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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
CHRISTOPHER LEITNER, : No. 186 EDA 2011
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, October 13, 2010,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0000137-2010
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 10, 2015
Appellant, Christopher Leitner, appeals from the October 13, 2010
judgment of sentence imposing a term of five to ten months’ imprisonment
with immediate parole followed by three years’ probation, and entered after
a bench trial where appellant was found guilty of criminal trespass,
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1). After careful review, we affirm.
The facts underlying this appeal, as summarized by the trial court, are
as follows:
On October 18, 2009, at approximately
1:30 p.m., Officer McCarthy was on duty in the area
of 1452 East Wilt Street in the City and County of
Philadelphia. (Notes of Testimony from 10/13/10
(hereinafter N.T.) at 11) Officer McCarthy was in
uniform and working solo in a marked police car. He
responded to a home at that address after receiving
a radio call and arrived at the same time as
Officer Fisher, also solo and also in uniform and a
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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marked police car. Officer McCarthy exited his
vehicle and noticed a for sale sign on the home and
broken glass on the sidewalk by a basement window.
(N.T. at 12) Officer McCarthy attempted to enter
through the front door, which was locked. He then
went down an alleyway and hopped a fence into the
backyard. He and Officer Fisher entered the house
through an unlocked rear door. Upon entering the
dining room, Officer McCarthy saw Appellant coming
upstairs from the basement with a black duffle bag.
Upon seeing the Officers, Appellant dropped the bag
and ran for the front door. (N.T. at 13) The officers
quickly secured Appellant who stated that he was
working on the home. (N.T. at 14) Appellant was
wearing a black sweatshirt and Dickies, not a
uniform, and there was no work truck outside the
home. (N.T. at 15) Officer McCarthy testified that
the home was vacant but had recently been
renovated and that the work appeared to be
completed (N.T. at 16-17). The officers recovered
the black duffle ba[g], which contained
approximately twenty pounds of used copper piping.
(N.T. at 14)
Trial court opinion, 12/4/14 at 1-2.
Appellant was charged with burglary, theft by unlawful taking,
receiving stolen property, criminal mischief, and criminal trespass. At the
conclusion of his bench trial, appellant was found guilty of criminal trespass,
graded as a felony of the third degree. Appellant was found not guilty of the
remaining charges. Immediately following his trial, appellant was sentenced
to five to ten months’ incarceration with immediate parole plus three years’
reporting probation. No direct appeal was filed.
On December 10, 2010, the trial court granted appellant’s petition for
allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc and reinstated his direct appeal rights.
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On January 10, 2011, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 1 The trial
court failed to order appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal and, on August 16, 2013, wrote an opinion stating
any appellate issues were waived. On October 21, 2013, this court granted
appellant’s motion to vacate briefing schedule, remand for completion of the
record, and directed the trial court to issue a Rule 1925(b) order. On
March 18, 2014, appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) statement, and the trial
court filed an opinion on December 4, 2014.
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Was not the evidence presented insufficient as a
matter of law to sustain appellant’s conviction for
criminal trespass as a felony of the third degree,
where evidence of flight alone cannot support a
conviction and the trial court stated that
non-criminal reasons could have explained
appellant’s presence in the property?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
When reviewing a claim challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence, we apply the following standard:
[W]hether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the
fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not
weigh the evidence and substitute our
1
The 30th day to file a timely notice of appeal fell on Sunday, January 9,
2011. Consequently, that day is not included in the computation of time.
See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (excluding weekends and holidays from the
computation of time).
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judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need
not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its
burden of proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the
entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the trier of fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000
(Pa.Super.2003) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Gooding, 818 A.2d 546, 549 (Pa.Super.2003),
appeal denied, 575 Pa. 691, 835 A.2d 709 (2003)).
Commonwealth v. Jannett, 58 A.3d 818, 819-820 (Pa.Super. 2012).
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines Criminal Trespass, in pertinent
part, as follows:
§ 3503. Criminal trespass
(a) Buildings and occupied structures.--
(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that
he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he:
(i) enters, gains entry by subterfuge
or surreptitiously remains in any
building or occupied structure or
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separately secured or occupied
portion thereof[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i). In accordance with these provisions, “[t]he
crime of criminal trespass is committed when a person enters a building or
occupied structure knowing that he is not licensed to do so.”
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d 699, 709 (Pa. 1989). There is a
scienter requirement to criminal trespass that the Commonwealth must
prove in order to convict; namely, the Commonwealth must prove that the
defendant reasonably knew that he was not permitted to be on the property.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 815 (Pa. 2006) (criminal
trespass requires awareness of lack of privilege to enter).
Appellant concedes he was in the house. However, he argues the
Commonwealth failed to prove that he lacked permission to be there.
Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to present an owner or
non-permission witness to establish the scienter element, such as testimony
regarding whether or when the renovations had been completed and by
whom. According to appellant, the Commonwealth’s case was based on
circumstantial evidence that established only that the arresting officer saw
appellant in the middle of the afternoon inside a house that was newly
renovated. Appellant does not dispute he tried to run to the front door when
the police officer appeared, but upon apprehension, appellant stated that he
was doing work at the house. Appellant points out that the only damage
observed was a broken basement window; the front door was locked and
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another door, through which the officers entered, was open and undamaged.
Appellant concludes there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knew he was not licensed or privileged to enter, or
that he gained entry by subterfuge or was surreptitiously remaining on the
premises. (Appellant’s brief at 11.)
The trial court, sitting as finder-of-fact in this non-jury case, opined:
There was only one witness and Appellant did not
present any evidence to rebut Officer McCarthy’s
version of events. The evidence showed that
Appellant, immediately upon seeing the officers[,]
ran and attempted to flee through the front door. It
was not until the officers apprehended him that he
claimed that he was working on the home. This is
clear evidence that he was on the premises illegally
and without permission. Appellant had a guilty
conscious [sic] and was attempting to get away.
Furthermore, Officer McCarthy testified that[:]
Appellant was not wearing a worker’s uniform, there
was no work truck at the site, and all renovations
appeared to be complete and no longer in progress.
Trial court opinion, 12/4/14 at 3.
Based on the above, the trial court drew a reasonable inference that
appellant entered the house through the broken basement window and was
proceeding up the basement stairs, carrying a duffel bag filled with
20 pounds of copper tubing, when the officers appeared. It is undisputed
that appellant dropped the bag and immediately ran in an attempt to flee.
Such evidence leads to a conclusion that appellant did not have permission
to be in the house. See Commonwealth v. Fox, 498 A.2d 917, 918
(Pa.Super. 1985) (finding sufficient evidence of non-permission where police
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found defendant hiding next to a building with a broken window and
defendant attempted to walk away from the officer).
Additionally, evidence that appellant attempted to flee the scene of a
crime is admissible to show consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v.
Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Pa.Super. 2008) (flight is a circumstance
tending to prove consciousness of guilt), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 1 (Pa.
2009); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 203 A.2d 782 (Pa. 1964) (flight as
evidence of consciousness of guilt may form the basis in connection with
other proof from which guilt may be inferred).
We note Officer McCarthy testified that he smelled fresh paint and it
appeared the house had been “recently renovated.” (Notes of testimony,
10/13/10 at 18-19.) While appellant stated that he was working on the
home, Officer McCarthy testified that it looked to him as though the work
was completed. (Id. at 17.) Additionally, Officer McCarthy testified
appellant was not wearing any type of work uniform nor was there a work
vehicle outside the house. (Id. at 15.) All of these facts led the trial court
to the conclusion that appellant was in the home without license or privilege.
See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 477 A.2d 1342, 1348 (Pa.Super. 1984)
(lack of privilege to enter may be proved from the surrounding
circumstances).
Appellant also argues the record was insufficient because the
Commonwealth did not introduce direct evidence of non-permission. That
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argument lacks merit as such evidence is not required. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden entirely through circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 805 (Pa.Super. 2014).
Last, appellant contends his conviction cannot stand because the trial
court stated it believed appellant’s behavior was equally consistent with
non-criminal behavior. (Appellant’s brief at 12.) Appellant cites to a
statement the trial judge made after finding him guilty of criminal trespass.
The trial judge said, “I think you did it. But unfortunately, without a
complaining witness, other things could have explained it.” (Notes of
testimony, 10/13/10 at 39.)
Appellant omits an entire passage. Prior to announcing the verdicts,
there was much discussion about the copper pipes appellant was carrying
and whether there was damage to the house. (Id. at 36-38.) The notes of
testimony show that the court first found appellant guilty of criminal
trespass and then found appellant not guilty of burglary, theft by unlawful
taking, receiving stolen property, and criminal mischief. (Id. at 38.) After
finding appellant “not guilty” of those crimes, the court said:
And, Sir, I want to be clear on this. I think that you
did it. I think the evidence shows you did it, but the
standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.
Beyond a reasonable doubt, I’m finding you in that
house without permission. That’s criminal trespass
into a structure. I think you did it. But
unfortunately without a complaining witness, other
things could have explained it.
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I just want you to know that; that I do think
you did it.
Id. at 38-39. It appears to this court the trial judge was indicating he
believed appellant was guilty of the other crimes but the Commonwealth had
not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, a review of the trial
court’s opinion shows our interpretation is, indeed, what the trial court
meant. The trial court explained: “Although this court believed Appellant
was probably guilty of all the offenses he was originally charged with, many
were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, all the elements of
criminal trespass were met since Appellant was in the home and was there
without a license or privilege.” (Trial court opinion, 12/4/14 at 3.)
Accordingly, based on the above, we affirm appellant’s judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/10/2015
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