commonwealth's Exhibit:
AGENT BARDWELL: Yes. This states that on November 30, 2013 that he was
released to parole and discharged from the facility with an
unsuccessful completion of the program at the halfway
house and, yes, that Irecall, yes, that's the date.
N.T., pp. 74-75, 6/17/14.
Considering the Defendant's Discharge Summary from ADAPPT was entered into
evidence and Defendant's parole violations at ADAPPT were a topic of discussion, it was proper
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to permit the Commonwealth to inquire into the incident that triggered Defendant's eventual
transfer to WCCC. In setting limits on cross-examination, this Court believed such questioning
was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury. Additionally, the parole violations committed by
Defendant at ADAPPT were not only relevant to aid in the understanding of the chronology of
events leading up to Defendant's eventual transfer to WCCC, but also helped in distinguishing
the difference between his parole status in the halfway house when compared to his detained
status inside Building 30. The helpfulness of the testimony outweighed its potential confusion or
prejudice, thereby this Court did not commit an abuse of discretion when it overruled Defense's
objection to the Commonwealth eliciting testimony from Defendant concerning the
circumstances that led to his expulsion from ADAPPT.
III. Trial Court Error
Defendant's final claim is that this Court erred in instructing the jury that the definition of
''official detention" excludes only "active" supervision of probation or parole because
18 Pa. C. S .A. § 5121 makes no distinction in type or status of supervision.
When examining the propriety of the instructions the trial court provides to a jury, the
· reviewing court must determine whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or
committed an error oflaw which controlled the outcome of the case. Commonwealth v. Thomas,
904 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. 2006). A jury charge is grounds for reversible error only if the
charge, when read as a whole, is inadequate, unclear, or has a tendency to confuse or mislead,
rather than clarify, a material issue. Id. Moreover, trial courts have broad discretion in phrasing
their jury instructions and are not limited to using particular language so long as the applicable
law is explained clearly, adequately, and accurately to the jury. Commonwealth v. McClendon,
874A.2d 1223, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2005).
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!
N,
fi
'tr
At trial, this Court provided the jury with the suggested Pennsylvania Standard Jury
~ Instruction, 15.5121A. Ultimately, the trial court instructed the jury as follows on the matter of
escape:
THE COURT:
The defendant has been charged with the offense of escape. To find the defendant guilty
of this offense, you must find that the following elements have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant was under official detention. Official detention
includes arrest or being informed by law enforcement that an arrest warrant exists for him
and that he is in fact under arrest or detention in any facility for custody of persons under
charge or conviction of crime or detention for law enforcement purposes. The second
element is that the defendant unlawfully removed himself from the official detention.
Now if, and only if, you find that the above elements have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must then indicate on the verdict form whether you find the
following element also proven to that standard: that final element is that the defendant
was under arrest for or detained on a charge of felony. The parties stipulated that the
Defendant's original offense was a felony.
Now irregularity in bringing about or maintaining detention or lack of jurisdiction
of the committing or detaining authority is not a defense to a charge of escape. Those are
the basic elements for you to consider. I would note that under the law the phrase official
detention does not include active supervision of probation or parole.
To be convicted of escape, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a
person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly as to the question of whether the person
was under official detention. A person acts intentionally when it is his conscious
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objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. A person acts knowingly,
or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause a result. A person acts recklessly with respect to a
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
For recklessly, the risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a person, a reasonable person
would observe in the actor's situation. Now an individual committed to a community
corrections center or a community corrections facility shall be deemed to be in official
detention under the statute relating to escape. Once a parolee is arrested and detained for
failing to report, he is in official detention.
If the Defendant understood that the nature of his placement had materially
changed and that he was now housed in a facility in which his freedom was substantially
restricted, then you may conclude that he had the necessary state of mind that he was in
detention. Now because neither the scope of supervision of parole nor the interplay of the
phrase with the remainder of the statute has ever been specified you may find that the
statutory language is ambiguous under the present facts such that statutory interpretation
is warranted.
I would note that the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act requires that penal
provisions that would be a statute about a crime, where there is a penalty, penal
provisions of statutes must be strictly construed thus where thereabout [ sic - transcription
error J an ambiguity in the language ofthe penal statute such language should be
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interpreted in the light most favorable to the accused by the Statutory Construction Act
also requires that the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. _
When the words of the statute are not explicit the intention of the General
Assembly may be ascertained by considering there are actually six factors, three of which
may apply to this case. Those factors would be the occasion and necessity for the statute,
the mischief to be remedied, and the object to be attained.
N.T., pp. 194-197, 6/18/14.
The instructions as a whole fairly convey the required legal principles at issue in this
case. This Court added additional language to the standard instruction because of the ambiguity
in the law which has caused confusion in numerous jurisdictions. In reviewing a challenged jury
instruction, we must review the charge not in isolated portions but as a whole to ascertain
whether it fairly conveys the required legal principles at issue. Commonwealth v. Bracey, 831
A.2d 678 (Pa.Super.2003). The term "active supervision" could be found in a single sentence of
this Court's instructions to the jury to help differentiate between active and detained supervision
which was a common theme throughout the jury trial. Looking at the entirety of the instructions
the law was clearly and accurately presented to the jury and the trial court did not err by
including the term "active supervision."
Therefore, this Court respectfully requests that the Defendant's appeal be denied.
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