FILED
JUNE 9, 2015
In the Office ofthe Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 32182-7-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
SHANE ALLAN JONES, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
FEARING, J. - Shane Allan Jones appeals from a trial court order denying his
RCW 10.73.170 motion for DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) testing of evidence regarding
his 2003 conviction upon a plea of guilty to two counts of first degree child rape. Jones
contends the trial court abused its discretion by summarily denying his motion on the
ground that he did not show a likelihood that DNA evidence would demonstrate
innocence on a more probable than not basis. We affirm the denial on the ground that no
. biological evidence was tested at the time of the prosecution.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2003, Shane Allan Jones entered a guilty plea to two counts of first degree child
rape. The crimes occurred in 1995 and 1998 and involved separate victims, well known
No. 32182-7-III
State v. Jones
to Jones, who were ages two and six at the time of the respective crimes. Law
enforcement investigated the incidents beginning in May of 2002, when the children
disclosed that he sexually abused them. One child described Jones engaging in oral
penile contact with him. The other child related giving oral sex and masturbating Jones.
Jones admitted to the crimes in his signed guilty plea statement and in a subsequent
interview with the presentence investigator. The State did not rely on any physical or
biological evidence. The trial court imposed on Jones a 216-month prison sentence on
November 17, 2003.
On December 6,2013, Shane Allan Jones filed in the superior court a motion
under RCW 10.73.170 for DNA testing of "all of the physical evidence collected" in the
case. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 61. In his supporting affidavit, Jones requested testing
"upon the grounds that (1) the conviction rested primarily on eyewitness identification
evidence, (2) there is demonstrable doubt concerning [his] identification as the
perpetrator, and (3) DNA testing would likely be conclusive on that issue." CP at 63.
Also on December 6, the court entered an order summarily denying the motion on the
bases that (1) Jones plead guilty to the charges in May 2003, and (2) he had not shown a
likelihood that DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not
basis. We stayed this appeal pending the Supreme Court's decision and mandate in State
v. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d 252,332 P.3d 448 (2014).
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State v. Jones
ANALYSIS
In State v. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d 252, 332 P.3d 448 (2014), our state high court
held that the trial court must presume that DNA test results would be favorable to a
convicted defendant when deciding whether he has shown a likelihood that DNA
evidence would probably demonstrate his innocence. The sole issue on appeal is whether
the trial court erred in denying Shane Allan Jones' motion for DNA testing because it
failed to follow the presumption.
A trial court's decision on a motion for postconviction DNA testing is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. State v. Riofta, 166 Wn.2d 358, 370,209 P.3d 467 (2009). A
court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on
untenable grounds. State v. Ratay, 167 Wn.2d 644, 655, 222 P.3d 86 (2009). A decision
is based upon untenable grounds or made for untenable reasons if it is made on facts
unsupported in the record or is reached by applying the wrong legal standard. ld.
RCW 10.73.170 allows a convicted person currently serving a prison sentence to
petition the trial court for postconviction DNA testing. The petitioner must satisfy both
procedural and substantive requirements of the statute. RCW 10.73.170(2), (3). The
statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person convicted of a felony in a Washington state court who
currently is serving a term of imprisonment may submit to the court that
entered the judgment of conviction a verified written motion requesting
DNA testing, with a copy of the motion provided to the state office of
public defense.
(2) The motion shall:
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No. 32182-7-111
State v. Jones
(a) State that:
(i) The court ruled that DNA testing did not meet acceptable
scientific standards; or
(ii) DNA testing technology was not sufficiently developed to test
the DNA evidence in the case; or
(iii) The DNA testing now requested would be significantly more
accurate than prior DNA testing or would provide significant new
informati on;
(b) Explain why DNA evidence is material to the identity of the
perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, or to sentence enhancement; and
(c) Comply with all other procedural requirements established by
court rule.
(3) The court shall grant a motion requesting DNA testing under this
section if such motion is in the form required by subsection (2) of this
section, and the convicted person has shown the likelihood that the DNA
evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis.
The statute requires a trial court to grant a motion for postconviction testing when
exculpatory results would, in combination with other evidence, raise a reasonable
probability the petitioner was not the perpetrator. State v. Riofia, 166 Wn.2d at 370.
In Crumpton, the Supreme Court held that a trial court should presume DNA
evidence would be favorable to the convicted individual when determining if it is likely
the evidence would prove their innocence. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d at 255, 260. In
holding that this presumption is part of the standard in RCW 10.73.170, the Supreme
Court explained:
A court should look to whether, considering all the evidence from
the trial and assuming an exculpatory DNA test result, it is likely the
individual is innocent on a more probable than not basis. If so, the court
should grant the motion and allow testing to be done. Only then can it be
determined whether the DNA actually exculpates the individual and if the
results could be used to support a motion for new trial.
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No. 32182-7-II1
State v. Jones
Id. at 260-61. The Supreme Court further observed that "[m]any innocent individuals
have been exonerated through postconviction DNA tests, including some who had
overwhelming evidence indicating guilt." Id. at 261-62.
Shane Allan Jones contends that his conviction fulfills the Supreme Court's
observation because, despite his guilty plea, he is likely innocent if the DNA does not
match. He thus contends that, under Crumpton, the trial court should have evaluated the
likelihood of innocence based on a presumed favorable test result, not the likelihood of a
favorable test result in the first place. He argues that, since the record does not confirm
that the trial court applied the favorable presumption, this court must find an abuse of
discretion and remand to the trial court to apply the proper standard to his motion.
We agree with Shane Allan Jones that the trial court record does not reflect that
the lower court applied the favorable presumption. We conclude, however, that any
failure to apply the presumption does not constitute error. A motion for DNA testing and
the Supreme Court's imposition of the presumption serves no purpose when law
enforcement never collected any physical or biological evidence in the case. Jones'
guilty plea, conviction, and sentencing was based solely on the children's disclosures and
his admissions. His identity as the perpetrator was never in question during plea
proceedings.
Shane Allan Jones cannot satisfy the procedural requirements of RCW
10.73. 170(2)(a) because the State conducted no testing that failed to meet acceptable
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No. 32182-7-111
State v. Jones
scientific standards; the State possessed no evidence unable to be tested due to
insufficient technology; and current DNA testing would not provide any new significant
infonnation because of no prior testing. Since there is no DNA evidence to test and no
prejudice shown by Jones, a remand for entry of more thorough findings or application of
the favorable presumption to the trial court's decision under RCW 10.73.170(3) would be
a useless and unnecessary act. An appellate court need not remand for a futile exercise.
Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wn.2d 503, 508, 403 P.2d 664 (1965).
CONCLUSION
We affinn the trial court's denial of Shane Allan Jones' request for DNA testing.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Fearmg,
WE CONCUR:
~)At4-
Brown, A.C.J.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
6
State of Washington v. Shane Allan Jones
Combined Opinion