United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-2116
JONATHAN E. MITCHELL,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ROBERT MILLER,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Nancy Torresen, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Thompson, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Michael J. Waxman for Jonathan E. Mitchell.
Mark E. Dunlap, with whom Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC was
on brief, for Robert Miller.
June 15, 2015
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. We seldom do our best thinking
in the murky hours when late night seeps into early morning. What
strikes one as a fine idea in the darkness may reveal itself to be
a brilliant mistake in the cold light of dawn. Decisions made
well past 4 a.m. by two men -- one a suspect, the other a police
officer -- are at the heart of this appeal. Jonathan E. Mitchell,
once the suspect, now the plaintiff, decided to break in to his
estranged wife's apartment to talk about their relationship, and
then opted to lead police on a car chase. He now contends that
Officer Robert Miller violated his Fourth Amendment rights when
Miller shot him as he sped away. The district court granted
summary judgment to Miller, finding that the officer was entitled
to qualified immunity. Although Mitchell appeals that judgment,
because we find the district court reached the right decision, we
affirm.
I.
Background
On the evening of April 9, 2011 in Portland, Maine,
Jonathan E. Mitchell spent time drinking at a bar and smoking
marijuana before deciding to help himself to a friend's Volkswagen
Jetta. In the wee small hours of the 10th, Mitchell had the idea
of visiting his estranged wife to talk "about their relationship."
Perhaps anticipating the reception he might receive, instead of
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calling or ringing the bell, Mitchell broke into the sleeping
woman's apartment. He then woke her and talked to her in what he
characterizes as an attempt "to rekindle their relationship."
Unsurprisingly, she viewed his behavior as more of a criminal act
than a display of ardor, and, once Mitchell made his exit, she
called the police. The woman reported the break-in at 4:39 a.m.,
and provided a description of the Jetta, as well as the direction
in which Mitchell was driving when he left.
The police dispatcher, in turn, passed along the
information to patrol officers and added that: Mitchell's driver's
license had been revoked as a habitual offender; he was a sexually-
violent convicted felon; and he was reported to be under the
influence of alcohol or drugs and "possibly unstable." Portland
Police Officer Robert Miller was on patrol that evening when he
heard the report of the residential burglary, spotted the Jetta,
and began to follow Mitchell. A video camera mounted to Mitchell's
cruiser recorded the subsequent events.1
Mitchell turned into a residential neighborhood and
drove at a normal rate of speed, stopping at stop signs and using
1 Both Mitchell and Miller rely on the factual summary in the
district court's order. The district court, in turn, relied on
the videotape from Miller's cruiser, as well as that of Officer
Schertz, who also responded to the radio call. Because the facts
are largely undisputed, we too shall rely on the district court's
recitation, and our own review of the videotapes.
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his turn signal. After Miller confirmed that this was the Jetta
he had been looking for, he turned on his blue lights and siren.
Rather than pull over, Mitchell continued to drive at a moderate
speed for over a minute. At this point, Officer David Schertz
joined the pursuit in his own cruiser.
Mitchell, now tailed by two cruisers, sped up and drove
down residential side streets at speeds of up to sixty-five miles
per hour. After another forty seconds, Mitchell turned down a
dead-end residential street and, at the end of the street, veered
up onto an embankment, coming to rest three to four feet above
street level. The remainder of the incident, captured on video,
took only twenty-six seconds to unfold.
As Miller parked his cruiser behind the Jetta, and
Schertz parked behind Miller, Mitchell began backing the Jetta
down the embankment. Miller emerged from the cruiser, and Mitchell
pulled the Jetta abruptly forward two to three feet before
stopping. Miller approached the Jetta with his gun drawn, yelling
loudly to Mitchell to get out of the car. Schertz then exited his
cruiser and followed Miller. When Mitchell did not obey his
commands, Miller opened the driver's side door of the Jetta with
his left hand, keeping the gun pointed at Mitchell with his right.
As Miller held the door, the Jetta again lurched forward. Schertz
also grabbed the door of the Jetta with his left hand. Miller
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then reached into the passenger compartment and began to grapple
with Mitchell. At one point, Miller stepped back slightly and the
car rolled backwards. As Miller continued to try to get hold of
Mitchell, the Jetta lurched forward several feet, and its wheels
turned sharply to the left. Both officers sidestepped to keep
pace with the moving car.
Miller continued to tussle with Mitchell as the car once
again rolled backwards. Schertz repositioned himself somewhat,
moving from Miller's left and in front of the open driver's side
door, to behind Miller. The Jetta's engine began to rev and its
tires squealed as Mitchell threw the car into a rapid u-turn to
the left (the side where the officers were standing). Miller,
still holding the door, was briefly pulled around by the car, but
did not fall. Miller then fired two shots in Mitchell's direction.
The Jetta sped away. Mitchell, with one bullet lodged
in his shoulder (the other having passed through his neck), drove
to a friend's house and ingested some opiates. He was later
apprehended at the friend's house.
In April 2013, Mitchell filed suit against Miller, the
city of Portland, and its chief of police. The lawsuit originally
alleged four counts, two of which, against the city and the police
chief, were voluntarily dismissed. As to the remaining counts,
Mitchell alleged that Miller had violated his Fourth Amendment
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rights, and had committed common law assault. Miller moved for
summary judgment, arguing that he had used reasonable force, and
that he was protected by qualified immunity. On September 26,
2014, the district court awarded summary judgment to the defendant
on the grounds of qualified immunity (for the 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim) and discretionary act immunity (for the assault claim).
This appeal followed.
II.
Discussion
Mitchell argues that the district court erred by
concluding "that Defendant Miller 'could reasonably have believed
at least one other person in the immediate vicinity was in great
danger,'" and by holding that Miller was entitled to qualified
immunity.2
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Alicea v. Machete Music, 744 F.3d 773, 778 (1st
Cir. 2014). Here, the inferences that can reasonably be drawn are
2 Mitchell makes no separate argument regarding his state law
claim and discretionary authority. Miller contends, and Mitchell
does not dispute, that although the terminology differs, the
standard for determining discretionary authority for the state
tort claim is the same as the standard for determining qualified
immunity for the federal claim, so we will address them as one.
Richards v. Town of Eliot, 780 A.2d 282, 292 (Me. 2001).
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limited by the existence of video evidence. See Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007). We will affirm the grant of summary
judgment only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact" and the moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Bos. Prop. Exch. Transfer Co. v. Iantosca, 720 F.3d 1, 10
(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We may affirm
the grant of summary judgment on any basis apparent from the
record. Id.
A claim that a police officer used excessive force "is
governed by the Fourth Amendment's 'reasonableness' standard."
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014). To determine
whether an officer's actions were objectively reasonable, we must
balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake." Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In so doing, we analyze the totality of
the circumstances, taking the "perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene, rather than . . . the 20/20 vision of hindsight."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even if it is not clear that the use of force was
reasonable, under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a police
officer is protected from liability for civil damages under § 1983
"unless it is shown that the [officer] violated a statutory or
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constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct." McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20, 29 (1st
Cir. 2014) (quoting Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2023). "An officer
cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless
the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in [his] shoes would have understood that he
was violating it, meaning that existing precedent . . . placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." City and
Cnty. of San Francisco, California v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765,
1774 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alterations in original).
The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the
law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation,
and it is a heavy burden indeed. McGrath, 757 F.3d at 29. "This
exacting standard gives government officials breathing room to
make reasonable but mistaken judgments by protecting all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 (internal quotation marks, alteration,
and citation omitted) (bracket omitted). For reasons that will
become clear, because we find that Miller is protected by qualified
immunity, we do not reach the question of whether he used
reasonable force.
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Analysis
We "employ a two-prong analysis" to determine whether an
officer is protected by qualified immunity. Mlodzinski v. Lewis,
648 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). We first determine "whether the
facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a
constitutional right." Id. If such a violation is shown, we then
determine whether the law "was clearly established at the time of
the defendant's alleged violation." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
This two-step process is not mandatory; courts have the
discretion, where warranted, to proceed directly to the second
prong. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). In fact,
the Supreme Court has urged us to "think carefully before expending
scarce judicial resources to resolve difficult and novel questions
of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no
effect on the outcome of the case." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.
Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The district court took this approach, and we will
likewise move straight to the second prong.
1. Clearly Established
Mitchell has the burden of demonstrating that as of April
10, 2011, the time of the alleged violation, the law was clearly
established such that a reasonable officer in Miller's shoes would
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be on notice that his actions would violate the Fourth Amendment.
McGrath, 757 F.3d at 29. Although "[w]e do not require a case
directly on point . . . existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Taylor v.
Barkes, 575 U.S. ___, No. 14-939, slip op. at 4 (U.S. June 1, 2015)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine the
state of the law as of that date, we first turn to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
The conduct at issue in Brosseau occurred in February
1999. Id. at 200 n.4. Police Officer Brosseau responded to a
fight in progress and chased one of the participants (Haugen) on
foot. Id. at 196. When Haugen jumped into a parked Jeep and
locked the doors, refusing to exit the vehicle, Officer Brosseau
struck the Jeep's window several times with her handgun before
shattering it. Id. She then reached into the car and attempted
to wrest the keys from Haugen. Id. Haugen prevailed in the
struggle, managing to start the Jeep and throw it into gear,
driving in the direction of an occupied vehicle and forcing
Brosseau to jump back. Id. Brosseau fired one shot as the Jeep
drove off, hitting Haugen in the back. Id. at 196-97. Haugen
filed a § 1983 action alleging that Brosseau used excessive force.
Id. at 194-95. Officer Brosseau argued that she fired her gun in
reasonable fear for the safety of other officers in the area,
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passengers in the occupied vehicle, and "any other citizens who
might be in the area." Id. at 197. The district court granted
summary judgment to Brosseau on the grounds of qualified immunity,
and the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 195. The Supreme Court
"express[ed] no view as to the correctness of the Court of Appeals'
decision on the constitutional question," but held that the right
was not clearly established, and Brosseau was entitled to qualified
immunity. Id. at 198. As the Supreme Court has since instructed,
"Brosseau makes plain that as of February 21, 1999 -- the date of
the events at issue in that case -- it was not clearly established
that it was unconstitutional to shoot a fleeing driver to protect
those whom his flight might endanger." Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at
2023.
In McGrath, a more recent case involving a police officer
who fired on a fleeing driver, we determined that there were two
paths a plaintiff could take to avoid summary judgment under the
second prong of the qualified immunity analysis: "a plaintiff would
have to show at a minimum that the officer's conduct is materially
different from the conduct in Brosseau or that between February
21, 1999 and the date of the alleged constitutional violation there
emerged either controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases
of persuasive authority that would alter our analysis of the
qualified immunity question." McGrath, 757 F.3d at 30 (quoting
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Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although Mitchell argues that Miller's conduct is materially
different from that of Officer Brosseau, he does not argue that
either controlling authority or a robust consensus has arisen in
the years since Brosseau that would render unreasonable a police
officer's use of deadly force in a case such as this.3 See McGrath,
757 F.3d at 30. Accordingly, our task is further narrowed and we
will focus solely on whether Miller's conduct was materially
different from the conduct in Brosseau.
i. Materially Different
Mitchell attempts to distinguish the facts of this case
from Brosseau, arguing that neither Miller nor anyone else was in
danger of death or serious injury. There are some striking
parallels between this case and Brosseau: both cases involve a
suspect who refused to exit a vehicle; an officer with gun drawn
who wrestled with the suspect for control of the car; and shots
fired as the suspect drove away. Mitchell focuses his argument on
the distinctions that exist between the two cases: that there was
no active arrest warrant for Mitchell as there was for the suspect
in Brosseau; that, in Brosseau, "the officer believed other
3"[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied
by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived."
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
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officers were in the immediate area" of the escaping vehicle; and
that, unlike Brosseau, no person or vehicle was directly in the
Jetta's path. As we shall discuss, these are distinctions without
a difference.
Although a warrant had not been issued for Mitchell's
arrest, Miller was aware that Mitchell was a sexually-violent
convicted felon suspected of breaking into his estranged wife's
apartment, and that he was reported to be driving without a license
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and "possibly
unstable." It is likely, therefore, that Miller and Brosseau had
similar reasons for concern, and certainly more than probable cause
to arrest.
Mitchell's second distinction, if correct, would be more
compelling. He points out that, in Brosseau, "the officer believed
other officers were in the immediate area" of the escaping vehicle.
At oral argument, Mitchell's attorney distinguished this fact by
stating that Officer Miller said nothing in his police report about
fearing for the safety of Officer Schertz. According to counsel,
that motivation surfaced for the first time during Officer Miller's
deposition. Curious, we dug a little deeper. Although Mitchell
did not include the police report in the record submitted to us,
we found that it was attached to the deposition in the district
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court docket. The following is from the very end of the narrative
in that report:
Knowing the danger of a motor vehicle being
driven recklessly I felt my life and Ofc.
Schertz's life were in imminent danger. At no
time did Mitchell obey any of our verbal
commands nor did he show any concern for our
lives or the general public. There was no
question in my mind that Mitchell would have
stopped at nothing to get away.
Clearly, despite counsel's representation to the contrary, Officer
Miller has consistently stated that he was motivated by fear for
his own life as well as that of Officer Schertz.4
Mitchell argues that Miller could not reasonably have
believed (as Brosseau claimed to) that he or anyone else was in
danger because neither the officers nor anyone else were in the
path of the Jetta.5 However, the test is not whether a person was
actually directly in the path of the car, but whether it was
reasonable for Miller to believe -- at the point when events were
4 "[A] genuine dispute as to a material fact cannot be created
by relying on the hope that the jury will not trust the credibility
of the witness. There must be some affirmative evidence that the
officer[] [is] lying. There is none in this case, and there is
nothing inherently unbelievable" about Officer Miller's testimony.
McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20, 30 n.13 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
5 We note that while Brosseau asserted that she acted out of
fear for her fellow officers, for occupants in vehicles in Haugen's
path and other citizens, the Supreme Court expressed no view as to
whether her use of force was reasonable. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
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rapidly unfolding -- that someone was at risk of serious physical
harm. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021 (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at
381). Both men were standing close to the Jetta at the point at
which Mitchell threw the car into a rapid, tight U-turn, and Miller
was still holding onto the car's door at the time. As the video
reveals, although Schertz had repositioned himself shortly before
the turn, Miller's focus was trained on Mitchell and he likely did
not see Schertz move in his peripheral vision. Miller did not
have a duty to "turn around and pin down [his partner's] exact
location." McGrath, 757 F.3d at 28. We "must account for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in
a particular situation." Id. at 25-26 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Miller faced just such a circumstance here;
the confrontation with Mitchell -- following what was at times a
high-speed chase -- lasted only twenty-six seconds.
Our review of the evidence leads us to conclude that in
all material ways, the facts of this case are similar to that of
Brosseau, in which the Supreme Court held that it was not clearly
established that the officer's conduct violated the Fourth
Amendment. Because this case is not materially different from
that of Brosseau, and in the absence of any subsequent contravening
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authority, Mitchell has failed to demonstrate that it was clearly
established that Miller's conduct was constitutionally
unreasonable in these circumstances. We hold that Miller is
protected by qualified immunity.
III.
Conclusion
Our de novo review reveals no genuine dispute as to any
material fact, therefore Miller is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's entry of
summary judgment.
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