FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 12 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATT BARTELL; JODI BARTELL, No. 13-56027
Plaintiffs - Appellants, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-01131-DMS-
WMC
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 4, 2015**
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and SINGLETON,***
Senior District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable James K. Singleton, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
page 2
Although Plaintiffs allege that the foreclosure of their home is illegal
because JPMorgan Chase Bank has no right to collect the Bashkingys’ mortgage
payments, the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) fails to plead any facts to
support this theory. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Without any facts supporting Plaintiffs’ theory, the SAC
fails to go beyond “labels and conclusions” and provide “[f]actual allegations . . .
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The SAC is Plaintiffs’ third filing that raises claims challenging the validity
of the foreclosure and their third failed attempt to provide any factual basis for
these claims. Because Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to cure these deficiencies, the
district court didn’t abuse its discretion by dismissing with prejudice. See
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532–33 (9th Cir. 2008).
Similarly, the district court didn’t err in denying discovery, because Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
We remind Plaintiffs’ counsel that judges don’t “hunt[] for truffles buried in
briefs.” See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per
page 3
curiam). In the three paragraphs of the “Argument” section in his brief, counsel
doesn’t even address how the district court abused its discretion, nor why the
district court erred in finding that the complaint didn’t contain any facts to support
Plaintiffs’ theory. Nor did he discuss what would have been raised in a Third
Amended Complaint to cure these deficiencies. Conclusory statements, tautologies
and a couple of citations don’t an argument make.
AFFIRMED.