UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1794
DAVE & BUSTER'S, INC.,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
WHITE FLINT MALL, LLLP, f/k/a White Flint Limited Partnership,
Defendant − Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:13-cv-03390-RWT)
Argued: May 12, 2015 Decided: June 11, 2015
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
majority opinion, in which Judge Agee joined. Judge Wynn wrote
a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Edward Smith Scheideman, III, DLA PIPER LLP (US),
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Albert David Brault, BRAULT &
GRAHAM, LLC, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul
D. Schmitt, DLA PIPER LLP (US), Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
James M. Brault, BRAULT & GRAHAM, LLC, Rockville, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from a Landlord-Tenant dispute at White
Flint Mall in Montgomery County, Maryland. Landlord White Flint
Mall sought to terminate its lease agreement with Tenant Dave &
Buster’s in 2012 in light of a prior and ongoing violation of
the radius restriction clause, which prohibited Dave & Buster’s
from operating a competing facility within the nearby geographic
area. Dave & Buster’s sought a declaratory judgment that the
termination was time-barred by the statute of limitations and
equitable relief in the form of specific performance of the
agreement between the parties. The district court granted
summary judgment for White Flint, finding that Dave & Buster’s
had violated the radius restriction clause and that White
Flint’s termination was therefore lawful, and not time-barred or
waived. Dave & Buster’s now appeals raising numerous arguments.
Because those arguments all seek to overlook the agreement
between the parties, we now affirm.
I.
In 1995, Dave & Buster’s entered into a lease agreement
with White Flint to open an entertainment-recreation-amusement
complex in the White Flint Mall in Montgomery County, Maryland.
The Lease was to last for a term of twenty years, with a right
to extend for three successive periods of five years. Included
in the provisions of the agreement was a radius restriction
2
clause, in which Dave & Buster’s agreed to refrain from
operating a competing facility under the Dave & Buster’s Trade
Name within a given radius area. See J.A. 52 (Section 11.3).
At some point prior to April 2006, however, Dave & Buster’s
acquired a former Jillian’s location, which it rebranded and
began operating as Dave & Buster’s Grand Sports Café in the
Arundel Mills Mall in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. On April
13, 2006, White Flint Mall notified Dave & Buster’s that its
operation of the Arundel Mills Mall location rendered it in
violation of the radius restriction clause in the 1995 Lease.
Although the map of the geographic area covered by the radius
restriction clause is not included in the record before this
court, neither party contests that the Arundel Mills Mall
location is within the covered area.
White Flint noted that out of “deference to the
longstanding, mutually beneficial relationship between the
parties,” the company had “elected not to formally place Dave &
Buster’s in default under the Lease” even though “the Arundel
Mills situation constitute[d] a significant violation of the
Lease.” J.A. 130. The company did, however, include in the
letter that “the Landlord reserves all of its rights under the
Lease and at law to enforce the terms of the Lease.” Id.
Following this letter, both parties continued to engage in the
usual course of business under the Lease.
3
On September 5, 2012, however, in connection with
redevelopment efforts at White Flint Mall, White Flint provided
Dave & Buster’s with formal notice demanding the company cure
the violation of the radius restriction clause within 30 days or
the landlord would proceed to exercise its rights under the
contract. After the 30 day period had passed, on October 9, 2012
White Flint notified Dave & Buster’s that it had elected to
exercise its right to terminate the Lease under Section 18.1(c)
effective as of December 31, 2012. Id. at 134. Section 18.1(c)
allows the Landlord to terminate the Lease with 10 days’ notice
in the event that the Tenant was in default in the performance
of any of its covenants or agreements (other than payment of
rent) for a period of 30 days. Id. at 61.
Dave & Buster’s continued to operate and pay rent while the
parties attempted to negotiate a resolution to the dispute. The
discussions did not result in a satisfactory outcome and on
October 17, 2013, White Flint sent a letter to Dave & Buster’s
stating that it was “no longer willing to refrain from enforcing
its right to possession of the Premises” and requesting Dave &
Buster’s vacate the property by the end of November. Id. at 139.
On November 14, 2013, Dave & Buster’s initiated this
lawsuit in the district of Maryland seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. The Complaint pled three counts. It sought a
declaratory judgment on whether White Flint’s claim of breach of
4
contract was time-barred by the statute of limitations,
requested specific performance of the Lease and a preliminary
injunction to that effect, and asserted breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. White Flint in response
moved to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment.
Dave & Buster’s crossed moved for summary judgment only on the
issue of the statute of limitations.
The district court, after a hearing, granted partial
summary judgment to White Flint on March 24, 2014 with regard to
Count One, finding the company’s breach of contract claim was
not precluded by the statute of limitations or any theory of
waiver and that the radius restriction clause was enforceable
and breached by Dave & Buster’s. It further dismissed Dave &
Buster’s request for a preliminary injunction that would enable
it to continue operation at White Flint Mall notwithstanding the
radius restriction clause. Further, the court rejected any claim
that White Flint had breached an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. On July 22, 2014, the court dismissed the
outstanding claims, finding the Lease properly terminated, and
ruled on a counterclaim for possession of the property filed by
White Flint in answer to the initial Complaint, awarding
possession of the premises to White Flint.
On July 29, 2014, Dave & Buster’s filed a Motion to Alter
or Amend a Judgment arguing that the district court erroneously
5
stated that it had “abandoned any claim for damages arising out
of any violation of the express terms of the Lease between the
parties.” Id. at 418. The district court denied the motion on
August 8, 2014. Dave & Buster’s now appeals.
II.
A.
Dave & Buster’s primary contention is that the statute of
limitations has run on White Flint’s claim for breach of
contract. The company argues that the district court erred when
it refused a declaratory judgment on the question and granted
summary judgment for White Flint. We disagree. Because Dave &
Buster’s actively continued to breach a contract that was still
valid and in effect, White Flint’s action did not run afoul of
the statute of limitations.
Under Maryland law, which governs the statute of
limitations question, a civil action “shall be filed within
three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of
the Code provides a different period of time within which an
action shall be commenced.” MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
101. Maryland courts construe the statute of limitations
strictly. See Murphy v. Merzbacher, 697 A.2d 861, 865 (Md.
1997). Traditionally, the statute of limitations for a claim of
breach of contract begins to run when the contract has been
breached and “the breach was or should have been discovered.”
6
Jones v. Hyatt Ins. Agency, Inc., 741 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Md.
1999); see also Mayor of Federalsburg v. Allied Contractors,
Inc., 338 A.2d 275, 280 (Md. 1975) (“In contract cases, the
general rule is that the period of limitations begins to run
from the date of the breach.”).
Here, there is no factual dispute surrounding the conduct
constituting the breach -– the opening of a Dave & Buster’s
facility in Arundel Mills Mall in violation of Section 11.3 of
the Lease – so the question of accrual is one of law that we
decide de novo. See Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t., 76 A.3d 1076,
1086 (Md. 2013). Dave & Buster’s argues that the facts before us
amount to a single breach based on the acquisition and
rebranding of the Arundel Mills location from which consequences
continued to flow. We disagree. The situation here does not
involve the “continuing effects of a single earlier act.”
MacBride v. Pishvaian, 937 A.2d 233, 240 (Md. 2007), overruled
on other grounds by Litz, 76 A.3d at 1090 n.9.
The Lease between White Flint and Dave & Buster’s imposed a
continuing obligation on the latter not to operate any competing
facilities within the radius restriction area so long as the
contract continued to be valid and the parties continued to do
business under its terms. The Maryland Court of Appeals has long
accepted that certain covenants imposing ongoing negative
obligations are covenants de die in diem and can be breached
7
continuously, or on a daily basis. Kaliopulus v. Lumm, 141 A.
440 (Md. 1928). Such is the case here and we find that an action
for breach of contract accrued for so long as Dave & Buster’s
was in violation of the radius restriction clause through the
operation of the Arundel Mills location. In a case of this
nature, the statute of limitations may indeed operate to bar
recovery of damages incurred more than three years prior to
suit, but it does not render the present action for an equitable
remedy time-barred. See Singer Co., Link Simulation Sys. Div. v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 419, 425-26 (Md. 1989).
In Kaliopulus v. Lumm, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered a question quite similar to the one before us today.
See 141 A. at 442. Appellant James Kaliopulus sold his
Hagerstown restaurant to Mr. and Mrs. Charles E. Lumm on the
contractual condition that he would not “enter into, conduct, or
finance any restaurant or dining room business within the
corporate limits” of the city for a period of ten years. Id.
When Kaliopulus breached this contractual obligation by
financing a new restaurant on the very same street as the one he
sold, the Court found that the specific relief sought by the
buyers was not subject to the equitable doctrine of laches
8
despite the passage of five years time. 1 Id. at 445-46. Rather,
the Court explained that continued operation of the competing
restaurant constituted a breach de die in diem such that “each
successive breach in the course of the continuing or recurring
breaches was constantly creating fresh causes of action.” Id. at
445.
Appellant makes much of the fact that this case was decided
nearly a century ago and concerned the equitable doctrine of
laches rather that the statute of limitations, but we find that
of no moment. The case remains good law and demonstrates that
under Maryland law, the continued operation of a competing
enterprise can constitute a continuous breach of a contractual
obligation so long as the contract under which the obligation
arose is valid and in effect. Furthermore, in 1989, the Court of
Appeals underscored that “where a contract provides for
continuing performance over a period of time, each successive
breach of that obligation begins the running of the statute of
limitations anew, with the result being that accrual occurs
continuously.” Singer, 558 A.2d at 426; see also Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349, 352
(Okla. 1941) (“[T]he right to maintain an action for its breach
1
The sale was executed pursuant to a specialty contract
such that the applicable statute of limitations was twelve
years. Kaliopulus, 141 A. at 445.
9
continues so long as the breach continues and plaintiff is
damaged thereby. . . . The rule is that a breach of a continuing
covenant gives rise to a cause of action each day the breach
continues.”) (rationale adopted by Court of Appeals of Maryland
in Singer, 558 A.2d at 425).
It is not difficult to see why the resolution of the case
at bar comports with Maryland law. Dave & Buster’s was under a
continuing obligation, so long as the Lease was valid and the
parties continued to do business under its terms, to refrain
from operating any competing facilities within the radius
restriction area. It was not merely the opening of the facility,
but its daily operation that constituted a continued breach of
the agreed-to contract.
Furthermore, this finding also mirrors what Maryland courts
have concluded in the tort context. The Court of Appeals has
rejected a continuing breach theory where the grounds for
tolling the statute of limitations were “ongoing adverse
consequences” but not ongoing adverse conduct. Litz, 76 A.3d at
1089 (internal quotations omitted). What is at issue before this
court is not merely adverse effects allegedly suffered by White
Flint Mall but rather an adverse course of conduct that Dave &
Buster’s engaged in every day the competing facility was open
for business as a challenger to the White Flint location.
10
We think it important to note, however, that Maryland’s
theory of continuing breach of contract is a limited one. Here,
the party to the contract that committed the breach was subject
to an ongoing obligation to refrain from certain conduct and
repeatedly or continuously engaged in that very conduct while
the contract remained in effect. We do not, however, read the
Court of Appeals of Maryland to be endorsing a wide-reaching
continuous breach exception to the statute of limitations.
Statutes of limitations “represent a public policy about the
privilege to litigate” and “find their justification in
necessity and convenience . . . [in order to] spare the courts
from litigation of stale claims.” Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson,
325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). Here, the facts do not present a
single, isolated breach. Every day that Dave & Buster’s operated
the Arundel Mills Mall facility in direct competition with the
White Flint Mall location constituted a breach of the ongoing
contract between the parties such that accrual of the statute of
limitations began anew. Thus, we do not find the action for
termination of the Lease by White Flint Mall to be time-barred
by the statute of limitations.
B.
Dave & Buster’s next contends that White Flint waived its
right to termination of the Lease by continuing performance
under the contract after learning of the breach. However, in its
11
April 2006 letter, White Flint notified Dave & Buster’s that it
believed the operation of the Arundel Mills location
“constitute[d] a significant violation of the Lease” and
“clearly advise[d] [Dave & Buster’s] that the Landlord
reserve[d] all of its rights under the Lease and at law to
enforce the terms of the Lease.” J.A. 130. In addition, the
Lease agreement contains an express non-waiver provision.
Because White Flint clearly and explicitly reserved its rights
under the Lease, we find that there was no waiver and summary
judgment was properly granted on this issue.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland defines waiver as “the
intentional relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right.” Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166, 172 (Md. 1964).
Waiver “may result from an express agreement or be inferred from
circumstances.” Id.; see also John B. Robeson Assocs., Inc. v.
Gardens of Faith, Inc., 172 A.2d 529, 533 (Md. 1961) (“There are
few principles of contract law better established . . . than
that a party to an executory bilateral contract, who keeps the
same in existence after a known breach by the other party and
accepts further performance from the party who has committed the
breach, waives the breach.”).
However, as the Court of Appeals has made clear, waiver is
not always mandated in a situation where the parties continue to
12
do business. To “avoid waiver, a party must assert[] his
intention to retain the rights accruing to him as a result of
said breach.” Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp., LLC v. Annapolis Towne
Centre at Parole, LLC, 25 A.3d 967, 980 n.17 (Md. 2011) (citing
Pumphrey v. Pelton, 245 A.2d 301, 304 (Md. 1968)) (internal
quotations omitted) (brackets in original). The intent to waive
a contractual provision “must be clearly established and will
not be inferred from equivocal acts or language.” Myers v.
Kayhoe, 892 A.2d 520, 531 (Md. 2006). Here, for the reasons
noted above, the record is clear. In light of the undisputed
material facts before us, no rational factfinder could find that
White Flint intended to waive its right to enforce the terms of
the Lease, including the non-waiver provision and the radius
restriction clause.
Dave & Buster’s argues that the continued performance under
the contract constitutes a waiver of White Flint’s rights to
terminate the Lease for violation of the radius restriction
clause. The continued acceptance of rent after the breach of a
covenant may, in some cases, be considered evidence of intent to
waive a breach of contract claim. See Chertkof v. Southland
Corp., 371 A.2d 124, 127 (Md. 1977). However, it “does not
establish waiver as a matter of law.” Id. Maryland law “treat[s]
the question of waiver of a breach by the acceptance of rent as
13
a matter of intent, which necessarily turns on the factual
circumstances” of the case. Id.
In considering the factual circumstances here, it is
important to reemphasize that the Lease agreement between White
Flint and Dave & Buster’s contains an express non-waiver
provision. Section 20.3 of the contract states that “[f]ailure
of either party to complain of any act or omission on the part
of the other party, no matter how long the same may continue,
shall not be deemed to be a waiver of said party of any of its
rights hereunder.” J.A. 66. As with any provision, “waiver of
[the non-waiver] clause may be implied from the very actions
which imply waiver of the condition precedent.” Hovnanian, 25
A.3d at 985. However, to defeat summary judgment, Dave &
Buster’s would have had to produce evidence that White Flint
intended to waive Section 20.3 in addition to the radius
restriction clause. This it cannot do.
The evidence here is clear that White Flint intended to
reserve its right to enforce the radius restriction clause.
Although White Flint continued to accept rent from Dave &
Buster’s location at White Flint Mall, it plainly explained in
the April 2006 letter that it was choosing not to pursue its
remedies under the Lease at that time only out of “deference to
the longstanding, mutually beneficial relationship between the
parties.” J.A. 130. It “clearly advise[d] [Dave & Buster’s] that
14
the Landlord reserve[d] all of its rights under the Lease and at
law to enforce the terms of the Lease.” Id. Following this
letter, Dave & Buster’s was on notice that at any point in the
future White Flint might seek to enforce the radius restriction
clause with regard to the Arundel Mills location. Dave &
Buster’s took no action to conform its behavior to the terms of
the contract for seven years, instead choosing to enjoy the
benefits of operating both facilities. However, it also assumed
the risks associated with that business decision, namely that
White Flint could still elect to pursue its bargained-for
remedies under the Lease.
In 2012, when White Flint did choose to terminate the Lease
and resume possession of the property, the downside of
Plaintiff’s business decision came to pass. But that does not
permit the courts to confer on Dave & Buster’s a benefit that
the contract did not provide. On the record here, there is no
issue of triable fact such that a reasonable jury could conclude
that the evidence “amount[s] to an understanding between the
parties that the [radius restriction] condition would no longer
be enforceable.” Hovnanian, 25 A.3d at 984. Thus, summary
judgment was properly granted on the question of waiver. 2
2
Our colleague in dissent argues that the facts here could
amount to waiver, relying on asserted similarities between the
facts at bar and those in Chertkof v. Southland Corp., 371 A.2d
(Continued)
15
III.
A.
Dave & Buster’s primary contentions in this action are
procedural, namely that the statute of limitations bars White
Flint’s ability to terminate the contract and, in the
alternative, that any claim for the breach of contract was
waived. On the merits, Dave & Buster’s also challenges the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for White Flint on
the question of whether the radius restriction clause was
enforceable and breached by Dave & Buster’s.
The district court did not err when it granted summary
judgment in White Flint’s favor on the issue. We review a grant
of summary judgment de novo. Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234,
236 (4th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is proper where “there is
no genuine dispute as to [any] issue of material fact.” Id. at
236-37; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The radius restriction
clause at issue in this case is a straightforward restrictive
124 (Md. 1977). The Maryland Court of Appeals noted in Chertkof,
however, one important difference between our case and theirs:
the unilateral nature of the reservation of rights. It explained
that “the inference of intent to waive, arising from the
acceptance of rent, [can be] rebutted by the express agreement
between the parties.” Chertkof at 128. Such is the case here.
The previously agreed-to express non-waiver clause combined with
the express reservation of rights at the time of the breach
provides clear and indisputable evidence that White Flint did
not intend to waive the breach.
16
covenant of a kind often enforced by Maryland courts where there
is a “significant economic purpose” to the covenant. See, e.g.,
Diamond Point Plaza Ltd. P’ship v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 929
A.2d 932, 952 n.7 (Md. 2007) (noting that radius restriction
clauses are “in the nature of restraints on trade and
competition, which are to be narrowly construed” but are often
upheld).
The language of the provision here is clear and
unambiguous. Dave & Buster’s was obligated “not to operate a
restaurant-bar-entertainment-recreation-amusement complex under
the Dave & Buster’s Trade Name within the radius area.” J.A. 52.
It is undisputed that the Arundel Mills Dave & Buster’s location
was within the radius restriction area, and thus in violation of
the provision. Furthermore, the language at issue is very
similar to that which the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld in
Diamond Point Plaza. See 929 A.2d at 950. As the Court observed,
“it would seem clear that the purpose of the radius restriction
was to protect the percentage rent by precluding competing
operations within the same market area that might siphon sales.”
Id. at 952 n.7.
Both Dave & Buster’s and White Flint are sophisticated
business entities and radius restriction clauses are common in
commercial leases. The significant economic purpose is self-
evident here. The Lease is for the operation of a Dave &
17
Buster’s facility in the White Flint Mall and provides White
Flint with a percentage of the operation’s sales. It does not
require expert testimony to determine that another Dave &
Buster’s, which is a unique entertainment experience, operating
nearby would affect the number of customers visiting the White
Flint Mall location.
Dave & Buster’s argues on appeal that the provision was
unenforceable, but failed to brief the necessary facts to
support such an allegation. “[T]here is no issue for trial
unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (finding summary
judgment proper against “a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case”). Here, Dave & Buster’s cannot point to any
genuine issues of fact that exist to support a finding that the
clause lacked significant economic purpose, or was overly broad,
or unduly burdensome. Thus, summary judgment was properly
granted for White Flint.
B.
Dave & Buster’s further argues that summary judgment was
improperly granted because the parties had not been allowed to
undertake discovery and relatedly, that the district court
18
abused its discretion in not granting Dave & Buster’s Rule 56(d)
request for discovery, which it filed as part of its motion for
reconsideration. We address these two interconnected arguments
in turn.
As a general matter, of course, summary judgment is to be
“refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity
to discover information that is essential to his opposition.”
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244
(4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 447 U.S. at 250 n.5).
However, the party opposing summary judgment “cannot complain
that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that
party ha[s] made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds
that more time was needed for discovery . . . before the
district court ruled.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.,
80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996).
Generally such an attempt is made through the filing of a
Rule 56(d) affidavit that outlines the need for discovery and
what additional facts litigants hope to uncover through
discovery to properly defeat summary judgment. See id. Although
this court has found that filing an affidavit is not a necessary
condition of obtaining discovery prior to summary judgment, we
have repeatedly “warned litigants that we ‘place great weight on
the [Rule 56] affidavit’” and that “’the failure to file an
affidavit under [Rule 56] is itself sufficient grounds to reject
19
a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.’”
Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244 (quoting Evans, 80 F.3d at 961).
Dave & Buster’s failed to make the case for why discovery was
necessary prior to a grant of summary judgment. Dave & Buster’s
did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit until April 4, 2014, almost
two weeks after the district court granted summary judgment in
White Flint’s favor. J.A. 308-11.
In Harrods, this court found that where “the nonmoving
party’s objections before the district court served as the
functional equivalent,” a Rule 56(d) affidavit may not be
necessary. Id. at 244-45 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co. Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375,
1380 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). But here, Dave & Buster’s included
nothing more than a conclusory statement at the end of its
memorandum in opposition to summary judgment arguing that
“further factual development of the record regarding the
reasonableness of the radius restriction” was needed. J.A. 172.
This is not the equivalent of a Rule 56(d) affidavit, nor
does it provide reasonable “notification and explanation” for
why more time for discovery was necessary or what the parties
intended to discover that was not yet in the record. Evans, 80
F.3d at 961; see also Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244
(“[R]eference to [Rule 56] and the need for additional discovery
in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for summary
20
judgment is not an adequate substitute for a [Rule 56(d)]
affidavit.”). As explained above, the court properly granted
summary judgment on the enforceability of the radius restriction
clause given the record before it. Only after the court granted
summary judgment for White Flint did Dave & Buster’s file its
Rule 56(d) affidavit. J.A. 308-11. This was too little, too
late.
Secondly, we do not find the district court abused its
discretion in denying Dave & Buster’s request for discovery as
part of its motion for reconsideration of the grant of summary
judgment. It is within the district court’s discretion to deny
such a request for discovery where “the information sought would
not by itself create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient
for the nonmovant to survive summary judgment.” Pisano v.
Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 2014). What Dave & Buster’s
sought to prove through additional discovery was largely
speculative as to any specific facts that might support a
finding that the radius restriction clause was unenforceable. It
was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to reconsider
conclusions regarding summary judgment on the basis of only
“vague assertions” about what possible facts might be discovered
to support Dave & Buster’s claim. Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242.
21
IV.
In addition to its request for additional discovery, Dave &
Buster’s also included in its motion for reconsideration an
argument that it had a right to cure under Section 18.1 of the
Lease. It now argues that the district court erred when it
denied the opportunity to cure and found the Lease was validly
terminated. We disagree.
Section 18.1 of the Lease provides in relevant part that in
the event of a default by Dave & Buster’s in the performance of
its covenants or agreements (other than payment of rent), the
company would have thirty days after notice in writing of the
default to cure. J.A. 61-62. In addition, where “there is a bona
fide dispute . . . [Dave & Buster’s would be able to] cure any
default at any time prior to final adjudication by a court of
competent jurisdiction,” through the payment of monetary
damages. Id. at 62-63.
The district court did not err in denying Dave & Buster’s
the opportunity to cure. Dave & Buster’s chose not to cure
following initial notice of default in 2006 or after subsequent
notice that White Flint intended to pursue its bargained-for
remedies under the Lease in 2012. By the time the company made
the argument that it had a right to cure, the parties were
months into litigation. White Flint had already elected to
terminate the Lease, a decision which the district court upheld.
22
Furthermore, the language of the Lease itself makes clear
that only where there is a “bona fide dispute” could Tenant cure
at a point later than 30 days after notice of default. Here,
however, the parties agree that the Arundel Mills location was
in fact a violation of the terms of the Lease. In addition, the
district judge had upheld the radius restriction clause as valid
and found Dave & Buster’s had defaulted on its obligation when
it opened the Arundel Mills location. We do not think the mere
fact of litigation is what the parties intended by “bona fide
dispute.” As such, we cannot find that the district court erred
in refusing to allow Dave & Buster’s to cure at the eleventh
hour of litigation a violation that was over seven years in the
making.
V.
We have reviewed the various claims pressed by Plaintiff
and find no merit in them. 3 Dave & Buster’s violated the radius
restriction clause in its agreement with White Flint Mall and
made the business decision that it was worth the risk to operate
both facilities for as long as possible. When White Flint
elected to pursue its properly-reserved rights under the
3
We do not think the district court abused its discretion
in denying Dave & Buster’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment and we affirm its ruling that Dave & Buster’s has
abandoned any claim for damages arising out of a violation of
the express terms of the Lease.
23
contract, the district court enforced the contract’s terms as
written. For the foregoing reasons, its judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
24
WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the radius
restriction is enforceable and that Dave & Buster’s breached it.
But I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “no rational
factfinder could find that White Flint intended to waive its
right to enforce the terms of the Lease.” Ante at 13. I
believe that a rational factfinder viewing all of the facts in
the light most favorable to Dave & Buster’s could determine that
White Flint waived both the radius restriction and the non-
waiver clause. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
To survive summary judgment, Dave & Buster’s needed only to
marshal evidence that would allow a rational factfinder to find
that White Flint waived both the radius restriction and the non-
waiver clause. See Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp., LLC v. Annapolis
Towne Ctr. at Parole, LLC, 25 A.3d 967, 987 (Md. 2011); see also
Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 256 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting
that we view the facts at summary judgment in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party). This it did. In reaching
the opposite conclusion, the majority opinion oversimplifies
Maryland’s waiver inquiry by granting outsized importance to the
fact that White Flint reserved its rights under the Lease and by
failing to articulate why the same facts that could support
25
waiver of the radius restriction clause cannot also support
waiver of the non-waiver clause.
A.
Under Maryland law, whether the continued acceptance of
rent constitutes a waiver is a fact-intensive question of
intent. See Chertkof v. Southland Corp., 371 A.2d 124, 127 (Md.
1977). The continued acceptance of rent does not constitute a
waiver as a matter of law. Id. In a similar vein, a unilateral
reservation of rights under a lease is not necessarily
enforceable as a matter of law. See id. at 127–8. Chertkof is
instructive in this regard.
Chertkof involved a commercial lease with a percentage-rent
clause that guaranteed the lessor a certain percentage of the
lessee’s gross sales. 371 A.2d at 125. The lease also included
a provision that required the original lessee to receive written
approval before subleasing or assigning the lease to another
party. Id. The lessee subleased and assigned the lease without
first receiving written consent. Id. at 125–26. When the
lessor discovered the assignment, it declared the lease “null
and void and cancelled” due to the breach of the lease terms.
Id. at 126. The lessor’s agent also wrote a letter specifying
that continued acceptance of rent should not be construed as a
waiver. Id.
26
The trial court held that the lessee breached the lease
provision requiring written consent. Id. at 126. But it also
found, despite the lessor’s relatively speedy filing of an
ejectment action and its express statement disavowing waiver,
that the lessor had waived its “right to a forfeiture of the
estate granted by the lease.” Id. at 127. The Maryland Court
of Appeals affirmed based on the acceptance of rent and months-
long negotiations for a new lease.
The facts of this case bear a more-than-passing resemblance
to the Chertkof facts: (1) The Lease included a percentage rent
clause, which gave White Flint an economic interest in Dave &
Buster’s performance, J.A. 33; (2) Dave & Buster’s breached a
lease provision designed to protect White Flint’s economic
interest; (3) White Flint promptly notified Dave & Buster’s of
the breach and unilaterally reserved its rights under the lease; *
(4) White Flint continued to accept rent; and (5) White Flint
engaged in months-long negotiations (October 2012–October 2013)
with Dave & Buster’s before threatening to take legal action
unless Dave & Buster’s vacated the premises. Indeed, the main
difference between this case and Chertkof is the length of time
*
White Flint’s April 2006 letter was a unilateral
reservation of its rights under the lease, and this reservation
is quite distinct from the (waivable) non-waiver clause
discussed below. “Had the reservation been the subject of
express agreement, a different result might have obtained.”
Chertkof, 371 A.2d at 128.
27
between the initial notice of breach and the threat of legal
action; instead of waiting months, White Flint waited more than
six years. It is difficult to square Chertkof with the majority
opinion’s holding that no rational factfinder could find that
White Flint waived the radius restriction.
B.
To survive summary judgment, Dave & Buster’s must also show
that White Flint waived the non-waiver clause. According to the
majority, “This it cannot do.” Ante at 14. Again, I disagree.
Maryland law provides that the waiver of a non-waiver
clause “may be implied from the very actions which imply waiver
of the condition precedent.” Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp., 25 A.3d
at 985. The non-waiver clause states that “[f]ailure of either
party to complain of any act or omission on the part of the
other party, no matter how long the same may continue, shall not
be deemed to be a waiver of said party of any of its rights
hereunder.” J.A. 66. To demonstrate waiver of this non-waiver
clause, Dave & Buster’s need only put forward facts showing that
White Flint waived some right by failing to complain. This it
can do.
As the majority opinion observed, The Court of Appeals of
Maryland defines waiver as “the intentional relinquishment of a
known right, or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right.” Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
28
Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166, 172 (Md. 1964). This precisely
describes White Flint’s (in)action when it chose not to complain
about the radius restriction for more than six years.
Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that no rational
factfinder could find waiver of the non-waiver provision.
II.
Both Dave & Buster’s and White Flint made business
decisions. Dave & Buster’s made the business decision to breach
the radius restriction. White Flint made the business decision
to not enforce the radius restriction for more than six years.
To be sure, these business decisions are subject to contractual
agreement. But that contractual agreement is subject to
Maryland law. If, for example, White Flint had not waited so
long to enforce the radius restriction, perhaps my conclusion
would be different. But because these facts, when taken in a
light most favorable to Dave & Buster’s, could support a
rational factfinder’s determination that White Flint waived both
the radius restriction and the non-waiver clause, I respectfully
dissent.
29