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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 13-CV-1472
ABUNE SAMUEL, APPELLANT,
V.
NEGA LAKEW, ET AL., APPELLEES.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(CAB-9083-12)
(Hon. Neal E. Kravitz, Trial Judge)
(Argued December 9, 2014 Decided June 11, 2015)
Leonard J. Koenick for appellant.
Earl N. Mayfield, with whom Michael P. Lewis was on the brief, for
appellee.
Before THOMPSON, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges.
THOMPSON, Associate Judge: In December 2012, appellant Abune Samuel,
identifying himself as the “duly constituted and appointed Archbishop of the
Washington DC area diocese of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Churches in the
Diaspora[,]” filed a Complaint against appellees Nega Lakew and Tesfaye Nega —
identified in the Complaint as, respectively, the President of the Board of Directors
2
of Kedus Gabriel Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (“Kedus Gabriel”) and
head of the Kedus Gabriel Parish Administrative Council. The Complaint
announced that the case “involves control over real property located at 2601 Evarts
Street, NE [the “Evarts Street property”] . . . and owned by Kedus Gabriel[.]” The
Complaint sought, inter alia, the following injunctive relief: that appellees “be
directed to forthwith turn over to Archbishop Abune Samuel any and all property
belonging to Kedus Gabriel” and that each appellee “cease and desist from holding
himself out in any manner as an administrator or member of the Parish Council of
Kedus Gabriel[.]”1 After defendants/appellees Lakew and Nega moved for
summary judgment, the trial court (the Honorable Neal Kravitz) dismissed the
Complaint, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction “to resolve
the matter of control of the [Kedus] Gabriel church[.]” In a subsequent order
denying appellant’s motion to amend the judgment, Judge Kravitz stated that he
1
Appellant also sought a declaratory judgment that he is the “duly
appointed Archbishop of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Churches in the
Diaspora in the control of Kedus Gabriel[,]” and, in his separate complaint in this
consolidated action, alleged and sought money damages for wrongful eviction,
conversion, and replevin. The trial court denied a defense motion for summary
judgment on the wrongful eviction and conversion claims, granted summary
judgment on the replevin claim, and dismissed the claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief. By order dated March 6, 2014, this court ruled that the instant
appeal is “limited to the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s claims for injunctive
relief.”
3
“remain[ed] of the view . . . that the First Amendment does not permit a civil court
to determine the religious leader of a religious institution[.]”
Appellant contends that Judge Kravitz had jurisdiction to make a finding that
Kedus Gabriel is part of the hierarchical Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in
the Diaspora and to grant injunctive relief based on deference to the church
hierarchy’s decision to remove appellees from their positions as Kedus Gabriel
administrators. He asks us to remand this matter for the Superior Court to make “a
determination of the true form of the organizational structure of Kedus Gabriel[.]”
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.2
I. Background
2
Our review is de novo. See Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ
of Apostolic Faith of Washington, D.C. v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 427 (D.C. 1996)
(“The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, and thus [our review
is] de novo.”); Sundberg v. TTR Realty, Inc., 109 A.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C. 2015)
(“We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint . . . for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.”); Johnson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 109
A.3d 1118, 1120 (D.C. 2015) (“We review a grant of summary judgment de
novo[.]”).
4
Political upheaval in Ethiopia in the early 1990s caused a division in the
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, the primary religious institution in
Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church’s original Patriarch, some of
its Archbishops, and many other Ethiopians fled to the United States. Some
Ethiopians who emigrated to the United States formed Ethiopian Orthodox
Tewahedo congregations. Kedus Gabriel, which was incorporated in 1993, is one
such congregation. The Patriarch and Archbishops who emigrated to this country
formed the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in the Diaspora; its governing
body is known as the “Holy Synod.”
In 1994, the then-leader of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in the
Diaspora appointed appellant as “priest-in-charge” of Kedus Gabriel. From 1994
until October 2012, appellant’s living quarters were provided by Kedus Gabriel.
Kedus Gabriel purchased the Evarts Street property on February 17, 2001, and,
beginning in July 2001, appellant’s living quarters were in the Evarts Street
property. Appellant was appointed Archbishop of the Washington Metropolitan
area in 2007 by the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in the
Diaspora, Abune Merkorios.
5
In 2012, a dispute arose between appellant and appellees in their capacity as
Kedus Gabriel administrators. We need not describe the background and details of
the dispute; it suffices for present purposes to say that a committee appointed by
the Holy Synod conducted an ecclesiastical investigation under the leadership of
Patriarch Merkorios and determined that appellee Nega and the existing Kedus
Gabriel Parish Council members had “no further legal standing and [were] to be
replaced under the direction of” appellant. Appellant wrote an October 4, 2012
letter to appellee Nega, describing the committee’s decision. The letter recited that
the Holy Synod committee had found that appellee Nega and the Parish Council
had “broken the laws and traditions of the Church” and had “lost moral standing.” 3
The letter explained that, in order to “protect the integrity of the Ethiopian
Orthodox Tewahedo Religion Church traditions, enforce the ecclesiastical
findings, and protect the spiritual well[-]being of parishioners” and to “ensure that
only those whom [appellant] deems to be capable of upholding and maintaining the
law and traditions of the Church, and who have not been found to violate the laws
and traditions of the Church[,] will be able to stand for election to the Church
3
The committee appointed by the Holy Synod found that Kedus Gabriel’s
administrator had “creat[ed] unnecessary provocative arguments with the clergy in
and around the Meqdes (innermost part) of the Church” and had been “abusive and
disrespectful to fathers of the Church.”
6
Council[,]”4 appellant had appointed himself Church Administrator (i.e., “the priest
who administers the Church”), had removed appellee Nega and all Kedus Gabriel
officers from their positions, and had suspended the Kedus Gabriel bylaws. Kedus
Gabriel’s Board responded by announcing that appellant was terminated, by
instructing him to “surrender all keys and properties” of the church and to “leave
the premises immediately,” and by blocking his access to the Evarts Street
property.5
4
The committee found that any election the existing Parish Council might
propose “would lack spirituality.”
5
Patriarch Merkorios wrote to Kedus Gabriel’s Board on October 14, 2012,
chastising them for their rebellious behavior and “urg[ing them] to submit to the
spiritual paternity and the powers vested in [appellant.]” In addition, in January
2013, Patriarch Merkorios sent a letter to the Kedus Gabriel Board, asserting that
he is “the final arbiter, ruler and decision maker in all administrative and spiritual
matters involving all Churches . . . in the Diaspora” and asserting that appellant is
“the sole principal administrator, decision maker and governor in all spiritual and
administrative matters” for Kedus Gabriel.
By contrast, appellee Lakew asserted in his declaration, submitted in support
of appellees’ summary judgment motion, that Kedus Gabriel’s association with the
Holy Synod is “purely voluntary and for purposes of spiritual guidance, and
involves no legal or administrative authority”; that while Kedus Gabriel “usually
accept[s] clergymen recommended by the Synod[,]” it “voluntarily follows the
spiritual guidance of the exiled Holy Synod, [and its] Church Board is solely
responsible for its administrative affairs, including the employment of priests”; and
that “[n]either the exiled Holy Synod nor its Patriarch . . . has administrative
powers over [Kedus Gabriel].” He explained in his deposition that the Holy
Synod’s investigating committee gave directives that contravened Kedus Gabriel’s
bylaws.
7
There followed appellant’s Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Complaint alleges that appellees have “refused to step aside,” in “total
defiance of the Holy Synod[.]” The Complaint further asserts that, “unless
enjoined, [appellees] will continue to disobey the directions of the Holy Synod.”
II. Applicable Law
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof[.]” U.S. Const. amend. I. The first of these “religion clauses,” the
Establishment Clause, “prevents the Government from appointing ministers[.]”
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
702-03 (2012). The second, the Free Exercise Clause, “prevents [the government]
from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own
[ministers].” Id.at 703. The religion clauses “severely circumscribe the role that
civil courts may play in the resolution of disputes involving religious
organizations.” Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343, 353 (D.C.
2005). This does not mean, of course, “that churches are above the law or that
there can never be a civil court review of a church action.” Heard v. Johnson, 810
A.2d 871, 879 (D.C. 2002). “There are several areas in which civil courts continue
8
to have jurisdiction over church actions.” Id. at 880. Courts may, for example,
apply “neutral principles of law” to resolve disputes over church property, see, e.g.,
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979), and “may have jurisdiction over
employment disputes where the employee provides a purely secular service for the
church.” Heard, 810 A.2d at 880. However, civil courts “must be careful not to
violate the First Amendment by agreeing to resolve a controversy which, at its
heart, concerns religious doctrine and practice.” Bible Way, 680 A.2d at 427
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 429 (noting that a court must not
“entangl[e] itself in doctrinal interpretations”); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (stating that
religious institutions have the “power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine”);
Meshel, 869 A.2d at 353 (“[T]he Establishment Clause precludes civil courts from
resolving disputes involving religious organizations whenever such disputes affect
religious doctrine or church polity or administration[.]”). “Any attempt by the civil
courts to limit [a] church’s choice of its religious representatives would constitute
an impermissible burden on the church’s First Amendment rights.” Pardue v.
Center City Consortium Schs. of the Archdiocese of Wash., Inc., 875 A.2d 669, 673
(D.C. 2005) (quoting United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conf. v. White,
571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C. 1990)).
9
III. Analysis
In arguing that Judge Kravitz erred in concluding that the Superior Court
lacks jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ dispute, appellant relies heavily on Watson
v. Jones. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). In Watson, the Supreme Court prescribed an
approach for resolving a dispute involving a church that is “a subordinate member
of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical
tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in
some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization.”
Id. at 722-23. The Court ruled that, in such cases, “the rule of action which should
govern the civil courts . . . is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must
accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the
case before them.” Id. at 727; see also Meshel, 869 A.2d at 353 (“The Free
Exercise Clause requires civil courts to defer to the decisions of the highest
tribunals of hierarchical religious organizations on matters of religious doctrine,
discipline, faith, and ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” (citing, inter alia, Watson,
10
80 U.S. at 727)).6 Appellant contends that the Watson rule applies in this case
because this “is a classic case of hierarchical authority and church structure.”
Appellant asserts that Judge Kravitz had authority to find that Kedus Gabriel is part
of the hierarchical Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahado Church in the Diaspora, to
recognize, upon such finding, that the decisions and orders of the Holy Synod and
the Patriarch are binding, and to enforce those decisions and orders, which give
appellant control over Kedus Gabriel.
As Judge Kravitz noted, however, “the parties disagree over whether the
[Kedus] Gabriel church is hierarchical or congregational in structure.” And as
Justice Brennan recognized in his concurrence in Maryland & Virginia Eldership
of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc. (Md. & Va. Churches),
“the use of the Watson approach is consonant with the prohibitions of the First
Amendment only if the appropriate church governing body can be determined
without the resolution of doctrinal questions and without extensive inquiry into
religious policy.” 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id.
at 369-70 (“[W]here the identity of the governing body or bodies that exercise
general authority within a church is a matter of substantial controversy, civil courts
6
Civil courts must “give equal deference to decisions on ecclesiastical
matters reached by congregational religious organizations[.]” Meshel, 869 A.2d at
354.
11
are not to make the inquiry into religious law and usage that would be essential to
the resolution of the controversy.”). In Jones, a Supreme Court majority
acknowledged the same principle, explaining that while determining whether a
church is hierarchical or congregational will not be difficult in some cases, “in
others, the locus of control would be ambiguous, and [a] careful examination of the
constitutions of the general and local church, as well as other relevant documents,
[would] be necessary to ascertain the form of governance adopted by the members
of the religious association.” 443 U.S. at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In such cases, the Court held, “the [Watson] rule would appear to require a
searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.” Id. (emphasis
added, internal quotation marks omitted)).
As appellant has framed the issues, this is just such a case, i.e., one in which
“the locus of control [is] ambiguous.”7 Id. It is not just that the nature of the
relationship between the Kedus Gabriel congregation and the Ethiopian Orthodox
Tewahedo Church in the Diaspora under the leadership of Patriarch Merkorios is
7
We note that in considering the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Judge
Kravitz was permitted to “consider[] matters outside the face of the complaint,”
including the full summary judgment record, and was not required to “presume that
the allegations in the complaint [here, that Kedus Gabriel ‘operates exclusively
under the control of [the] Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Churches in the
Diaspora’] are true.” Second Episcopal Dist. African Methodist Episcopal Church
v. Prioleau, 49 A.3d 812, 815 (D.C. 2012).
12
hotly disputed, though that is certainly so. See supra note 5. Even though the
parties are in accord in directing our attention to the Kedus Gabriel bylaws,8
determining whether the bylaw that acknowledges the Holy Synod’s responsibility
for “spiritual and religious matters” gives the Holy Synod authority to remove
Kedus Gabriel’s elected officers in the circumstances that preceded this litigation
would impermissibly entangle the court in “doctrinal interpretation[].” Bible Way,
680 A.2d at 429. The court would have to determine, for example, whether the
judgment of the Holy Synod Committee — i.e., that the administrators and officers
elected pursuant to the Kedus Gabriel bylaws must be removed because they “lack
spirituality[,]” “broke[] the laws and traditions of the Church,” “lost moral
standing,” failed to accord due respect to the “fathers of the Church,” “created
unnecessary . . . arguments,” and failed to protect “the spiritual well[-]being of
parishioners” — constitutes an exercise of responsibility for “spiritual and
8
Both parties rely on Article 5.7 of Kedus Gabriel’s 2012 Third Revised
Bylaws, which states that
The Holy Synod under exile is responsible for any
spiritual and religious matters whereas the administrative,
financial, property, social and developmental services
shall be the responsibilities of the Parish Administrative
Council or Board that shall be elected by the general
assembly.
13
religious matters.” Answering that question would entail an impermissible inquiry
into “church polity,” Jones, 443 U.S. at 605, would involve the court in deciding
“ecclesiastical questions,” and would require an impermissible inquiry into
“religious doctrine and practice.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Canada
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10, 714 (1976).9 In short, use of the Watson
approach in this case would not be “consonant with the prohibitions of the First
Amendment[.]” Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
9
See also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720-23 (holding that the Supreme
Court of Illinois erred when it exercised jurisdiction over a claim that “the Mother
Church’s reorganization of the American-Canadian Diocese” was in “excess of its
own jurisdiction” and ruled, based on its interpretation of the church constitution,
that the American-Canadian Diocese manifested an “intention to retain
independence and autonomy in its administrative affairs while at the same time
becoming ecclesiastically and judicially an organic part of the Serbian Orthodox
Church”; reasoning that “[t]he constitutional provisions of the American-Canadian
Diocese were not so express that the civil courts could enforce them without
engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity,”
and that the Illinois high court impermissibly “substituted its interpretation of the
Diocesan and Mother Church constitutions for that of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunals”); id. at 714 (“It may be said . . . that . . . the tribunal . . . in its judgment
. . . exceeds the powers conferred upon it . . . . But it is easy to see that if the civil
courts are to inquire into [such a] matter[], the whole subject of the doctrinal
theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization
of every religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness
and care, for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the
validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This
principle would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church
laws . . . and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts . . . the decision of all
ecclesiastical questions.” (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733-34) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
14
Nor is this a dispute about ownership of property that could perhaps have
been resolved using neutral principles.10 To be sure, the second sentence of the
Complaint asserts that this matter is about “control over real property[.]”
However, as this court has previously explained, “‘in determining whether the
adjudication of an action would require a civil court to stray impermissibly into
ecclesiastical matters, we look not at the label placed on the action but at the actual
issues the court has been asked to decide.’” Prioleau, 49 A.3d at 816 (bracket
omitted) (quoting Meshel, 869 A.2d at 356) 11; see also Heard, 810 A.2d at 885
(looking behind the label “defamation” to the actual issues the court had been
asked to decide). Here, notwithstanding the second sentence of the Complaint,
appellant was not actually asking the trial court to resolve a dispute about property.
He did not ask the court to decide whether the local church, Kedus Gabriel, or,
instead, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in the Diaspora owns the Evarts
10
“Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening
their doors to disputes involving church property.” Presbyterian Church in the
U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449 (1969).
11
This is a principle that we are certain Judge Kravitz well understood
because, sitting with this court by designation, he wrote the opinion in Meshel, in
which he applied “neutral principles of contract law” to determine whether a
provision in a religious organization’s bylaws was an enforceable arbitration
agreement. 869 A.2d at 346.
15
Street property.12 Quite the contrary, the Complaint states in two places that the
Evarts Street church property is “owned by Kedus Gabriel” and additionally asks
for a transfer to appellant of “all property belonging to Kedus Gabriel” (emphasis
added). Thus, this is not a matter that Judge Kravitz might have resolved by, for
example, enforcing a provision of the “corporate charter or the constitution of the
general church . . . [specifying] . . . that the [local] church property is held in trust
for the general church[.]” Jones, 443 U.S. at 607-08. To the extent that appellant
asserted a right to control of church property, he did so not on the basis of neutral
principles of law but rather based on arguments that could not be resolved without
requiring the court to resolve theological issues that a secular court could not
properly resolve.
This also is not a case in which Judge Kravitz could have applied neutral
principles of law to resolve a dispute about whether the leaders and members of the
Kedus Gabriel Parish Council and Board had been duly elected in accordance with
12
Had that actually been the task placed before the court, Judge Kravitz
might have utilized “any one of various approaches for settling church property
disputes[,]” Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (quoting Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 368
(Brennan, J., concurring)), including the application of “neutral principles of
law[.]” Id. at 604; see also Meshel, 869 A.2d at 357 (recognizing that church
property disputes are “susceptible to judicial resolution through the application of
neutral principles of law”).
16
church bylaws.13 In asserting that appellees have no “claim to legitimacy[,]”
appellant does not purport to enforce the Kedus Gabriel bylaws; rather, he claims
to have suspended the bylaws and asserts that appellees must be required to “step
aside” because of the Holy Synod’s decree that they have lost “moral standing.”
“[T]he conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required
of them” is a matter “strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character,” “over
which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction[.]” Watson, 80 U.S. at 733.
Notwithstanding the (bare) allegation in the Complaint that appellee Nega
and the members of the Parish Administrative Council have failed to “call[]
elections to the council as required by the Kedus Gabriel By-Laws,”14 the record
13
Had this been the issue, the court would have had subject matter
jurisdiction, because “[t]here can be little doubt about the general authority of civil
courts to resolve th[e] question” of “which faction of [a] . . . congregation is
entitled to possess and enjoy [church] property[,]” Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; Judge
Kravitz could have looked to the voting procedures described in Kedus Gabriel’s
bylaws or to the minutes of church meetings, or could have applied a neutral
principle, such as the “presumptive rule of majority representation,” to resolve the
dispute. Id. at 607.
14
This bare allegation was not enough to give the court jurisdiction,
because “there is a heightened pleading requirement [for a complaint challenging
church action] to assure that the defendants will not be unduly burdened.” Bible
Way, 680 A.2d at 429 (citing Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 1991)
(requiring that operative facts in a claim against a church be pled with particularity
because of “the myriad [of] First Amendment problems” accompanying such
claims), and Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F. Supp. 702, 706 (E.D.
(continued…)
17
makes clear that this is really a dispute about whether appellant is entitled to
“control over the local church” as its “complete administrator[,]” and whether
appellees should be enjoined from holding themselves out as Kedus Gabriel’s
administrators. Given that the Complaint uses the term “Parish church
administrator” to mean “the priest who administers the Church” or “a clergyman
who is . . . a priest in charge,”15 we understand the dispute to be about which
individuals are entitled to serve as the clergy of Kedus Gabriel.
As the Supreme Court explained in Hosanna-Tabor, and as appellees
stressed in their motion for summary judgment,
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so,
intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.
Such action interferes with the internal governance of the
church, depriving the church of control over the selection
of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an
unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape
its own faith and mission through its appointments.
According the state the power to determine which
individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the
(…continued)
Mich. 1992) (noting courts have required greater specificity in pleading where a
case implicates conduct that is, prima facie, protected by First Amendment)).
15
We note also that appellees’ brief identifies appellee Nega as Kedus
Gabriel’s “Head Priest.”
18
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
132 S. Ct. at 706. Informed by both parties’ summary judgment papers that the
dispute here at bottom is about which clergy have the right to control Kedus
Gabriel, Judge Kravitz properly denied relief, on the ground that “the First
Amendment does not permit a civil court to determine the religious leader of a
religious institution[.]”16 Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court
dismissing the Complaint is
Affirmed.
16
The Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor held that a defense rooted in the
religion clauses of the First Amendment was an affirmative defense rather than a
jurisdictional bar. 132 S. Ct. at 710 n.4. We have no occasion to consider that
aspect of Hosanna-Tabor in the present case, because the parties have not briefed
the issue and because the trial court in any event properly denied relief as a matter
of law.