MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jun 03 2015, 5:48 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Patricia Caress McMath Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Darrin Purnell, June 3, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1411-CR-535
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable Stanley E. Kroh,
State of Indiana, Judge Pro Tempore.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49G03-1408-F5-38091
Barteau, Senior Judge
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Statement of the Case
[1] Darrin Purnell appeals his conviction of operating a motor vehicle after
1
forfeiture of driving privileges for life, a Level 5 felony. We affirm.
Issues
[2] Purnell raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Purnell’s confession.
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support Purnell’s
conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Shortly after midnight on August 2, 2014, Steven Smith was at his business in
Indianapolis. His dog barked at a window, so he looked outside. Smith saw
two men, one of whom was later identified as Purnell, walking away from a car
that was parked at a building next to Smith’s business. The car had not been
there when Smith last looked outside forty-five to sixty minutes prior.
[4] Purnell and his companion walked between two buildings, where Smith lost
sight of them behind several dumpsters. Their actions were suspicious to Smith
because it was late at night and none of the neighboring businesses were open.
1
Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 (2014).
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Smith walked over to the car, wrote down its license plate number, and called
the police.
[5] Officer Bryan Sosbe arrived at the scene five minutes after Smith called,
followed by two other officers. After talking with Smith, Officer Sosbe walked
in the direction where Smith said Purnell and his companion had gone. He did
not see anyone in the darkness, so he called for a K9 unit. When the K9 unit
arrived and approached the dumpsters, Purnell appeared from behind the
dumpsters with his hands up. The K9 unit did not locate Purnell’s companion.
[6] The officers handcuffed Purnell and moved him to the front of Smith’s
business. Officer Sosbe read Purnell his Miranda rights. Officer Sosbe asked
Purnell why he was behind the dumpsters, and Purnell said he went back there
to urinate. Officer Sosbe accused Purnell of lying because the dumpsters were
four hundred feet from the car, and “no one is going to walk . . . 400 feet or
more just to go behind a dumpster to urinate.” Tr. p. 61. Next, Officer Andrew
Spalding spoke with Purnell. Purnell told Officer Spalding “he had parked the
car right up here,” referencing the car from which Smith had seen him walking
away. Id. at 34.
[7] One of the officers looked up Purnell’s driving record and determined that his
driving privileges had been forfeited for life. The officers arrested Purnell.
During a search of Purnell’s person, Officer Sosbe found a car key. Purnell
admitted that the key was for the car. The police called a tow truck to impound
the car, and the tow truck driver used the key to turn on the car’s engine.
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[8] The State charged Purnell with operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of
driving privileges for life, a Level 5 felony. Purnell waived his right to trial by
jury and agreed to a bench trial. After hearing evidence, the judge determined
that Purnell was guilty and sentenced him. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Confession
[9] Purnell argues that the trial court erred by admitting Officer Spalding’s
testimony that Purnell told him “[Purnell] had parked the car right up here.”
Tr. p. 34. He claims that his statement amounted to a confession, and it was
inadmissible in the absence of other evidence that a crime occurred.
[10] As a preliminary issue, the State argues that Purnell has waived his claim
because he did not timely object to Officer Spalding’s statement. We agree.
The transcript demonstrates that Purnell did not object, so he failed to preserve
his claim for appellate review. See Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 684 (Ind.
2009) (challenge to admissibility of confession waived where defendant
objected at trial, but on different grounds than he sought to present on appeal).
[11] Waiver notwithstanding, we choose to address Purnell’s claim. The trial court
has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Guilmette v. State,
14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). We review an evidentiary ruling for an abuse of
discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.
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[12] In Indiana, a crime may not be proven solely by a confession. Wilkes, 917
N.E.2d at 684. Admission of a confession requires some independent evidence
that a crime was committed. Id. This requirement is known as the corpus
delicti rule. The State need not prove every element of the corpus delicti
beyond a reasonable doubt, but the independent evidence must support an
inference—which may be established by circumstantial evidence—that the
crime was committed. Upshaw v. State, 934 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), trans. denied.
[13] Here, Smith saw Purnell and his companion walk away from a car. After the
police detained Purnell, they discovered that his driving privileges had been
suspended for life. During a search incident to arrest, the officers discovered a
key on Purnell. He conceded that the key was for the car. A tow truck operator
used the key to turn on the car’s engine.
[14] This circumstantial evidence supports an inference that Purnell drove the car
despite having his driving privileges suspended for life and establishes the
corpus delicti necessary for the admission of his confession. Consequently,
even if Purnell had not waived this claim for appellate review, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by admitting his confession.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[15] Purnell argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence needed to
support a conviction, it neither reweighs evidence nor judges the credibility of
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witnesses. Tin Thang v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1256, 1258 (Ind. 2014). Those tasks
are reserved for the finder of fact. Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012).
Instead, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Bailey v. State, 907
N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). We will affirm if there is substantial evidence
of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that
the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[16] In order to obtain a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while driving
privileges are forfeited for life, a Level 5 felony, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Purnell: (1) operated (2) a motor vehicle (3)
after his driving privileges had been forfeited for life. Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17.
[17] Purnell’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is premised upon his claim
that the trial court should not have admitted his confession, but he did not
preserve that claim for appellate review. Thus, the evidence against Purnell
includes: (1) Smith’s observation of Purnell and a companion walking away
from a car; (2) Purnell’s statement to Officer Spalding that “he had parked the
car right up here,” Tr. p. 34; (3) the officers’ discovery via electronic records
that Purnell’s driving privileges had been suspended for life; and (4) the officers’
discovery on Purnell’s person of the key that turned on the car. This is
sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that Purnell
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 813
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had
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operated a motor vehicle although no one saw the defendant drive the car),
trans. denied.
Conclusion
[18] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[19] Affirmed-Barteau, J.
Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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