14‐2667
United States v. Braan
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER
THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of June, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
PETER W. HALL,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
‐v.‐ No. 14‐2667
MACEO BRAAN, AKA TEEFUS,
Defendant ‐ Appellant.*
____________________________________________
*
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to amend the caption as set forth above.
FOR APPELLANT: MARK B. GOMBINER (Colleen P. Cassidy, on the brief),
Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: JAMES P. LOONAM, Assistant United States Attorney
(Susan Corkery, Assistant United States Attorney, on the
brief), for Kelly T. Currie, Acting United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.
____________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Townes, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment and sentence of the district
court be and hereby are AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐Appellant Maceo Braan appeals from the district court’s
finding of good cause to allow the introduction of otherwise inadmissible
hearsay evidence at Braan’s violation of supervised release hearing.1 Revocation
proceedings must afford the accused the “minimum requirements of due
process.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). If the Government
requests admission of a hearsay statement that does not fall within one of the
established hearsay exceptions, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C)
1 “We review de novo the district court’s determination that [the defendant’s] due
process rights were not violated . . . .” United States v. Ramos, 401 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.
2005). We also review its “balancing of the Rule 32.1 factors for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2006).
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“requires the court to determine whether good cause exists to deny the
defendant the opportunity to confront the adverse witness.” United States v.
Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006). “In making that determination, the court
must balance, on the one hand, the defendant’s interest in confronting the
declarant[] against, on the other hand, the government’s reasons for not
producing the witness and the reliability of the proffered hearsay.” Id.
Here, the court acknowledged that Braan had a strong interest in cross‐
examining the hearsay declarant. However, the court’s finding of good cause is
supported by the record as a whole. The hearsay evidence was reliable because
it was corroborated by a video that the district court found showed Braan
engaging in a cocaine sale, as well as the location of Braan’s home, the testifying
officer’s observation of Braan’s tattoos, and Braan’s history of participation in
drug trafficking, as evinced by his underlying conviction. See United States v.
Carthen, 681 F.3d 94, 100‐01 (2d Cir. 2012). Our review of the entire record does
not reveal an abuse of discretion.
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For the reasons stated above, the judgment and sentence of the district
court are AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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