NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 26, 2015
Decided June 10, 2015
Before
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐3118
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
v.
No. 13 CR 7‐1
SHERRI WILSON,
Defendant‐Appellant. Virginia M. Kendall,
Judge.
O R D E R
Sherri Wilson robbed two banks in a four‐month span, committing the second
robbery while out on bond for the first. She pleaded no contest to two counts of bank
robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and was sentenced below the guidelines range to 36
months’ imprisonment. Wilson filed a notice of appeal, but her appointed lawyer asserts
that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). Wilson opposes that motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), and also requests substitute
counsel. Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of this case and
addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because
the analysis in counsel’s brief appears to be thorough, we limit our discussion to the
No. 14‐3118 Page 2
issues identified in that brief and in Wilson’s response. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d
774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
In December 2012 Wilson, then 55, robbed a TCF Bank of $282 on Chicago’s south
side and was arrested a month later. After an initial appearance before a magistrate
judge, she was admonished about the terms of bond and released from custody. Wilson
later moved to suppress statements that she had made to the FBI, arguing that her
thinking at the time had been impaired by her medical conditions (including diabetes)
and prescription medicines. But in April 2013, before the motion could be heard, she held
up another south‐side TCF Bank of $80 and was promptly arrested a block or two away.
After a psychiatric examination Wilson was found competent to proceed, and she
agreed to plead “no contest” to a superseding indictment that incorporated both
robberies. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (explaining that a defendant
who maintains his innocence may nevertheless plead guilty in hopes of obtaining a
lighter sentence); Bey, 748 F.3d at 775. At sentencing, the district judge acknowledged the
irrationality of Wilson’s actions in robbing two banks, as well as her past medical and
mental health problems (including self‐reported suicide attempts), but concluded that the
seriousness of the offenses and Wilson’s risk of recidivism supported a below‐guidelines
sentence of 36 months on each count, to run concurrently.
Counsel begins by considering whether Wilson could challenge the voluntariness
of her no‐contest plea but neglects to say whether he consulted his client about this
possibility. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). And Wilson does not say in her Rule 51(b)
response whether she has discussed withdrawing her plea with counsel (though she
does assert that she is innocent of both bank robberies). These omissions do not require
that we deny this Anders submission, however, because our review of the record
persuades us that the district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 when accepting the plea. Wilson did not move to withdraw her plea in the
district court, and thus we would review the plea colloquy only for plain error.
See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 62–63 (2002); United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d
616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). The court advised Wilson of her trial rights and the
constitutional rights she was waiving by pleading guilty and forgoing a trial, FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(F), and ensured that she understood the charges against her and the
penalties she faced, id. 11(b)(1)(G)–(M). The government proffered a factual basis for the
plea, which Wilson acknowledged the government could prove at trial. Id. 11(b)(3).
No. 14‐3118 Page 3
As counsel points out, however, the court did neglect to ask Wilson whether the
plea “result[ed] from force, threats, or promises,” id. 11(b)(2), and the record does not
reflect the nature of pre‐plea discussions that took place between the government and
Wilson. But counsel properly concludes that we would not regard the court’s oversight
as plain error because nothing in the record suggests that Wilson pleaded no contest
involuntarily, that she was promised anything in return for her plea, or that anyone used
threats or force to induce the plea. Indeed Wilson’s own lawyer (who represented her in
the district court) states that the court “took careful steps in making its determination
regarding defendant’s ability to make [an] informed and intelligent decision to plead
nolo contendere.” Though Wilson asserts in her Rule 51(b) response that counsel told her
“over and over” that she would be “going home,” the record does not reflect any
misunderstandings between Wilson and her attorney about the penalties she faced. She
was present when counsel requested that she be placed in a treatment center for her
sentence, as opposed to being released on probation. Moreover, she did not seek to
withdraw her plea after either hearing this recommendation or being told that she faced
a sentence of up to 40 years in prison and a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months’
imprisonment. See United States v. Todd, 521 F.3d 891, 896–97 (8th Cir. 2008) (omissions in
plea colloquy did not affect defendant’s substantial rights when he neither objected to
them at his sentencing hearing nor sought to withdraw his guilty plea); United States v.
Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005) (plain‐error standard not met when “defendant,
before sentencing, learns of information erroneously omitted in violation of Rule 11 but
fails to attempt to withdraw” plea).
Counsel also considers whether Wilson could challenge her sentence and
properly concludes that such a challenge would be frivolous. Wilson’s 36‐month
sentence is below the low end of her calculated guidelines range. Counsel gives no
reason to disregard the presumption that this below‐guidelines sentence is reasonable,
see United States v. Womack, 732 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Liddell, 543
F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir. 2008), and we see none. The district court adequately considered
the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including Wilson’s personal characteristics
(noting her advancing age and serious mental‐health and medical conditions, including
diabetes and a history of seizures), the need to impose a sentence that reflected the
seriousness of the offense (stating that bank robberies are dangerous and frightening for
tellers and the public), and the need to protect the public from future crimes committed
by Wilson (noting that she committed her second bank robbery while out on bond for
the first).
No. 14‐3118 Page 4
In her Rule 51(b) submission, Wilson raises two issues. First she maintains her
innocence, but claims of innocence underlie all Alford pleas. When a defendant pleads
guilty or no contest but protests her innocence, the trial court ensures that the plea is
intelligent by determining that there is a factual basis for the plea, as was done here.
See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37; Bey, 748 F.3d at 775. Wilson also asserts that her counsel is
“incompetent and prejudiced.” We see no indication of that, but to the extent Wilson
wishes to challenge her counsel’s ineffectiveness, a challenge on that basis is best left for
collateral review, through which a record can be developed. See Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557–58 (7th Cir. 2005).
We do note one error by the district court: The written judgment describes her
plea as “guilty” rather than “nolo contendere.” But this mistake does not require that we
deny counsel’s motion to withdraw and order briefing. Clerical errors in a written
judgment can be fixed at any time on a motion to the district court. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
36; United States v. Anobah, 734 F.3d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is
DISMISSED. Wilson’s motion for substitution of counsel is DISMISSED as moot.