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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 71204-7-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
MILORD GELIN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: June 15, 2015
Per Curiam — We previously affirmed Milord Gelin's convictions for
burglary and assault with a deadly weapon and theft of a motor vehicle. After the
mandate issued in that appeal, the superior court, at the State's request, entered
an amended judgment and sentence correcting errors in the original judgment
and sentence. Gelin now appeals the amended judgment and sentence, arguing
for the first time that the jury's deadly weapon findings were not supported by
sufficient evidence. In a pro se statement of additional grounds for review, Gelin
argues for the first time that his offenses encompass the same criminal conduct,
that his burglary and assault convictions violate double jeopardy, and that his
exceptional sentence is not supported by sufficient findings
Assuming without deciding that the amended judgment and sentence is
appealable, the issues raised on appeal are, with one exception, beyond the
scope of our review. The proceedings below occurred after Gelin's direct appeal
No. 71204-7-1/2
was final and mandated. The State initiated the proceedings to correct errors on
the face of the judgment and sentence. An appeal from such proceedings is
limited to review of the actions taken by the court and does not afford Gelin an
opportunity to raise other challenges to his conviction and sentence.1 Because
the superior court simply corrected errors on the face of the judgment and
sentence, our review is limited to those corrective actions. In his statement of
additional grounds, Gelin questions the court's sentence corrections but fails to
adequately inform this court of the nature of the alleged error as required by RAP
10.10(c).
The remaining claims on appeal are beyond the scope of review and
amount to collateral attacks on Gelin's conviction and sentence.2 To the extent
11n general, a defendant may not raise issues, including constitutional, double jeopardy,
and sentencing issues, in a second appeal that were or could have been raised in an initial
appeal unless the superior court exercised discretion on those issues in the proceedings from
which the second appeal is taken. See State v. Wheeler, Wn.2d , P.3d (2015)(in
appeal following remand of personal restraint petition, court rejected attempts to raise new issues
under RAP 2.5(c) and RAP 12.2, holding that appellant could raise issues not raised in earlier
direct appeal only if the court on remand exercised its independent judgment on such issues);
State v. Kilqore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 37-41, 216 P.3d 393 (2009) (noting that new issues may be
raised in a second appeal if they were addressed on remand following the initial appeal or in
postjudgment motions, but holding that Kilgore could not challenge his sentence in his appeal
following remand because the court on remand merely made corrective changes to his sentence
and exercised no discretion); State v. Mandanas. 163 Wn. App. 712, 717, 262 P.3d 522 (2011)
(holding that double jeopardy claim could not be raised for the first time in second appeal, that
"even an issue of constitutional import cannot be raised in a second appeal," and that Mandanas
still had an avenue of relief via personal restraint petition); State v. Barberio, 121 Wn.2d 48, 50,
846 P.2d 519 (1993) (refusing to review new challenge to an affirmed exceptional sentence not
reconsidered at resentencing); State v. Tonev. 149 Wn. App. 787, 791, 205 P.3d 944 (2009)
(defendant could not raise double jeopardy and sentence issues in second appeal following
remand because remand was for ministerial corrections). We note that same criminal conduct
issues involve factual determinations and are therefore waived if not raised at sentencing, State
v. Jackson, 150 Wn. App. 877, 892, 209 P.3d 553 (2009), and Gelin's claim that the court entered
no findings supporting its exceptional sentence appears to be contradicted by the record in his
prior appeal.
2 Gelin admits as much in his statement of additional grounds, stating that his other
claims "collaterally attack[] his sentences pursuant to RAP 16.3, and RAP 16.4."
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No. 71204-7-1/3
they are not time-barred, such claims must be raised in a personal restraint
petition. RAP 16.4; State v. Wheeler. Wn.2d _ , _ P.3d _ (2015).
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT: dm J-
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