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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-15285
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-01334-AEP
KIMBERLEE K. LEWEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(June 4, 2015)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Kimberlee Lewen challenges on this appeal the magistrate judge’s order
affirming the Social Security Administration’s denial of her application for
supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c).1 In denying her
application, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Lewen had the
residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with several physical,
environmental, and psychological limitations. Regarding psychological
limitations, the ALJ found that Lewen was limited to “tasks and instructions that
are simple and consistent with unskilled work,” occasional interaction with the
public, and “routine and occasional interaction with supervisors.” Based partly on
this determination of Lewen’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ then concluded
that Lewen was not disabled because there were a significant number of jobs in the
national economy that she could perform.
On appeal, Lewen contends that the ALJ erred in failing to properly evaluate
various medical opinions when determining Lewen’s residual functional capacity.
In a Social Security appeal, we review de novo the legal principles upon
which the ALJ’s decision is based. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 2005). We review the resulting decision only to determine whether
substantial evidence supports it. Id. Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance, but rather such relevant evidence that a reasonable person would
1
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. Id. This limited review precludes our
deciding the facts anew, making credibility determinations, or reweighing the
evidence. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proving a qualifying disability. Id.
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers medical
opinions together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b).
Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists that reflect
judgments about the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairments, including
(1) what the claimant “can still do despite impairments,” and (2) her “mental
restrictions.” Id. § 404.1527(a)(2).
While the ALJ’s explanation of the decision must sufficiently explain the
weight given to “obviously probative exhibits,” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d
731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981), it need not discuss every piece of evidence. See Dyer v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). “In all events, there is no rigid
requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her]
decision,” so long as the decision enables the reviewing court to conclude that the
ALJ considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole. Id. In assessing
medical evidence, an ALJ is required to state with particularity the weight given to
the different medical opinions and the reasons therefor. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825
F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987).
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Lewen’s contention, that the ALJ did not properly consider the medical
opinions, lacks merit. The mental limitations imposed in the ALJ’s determination
of Lewen’s residual functional capacity were consistent with the medical opinions,
even the portions that the ALJ did not specifically quote in her order. The ALJ
limited Lewen to simple tasks and instructions, occasional interaction with the
public, and occasional routine interaction with supervisors. Lewen was further
limited to tasks and instructions that were “consistent with unskilled work.” There
is no indication that these limitations do not account for the doctors’ opinions in
their entireties. Rather, any need to limit Lewen’s ability to concentrate, deal with
stress, or maintain a regular schedule on the job—opinions that Lewen argues are
omitted from the ALJ’s decision—is accounted for by the ALJ limiting her to
simple tasks and unskilled work with little interaction with the public and
supervisors. Moreover, there is no indication that the doctors, by opining that
Lewen might have difficulties dealing with stress, concentrating, or maintaining a
schedule, meant that these limitations would limit her ability to work a full work
day/week. These doctors opined that, despite these limitations, she could perform
simple routine tasks. Finally, while the ALJ is required to state the weight
afforded to each medical opinion, Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279, the ALJ is not
required to discuss every piece of evidence. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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AFFIRMED.
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