This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1787
Chandler Billings,
Respondent,
vs.
65th Street Property Management, LLC,
Relator,
Department of Employment and
Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed June 8, 2015
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Department of Employment and
Economic Development
File No. 32596248-3
Chandler Billings, Stewartville, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
James A. Godwin, Rick A. Dold, Ryan E. Rousseau, Godwin Law Office, Rochester,
Minnesota (for relator)
Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Minge,
Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment
pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A man was fired from his job because he cleaned and put away his tools at the end
of his workday, rather than leaving the workplace immediately after his work was
completed without cleaning and putting away the tools. An unemployment-law judge
concluded that he did not engage in employment misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
Chandler Billings worked for 65th Street Property Management, LLC, from
March 1, 2012, to May 19, 2014. His duties involved maintenance and groundskeeping
as well as dog-walking and other personal services for Courtnay Montgomery, the
manager of the property, who lives on site.
On May 13, 2014, Billings was mowing a lawn. Montgomery was dissatisfied
with his work. She sent him a text message saying that he could leave when he finished
mowing. When Billings finished mowing the lawn, he “sprayed everything off with the
hose, made everything clean the way [Montgomery] likes it, put everything away and
left.” Six days later, 65th Street terminated Billings’s employment, in part because he did
not leave work immediately after he finished mowing on May 13. At the time of the
termination, 65th Street provided two other reasons for terminating Billings. But in its
appellate brief, 65th Street relies only on the reason that Billings did not leave work
immediately after he finished mowing on May 13.
Billings applied for unemployment benefits. The department of employment and
economic development made an initial determination that he is ineligible for benefits on
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the ground that he was discharged for employment misconduct. Billings filed an
administrative appeal. A ULJ conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which Billings and
Montgomery testified. The ULJ concluded that Billings’s conduct was not employment
misconduct, as defined by the unemployment statutes. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 6(a) (2014). Thus, the ULJ determined that Billings is not ineligible for
unemployment benefits. After 65th Street requested reconsideration, the ULJ affirmed
her earlier determination. 65th Street appeals to this court by way of a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
65th Street argues that the ULJ erred by concluding that Billings did not engage in
employment misconduct and that he is not ineligible for unemployment benefits. This
court reviews a ULJ’s decision granting unemployment benefits to determine whether the
findings, inferences, conclusions of law, or decision are affected by an error of law or are
unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record. Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d) (2014). The ULJ’s factual findings are viewed in the light most favorable to
the decision being reviewed. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn.
App. 2006). The ultimate determination whether an employee is ineligible for
unemployment benefits is a question of law, which is subject to a de novo standard of
review. See id.
“An applicant who was discharged from employment by an employer is ineligible
for all unemployment benefits . . . if . . . the applicant was discharged because of
employment misconduct as defined in subdivision 6.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1)
(2014). “Employment misconduct” is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or
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indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job that displays clearly: (1) a serious violation
of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the
employee; or (2) a substantial lack of concern for the employment.” Id., subd. 6(a)
(2014). “As a general rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s reasonable policies and
requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644
N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002).
In this case, the ULJ made the following findings about the events of May 13,
2014: “Billings mowed Montgomery’s lawn. Montgomery was unhappy with his work
and told him to leave when he was finished mowing. Billings cleaned and put away the
mowing equipment before leaving. Montgomery was upset that Billings did not leave
immediately after mowing.” The ULJ ultimately determined that the “preponderance of
the evidence shows that [Billings’s] conduct was not employment misconduct.” The
ULJ’s ultimate determination was based on the following reasoning: “It is not
unreasonable for an employee to clean and put away tools used to finish a job. An
average reasonable employee would put away his tools if his employer told him to stop
doing a job with those tools, rather than immediately set them down and walk away.”
The ULJ’s findings and reasoning comport with the evidentiary record and with
common sense. Billings testified that he received a text message from Montgomery
saying only that he could leave when he finished mowing the lawn. Billings also testified
that he “sprayed everything off with the hose, made everything clean the way
[Montgomery] likes it, put everything away and left.” Billings testified further that he
was concerned that he would be terminated if he did not clean and put away his tools
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after he finished mowing. Billings’s testimony gives the impression that it was
customary for him to clean and put away his tools whenever he finished mowing and that
Montgomery generally wanted him to do so. The ULJ was entitled to make such
inferences, which would support the ULJ’s decision. Thus, Billings’s testimony provides
ample support for the ULJ’s factual findings and the ultimate determination that he did
not engage in employment misconduct.
65th Street contends that Billings engaged in insubordination by remaining on the
employer’s premises after being told to leave. In general, an employee engages in
misconduct by not abiding by an employer’s reasonable request. Schmidgall, 644
N.W.2d at 804. But the record of the hearing before the ULJ does not contain any
evidence that Montgomery told Billings that he must leave the premises the very instant
he finished mowing, without taking any other action. The most extensive and clear
evidence about Montgomery’s communication to Billings is Billings’s own testimony,
which is as follows:
[Montgomery] sent me a text saying that when I was done
mowing, when I was done mowing I could leave . . . . I said
fine. I picked up, I cleaned up everything I had out because I
knew if I left things just left, I just up and left I would be fired
for that. So I made sure I put everything away that I had out,
sprayed everything off with the hose, made everything clean
the way [Montgomery] likes it, put everything away and left.
There was no documentary evidence of the text message that Montgomery sent to
Billings that afternoon. Montgomery’s testimony about the issue is very general and
brief and does not contradict Billings’s version of the events. In light of all the evidence,
the ULJ did not err by finding that Billings did not disobey an instruction to leave work
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immediately after completing the mowing, before cleaning and putting away the lawn
mower and other tools, because, as far as the evidence shows, there was no such
instruction.
65th Street also contends that Billings’s conduct should be deemed misconduct
because the company “was required to pay [Billings] for additional wages” for the time
he spent cleaning and putting away the tools and that he “unilaterally increased his pay
despite his supervisor instructing him to leave the premises.” This contention, which
focuses on the impact on the employer, does not overcome the ULJ’s finding that Billings
did not disregard an employer’s instruction, for the reasons already discussed. In any
event, there is no evidence in the record that Billings’s conduct actually increased the
employer’s wage expenses. That is so because there is no evidence in the record as to
how much time Billings spent cleaning and putting away the tools and no evidence as to
whether he actually was paid for that time. Thus, even if it were relevant, 65th Street did
not introduce evidence of increased wage expenses.
In sum, the ULJ did not err by finding that Billings did not engage in employment
misconduct.
Affirmed.
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