14‐4284
United States v. Beckett
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER
THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of June, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
‐v.‐ No. 14‐4284
CARTENSE A. BECKETT, AKA ALPHONSO C. BECKETT,
Defendant ‐ Appellant.
____________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: MEGAN WOLFE BENETT, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP
(Joyce C. London, Law Office of Joyce London, P.C., on
the brief), New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: HARRIS FISCHMAN (Margaret Garnett, on the brief), for
Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, New York, NY.
____________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Pauley, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment and sentence of the district
court be and hereby are AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐Appellant Cartense Beckett appeals from the district court’s
imposition of a new fourteen‐month term of supervised release.1 Beckett argues
that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his continued alcohol
treatment and his significant contributions to the welfare of his family.
However, the sentence imposed in this case was not substantively unreasonable
because Beckett had violated his supervised release in a way that the district
court described as “contemptuous” [J.A. at 35], and the sentence was not
“shockingly high . . . or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law,” United
1 “Substantive reasonableness is . . . reviewed for abuse of discretion[.]” United States v.
Desnoyers, 708 F.3d 378, 385 (2d Cir. 2013). In addition, “[b]ecause a determination of
whether the district court improperly considered the defendant’s [sex] is a pure
question of law, we review this aspect of the sentencing de novo.” United States v. Kaba,
480 F.3d 152, 156‐57 (2d Cir. 2007).
2
States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). Beckett’s argument that the
district court violated the Equal Protection Clause when fashioning Beckett’s
sentence is not supported by the record.
We have considered all of Beckett’s remaining arguments and conclude
that they are without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment and
sentence of the district court are AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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