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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL A. LEHMAN,
Appellant No. 1208 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 19, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002000-1988
BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and LAZARUS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 15, 2015
Michael A. Lehman appeals from the June 19, 2014 order denying as
untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. For the reasons set forth herein, we
affirm.
When he was fourteen years old, Appellant, along with three co-
defendants, was charged with murder, burglary, robbery, criminal
conspiracy, and criminal homicide relating to the murder of Kwame Beatty
on June 18, 1988. In January 1990, Appellant was tried as an adult and
convicted by a jury of all charges, including first-degree murder. Later that
year, the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
without parole, as well as a consecutive five to ten year sentence for
burglary and concurrent sentences of three to six years for each robbery and
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criminal conspiracy count. Appellant filed a direct appeal from the judgment
of sentence, which this Court affirmed on December 27, 1991.
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 606 A.2d 1231 (Pa.Super. 1991) (unpublished
memorandum).
Appellant, represented by counsel, filed his first PCRA petition on
October 8, 1998. That petition as amended was denied on May 26, 1999.
This Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Lehman, 754 A.2d 19 (Pa.Super.
2000) (unpublished memorandum). Following that dismissal, our High Court
denied allowance of appeal on July 20, 2000. Commonwealth v. Lehman,
764 A.2d 1066 (Pa. 2000).
Appellant’s second collateral petition was filed on July 1, 2010 and
dismissed as untimely by the PCRA court on August 26, 2010. This Court
upheld the dismissal, Commonwealth v. Lehman, 34 A.3d 221 (Pa.Super.
2011) (unpublished memorandum), and our High Court again denied
allowance of appeal on December 20, 2011. Commonwealth v. Lehman,
34 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2011).
Appellant’s third collateral petition, which he filed on August 21, 2012,
was dismissed on November 20, 2013, by the Honorable Michael E. Bortner.
Appellant thereafter amended that petition to assert that Appellant was
entitled to relief under the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which prohibits the imposition of a mandatory term
of life imprisonment on juvenile homicide offenders. That amended petition
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generated an order staying the motion pending a decision by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d
1 (Pa. 2013), in which our High Court ultimately held that the Miller
prohibition did not apply retroactively to collateral appeals. Based on the
resolution of Cunningham, Judge Bortner dismissed Appellant’s petition as
untimely.
Appellant filed this timely appeal of that dismissal. He complied with
the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained
of on appeal, and the PCRA court filed its responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion shortly thereafter. Appellant’s issues are now ready for our review.
Appellant raises three issues on appeal:
1. Despite the ruling in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, did the
lower court judge abuse his discretion by refusing to grant
Appellant a new sentencing hearing because the currently
imposed sentence of mandatory life without parole violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution?
2. Did the lower court judge abuse his discretion by not granting
the Appellant a new sentencing hearing pursuant to Article 1,
Section 1, and Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, thereby violating Appellant’s right to due process,
equal protection, and to be free from cruel punishments?
3. Did the Appellant preserve all of the issues presented in the
statement of matters complained of on appeal in the amended
Post Conviction Relief Act petition?
Appellant’s brief at 3.
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In reviewing a PCRA appeal, we consider the record “in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.” Commonwealth v.
Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc). In performing this
review, we consider the evidence of record and the factual findings of the
PCRA court. Id. We afford “great deference to the factual findings of the
PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in
the record.” Id. Accordingly, so long as a PCRA court’s ruling is free of
legal error and is supported by record evidence, we will not disturb its
decision. Id. Where the issue presents a question of law, “our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id.
A PCRA petition is untimely if it is filed more than one year after the
date of judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. This Court
is therefore without jurisdiction to evaluate a facially untimely petition unless
the petitioner can prove that it falls within one of the three exceptions to the
PCRA’s one year time-bar: 1) failure to raise a claim is the result of
governmental interference, 2) facts were unknown to and could not have
been learned by the petitioner, and 3) the sentence interferes with a
constitutional right recognized by either the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after one year following
petitioner’s conviction and that court has held to apply such recognition
retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. A facially untimely petition that does not
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plead and prove any of the three exceptions is time-barred and is to be
dismissed.
Herein, Appellant’s issues rest solely upon questions of law. Appellant
argues that the imposition of such a sentence violated his Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment liberties. Appellant’s brief at 7. In
light of Cunningham, the Commonwealth maintains that, because neither
the United States Supreme Court nor our High Court has held that Miller is
retroactive, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this basis. Thus, he does
not satisfy any of the three exceptions to the PCRA’s time limitations. We
agree.
Appellant’s petition was filed almost twenty years after judgment of
sentence became final. Because that petition is facially untimely and
because Appellant raises no argument that he satisfies any of the three
exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar, we have no jurisdiction to
address the issues he presents. We consequently find that the PCRA court
did not err in denying and dismissing Appellant’s time-barred petition for
post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/15/2015
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