14‐2423
Lawrence v. Ramseur
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER
THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of June, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
PETER W. HALL,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
DAVID LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
‐v.‐ No. 14‐2423
CRAIG RAMSEUR, individually and in his
official capacity as Court Attorney Referee,
WANDA WARDLAW MATTHEWS,
individually and in her official capacity as Court
Attorney Referee,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: David Lawrence, pro se, Valley Stream, NY.
____________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Kuntz, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and
hereby is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐Appellant David Lawrence (“Lawrence”), proceeding pro se,
appeals from the District Court’s judgment sua sponte dismissing his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
procedural history, and issues on appeal.
Lawrence filed this action against two state court officials alleging that the
state court’s entry of a temporary order of protection against him violates his
constitutional rights and seeking the order’s dismissal and other related relief.
The District Court sua sponte dismissed his complaint, concluding that the
abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), deprived the
court of subject matter jurisdiction. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149–50 (2d Cir.
2
2001). Moreover, we are free to affirm a decision on any grounds supported in
the record, even if it is not one on which the District Court relied. Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 2006).
While a pro se complaint “must be construed liberally to raise the strongest
arguments it suggests,” it must nonetheless “state a plausible claim for relief.”
Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Here, Lawrence fails to plausibly allege facts
sufficient to state a federal claim.1 Cf. Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.
1999); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). We have considered all of
Lawrence’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
1
In addition, Lawrence sporadically reargues points that he raised in a previous, related
appeal. We dismissed that appeal, also pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), because “it
lack[ed] an arguable basis in law or fact.” Lawrence v. Hoyos, No. 14‐959, Doc. No. 21 (2d
Cir. June 20, 2014).
3