Adams v. Anne Arundel County Public Schools

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1608

ANDREW ADAMS,

Plaintiff − Appellant,

v.

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:11-cv-02876-MJG)

Argued: May 13, 2015 Decided: June 15, 2015

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd joined.

Joyce E. Smithey, RIFKIN, LIVINGSTON, LEVITAN & SILVER, LLC,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Jay Creech, ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Andrew Adams contends that the Board of Education of Anne

Arundel County violated his rights under the Family and Medical

Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) and the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 (“ADA”). His allegations include interference with

his medical leaves, retaliation for taking those leaves,

discrimination and retaliation on the basis of his disability,

and a failure to accommodate his condition. We find no merit to

these related claims and affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I.

A.

On January 19, 2010, Adams was involved in an incident with

a student in a hallway at MacArthur Middle School in Fort Meade,

Maryland, where he was an assistant principal. Although witness

accounts differed significantly, the student initially claimed

that Adams “grabbed [her] by the arms, shook her, and pinned her

against a wall.” J.A. 145. As a result of the incident, Child

Protective Services (“CPS”) launched a child abuse

investigation, and the matter was also referred to the school

Board’s Employee Case Management committee. CPS acts to prevent

and investigate incidences of child abuse under the auspices of

the Department of Social Services (“DSS”), whereas the Board’s

Employee Case Management committee has as its focus conduct

2
detrimental to the proper functioning of the school system.

Adams was temporarily reassigned from MacArthur in the meantime.

On February 24, Adams met with Board investigators. Adams

contends that at that meeting he was shown a document stating he

was completely cleared of all charges. The Board denies Adams

was shown any such document and claims its independent

investigation, which focused on school district policy

violations, continued on a parallel track. In all events, the

Board transferred Adams back to MacArthur on February 25. That

same day, however, he went on medical leave upon the

recommendation of Dr. Kim Bondurant, an internal medicine

specialist, because he suffered from stress, anxiety, and high

blood pressure, presumably related to the January 19 incident

and the child abuse allegation. Adams returned to MacArthur on

March 3, but had a panic attack, during which he claims he was

berated by Principal Reginald Farrare. Adams took a second

medical leave, and Dr. Bondurant referred him to a psychiatrist,

Dr. Lawrence Adler. Adams claims that when he came back to work

on March 8, Farrare again berated him, this time in front of

other staff.

Two weeks later, Adams began his third and final medical

leave after Dr. Adler diagnosed him with acute stress disorder.

Dr. Adler informed the Board that, when Adams returned from

leave, “he will require assignment to another school,” because

3
being at MacArthur could spur “panic attacks and other

manifestations of his illness.” J.A. 36. Dr. Adler later updated

the diagnosis to post-traumatic stress disorder, as reflected in

the FMLA paperwork that he submitted on May 5. The Board

required Adams to attend three sessions during the summer with a

specialist of its choosing, psychologist Dr. Anthony Wolff. Dr.

Wolff cleared Adams to work on July 28.

The Board’s investigative process continued while Adams was

on that extended leave. The Board sent a letter to Adams on

April 12, notifying him that a pre-disciplinary conference had

been scheduled for May 6. The meeting was delayed by four days

so that Adams’s attorney could attend. Two weeks after the

conference, Adams received a letter from the Board formally

reprimanding him for “engag[ing] in physical contact by using a

technique that escalated a situation that could have been

handled differently.” J.A. 584.

Adams began working at a new school, J. Albert Adams

Academy (“JAA”), on August 4. The Board had first informed Adams

in early June that it intended to transfer him to JAA. However,

Adams agrees that the transfer did not occur in practice until

August, as he was on leave until late July. In the spring, Dr.

Adler had recommended a transfer, and Dr. Wolff later agreed

that Adams “would best be assigned to a supportive, lower-stress

school environment.” J.A. 194. “Mr. Adams,” Dr. Wolff stated,

4
“is not averse to the possibility of being assigned to a

specialized program such as the J. Albert Adams Academy, which

has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A. 194.

The student population of JAA, a specialized middle school

for children with behavioral issues, used to reach 120, but now

is capped at 80. In contrast, MacArthur has more than 1,000

students and a less favorable staff-to-student ratio. In

accordance with a union contract, Adams’s salary remained the

same for two years and then was reduced by less than one percent

because of JAA’s smaller size. JAA employees are also ineligible

for certain discretionary bonuses available at other schools.

Adams has reportedly excelled at JAA. He has received

exceptional performance reviews, has served as acting principal

for a month, and has not been subject to any further discipline.

He has not requested a transfer from JAA.

B.

Adams filed this lawsuit in Maryland state court, and the

Board removed the case to federal court. Adams alleged various

violations of the FMLA, the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, and Maryland state law. After allowing Adams to

amend his initial complaint, the district court dismissed all of

the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint for failure to

state a claim, except for Adams’s FMLA interference and

retaliation claims and his ADA discrimination and retaliation

5
claims. See J.A. 61-126. After discovery, the district court

granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment on those

remaining claims. See J.A. 625-55.

On appeal, Adams presses his various FMLA and ADA claims,

all of which arise from the same set of operative facts. We

review de novo both the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim and the grant of a motion for summary judgment.

Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 2013); E.I. Du

Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 400

(4th Cir. 2011). Under our summary judgment standard, of course,

the facts are generally viewed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see Dennis v. Columbia Colleton

Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). Summary

judgment is appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as

to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For the following

reasons, we affirm the judgment.

II.

Adams contends that the Board both interfered with his FMLA

rights and retaliated against him for taking medical leave.

A.

The FMLA grants employees the prescriptive right to take up

“to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period”

when, inter alia, an employee is burdened with “a serious health

6
condition that makes the employee unable to perform” his job. 29

U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). When returning from FMLA leave, an

employee is also entitled to be restored to his previous

position or an equivalent position, so long as he would have

retained that position or an equivalent one absent the taking of

leave. Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 546-47

(4th Cir. 2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)). That is, there is

“no absolute right to restoration to a prior employment

position.” Id. at 549. Nonetheless, it is “unlawful for any

employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or

the attempt to exercise” an employee’s FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C.

§ 2615(a)(1).

To make out an “interference” claim under the FMLA, an

employee must thus demonstrate that (1) he is entitled to an

FMLA benefit; (2) his employer interfered with the provision of

that benefit; and (3) that interference caused harm. See

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)

(citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)); Wonasue v. Univ. of Md. Alumni

Ass’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d 480, 495 (D. Md. 2013).

We begin by noting one salient fact: Adams was not denied

FMLA leave. In fact, he took three separate medical leaves

totaling well over twelve weeks. The Supreme Court has observed

that the “purpose of [an interference claim] is to permit a

court to inquire into matters such as whether the employee would

7
have exercised his or her FMLA rights in the absence of the

employer’s actions.” Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 91. Adams has not

suggested that the Board denied him any FMLA leave he requested.

On the contrary, Adams received more than the statutorily

guaranteed amount.

Nevertheless, Adams argues that the Board interfered with

his leave in a variety of ways that stopped short of actually

denying him leave. In particular, he asserts that the Board took

adverse employment actions against him, which interfered with

his FMLA rights by discouraging the taking of leave. See 29

C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (“‘Interfering with’ the exercise of an

employee’s rights would include, for example, not only refusing

to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using

such leave.”).

Adams first objects that the Board required him to submit

to three unnecessary examinations by a Board-chosen specialist.

But the FMLA and the applicable regulation explicitly allow

employers to seek a second opinion and even a third, if the

first two opinions conflict. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d); 29 C.F.R.

§ 825.307(b), (c). Such medical opinions allow an employer to

verify the claimed medical condition, to assess how long the

employee might be out of work, and to fashion the best

environment for the employee upon his return to the workplace.

8
 The regulation concerning the “authenticity” of the initial

certification by a medical professional, 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a),

is not applicable here. Employers may order a second or third

medical evaluation out of concern that the original

certification of a serious medical condition is invalid, not

that it is inauthentic. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (allowing a

second evaluation where “the employer has reason to doubt the

validity of the certification”). Employers are entitled to seek

a second opinion regardless of whether the certification notice

proffered by the employee is real or not. In requiring Adams to

attend the sessions with Dr. Wolff, the Board simply exercised

its statutory right to seek another professional medical

opinion.

Second, Adams argues that the Board’s pre-disciplinary

conference interfered with his leave by forcing him to “work.”

Appellant’s Br. at 32. In certain circumstances required

meetings may unlawfully interrupt an employee’s leave. Here,

however, the one-time conference was a legitimate piece of an

ongoing investigation into the January 19 incident between Adams

and the student. Adams argues more broadly that the Board’s

continued disciplinary investigation ran contrary to the

understanding reached at the February 24 meeting with school

officials, during which they allegedly indicated the entire

matter had been wrapped up. He also submits several deposition

9
statements from MacArthur staff to the effect that his

reinstatement at MacArthur indicated everything was fine. See

J.A. 481 (statement of Reginald Farrare) (“When he returned to

school it signified to me that he had been cleared of those

allegations. . . . [S]omeone informed me that he had been

cleared of the allegations . . . .”); J.A. 592 (statement of

Deanna Natarian) (“[U]pon his return I assumed everything was

fine. He wouldn’t have returned if it wasn’t.”). The staff

members had not been at the February 24 meeting and relayed

general information apparently conveyed by unspecified other

persons.

For several reasons, we do not believe Adams’s proffers

suffice to create an issue of triable fact as to the events

surrounding the February 24 meeting, or in a larger sense the

Board’s continuation of its own investigation. See Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (finding summary judgment

proper, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case”). Although the DSS committee by early February had cleared

Adams in its child abuse investigation, there is little evidence

that the Board in some way closed and then reopened its own

investigation into whether Adams had violated school district

10
policies, much less that its actions had anything to do with

Adams’s FMLA leave.

Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly points to the contrary

conclusion that the Board’s separate investigation into school

district policy violations was continuous. The only document in

the record that resembles what Adams claims was a fully

exculpatory resolution of the January 19 incident is the

February 4 decision by a five-member committee of the DSS to

“rule[] out” the child abuse allegation. J.A. 604-05. By

contrast, the Employee Case Management log shows that the

Board’s own investigation report was not completed on February

24, the date on which Adams claims the investigation was closed.

In fact, the school district’s interview of Adams about the

incident was not even scheduled until that same day, because DSS

had just completed and finalized its investigation of the child

abuse allegations and the school district investigation could

thereafter proceed unfettered. The draft report was not finished

until March 23, and the report was not finalized until April 8.

The Board then notified Adams of the pre-disciplinary conference

by letter. The conference was postponed for several days so that

Adams’s counsel could attend.

It is surely true that the investigative processes of any

institution are open to abuse, but the record here points to a

standard procedure during which due process was accorded to

11
Adams every step along the way. Adams does not dispute that the

Board was entitled to conduct its own investigation into the

January 19 incident. Indeed, school districts must often engage

in investigations like this one or else face accusations and

lawsuits for not looking promptly into allegations of improper

teacher contact with students or violations of school district

policies. The pre-disciplinary conference was part of the

investigatory and disciplinary process, which Adams has not

adequately linked to his ample FMLA leaves, and seeking the

participation of Adams and his attorney in that process did not

constitute an impermissible interference with Adams’s FMLA

leave. And Adams never objected or sought a continuance he did

not get.

Third, Adams asserts that Farrare’s alleged verbal

“attacks” and the written reprimand constituted adverse

employment actions. Appellant’s Br. at 11. But however bad the

relationship between Adams and Farrare, Adams cannot demonstrate

that these verbal and written reprimands in fact discouraged him

from taking FMLA leave. Indeed, Adams began his second medical

leave the same day as the first alleged verbal attack. Nor did

the written reprimand inhibit Adams’s final medical leave -- he

did not return to work until more than two months after the

reprimand was issued.

12
 Regardless, neither the written nor the verbal reprimands

qualify as adverse employment actions, because they did not lead

to further discipline. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec.

Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1996); Jeffers v. Thompson,

264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003). The written reprimand,

in particular, was the final step in the Board’s legitimate

ongoing investigation. These incidents were what the Board said

they were -- reprimands, not signposts on a predetermined path

to a true adverse employment action. In fact, Adams has received

excellent reviews of his performance since returning from the

third and final FMLA leave.

B.

Adams also contends that the Board retaliated against him

for exercising his FMLA rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)

(making it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any

other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing

any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA); see also 29 C.F.R.

§ 825.220(c) (noting that “employers cannot use the taking of

FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions”).

Retaliation claims brought under the FMLA are analogous to

those brought under Title VII. Laing v. Federal Express Corp.,

703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013); Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 550-51.

Plaintiff must prove three elements to establish a prima facie

case of retaliation: (1) “she engaged in a protected activity”;

13
(2) “her employer took an adverse employment action against

her”; and (3) “there was a causal link between the two events.”

Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. 13-1473, slip op. at

36 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). If the

defendant advances a lawful explanation for the alleged

retaliatory action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

defendant’s reason for taking the adverse employment action was

pretextual. See Laing, 703 F.3d at 717, 719 (citing McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).

Many of the Board’s actions here were simply not

retaliatory. As noted above, the Board’s disciplinary

investigation into Adams’s conduct was never concluded, and thus

it could not have been reopened in order to retaliate against

Adams. The Board’s review, including the pre-disciplinary

conference and the written reprimand, observed due process

requirements. Other Board decisions fail to qualify as adverse

employment actions. The eventual result of the Board’s

investigation -- the reprimand letter -- did not adversely

affect Adams’s employment position or his pay and benefits.

Similarly, Farrare’s verbal reprimands did not adversely affect

Adams’s employment. Although the Board required the medical

examinations in reaction to Adams’s taking of FMLA leave, such a

request for a second medical opinion is expressly allowed under

the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.

14
 Nor was Adams’s transfer from MacArthur to JAA in

retaliation for his exercise of FMLA rights. Crucially, both Dr.

Adler and Dr. Wolff recommended that Adams be transferred to a

different and less stressful school, and Adams reportedly was

“not averse to the possibility of being assigned to” JAA. J.A.

194. The Board effectuated the transfer promptly -- Adams’s

first day at JAA came merely a week after Dr. Wolff had cleared

him as fit to work. Adams’s salary remained at the same level

for two years before being reduced by less than one percent, and

as a JAA employee he was no longer eligible for some

discretionary bonuses. The salary reduction was mandated by the

union contract because JAA has a much smaller student population

than MacArthur.

Although JAA is a school for children with behavioral

issues, it has no more than ten percent the number of students

as MacArthur and also has a more favorable staff-to-student

ratio. Moreover, Adams seems to have done well at JAA. He has

received superb reviews and has not requested a transfer from

JAA, despite having the opportunity to do so.

There simply is no retaliatory animus at work here. By

transferring Adams to JAA in a timely manner, on the

recommendations of both Dr. Adler and Dr. Wolff, to a school

with fewer students and more staff per student, the Board

essentially fashioned an accommodation for his disability. See

15
infra Section III.B. Such reasonable accommodations under the

ADA are not likely to be retaliatory under the FMLA, and they

were plainly not under the circumstances presented here.

III.

Adams mounts a separate set of claims under the ADA. He

asserts that the Board discriminated and retaliated against him

based on his disability and also failed to accommodate his

condition.

A.

The ADA forbids employers from discriminating against

persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b). The Act

also bars employers from retaliating against employees for

seeking these statutory protections. Id. § 12203(a)-(b).

Congress passed the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive

national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against

individuals with disabilities,” id. § 12101(b)(1), through

“clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards,” id.

§ 12101(b)(2). A “qualified individual” with a disability under

the ADA is someone “who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the job.

Id. § 12111(8). The Act contains a “detailed description of the

practices that would constitute the prohibited discrimination,”

and it “speaks in clear and direct terms to the question of

16
retaliation.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.

2517, 2531 (2013).

In Adams’s view, the Board’s alleged ADA violations

included Principal Farrare’s verbal “attacks,” the Board’s

continued investigation of the student hallway incident, the

written reprimand, and the mandated medical examinations. In

addition, Adams argues that the Board retaliated against him for

requesting a disability accommodation. The Board’s retaliatory

measures, he asserts, included the written reprimand, the

medical examinations, and the reduced pay at JAA.

Adams’s discrimination and retaliation claims at this stage

are subject to similar though not identical legal standards.

Compare Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 702

(4th Cir. 2001) (discrimination), with A Soc’y Without a Name v.

Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (retaliation). These

two tests share a common element, however: the plaintiff must

have suffered an adverse employment action of some kind. See

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173-74 (2011);

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63-64

(2006).

The requirement of an adverse employment action seeks to

differentiate those harms that work a “significant” detriment on

employees from those that are relatively insubstantial or

“trivial.” White, 548 U.S. at 68. As the Supreme Court has

17
explained in the analogous Title VII context: “The substantive

[discrimination] provision seeks to prevent injury to

individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The

antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals

based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.” Id. at 63 (emphasis

added). Pointedly, the antiretaliation provision “covers those

(and only those) employer actions that would have been

materially adverse to a reasonable employee.” Id. at 57. The

analysis depends on the particular circumstances of the case.

Id. at 71. All the tests, however, require that there be an

adverse employment action, which denotes some direct or indirect

impact on an individual’s employment as opposed to harms

immaterially related to it. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 173-74;

White, 548 U.S. at 63-64.

Many of the harms alleged by Adams do not rise to the level

of an adverse employment action. It is surely true that Farrare

and the Board did things that Adams personally did not like. But

dislike of or disagreement with an employer’s decisions does not

invariably make those decisions ones that adversely affected

some aspect of employment.

Moreover, reprimands and poor performance evaluations occur

with some frequency in the workplace. While the analysis of them

is necessarily dependent on the circumstances, see White, 548

U.S. at 69, they are much less likely to involve adverse

18
employment actions than the transfers, discharges, or failures

to promote whose impact on the terms and conditions of

employment is immediate and apparent. Here, Adams has failed to

link such matters as the upbraiding by Farrare, the Board’s

pursuit of its obligation to investigate the hallway incident,

and the statutorily permitted medical examinations to some

material change in the conditions of his employment. See James

v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir.

2004). Even assuming the unlikely presence of an unlawful

discriminatory intent for any of the above actions, they did not

cross the threshold that courts have traditionally required for

a personnel matter to be actionable. See, e.g., Cepada v. Bd. of

Educ., 974 F. Supp. 2d 772, 788 & n.51 (D. Md. 2013) (yelling by

an assistant principal at a teacher insufficient); Jeffers v.

Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003) (an oral or

written reprimand, without some actual injury, does not

qualify); Settle v. Balt. Cnty., 34 F. Supp. 2d 969, 992 (D. Md.

1999) (“inconvenience” or “emotional anxiety” resulting from “a

disciplinary investigation [that] is reasonably rooted in

articulable facts justifying such an investigation” not

sufficient), aff’d sub nom. Harris v. Earp, 203 F.3d 820 (4th

Cir. 2000), and Settle v. Balt. Cnty. Police Dep’t, 203 F.3d 822

(4th Cir. 2000).

19
 B.

The transfer of Adams from MacArthur to JAA belongs in a

rather different category from that of the actions discussed

above. Adams claims here that the Board failed to provide a

reasonable accommodation for his disability. In particular, he

contends that the Board “made no effort” to reassign him “to a

less stressful school where he would not suffer a reduction in

pay,” and that the Board did not transfer him until four months

after he had initially requested an accommodation. Appellant’s

Br. at 46.

The ADA forbids an employer from discriminating against an

individual with a disability who, with “reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the

position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,

535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11

(4th Cir. 2001). An employer that fails to make “reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability” has engaged in

impermissible discrimination, unless the employer can show that

the accommodation imposed an “undue hardship” upon its

operations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A “reasonable

accommodation” may include “job restructuring, part-time or

modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,” and

other appropriate changes. Id. § 12111(9)(B).

20
 Here, the Board did not outright deny Adams’s requests to

accommodate his disability. Rather, Adams questions the adequacy

of the Board’s efforts. We think, however, that the Board’s

accommodations were plainly reasonable. Many of the

justifications are similar to those already touched upon in our

discussion of Adams’s FMLA claims. See supra Part II.

First, Adams’s transfer to JAA was consistent with the

recommendations of the doctors who had examined him. Adams’s

psychiatrist, Dr. Adler, emphasized that Adams “must be

reassigned to another location,” away from the “site of

psychological trauma.” J.A. 38-39. The Board’s psychologist, Dr.

Wolff, agreed that Adams “would best be assigned to a

supportive, lower-stress school environment.” J.A. 194. Dr.

Wolff noted that Adams was “not averse to the possibility of

being assigned to a specialized program such as the J. Albert

Adams Academy, which has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A.

194. The professional advice of both doctors, in short, supports

the basic reasonableness of the Board’s reassignment decision.

Second, the Board acted on Adams’s request in a timely

manner. Adams requested an accommodation in late March. He gave

the Board a note from Dr. Adler stating that he “require[d]

temporary medical leave,” and that, “[w]hen he is stabilized, he

will require reassignment to another school.” J.A. 36 (emphasis

added). The Board informed Adams of the reassignment to JAA on

21
June 2, and after his extended leave ended on July 28, he began

work there on August 4. The Board addressed this task during his

leave and executed the reassignment within a week of his return.

Under the circumstances, that seems a quite reasonable interval.

Third, in light of Adams’s disability, the Board sensibly

sought a “less stressful environment” for him. J.A. 202.

Regardless of whether comparable positions at other schools were

available at the time, the Board’s reassignment decision was

based not only on the advice of medical professionals, but also

on the particular characteristics of JAA, after consultation

with Adams. As noted earlier, the Board moved him to a school

with a far smaller student population (by a factor of ten), a

more favorable staff-to-student ratio, and a sizable support

staff. The Board appears to have weighed those features in

conjunction with the fact that many students at JAA have a

history of behavioral problems. An array of legitimate

considerations entered into what frankly was for the Board a

judgment call. As Dr. Wolff observed, “It is difficult to define

what may constitute a lower-stress school environment, given the

unpredictable nature of student behavior.” J.A. 194.

Fourth, Adams did not object to his reassignment to JAA at

the time, and he has not requested a transfer since then. The

Board has posted openings for other schools during the interim,

but Adams has not asked to leave his position at JAA to work

22
elsewhere. Indeed, as noted, he has thrived there: he has

received ratings of “outstanding” on his annual evaluations and

briefly served as acting principal. Adams does allege that JAA

students have threatened him on two occasions since his

transfer. Although such behaviors are always troubling, they

must be considered in context. Aside from his own affidavit and

deposition, Adams has not offered any evidence to bolster his

argument that JAA is an equally or more stressful work

environment than MacArthur. The record does not specifically

indicate what else the Board could have done or where else he

would prefer to work. Indeed, Adams has never requested a

transfer or had any further work-related medical problems.

Fifth, the eventual decrease in Adams’s salary stemmed from

a systemwide collective-bargaining agreement. The agreement

between the teachers’ union and the Board determines salaries on

the basis of schools’ populations, and JAA has far fewer

students than MacArthur. The resulting $1,031 decrease

constituted less than one percent of his salary. Moreover, Adams

held the same position, assistant principal, at the two schools.

For his first two years at JAA, Adams in fact earned the same

salary as he had at MacArthur, as stipulated in his transfer

letter. It is true that Adams did become ineligible for certain

discretionary bonuses awarded at other schools. The fact

remains, however, that less stressful jobs may on occasion be

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less remunerative. That tradeoff does not invalidate the Board’s

action in these circumstances.

In sum, there is nothing in this entire sequence of events

to indicate that the Board’s efforts to accommodate Adams were

anything but reasonable.

IV.

The FMLA and the ADA impose important obligations on

educational, and indeed all, covered employers. What they do not

impose, however, are extra statutory obstacles to the

investigation of what in other cases might be serious instances

of child abuse. Schools have an obligation to safeguard the

safety and welfare of those students in their charge. A proper

reading of the FMLA and ADA does not impair the ability of

school systems to responsibly exercise this duty.

The Board of Education faced a further predicament here.

Had it failed or refused to reassign Adams from his positon at

MacArthur, its inaction would have courted ADA litigation. That

statute, moreover, requires a “reasonable” accommodation, not a

perfect one. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8)-(9), 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B).

Hindsight must not underestimate hard choices that employers, in

consultation with their employees and medical professionals,

confront at the time. The record before us plainly indicates

that the Board did what it could to alleviate an unfortunate

situation. It should not incur liability for its efforts.

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 V.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

AFFIRMED.

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