Maria Yanez-Marquez v. Loretta Lynch

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1605

MARIA YANEZ-MARQUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.

Argued: September 17, 2014 Decided: June 16, 2015

Before KING and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by published opinion. Senior Judge Hamilton
wrote the opinion in which Judge King and Judge Floyd joined.

ARGUED: Amanda Hunnewell Frost, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, Washington,
D.C., for Petitioner. Jonathan Aaron Robbins, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON
BRIEF: Margaret Hobbins, MAGGIO & KATTAR, Washington, D.C., for
Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, Daniel E. Goldman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office
of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Maria Yanez-Marquez (Yanez), a native and citizen of El

Salvador, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) decision dismissing her appeal from the order of an

Immigration Judge (IJ) ordering her removal from the United

States to El Salvador. Prior to ordering Yanez’s removal, the

IJ denied her motion to suppress certain evidence and to

terminate the removal proceeding. At the center of Yanez’s

petition for review is her challenge to the denial of this

motion, which was premised on, inter alia, alleged egregious

violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. For the reasons

stated below, we deny the petition for review.

I

A

Because the IJ denied Yanez’s motion to suppress and to

terminate without an evidentiary hearing, we review the evidence

in the light most favorable to Yanez. Cotzojay v. Holder, 725

F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2013).

In June 2008, agents from the Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) were investigating Robert Bontempo, Jr. and

Rebecca Bontempo, the owners of Annapolis Painting Services

(APS). The agents suspected that the Bontempos employed and

harbored illegal aliens. The Bontempos owned a property, 402

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Harbor Drive, Annapolis, Maryland (the Premises), which ICE

surveillance revealed was occupied by Jose Umana Ruiz (Umana),

an illegal alien and El Salvadorian citizen. Unbeknownst to the

agents, Yanez, an illegal alien and Umana’s long-time partner,

also lived at the Premises. In June 2008, Yanez was five months

pregnant.

In an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the

Premises and numerous other houses owned by the Bontempos that

were tied to the housing of illegal aliens, ICE Special Agent

Francis Coker (Agent Coker) outlined the extensive background

evidence concerning how employers employ and house illegal

aliens, and the extensive evidence concerning how APS and the

Bontempos engaged in such practices. 1 The affidavit also

included a picture of the Premises and described it as a

“single-family home[,] a single story building with a shingled

roof.” (J.A. 524). 2 A mailbox, with the number “402,” is

1
The search warrant itself incorporated by reference Agent
Coker’s affidavit, thus avoiding any difficulty with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004). See
United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 470-71 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“As a general rule, a supporting affidavit or document may be
read together with (and considered part of) a warrant that
otherwise lacks sufficient particularity ‘if the warrant uses
appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting
document accompanies the warrant.’” (quoting Groh, 540 U.S. at
557-58)).
2
The picture of the Premises included in Agent Coker’s
affidavit shows a single story home with a gable roof. It shows
(Continued)
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located in front of the Premises. (J.A. 524). The affidavit

noted that Anne Arundel County land records reflected a sale of

the Premises from Jennifer Scott to the Bontempos in October

2000 for the sum of $156,000.00.

The search warrant that accompanied Agent Coker’s affidavit

had two boxes on its front side, where the issuing judge was

required to designate the time of day when the search was

authorized to occur. The “daytime” box read “in the daytime--

6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M.” (J.A. 455). Meanwhile, the

alternative “any time” box read “at any time in the day or night

as I find reasonable cause has been established.” (J.A. 455).

In issuing the warrant for the Premises, a United States

Magistrate Judge in the District of Maryland checked only the

daytime box and struck the language next to the any time box

that would have authorized a nighttime search as follows: “at

any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been

established.” (J.A. 455) (strikeout in original). Thus, the

warrant for the Premises authorized a daytime search only, to be

conducted between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. The warrant also

specified that the search was to be completed on or before July

4, 2008. The scope of the items to be seized under the warrant

two windows in the roof facing the street and one window on the
right gable end.

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was broad and included illegal aliens, travel documents,

financial records, and photographs of harbored aliens.

The magistrate judge issued the search warrant on June 24,

2008. The search of the Premises took place six days later, on

the morning of Monday, June 30, 2008. Prior to the search,

several ICE agents, along with officers of the Anne Arundel

County Police Department, assembled in an Annapolis parking lot

for a briefing. ICE Agent Sean Currie (Agent Currie), the ICE

search team leader, assigned responsibilities for the search.

After the briefing, the search team proceeded to the Premises,

which was ten to fifteen minutes away by car, to execute the

warrant.

According to Yanez, the search warrant was executed at the

Premises at 5:00 a.m. 3 Agent Currie knocked on the front door

which was answered by another occupant of the Premises, Jose

Mendoza-Gomez (Mendoza), who immediately was handcuffed and

seated on the couch in the living room for officer safety.

After detaining Mendoza, two agents proceeded upstairs. Umana

and Yanez were awakened by the yelling of “police” and a loud

banging on their bedroom door. (J.A. 141). Umana and Yanez had

3
Agent Currie and ICE agent Richard Federico, Sr. (Agent
Federico) executed declarations that were presented to the IJ.
In their respective declarations, they assert that the search
began at 6:02 a.m. The return on the search warrant states that
the search was completed at 8:56 a.m., but it fails to indicate
when the search began.

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been planning to sleep later than normal that morning because

Yanez had the day off from work. She felt groggy and confused

because “it seemed like it was the middle of the night.” (J.A.

141). She had no idea what was going on. Umana clothed

himself, but before he could reach the locked door, the ICE

agents broke it down, causing the door to hit Umana’s hand. Two

agents “burst” into the room and screamed “police.” (J.A. 142).

One agent grabbed Umana’s neck and threw him to the ground. The

other held a gun to Umana’s head while pinning his body and face

to the floor. The agents screamed “don’t move.” (J.A. 142).

Once Umana was held down, an agent pointed a gun at Yanez’s head

and yelled “don’t move.” (J.A. 142). Yanez, who was wearing a

“nightshirt,” cried and pleaded for permission to cover herself

“with more clothes.” (J.A. 142). The agent again screamed

“don’t move” and pointed his gun at her head. (J.A. 142).

Umana told the agents that Yanez was pregnant and begged them to

allow her to get dressed. A female agent was called for

assistance and came to Yanez, telling her that “it will be

okay.” (J.A. 142). Yanez was scared that she or Umana would be

harmed, and she was not allowed to use the restroom. Although

an agent was speaking in Spanish, loud noise obstructed Yanez

from hearing. The agents handcuffed Umana and escorted him

downstairs. Yanez grabbed a “T-shirt to put over [her]

nightshirt” as she was led downstairs at gunpoint. (J.A. 143).

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 Downstairs, Yanez saw four ICE agents in the living room.

She was told to join Umana on the couch. Although the occupants

denied that anyone else was in the house, the agents knocked

down doors and found no one. For five to ten minutes, the

agents questioned the occupants about their identities, asking

repeatedly about Annapolis Painting Services. The occupants

denied knowing anything about the company. The agents were

“extremely hostile,” and Yanez thought that someone would be

harmed if they did not answer the questions. (J.A. 143). The

agents then took the occupants’ fingerprints and escorted Umana

and Mendoza away. Yanez was “never shown a warrant, [never]

told that [she] had a right to an attorney, [and never told]

that [she] could refuse to answer any questions.” (J.A. 143).

The ICE agents searched the entire house, “ripp[ing] apart

each room that they went through,” kicking down doors,

scattering documents, and turning over furniture. (J.A. 144).

During the search, Yanez again was questioned. The agents asked

her if she had a car and keys for it, which Yanez conceded.

Yanez felt she had no choice but to surrender the keys. Her car

was searched. The agents told Yanez that she “had” to sign

“several pieces of paper,” although she did not want to sign

them, asked why she had to sign, and did not understand what

they said. (J.A. 144). Despite no one reading or explaining

the documents to her, she signed them.

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 Before leaving, an ICE agent told Yanez that she would get

a letter from “the Immigration Court” and warned her not to move

to a different location. (J.A. 145). When the agents left at

9:15 a.m., they took many of Yanez’s belongings, including her

pay stubs, tax returns, and photo albums. These items were

never returned.

After the search, Yanez left the Premises and spent the

night at her sister-in-law’s house. She returned to the

Premises the following day to find the landlord’s employees

“hauling” off her and Umana’s “belongings . . . to the trash

dump.” (J.A. 145). Later that day, Yanez experienced stress

and severe abdominal pain that she believes were caused by the

search, seizure, and questioning. At 5:30 p.m., she was taken

to the hospital where she was treated and released after a few

hours. Upon her release from the hospital, Yanez was told her

unborn child would be “alright.” (J.A. 145).

Yanez’s statements to the ICE agents were memorialized on

two “Form I–213s” (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien). 4

4
“A Form I–213 is an official record routinely prepared by
an [immigration officer] as a summary of information obtained at
the time of the initial processing of an individual suspected of
being an alien unlawfully present in the United States.” Bauge
v. INS, 7 F.3d 1540, 1543 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993). “Form I–213[s]
. . . are records made by public officials in the ordinary
course of their duties, and accordingly evidence strong indicia
of reliability.” Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.
1996).

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The forms state that Yanez is a native and citizen of El

Salvador and that she “last entered the United States on or

about April 2007 without inspection.” (J.A. 453). The forms

further reveal that Yanez has been illegally present in the

United States since her April 2007 entry.

B

On July 10, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

issued a notice to appear to Yanez. The notice alleged that

Yanez was “an alien present in the United States who had not

been admitted or paroled.” (J.A. 547); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (rendering inadmissible an alien who has not

been properly admitted or paroled). In support of this

allegation, the notice alleged that Yanez: (1) was not a United

States citizen; (2) was a native and citizen of El Salvador; (3)

entered the United States at an unknown location on an unknown

date; and (4) was not “admitted or paroled after inspection by

an Immigration Officer.” (J.A. 547).

On February 10, 2010, the DHS filed its “Submission of

Intended Evidence,” which designated the evidence the DHS

intended to introduce in the removal proceeding as follows: (1)

the two Form I–213s; (2) the search warrant executed for the

Premises; and (3) the affidavit in support of the warrant. In

response, on April 21, 2010, Yanez filed a “motion to suppress

and to terminate removal proceedings.” (J.A. 106). Yanez

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claimed that, during the June 30, 2008 search, seizure, and

questioning, the ICE agents egregiously violated her Fourth

Amendment rights, violated her Fifth Amendment due process

rights, and failed to follow five applicable federal

regulations. In her motion, Yanez stressed that the Supreme

Court’s decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984),

permitted the application of the exclusionary rule in a civil

removal proceeding where the Fourth Amendment violations were

either widespread or egregious.

More specifically, Yanez first claimed that the ICE agents

egregiously violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they

executed the search warrant at 5:00 a.m. instead of between 6:00

a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Second, Yanez claimed that the warrant’s

lack of particularity egregiously violated her Fourth Amendment

rights in that (1) she was not specified as an “item” to be

seized in the warrant and (2) the agents should have known the

Premises was a “two-floor, multi-family dwelling.” (J.A. 118).

Third, Yanez claimed that her Fourth Amendment rights were

egregiously violated when the agents used excessive force during

the search and seizure. Fourth, she claimed that the Fourth

Amendment violations committed by the agents were part of a

widespread pattern of ICE misconduct. Fifth, Yanez claimed that

the agents violated her Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause

rights when they coerced her into making incriminating

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statements. Finally, she claimed that the agents violated five

different federal regulations, in particular, 8 C.F.R.

§ 287.8(b)(2) (permitting an immigration officer to detain a

person for questioning if he has reasonable suspicion “that the

person being questioned is, or is attempting to be, engaged in

an offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in

the United States”), 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) (“An arrest shall

be made only when the designated immigration officer has reason

to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an

offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in

the United States.”), 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii) (“A warrant of

arrest shall be obtained except when the designated immigration

officer has reason to believe that the person is likely to

escape before a warrant can be obtained.”), 8 C.F.R.

§ 287.8(a)(1)(iii) (“A designated immigration officer shall

always use the minimum non-deadly force necessary to accomplish

the officer’s mission and shall escalate to a higher level of

non-deadly force only when such higher level of force is

warranted by the actions, apparent intentions, and apparent

capabilities of the suspect, prisoner or assailant.”), and 8

C.F.R. § 287.3(c) (which requires that an alien who is arrested

without a warrant and placed in formal removal proceedings be

informed that she has a right to an attorney and provided with a

list of attorneys that provide free legal services).

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 In its response, the DHS first argued that the exclusionary

rule does not apply to civil removal proceedings, also relying

on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez-Mendoza. The DHS

stressed that the Court in Lopez-Mendoza “did not affirmatively

state that egregious Fourth Amendment violations are an

exception to the Court’s holding that the Fourth Amendment’s

exclusionary rule is inapplicable in civil deportation

proceedings.” (J.A. 47). Alternatively, the DHS argued that,

even if the exclusionary rule applied, Yanez failed to set forth

facts establishing a prima facie case of an egregious violation

of her Fourth Amendment rights or a violation of her Fifth

Amendment Due Process Clause rights. See Matter of Barcenas, 19

I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (BIA 1988) (noting that petitioner

challenging the admissibility of evidence in removal proceeding

is required to establish a prima facie case for exclusion).

Finally, the DHS argued that the ICE agents did not violate any

applicable regulations, and, even if they did, it did not

justify suppressing the challenged evidence. Along with its

motion, the DHS submitted the declarations of Agent Currie and

Agent Federico. These declarations take issue with not only

Yanez’s timing assertions, but also her assertions concerning

the manner in which the search, seizure, and questioning were

carried out.

In her decision denying the motion to suppress and to

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terminate, the IJ first rejected the DHS’s contention that the

exclusionary rule did not apply in civil removal proceedings,

relying on Lopez-Mendoza and BIA precedent. The IJ then set

forth the prima facie case framework, noting that Yanez bore the

initial burden of alleging facts constituting an egregious

Fourth Amendment violation. The IJ then turned to Yanez’s

substantive claims and rejected each one of them.

In rejecting Yanez’s claim that the ICE agents committed

egregious Fourth Amendment violations, the IJ stated:

With respect to the timing of entry, even if ICE
agents entered “at 5 a.m.” as the Respondent asserts,
the Court cannot find that such a violation of the
terms of the warrant — by a single hour — would be
egregious. That simply does not amount to conduct
that “shocks the conscience.” With respect to the
entry into the bedroom, even if an officer . . . had
simply come upon the locked door, banged on it,
announced his presence, and forced it open with
another officer, the Court cannot conclude that such
action would be egregious. The agents were executing
a search warrant. . . . The alleged timing of entry
into the residence and method of entry into the
bedroom were not egregious violations.

(J.A. 543). Turning next to Yanez’s challenge to the amount of

force used by the agents, the IJ rejected this challenge,

noting:

With respect to the force used by the officers in the
home, the Court cannot conclude that excessive force
was used, even considering solely the Respondent’s
account. The Respondent’s affidavit claims that an
officer held a gun to her head. The Respondent
acknowledges that both officers were screaming, “don’t
move!” in English and Spanish. . . . The Respondent
indicates that her partner told the officers that the

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 Respondent was pregnant and asked that she be allowed
to put on more clothes. She also indicates that when
the officers heard this, they asked for a female
officer to come up to the bedroom. These actions,
while no doubt extremely frightening for the
Respondent, are consistent with ensuring officer
safety and enabling the officers to control a
potentially dangerous situation. There is no showing
that greater than necessary force was used or that
weapons were drawn any longer than necessary. The
Respondent acknowledges that the officers identified
themselves as police and repeatedly shouted at them
not to move. She acknowledges that a female officer
was called as soon as her partner told them that she
was pregnant. She also acknowledges that she was not
put in handcuffs, that she was not taken out of the
house for further processing, and that she was not
placed in immigration detention. The actions of the
agents and the other officers were reasonable under
the circumstances and reflect that ICE officials took
appropriate account of the Respondent’s pregnancy
throughout the operation. As such, those actions
cannot be found to be egregious.

(J.A. 544).

With regard to Yanez’s claim that the ICE agents violated

her Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause rights, the IJ rejected

this claim, concluding that the circumstances as a whole did not

“reflect an atmosphere of coercion and intimidation that would

render [Yanez’s] statements involuntary.” (J.A. 544).

Next, the IJ rejected two of the five regulatory claims

pressed by Yanez. First, the IJ rejected Yanez’s

§ 287.8(a)(1)(iii) claim on the basis that she had “not made a

sufficient showing that excessive force was used.” (J.A. 545).

Second, the IJ rejected the § 287.3(c) claim because the DHS’s

notice to appear had sufficiently advised Yanez of her right to

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counsel. As for the three remaining regulatory claims, for some

inexplicable reason, the IJ quoted the regulations

(§ 287.8(b)(2), § 287.8(c)(2)(i), § 287.8(c)(2)(ii)), but did

not explain her reasoning for rejecting the claims.

The IJ then addressed Yanez’s widespread ICE misconduct

argument. The IJ rejected this argument, finding “no basis to

suppress evidence in this case on the basis of what may or may

not have occurred in other cases or during other enforcement

operations.” (J.A. 546).

The IJ concluded her opinion by noting that Yanez had “not

met her burden of establishing a prima facie case for

suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, ICE regulations, or on any other

theory.” (J.A. 546). Accordingly, the IJ denied the motion to

suppress and to terminate.

On December 13, 2010, the IJ found that the DHS had

satisfied its burden of proving removability by clear and

convincing evidence. See Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 566

(4th Cir. 2013) (“In removal proceedings, the government bears

the burden of proving removability . . . by clear and convincing

evidence.”). Because Yanez had not sought relief from removal,

the IJ ordered that Yanez be removed from the United States to

El Salvador.

On January 11, 2011, Yanez filed a notice of appeal with

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the BIA. In her brief filed with the BIA on April 1, 2011,

Yanez reiterated all of the arguments that she raised before the

IJ, save one. She did not claim, as she did before the IJ, that

the Fourth Amendment violations committed by the ICE agents were

part of a larger, widespread pattern of misconduct by ICE

officials. To be sure, Part III D of Yanez’s motion to suppress

and to terminate filed with the IJ raises the widespread pattern

claim in a section following Part III C iv of the motion, which

raised the § 287.3 claim. In her brief filed with the BIA, the

conclusion section of the brief follows the § 287.3 claim, and

the brief contains no argument concerning widespread

constitutional violations committed by ICE officials.

On April 7, 2011, the DHS filed its brief with the BIA. In

urging the BIA to affirm the IJ’s decision, the DHS

“incorporate[d] by reference the entirety” of the brief it filed

with the IJ. (J.A. 8).

On April 15, 2013, the BIA dismissed Yanez’s appeal. In

its decision, the BIA first noted that the exclusionary rule

does not apply in civil removal proceedings unless the alleged

Fourth Amendment violation is egregious. Next, the BIA rejected

Yanez’s claim that the ICE agents egregiously violated her

Fourth Amendment rights, relying on the reasoning of the IJ.

The BIA also adopted the reasoning of the IJ in rejecting

Yanez’s Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause claim and her

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regulatory claims under § 287.8(a)(1)(iii) and § 287.3(c). With

regard to the three regulations the IJ quoted but did not

address, § 287.8(b)(2), § 287.8(c)(2)(i), and § 287.8(c)(2)(ii),

the BIA determined that no remand was necessary because the IJ

adequately addressed the nature of Yanez’s “detention and

interrogation, as well as the warrant used by the ICE officers.”

(J.A. 5). As a result, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and

dismissed Yanez’s appeal.

Yanez filed a timely petition for review under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252.

II

A

When the BIA affirms and adopts an IJ’s decision and

includes its own reasons for affirming, we review both decisions

as the final agency action. Ai Hua Chen v. Holder, 742 F.3d

171, 177 (4th Cir. 2014). Legal conclusions made by the IJ and

the BIA are reviewed de novo. Crespin–Valladares v. Holder, 632

F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011). We must uphold the BIA’s

decision unless it is “manifestly contrary to the law and an

abuse of discretion.” Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th

Cir. 2011). The BIA abuses its discretion if it fails “to offer

a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distort[s] or

disregard[s] important aspects of the applicant’s claim.” Id.

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 A petitioner challenging the admissibility of evidence in a

civil removal proceeding “must come forward with proof

establishing a prima facie case before the [government] will be

called on to assume the burden of justifying the manner in which

it obtained the evidence.” Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec.

at 611 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under

this burden-shifting framework, “if the petitioner offers an

affidavit that could support a basis for excluding the evidence

. . . , it must then be supported by testimony.” Maldonado v.

Holder, 763 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Upon the establishment of a prima

facie case by the petitioner, the burden of proof shifts to the

government to demonstrate why the IJ should admit the challenged

evidence. Id.

In the case before us, both the IJ and the BIA applied this

framework and concluded that Yanez did not establish a prima

facie case on any of her claims to warrant a suppression

hearing. It is this conclusion that Yanez principally

challenges in this court.

B

In her petition for review, Yanez presses claims under the

Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as well as certain regulatory

claims. The heart of her case is that the Fourth Amendment’s

exclusionary rule requires the suppression of all statements and

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documentation regarding her national origin and citizenship

obtained by the ICE agents, including the two Form I–213s.

Yanez contends that, without the two Form I–213s and her

statements, the government cannot meet its burden of proving her

alienage and removability, and, therefore, her removal

proceeding should be terminated. At a minimum, Yanez claims

that her affidavit and other record evidence provide a basis in

which to exclude the challenged evidence, such that an

evidentiary hearing is required. To resolve Yanez’s

contentions, we must first decide whether the Fourth Amendment’s

exclusionary rule applies in the civil removal proceeding before

us.

C

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

Although the Fourth Amendment “contains no provision expressly

precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its

commands,” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995), to deter

violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court

established the exclusionary rule, Weeks v. United States, 232

U.S. 383, 398 (1914), which, “when applicable, forbids the use

of improperly obtained evidence at [a criminal] trial.” Herring

v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009); see also Lopez–

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Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040–41 (“The general rule in a criminal

proceeding is that statements and other evidence obtained as a

result of an unlawful, warrantless arrest are suppressible if

the link between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not

too attenuated.”). “[T]he exclusionary sanction applies to any

‘fruits’ of a constitutional violation--whether such evidence be

tangible, physical material actually seized in an illegal

search, items observed or words overheard in the course of the

unlawful activity, or confessions or statements of the accused

obtained during an illegal arrest and detention.” United States

v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980) (footnotes omitted).

Given the “substantial social costs” of the application of

the exclusionary rule, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907

(1984), namely, “the loss of often probative evidence and all of

the secondary costs that flow from the less accurate or more

cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs,” Lopez–Mendoza,

468 U.S. at 1041, “the exclusionary rule is not a remedy we

apply lightly,” Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347

(2006). Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the

exclusionary rule’s “massive remedy,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547

U.S. 586, 595 (2006)--the suppression of evidence--is “our last

resort, not our first impulse,” id. at 591.

While the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a

criminal proceeding is settled, the applicability of the rule in

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a civil removal proceeding is not. The Supreme Court has never

applied the rule in a removal proceeding. In fact, in Lopez–

Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule

generally does not apply in removal proceedings. 468 U.S. at

1034; see also United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 230

(4th Cir. 2007) (“Lopez-Mendoza establishes that the

exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation

proceedings.”).

In Lopez–Mendoza, Adan Lopez-Mendoza (Lopez) and Elias

Sandoval-Sanchez (Sandoval), two citizens of Mexico, were

summoned to separate removal proceedings, and both were ordered

deported after such proceedings. 468 U.S. at 1034. Immigration

and Naturalization Service (INS) agents arrested Lopez at his

place of employment, a transmission repair shop, without a

warrant to search the repair shop or a warrant to arrest anyone

there. Id. at 1035. The repair shop owner refused to permit

the agents to speak with his employees during work hours. Id.

However, while one agent engaged the repair shop owner in

conversation, another agent entered the repair shop and spoke

with Lopez. Id. While he was being questioned, Lopez told the

agent his name and that he was from Mexico with no close family

ties in the United States. Id. After the agent placed Lopez

under arrest, he was transported to an INS office where he

admitted that he was born in Mexico, was still a citizen of

- 21 -
Mexico, and had entered the United States without inspection by

immigration officials. Id.

At his removal hearing, Lopez moved to terminate the

removal proceeding on the basis that he was arrested

illegally. Id. The IJ held that the legality of Lopez’s arrest

was not germane to the removal proceeding, and, therefore,

declined to rule on the legality of the arrest. Id. On the

basis of the Form I-213 and an affidavit executed by Lopez, the

IJ ordered that Lopez be removed from the United States to

Mexico. Id. at 1035-36.

On appeal to the BIA, the BIA dismissed Lopez’s

appeal. Id. at 1036. The BIA noted that the “mere fact of an

illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation

proceeding.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). On Lopez’s petition for review, the Ninth Circuit

vacated Lopez’s removal order and remanded the case to the BIA

for a determination of whether Lopez’s Fourth Amendment rights

were violated when he was arrested. Id.

The second petitioner in Lopez-Mendoza, Sandoval, was

arrested at his place of employment, a potato processing plant

in Pasco, Washington. Id. INS agents went to the plant, with

the permission of its personnel manager, to check for illegal

aliens. Id. During a shift change, plant workers were asked

innocuous questions in English by INS agents as they entered the

- 22 -
plant to work. Id. at 1037. Upon seeing the INS agents as he

approached the entrance to the plant, Sandoval “averted his

head, turned around, and walked away.” Id. Sandoval was among

the thirty-seven people detained and transported to a county

jail. Id. At the jail, Sandoval was questioned by an INS agent

and admitted, in a written statement, that he unlawfully entered

into the United States. Id.

At his removal hearing, Sandoval contended that the

evidence offered by the INS should be suppressed as the fruit of

an unlawful arrest. Id. The IJ considered and rejected

Sandoval’s claim that he had been illegally arrested, but ruled

in the alternative that the legality of the arrest was not

relevant to the removal hearing. Id. Based on the written

record of Sandoval’s admissions, the IJ found him

removable. Id. at 1038.

On appeal to the BIA, the BIA dismissed Sandoval’s

appeal. Id. The BIA declined to invoke the exclusionary rule,

concluding that the circumstances of the arrest had not affected

the voluntariness of Sandoval’s written statement. Id. On

Sandoval’s petition for review, the Ninth Circuit reversed the

removal order. Id. The Ninth Circuit opined that Sandoval’s

detention by the INS agents violated the Fourth Amendment, that

the statements he made were a product of that detention, and

that the exclusionary rule barred their use in a removal

- 23 -
hearing. Id.

In resolving the cases before it, the Supreme Court quickly

disposed of Lopez’s challenge to his removal order because the

“mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent

deportation proceeding.” Id. at 1040 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). According to the Court, “[t]he ‘body’

or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil

proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an

unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest,

search, or interrogation occurred.” Id. at 1039.

Sandoval’s case meaningfully differed from that of Lopez’s

case in that Sandoval challenged the admissibility of evidence

at his removal hearing, while Lopez only raised a personal

jurisdiction challenge. Cf. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 229

(noting that, in Lopez-Mendoza, Lopez’s case only raised a

personal jurisdictional challenge, that is, Lopez sought

“suppression of [his] body,” while Sandoval conceded personal

jurisdiction, but sought to suppress the evidence in his removal

proceeding). Indeed, the Court in Lopez-Mendoza observed that

Sandoval had “a more substantial claim” because “[h]e objected

not to his compelled presence at a deportation proceeding, but

to evidence offered at that proceeding.” 468 U.S. at 1040. As

a result, the Court considered whether the exclusionary rule

should apply to prohibit the government from using illegally

- 24 -
obtained evidence of Sandoval’s alienage against him in his

removal proceeding. Id. at 1040–41.

In determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule in a

removal proceeding, the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza noted

that removal proceedings are “purely civil,” id. at 1038, the

purpose of which is “not to punish past transgressions but

rather to put an end to a continuing violation of the

immigration laws.” Id. at 1039. The Court emphasized that the

evidentiary protections that apply in criminal proceedings do

not apply in removal proceedings because: (1) criminal trials

adjudicate the defendant’s guilt, whereas removal proceedings

determine the alien’s “eligibility to remain in this country”;

and (2) unlike criminal trials, removal hearings do not impose

punishment on the alien. Id. at 1038. Given this, the Court

characterized the intent of a removal hearing as a “streamlined

determination of eligibility to remain in this country, nothing

more.” Id. at 1039.

Viewing a removal proceeding through the proper lens, the

Court employed a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to

apply the exclusionary rule to removal proceedings, id. at 1041-

50, weighing the “social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized

evidence against the likely costs.” Id. at 1041; cf. Leon, 468

U.S. at 906-08 (concluding that evidence obtained pursuant to

the good faith reliance on a defective warrant should not be

- 25 -
excluded because the cost of exclusion outweighed the benefit of

deterrence); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)

(declining to apply the exclusionary rule to a civil tax

proceeding because the cost of exclusion outweighed the benefit

of deterrence). On the benefit side of the ledger, the Court

proffered four reasons why, in the context of removal

proceedings, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule was

significantly reduced. 468 U.S. at 1043-46. First, the Court

opined that, because deportability can be proven by evidence

independent of the arrest, the legality of the arrest was

irrelevant. Id. at 1043-44. Second, the Court noted that very

few undocumented aliens actually challenge removal orders based

on Fourth Amendment grounds, making it “unlikely” that an

immigration agent would “shape his conduct in anticipation of

the exclusion of evidence” at a removal hearing. Id. at 1044.

Third, because the INS already had its own comprehensive scheme

for deterring Fourth Amendment violations, application of the

exclusionary rule was unnecessary. Id. at 1044-45. Finally,

the Court reasoned that the availability of alternative

remedies, such as civil or criminal sanctions against the

immigration official, further undermined the deterrent value of

the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1045.

The Lopez-Mendoza Court then turned to the cost of

exclusion. First, the Court observed that the effect of

- 26 -
applying the exclusionary rule required courts “to close their

eyes to ongoing violations of the law.” Id. at 1046. Second,

applying the exclusionary rule would significantly complicate

the “simple” and “streamlined” deportation system. Id. at 1048.

Finally, the Court opined that, with respect to the apprehension

of over one million undocumented aliens each year, expecting

immigration agents to provide written details of each arrest and

to attend suppression hearings would severely burden the

administration of immigration laws. Id. at 1048-49.

Weighing the benefits of exclusion against the likely

costs, the Court in Lopez-Mendoza was persuaded that the scales

tipped against applying the exclusionary rule in removal

proceedings. Id. at 1050. In particular, the Court emphasized

that the “costs” of applying the exclusionary rule in removal

proceedings are “high,” noting that such application “would

compel the courts to release from custody persons who would then

immediately resume their commission of a crime through their

continuing, unlawful presence in this country.” Id.

After concluding that the exclusionary rule was

inapplicable to removal proceedings because the costs outweighed

the benefits, a plurality of the Court in Lopez-Mendoza appeared

to limit the scope of its holding by apparently reserving

judgment for cases that presented a “good reason to believe that

Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were

- 27 -
widespread.” Id. at 1050. 5 In carving out this apparent

limitation, the plurality emphasized that its holding “[did] not

deal . . . with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or

other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental

fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence

obtained.” Id. at 1050-51 (footnote omitted).

Four Justices dissented in Lopez-Mendoza. Each of these

four Justices opined that the exclusionary rule should apply in

removal proceedings. See id. at 1052 (White, J., dissenting)

(“I believe that the conclusion of the majority is based upon an

incorrect assessment of the costs and benefits of applying the

rule in [removal proceedings].”); id. at 1051 (Brennan, J.,

dissenting) (“I fully agree with Justice White that . . . the

exclusionary rule must apply in civil deportation proceedings”

not because it is a deterrent but because “of the Fourth

Amendment itself.”); id. at 1060 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I

agree with Justice White that . . . [Supreme Court precedent]

compels the conclusion that the exclusionary rule should apply

in civil deportation proceedings.”); id. at 1061 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) (“Because the Court has not yet held that the rule

5
While Chief Justice Burger joined the parts of the opinion
(Parts I to IV) holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply
in removal proceedings, he did not join in the part of the
opinion (Part V) recognizing that egregious or widespread Fourth
Amendment violations might warrant application of the
exclusionary rule.

- 28 -
of . . . [Leon] . . . has any application to warrantless

searches, I do not join the portion of Justice WHITE’s opinion

that relies on that case. I do, however, agree with the

remainder of his dissenting opinion.”). Considering the

position of the four dissenting justices, a total of eight

justices in Lopez-Mendoza seem to have agreed that the

exclusionary rule should apply in removal proceedings in some

form.

Since Lopez-Mendoza was decided, circuit courts have

applied the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings in a

variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Cotzojay, 725 F.3d at 179-

83 (addressing whether warrantless entry into alien’s home was

egregious Fourth Amendment violation); Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y

Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2012) (addressing whether

ICE agents’ entry into apartment and seizure of the alien

egregiously violated the Fourth Amendment, and whether the ICE

agents’ conduct was part of a widespread pattern of Fourth

Amendment misconduct); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 779

(8th Cir. 2010) (addressing whether the arrest of the alien

egregiously violated the Fourth Amendment); Kandamar v.

Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006) (addressing whether

alien’s statements were obtained in egregious violation of the

Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 233-37 (2d

- 29 -
Cir. 2006) (addressing whether the alien’s seizure was an

egregious Fourth Amendment violation); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS,

22 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (addressing whether stop of

alien egregiously violated the Fourth Amendment). Such courts

have applied the rule even though the Court’s limiting language

in Lopez-Mendoza could be labeled as “dicta” in that the Court

arguably reserved judgment on whether the exclusionary rule

applies in the event of an egregious Fourth Amendment. See,

e.g., Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 275 (noting that the apparent

limitation in Lopez-Mendoza could be characterized as dicta).

In our case, the IJ, the BIA, and the Attorney General all

agree that the exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings

to egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment. 6 Although we

have not had occasion to consider the application of the

exclusionary rule in removal proceedings in a published opinion, 7

6
Before the IJ and the BIA in this case, the DHS took the
position that the exclusionary rule does not apply in removal
proceedings under any circumstances. However, the Attorney
General, who represents the government in this court, takes a
position contrary to that of the DHS, and his position
concerning the exclusionary rule is binding on the DHS. See 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (providing that the Secretary of Homeland
Security “shall be charged with the administration and
enforcement of . . . all . . . laws relating to the immigration
and naturalization of aliens . . . [p]rovided, however, [t]hat
determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to
all questions of law shall be controlling”).
7
In unpublished decisions, we have recognized the
application of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings.
(Continued)
- 30 -
we are in agreement with those courts that have concluded that

the rule applies to egregious violations of the Fourth

Amendment. 8 To hold otherwise would give no effect to the

language used by the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza expressing

concern over fundamentally unfair methods of obtaining evidence

and would ignore the fact that eight justices in Lopez-Mendoza

seem to have agreed that the exclusionary rule applies in

removal proceedings in some form. Moreover, even assuming the

Court’s limitation in Lopez-Mendoza could be construed as dicta,

we simply cannot ignore the import of the language used by the

Supreme Court in that case. See United States v. Fareed, 296

F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2002) (following “dictum endorsed by six

justices” of the Supreme Court and citing Gaylor v. United

States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that federal

appellate court is “‘bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as

firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings’”)). Accordingly, we

See, e.g., Samuels v. INS, 993 F.2d 1539, at *1 (4th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished) (“We reject Samuels’ arguments that her confession
should have been suppressed because of alleged Fifth Amendment
violations. The Supreme Court has made clear that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation cases,
absent ‘egregious’ constitutional violations. . . . We perceive
no egregious violations here.” (footnote omitted)).
8
All of Yanez’s egregiousness claims pertain to alleged
Fourth Amendment violations. Consequently, we do not decide
what “other liberties” fall within the egregiousness exception.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.

- 31 -
hold that the exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings

where the challenged evidence has been obtained by “egregious

violations of [the] Fourth Amendment . . . that might transgress

notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative

value of the evidence obtained.” Lopez–Mendoza, 468 U.S. at

1050-51.

Under this holding, an alien seeking the application of the

exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment claim in a removal

hearing faces two hurdles at the prima facie case stage. First,

she must allege facts that state a violation of her rights under

the Fourth Amendment. Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 275. Second,

the alien must show that the alleged violation of the Fourth

Amendment was egregious. Id. To get an evidentiary hearing,

the alien must satisfy both prongs. See Maldonado, 763 F.3d at

162 (“Petitioners were required to proffer affidavits based on

personal knowledge that, taken as true, could support

suppression. Had their affidavits been sufficient, they would

have had an opportunity to confirm those allegations in an

evidentiary hearing.”). If an evidentiary hearing is warranted,

the alien will have the opportunity to present testimony and

evidence in support of her Fourth Amendment claim. Id. Upon

the establishment of a prima facie case, the burden of proof

shifts to the government to demonstrate why the IJ should admit

the challenged evidence. Id.

- 32 -
 A court reviewing the alien’s claim may, but is not

required to, address both the constitutional and egregiousness

prongs. Like a § 1983 qualified immunity inquiry, the court can

choose to decline to address whether a Fourth Amendment

violation has occurred and first address whether the

egregiousness prong has been satisfied. See, e.g., Martinez

Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding

that alleged Fourth Amendment violations were not egregious and

declining to address whether Fourth Amendment violations had

occurred); Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th

Cir. 2011) (“However, we need not and do not decide whether the

seizure violated Petitioners’ Fourth Amendment rights because we

conclude that, even if the seizure violated Petitioners’ Fourth

Amendment rights, the violation was not egregious.”); see

also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235-37 (2009)

(explaining that, in deciding the question of § 1983 qualified

immunity, the court may, but is not required to, address both

the constitutional and clearly established prongs; rather, it

may decide the case solely on the clearly established prong).

Thus, if the alien fails to allege facts sufficient to show that

an immigration official has violated the Fourth Amendment,

relief can be denied alone on that basis. Cf. Evans v.

Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a plaintiff

fails to allege that an official has violated any right, the

- 33 -
official ‘is hardly in need of any immunity and the analysis

ends right then and there.’” (quoting Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d

412, 415 (4th Cir. 2007))). Alternatively, relief can be denied

where the alien fails to allege facts that an immigration

official egregiously violated the Fourth

Amendment. See Maldonado, 763 F.3d at 160 (“The affidavits in

this case do not suggest egregious constitutional violations,

and therefore could not support a basis for excluding the

evidence.” (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks

omitted)). If there is an evidentiary hearing on the alien’s

claim, relief can be denied if the alien fails to meet her

evidentiary burden on either prong. Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at

279.

D

As noted above, an alien seeking to invoke the exclusionary

rule in a removal proceeding must demonstrate: (1) a violation

of her Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) that the violation was

egregious. While the standard for establishing the

constitutional violation prong is straightforward--alleging

facts establishing a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, Chalmers, 703 F.3d at 646--the standard for

establishing the egregiousness prong is not so straightforward.

The confusion, and hence uncertainty, stems from Part V

of Lopez-Mendoza.

- 34 -
 1

Part V of Lopez-Mendoza sanctions the application of the

exclusionary rule in cases where the evidence was obtained as a

result of “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other

liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness

and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”

468 U.S. at 1050–51. The exact meaning of this statement is far

from clear.

The plain meaning of this statement suggests that the

Fourth Amendment violation must “transgress notions of

fundamental fairness” and “undermine the probative value of the

evidence obtained.” Id. However, closer inspection of the

context of this statement reveals that the Supreme Court meant

to use the disjunctive “or” instead of the conjunctive “and” to

create two avenues of relief instead of one such avenue. In

other words, an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment is:

(1) a violation of the Fourth Amendment that transgresses

notions of fundamental fairness; or (2) a violation of the

Fourth Amendment that, regardless of the violation’s unfairness,

undermines the probative value of the challenged

evidence. See Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 278 (concluding that an

egregious constitutional violation involves either a

constitutional violation that was fundamentally unfair or,

alternatively, a constitutional violation that, regardless of

- 35 -
its unfairness, undermined the probative value of the obtained

evidence); Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 234 (“The [Lopez-Mendoza]

Court, seemingly inadvertently, used the conjunctive ‘and’

instead of the disjunctive ‘or’ to link these two possible

grounds for deeming a violation egregious.”); Gonzalez-Rivera,

22 F.3d at 1451 (holding that a “fundamentally unfair Fourth

Amendment violation is considered egregious regardless of the

probative value of the evidence obtained”).

To be sure, the Lopez-Mendoza Court justified its exception

for egregious constitutional violations by citing four cases in

which the evidence was reliable (and therefore its probative

value was not undermined), but nevertheless suppressible because

its admission was fundamentally unfair. The first case cited

was Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). There, police

officers obtained probative evidence of Rochin’s drug

involvement by forcing him to ingest an emetic solution to

induce vomiting so they could recover recently swallowed

morphine capsules. Id. at 166. The Court held that the

probative evidence was illegally obtained because the method

used offended even “hardened sensibilities” and “shocks the

conscience” of the Court. Id. at 172. In no uncertain terms,

the Court in Rochin opined that reliability is not the sole

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 173 (noting that

coerced confessions are inadmissible in criminal trials “even

- 36 -
though statements contained in them may be independently

established as true” principally because they “offend the

community’s sense of fair play and decency”). Thus, it was the

tactics of the police, not the reliability of the obtained

evidence, that led to the exclusion of the evidence in Rochin.

The three remaining cases concerning egregiousness cited by

the Lopez-Mendoza Court were BIA decisions, Matter of Toro, 17

I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA 1980); Matter of Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec.

319 (BIA 1980); and Matter of Ramira–Cordova, No. A21 095 659

(BIA Feb. 21, 1980) (unpublished). In each of these cases, the

BIA decision did not focus on the reliability of the evidence.

Rather, the decision focused on whether the admission of the

contested evidence would be fundamentally fair. See Matter of

Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 343-44 (suggesting that a stop based on

Hispanic appearance alone would constitute an egregious Fourth

Amendment violation if the Border Patrol officers acted in bad

faith, regardless of the probative value of the evidence

obtained); Matter of Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 320-21

(excluding statements obtained after agents repeatedly ignored

detainee’s request for counsel); Matter of Ramira–Cordova, No.

A21 095 659, slip op. at 3-4 (suppressing evidence obtained as a

result of a nighttime warrantless entry into the aliens’

residence).

The Lopez-Mendoza Court’s use of the cited authority only

- 37 -
makes sense if fundamental unfairness is not tethered to the

probative value of the evidence obtained. As noted by the court

in Orhorhaghe v. INS, “[w]ere the rule to the contrary, the

egregiousness exception would have little meaning, for the

fruits of an illegal search or seizure ordinarily consist of

physical evidence, the reliability of which is in no way

affected by the manner in which the evidence is obtained.” 38

F.3d 488, 501 (9th Cir. 1994). Given this, it is no surprise

that the three circuits to have meaningfully considered the

unsettled “and/or” issue raised by Part V of the Lopez-Mendoza

opinion have opted to replace the opinion’s “and” with an “or”

to create a workable, disjunctive standard. Oliva-Ramos, 694

F.3d at 278; Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 234; Gonzalez-Rivera,

22 F.3d at 1451; but see Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d

1098, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J., dissenting from the denial

of rehearing en banc) (“Finally, the Mendoza dicta seems to

posit a conjunctive test. To trigger application of the

exclusionary rule, the egregious conduct must both (1)

transgress notions of fundamental fairness and (2) undermine the

probative value of the evidence obtained.” (emphasis, footnote,

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

In our case, Yanez does not challenge the probative value

of the evidence obtained as a result of the alleged wrongful

search, seizure, and questioning. Consequently, the challenged

- 38 -
evidence cannot be excluded on the basis that its probative

value is undermined by the activities of the ICE agents.

Rather, the challenged evidence can only be excluded if the

actions of the agents amounted to a violation of the Fourth

Amendment that transgresses notions of fundamental fairness.

This begs the question: When does a violation of the Fourth

Amendment transgress notions of fundamental fairness? We turn

to this question next.

2

A review of the case law demonstrates that there is no

consensus on when a violation of the Fourth Amendment is

egregious such that it transgresses notions of fundamental

fairness. However, two different approaches to assessing

egregiousness have emerged in the fact-specific case law. The

first is the qualified immunity approach, which is applied in

the Ninth Circuit. The second is the totality of the

circumstances approach, which is applied in the Second, Third,

and Eighth Circuits. 9

a

9
Other circuits have raised and disposed of claims of
egregiousness without setting out a detailed standard. See,
e.g., Kandamar, 464 F.3d at 74 (refusing to find egregiousness);
United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1118 n.11 (10th
Cir. 2006) (citing the Lopez-Mendoza examples of egregiousness);
Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004)
(refusing to find egregiousness for voluntary statements made by
alien while not in custody).

- 39 -
 The Ninth Circuit’s qualified immunity approach is the most

alien-friendly test for egregiousness, linking the inquiry to a

qualified immunity analysis. In Gonzalez-Rivera, the Ninth

Circuit held that all “bad faith” violations of the Fourth

Amendment are egregious, warranting the application of the

exclusionary rule. 22 F.3d at 1449 & n.5. A bad faith Fourth

Amendment violation occurs when “evidence is obtained by

deliberate violations of the [F]ourth [A]mendment, or by conduct

a reasonable officer should have known is in violation of the

Constitution.” Id. at 1449 (emphasis omitted). Applying that

standard in Gonzalez-Rivera, the court held that stopping an

individual based solely on a person’s race constitutes an

egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment because “the

officers should have known that their decision to stop [the

alien] based solely on his Hispanic appearance was

unconstitutional.” Id. at 1450.

In another case, the Ninth Circuit found an egregious

violation where officers entered a home without trying to

procure a warrant, without exigent circumstances, and without

consent, because “reasonable officers should have known that

they were violating the Fourth Amendment.” Lopez-Rodriguez v.

Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008). In the court’s

view, “reasonable officers would not have thought it lawful to

push open the door to petitioners’ home simply because [the

- 40 -
petitioner] did not ‘tell them to leave or [that] she did not

want to talk to them.’” Id.

Building on Lopez-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit in Martinez-

Medina noted that whether “a reasonable officer should have

known his conduct violated the Constitution depends in part on

whether the constitutional right was clearly established in the

particular context at issue.” 673 F.3d at 1034. There, a

deputy sheriff was told by two Mexican nationals that they were

illegally present in the United States. Id. at 1031. The

deputy sheriff detained them solely by verbal instruction until

an immigration officer arrived. Id. at 1031-32. The aliens

admitted to the immigration officer that they were illegally

present in the United States. Id. at 1032. The Martinez-Medina

court found no egregious violation of the aliens’ Fourth

Amendment rights because “a reasonable officer would not have

known he lacked probable cause to detain Petitioners.” Id. at

1035. In the court’s view, “the deputy sheriff, unlike the

officers in Lopez–Rodriguez, was not acting against an

unequivocal doctrinal backdrop.” Id. In other words, because

the “law was unclear as to whether an alien’s admission to being

illegally present in the United States created probable cause to

seize the alien for violating federal immigration law,” there

was no egregious violation of the aliens’ Fourth Amendment

rights. Id.

- 41 -
 b

On the other end of the spectrum is the totality of the

circumstances approach. In Oliva-Ramos, the Third Circuit

criticized the Ninth Circuit’s linking of the exclusionary rule

in removal cases to the qualified immunity standard. Oliva-

Ramos, 694 F.3d at 277. The court said that it could not adopt

an egregiousness standard that is “perched on the fulcrum of the

good faith of the police.” Id. The Third Circuit noted that

the Ninth Circuit’s test would “permit conduct that may be

objectively reasonable based on directives of the [DHS], but

nevertheless result in routine invasions of the constitutionally

protected privacy rights of individuals.” Id. Finding such a

result untenable, the court in Oliva-Ramos indicated that the

egregiousness analysis “must, by its very nature, differ from an

inquiry into an officer’s good faith.” Id. at 259 n.21.

In Oliva-Ramos, the alien alleged several Fourth Amendment

violations, including that the officers lacked proper consent

before entering his apartment at 4:30 a.m., arrested him without

probable cause or a warrant, and seized him without reasonable

suspicion. Id. at 261-62. The BIA denied the alien’s request

to supplement the record with new, previously unavailable

evidence of widespread Fourth Amendment violations and egregious

conduct, concluding that Part V of Lopez-Mendoza was only

dicta. Id. at 262-70. On the ensuing petition for review, the

- 42 -
Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s decision and required it to

reopen the proceedings so that the alien could present evidence

of widespread and egregious conduct. Id. at 274-82.

The court in Oliva-Ramos opined that “evidence will be the

result of an egregious violation within the meaning of Lopez-

Mendoza, if the record evidence establishes” that a Fourth

Amendment violation that was fundamentally unfair had

occurred. Id. at 278. In setting the contours of this

standard, the Oliva-Ramos court discerned “guiding principles”

from the Second Circuit’s decision in Almeida-Amaral. Id.

First, “courts and agencies must adopt a flexible case-by-case

approach for evaluating egregiousness, based on a general set of

background principles which fulfill the two-part Lopez-Mendoza

test.” Id. at 278-79. Second, fact-finders who “evaluat[e] the

egregiousness of the violation should pay close attention to the

‘characteristics and severity of the offending conduct.’” Id.

at 279 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Quoting

the First Circuit’s decision in Kandamar and the Eight Circuit’s

decision in Puc-Ruiz, the Oliva-Ramos court explained that

“‘evidence of any government misconduct by threats, coercion or

physical abuse’ might be important considerations in evaluating

egregiousness,” id. (quoting Kandamar, 464 F.3d at 71), and

“evidence of ‘physical brutality’” and an “‘unreasonable show or

use of force’” also may be relevant, id. (quoting Puc-Ruiz, 629

- 43 -
F.3d at 778-79). Succinctly put, the Oliva-Ramos court

concluded that “there is no one-size-fits-all approach to

determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation is egregious”

and that the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza did not “suggest or

imply that any strict test-based approach is appropriate or

warranted.” Id. Rather, the totality of the circumstances

should guide the analysis, and the court required the BIA to

consider on remand factors such as:

[W]hether Oliva-Ramos can establish intentional
violations of the Fourth Amendment, whether the
seizure itself was so gross or unreasonable in
addition to being without a plausible legal ground,
(e.g., when the initial illegal stop is particularly
lengthy, there is an unnecessary and menacing show or
use of force, etc.), whether improper seizures,
illegal entry of homes, or arrests occurred under
threats, coercion or physical abuse, the extent to
which the agents re[s]orted to unreasonable shows of
force, and finally, whether any seizures or arrests
were based on race or perceived ethnicity.

Id. The court further explained that its list of factors was

merely “illustrative . . . and not intended as an exhaustive

list of factors that should always be considered, nor is any one

factor necessarily determinative of the outcome in every case.

Rather, the familiar totality of the circumstances must guide

the inquiry and determine its outcome.” Id.

Because the court in Oliva-Ramos took “no position . . . on

the underlying question of whether the circumstances here are so

egregious . . . as to justify a suppression order,” id. at 282,

- 44 -
it did not apply the totality of the circumstances test.

Instead, the court remanded the case to allow the alien to

marshal evidence concerning widespread and egregious Fourth

Amendment violations. Id.

The Second Circuit’s case law is in line with that of the

Third Circuit. In Almeida-Amaral, a border patrol agent stopped

a Brazilian national. 461 F.3d at 232. The court found a

Fourth Amendment violation because the arresting agent had no

legitimate basis for stopping the alien. Id. at 236. However,

these facts were not sufficient to find an egregious violation

requiring exclusion of the evidence obtained following the

stop. Id. The court concluded that stopping the alien without

“valid reason or suspicion” constituted a Fourth Amendment

violation but was not egregious because it was not “particularly

lengthy” and there was no show of force. Id. According to the

court, egregiousness must be gauged “based on the

characteristics and severity of the offending conduct. Thus, if

an individual is subjected to a seizure for no reason at all,

that by itself may constitute an egregious violation, but only

if the seizure is sufficiently severe.” Id. at 235. Thus, like

the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit’s egregiousness approach

involved an assessment of the totality of the objective facts in

the record.

The Second Circuit followed Oliva-Ramos in its decision

- 45 -
in Cotzojay. In that case, an alien from Guatemala, who was

seized by ICE agents at his home in Riverhead, New York at

approximately 4:00 a.m., asserted that his Fourth Amendment

rights, among others, had been violated and thus endeavored to

exclude the evidence obtained by ICE as a result of the seizure,

including a Form I-213, his passport, and his statements to the

agents. 725 F.3d at 174-77. Of note, the agents did attempt to

obtain a warrant to enter the alien’s home, and they entered the

home without the alien’s consent or exigent circumstances. Id.

at 174, 177. The IJ and the BIA refused to suppress the

challenged evidence because the alien did not claim he was

“physically threatened or harmed in the course of the nighttime,

warrantless raid.” Id. at 179.

On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case

to the BIA. Id. at 184. The court first observed that it had

never found a violation sufficiently severe to meet the

egregious standard in a removal case. Id. at 180. The court

then moved to the uncontroversial proposition that the Fourth

Amendment applies to aliens and citizens alike. Id. at 181.

The court noted that, in the absence of consent or exigent

circumstances, the Supreme Court has consistently held that an

entry into a home to conduct a search or make an arrest is

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to

a warrant. Id. In the court’s view, “if a Fourth Amendment

- 46 -
violation is measured by what is reasonable, then an egregious

violation must surely be something more than unreasonable.” Id.

at 182. In fact, the court observed that the test for

egregiousness is more demanding than the test for overcoming

qualified immunity. Id. at 183 n.10. 10 The court agreed that

the Third Circuit’s list of factors may be useful for

determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation is sufficiently

egregious to require application of the exclusionary rule,

adding that no “single aspect of a constitutional violation

elevates its status from merely unreasonable to egregious.” Id.

at 183. The court observed that,

although an unlawful search does not become an
egregious search merely because it invades the privacy
of the home, . . . that government agents intrude into
one’s home (versus a workplace or vehicle, for
example) is an important factor in assessing the
egregiousness of a Fourth Amendment violation because
the home is where its protections should be at their
peak.

Id. (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Applying the totality of the circumstances standard,

the Cotzojay court held that “the deliberate, nighttime,

warrantless entry into an individual’s home, without consent and

10
The Cotzojay court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s qualified
immunity approach because the court found that approach too
broad in that it places “too much emphasis on the good or bad
faith of government agents.” 725 F.3d at 183 n.10.

- 47 -
in the absence of exigent circumstances, may constitute an

egregious Fourth Amendment violation regardless of whether

government agents physically threaten or harm residents.” Id.

According to the court, its egregious Fourth Amendment violation

holding was further supported by other objective evidence,

namely, that the ICE agents “pounded” on the alien’s bedroom

door following the home entry, “corralled” the alien and “other

handcuffed residents in the living room,” searched the alien’s

“room for desirable identification documents, informed arrestees

that they could relieve themselves in a restaurant parking lot

while [the agents] ate breakfast, and, in total, detained [the

alien] for approximately eighteen hours.” Id. at 183-84 n.12.

As a result, the court remanded the case for further proceedings

to give the government a meaningful opportunity to show that its

officers obtained consent to enter the home. Id. at 183-84.

In Maldonado, the Second Circuit stressed the difficulty of

establishing a prima facie case of egregiousness. In that case,

aliens from Ecuador were among persons gathered in a park in

Danbury, Connecticut, to seek work. 763 F.3d at 158. The

Danbury Police Department (DPD) and the ICE were jointly

conducting an operation in that area. Id. The aliens entered

an unmarked vehicle operated by an undercover DPD officer (with

the expectation that they were destined to a work-site). Id.

The aliens were arrested, and their incriminating statements

- 48 -
about their alienage were memorialized on Form I-213s. Id.

Before the IJ, the aliens moved to suppress the Form I-213s and

to terminate the removal proceedings based on Fourth Amendment

violations, arguing that the ICE agents seized them without

reasonable suspicion and on the basis of their race. Id. The

IJ concluded that the aliens did not make out a prima facie case

and denied the motion. Id. Following the BIA’s affirmance, the

aliens sought review in the Second Circuit. Id.

In denying the petition for review, the Maldonado court

emphasized that a removal hearing was designed to provide a

quick method of determining an alien’s eligibility to remain in

the country. Id. at 159. As for the contours of the

egregiousness standard, the court observed that “‘egregious’ by

definition is very bad indeed.” Id. Thus, according to the

court, the egregiousness standard is “stringent” and “entails a

shock to the conscience.” Id.; see also id. at 165 (“Something

egregious is by nature extreme, rare, and obvious.”). Applying

the totality of the circumstances standard, the court found no

egregious Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 160-63. In so

holding, the court noted that the affidavit in Cotzojay was

deemed to satisfy the egregiousness standard “because it averred

facts that were appalling under any standard: a deliberate,

nighttime, warrantless entry into an individual’s home without

consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances.” Id. at

- 49 -
160 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Contrasting the facts in Cotzojay to the facts before it, the

court pointed out that the aliens did not allege that they were

treated in a particularly severe manner and found nothing in

their account suggesting that they were “gathered by the

authorities, let alone that they were selected by the

authorities on the basis of race.” Id. at 161. Rather, the

court declared that the aliens “self-selected on the basis of

their willingness to seek and accept day labor.” Id.

The Eighth Circuit’s case law is in line with that of the

Second and Third Circuits. In Puc-Ruiz, the Eighth Circuit

affirmed a removal order issued by the BIA, which upheld a

decision by the IJ, who refused to suppress evidence obtained

following the alien’s apprehension by a local police officer.

629 F.3d at 775-83. There, the alien, a native and citizen of

Mexico, was arrested at a restaurant by local police, who were

responding to a tip that the restaurant was serving alcohol in

violation of a municipal ordinance. Id. at 775. The police

entered the restaurant without a warrant and asked the patrons

to produce identification. Id. After the alien presented his

valid Missouri driver’s license, he was arrested and transported

to the police station, where he was fingerprinted and

detained. Id. After he was taken into ICE custody, the alien

was interviewed, resulting in the preparation of a Form I-

- 50 -
213. Id. at 775-76. Before the IJ, the alien moved to suppress

the evidence resulting from his arrest, including the Form I-

213, on the basis that his arrest violated the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 776.

On review in the Eighth Circuit, the Puc-Ruiz court held

that the police conduct at issue did not rise to the level of an

egregious Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 778-79. The court

acknowledged that egregious violations are not limited to those

of physical brutality and cited to the principle that the lack

of any valid basis whatsoever for a seizure sets the stage for

egregiousness, but more than that single factor would be

needed. Id. The court indicated that there was no evidence in

the record that the local police employed an unreasonable show

of force. Id. at 779. It emphasized that the alien did not

advance any argument that the decision to arrest him was based

on race or appearance, such as to trigger an egregious

violation, as has been recognized in other circuit court

decisions. Id. The court considered that this was not a case

in which police officers invaded private property and detained

individuals with no articulable suspicion whatsoever. Id. 11

In Martinez Carcamo, the Eighth Circuit rejected the

11
The Puc-Ruiz court also rejected the alien’s due process
claim on the basis that the statements were voluntarily made.
629 F.3d at 779-80.

- 51 -
aliens’ challenge to the IJ’s denial, and the BIA’s affirmance,

of their motion to suppress. 713 F.3d at 922-26. The motion to

suppress challenged the warrantless entry into the aliens’

trailer home “[b]efore approximately” 6:00 a.m. on the basis

that a warrantless entry into a home egregiously violates the

Fourth Amendment. Id. at 918. Before entering the home, the

ICE agents took away one man’s cell phone while he was trying to

make a call, and, after entering, pulled a blanket off another

man lying in his bed. Id. at 918-19. In upholding the denial

of the motion to suppress the passports the agents obtained as a

result of the warrantless entry, the court applied the totality

of circumstances approach outlined in Oliva-Ramos. Id. at 923. 12

Under that standard, the court found that the agents’ entry into

the home was not an egregious Fourth amendment violation

“because nothing in our previous cases indicates that an

unreasonable search becomes an egregious search merely because

it invades the privacy of the home.” Id. The court further

found that the aliens’ allegations that they were targeted on

12
The Martinez Carcamo court noted that it previously had
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s qualified immunity approach in
Garcia-Torres v. Holder, 660 F.3d 333 (8th Cir. 2011). Martinez
Carcamo, 713 F.3d at 923. In Garcia-Torres, the Eighth Circuit
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach because “[s]uch a standard
would likely eviscerate Lopez–Mendoza insofar as the Fourth
Amendment prohibits only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures
and the Ninth Circuit’s standard applies whenever ‘a reasonable
officer should have known’ his conduct was illegal.” Garcia-
Torres, 660 F.3d at 337 n.4.

- 52 -
account of their race were speculative. Id.

In Lopez-Fernandez v. Holder, the Eighth Circuit denied a

petition for review of a removal order issued by the BIA, which

upheld a decision by the IJ, who refused to suppress evidence

obtained following the aliens’ apprehension by ICE agents who

went to the aliens’ home following relevant information the

agents received from a named informant. 735 F.3d 1043, 1045

(8th Cir. 2013). Prior to the 7:00 a.m. entry, the agents did

not attempt to procure a warrant. Id. at 1044-45. Rather, they

“forced” their warrantless entry after one of the aliens opened

the front door. Id. at 1044. In resolving the aliens’ Fourth

Amendment claim, the court assumed the entry into the home

violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1046. Applying the

totality of the circumstances test, the court held, citing Puc-

Ruiz, Garcia-Torres, and Martinez Carcamo, that the aliens had

not established that the assumed Fourth Amendment violation was

sufficiently egregious to justify suppression of the

government’s evidence, including Form I-213s and the aliens’

passports. Id. at 1047-48. In so holding, the court found two

facts particularly relevant. First, there was “no evidence of

egregious force in the manner of entry.” Id. at 1048. Second,

the search occurred in the “morning when the Petitioners were

already awake, not in the middle of the night” as

in Cotzojay. Id.

- 53 -
 c

Our survey of the case law from the Ninth Circuit on the

one hand and the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits on the

other, informs us that we should align ourselves with the

Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits and apply a totality of the

circumstances test.

Any analysis into the appropriate egregiousness standard

should begin with the recognition that a removal hearing is

intended to “provide a streamlined determination of eligibility

to remain in this country, nothing more.” Lopez-Mendoza, 468

U.S. at 1039. As the Supreme Court noted in Lopez-Mendoza, the

removal hearing system is designed to “permit the quick

resolution of very large numbers of deportation actions, . . .

[and] [t]he prospect of even occasional invocation of the

exclusionary rule might significantly change and complicate the

character” of removal hearings. Id. at 1048. Considering the

views espoused by the Supreme Court, especially its admonishment

that we do not change and complicate the character of removal

proceedings, it is evident that a suppression hearing in a

removal proceedings is, at most, supposed to be a very rare

occurrence. Cf. Maldonado, 763 F.3d at 167 (noting that

invocation of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings

should not be a “common-place tactic”). Thus, to stay faithful

to the dictates of the Supreme Court, it follows that an alien’s

- 54 -
evidentiary proffer concerning egregiousness must be high,

otherwise a suppression hearing on the question of egregiousness

would be commonplace, and the very heart of the Lopez-Mendoza

decision would be undermined. Cf. id. at 159 (noting that

“‘egregious’ by definition is very bad indeed”); Garcia-Torres,

660 F.3d at 336 (noting that an egregious violation must be more

than a “mere garden-variety” violation); Almeida-Amaral, 461

F.3d at 235 (noting that, “if an individual is subjected to a

seizure for no reason at all, that by itself may constitute an

egregious violation, but only if the seizure is sufficiently

severe” (emphasis omitted)).

The Ninth Circuit’s approach requires a suppression hearing

any time an alien alleges that the law enforcement officers

acted in bad faith. This sets the evidentiary proffer bar too

low. Bad faith allegations often are difficult to resolve

without an evidentiary hearing because the outcome turns on the

subjective motivations of the law enforcement officers. It is

easy to see how the bad faith standard can be manipulated by

clever lawyers and encourages aliens to file frivolous improper

motivation claims. Thus, we see the Ninth Circuit’s standard as

stymieing, rather than promoting, the streamlined nature of the

removal hearing process as recognized by the Court in Lopez-

Mendoza. Relatedly, the Ninth Circuit’s standard runs the risk

of routinely requiring the arresting law enforcement officer to

- 55 -
appear at a suppression hearing to testify concerning

motivation, which the Court noted in Lopez-Mendoza would

unacceptably burden the administration of the immigration laws.

468 U.S. at 1049.

The Ninth Circuit’s standard is inconsistent with Lopez-

Mendoza on another front. The cases cited by the Lopez-Mendoza

Court in support of the egregiousness exception, in

particular Rochin, turned on the conduct of the law enforcement

officers not on the knowledge or intent of the law enforcement

officers. The Court in Rochin did not resolve the case on the

basis of what the law enforcement officers knew or intended, but

rather what they did--they forcibly arrested the defendant and

obtained inculpatory evidence without his consent by forcing a

tube down his throat to pump his stomach. 342 U.S. at 166.

Thus, the outcome of the egregiousness inquiry does not solely

turn on the knowledge or intent of law enforcement officers,

though intent may be one among other relevant

factors. See Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 279 (noting that intent

may be one among many other factors to be considered under the

totality of the circumstances). Yet, the Ninth Circuit’s

standard permits the application of the exclusionary rule in a

removal proceeding any time law enforcement officers knowingly

or intend to violate the Fourth Amendment regardless of the

severity of their conduct. Eliminating the severity of the law

- 56 -
enforcement officers’ conduct essentially guts the definition of

egregiousness envisioned by the Court in Lopez-

Mendoza. Cf. Martinez Carcamo, 713 F.3d at 923 (“We decline to

allow the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens or aliens to turn

on a federal agent’s personal state of mind.”).

The Ninth Circuit’s approach faces another obstacle as

well. As noted by the court in Oliva-Ramos, the Ninth Circuit’s

approach allows law enforcement officers a free pass any time

they unconstitutionally act pursuant to an agency regulation.

694 F.3d at 277. Such a standard makes little sense because

potentially it permits “routine invasions of the

constitutionally protected privacy rights of individuals,” id.,

by allowing law enforcement officers to invade such interests

pursuant to an agency regulation that permits unconstitutional

conduct.

In our view, the sounder egregiousness approach is the

totality of the circumstances standard as applied in the Second,

Third, and Eighth Circuits. This standard is a flexible case-

by-case standard, taking into account a variety of factors. Id.

It allows the court to examine all of the facts it deems

relevant to the egregiousness inquiry and focuses on the

unreasonableness of the conduct of the law enforcement

officers. Id. at 276, 278. Factors a court may consider

include: (1) whether the Fourth Amendment violation was

- 57 -
intentional; (2) whether the violation was unreasonable in

addition to being illegal; (3) whether there were threats,

coercion, physical abuse, promises, or an unreasonable show of

force by the law enforcement officers; (4) whether there was no

articulable suspicion for the search or seizure whatsoever; (5)

where, when, and how the search, seizure or questioning took

place; (6) whether the search, seizure, or questioning was

particularly lengthy; (7) whether the law enforcement officers

procured an arrest or search warrant; (8) any unique

characteristics of the alien involved; and (9) whether the

violation was based on racial considerations. Maldonado, 763

F.3d at 159-60; Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 279; Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d

at 779; Kandamar, 464 F.3d at 71. This list is not meant to be

exhaustive, as there is “no one-size-fits-all approach to

determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation is

egregious.” Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 279. The facts of each

case will dictate the relevant factors for consideration.

Importantly, the alien’s evidence, in its totality, must support

a basis to suppress the challenged evidence under a finding of

egregiousness, even at the prima facie case stage. Such

evidence cannot be based on intuition or speculation, especially

as it relates to the intent of law enforcement

officers. See Maldonado, 763 F.3d at 161 (noting the danger of

vague “improper motivation” allegations); Lopez-Gabriel v.

- 58 -
Holder, 653 F.3d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 2011) (no suppression

hearing required where the alien stated only that he “feels” the

police stopped him because of his race, and he “believe[d]” the

police treated him differently than they would “treat white

people”). Suppression hearings should be the exception, not the

rule in removal proceedings, so the alien’s evidentiary burden,

even at the prima facie case stage, is high. Lopez-Mendoza, 468

U.S. at 1049-50.

E

With the appropriate standard set forth, we can proceed to

address the substance of Yanez’s Fourth Amendment claims. 13

1

Yanez raises three Fourth Amendment particularity claims.

First, she claims that the search warrant was invalid because it

13
Because Yanez abandoned before the BIA her claim that the
alleged constitutional violations she experienced were part of a
larger, widespread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by ICE
agents, we decline to address the merits of her Fourth Amendment
widespread pattern claim. See Kporlor v. Holder, 597 F.3d 222,
226 (4th Cir. 2010) (“It is well established that an alien must
raise each argument to the BIA before we have jurisdiction to
consider it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Massis v.
Mukasey, 549 F.3d 631, 638-40 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1), an alien’s failure to dispute an issue on appeal
to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies that bars judicial review.”); see also Rodriguez-
Benitez v. Holder, 763 F.3d 404, 405 (5th Cir. 2014) (“The REAL
ID Act of 2005 grants this Court subject-matter jurisdiction
over constitutional claims and questions of law that were
exhausted before the BIA.” (footnote and internal quotation
marks omitted)).

- 59 -
identified the Premises as a single-family home when it was, in

fact, a multi-unit dwelling. Alternatively, she claims that,

once the agents entered the Premises, they should have realized

that the Premises was a multi-unit dwelling, and, at that point,

they should have stopped the search immediately because the

warrant was overbroad. Finally, she claims the ICE agents were

required to list her as an item to be seized in the warrant. We

reject these claims for the simple reason that they do not make

out a constitutional violation, let alone an egregious one. 14

14
We note that neither the IJ nor the BIA specifically
addressed Yanez’s particularity claims. Ordinarily, such an
error would require a remand to the BIA for further proceedings
pursuant to SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). Under
Chenery, generally we may only affirm on the grounds relied on
by the BIA and may not affirm on unstated alternate grounds.
Id. at 94-95. Chenery is based on the proposition that, unlike
lower courts, agencies exercise their discretion as the
repositories of a Congressionally-delegated power to make
policy; thus, just as an appellate court cannot take the place
of a jury in finding facts, it may not take the place of an
agency in advancing a rationale for agency action. Id. at 88.
However, where, as here, we are dealing with a purely legal
conclusion, that is, whether Yanez has established a prima facie
case, a remand is not compelled. See Hussain v. Gonzales, 477
F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2007) (no remand required where the
record was conclusive that the alien failed to establish a prima
facie case for adjustment of status); cf. N.C. Comm’n of Indian
Affairs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 725 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir.
1984) (“We do not . . . perceive there to be a Chenery problem
in the instant case because the question of interpretation of a
federal statute is not a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)). In this case, the
record is complete, Yanez’s arguments are fully briefed, and the
only question before us is purely a legal one. As in Hussain, a
remand to the BIA “would serve no useful purpose,” and the
(Continued)
- 60 -
 The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. The requirement for particularity “ensures that the

search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and

will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory

searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Maryland v.

Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). The particularity requirement

is satisfied when an officer in possession of a search warrant

describing a particular place to be searched can reasonably

ascertain and identify the intended place to be

searched. United States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462, 463 (4th Cir.

1988). Even if the description of the place to be searched is

mistaken, there is no Fourth Amendment violation when the

officers executing the search reasonably believe that the

warrant is sufficiently particular and that they are searching

the correct location. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84-89. An

erroneous description or a factual mistake in the warrant will

not necessarily invalidate the warrant and the subsequent

search. Owens, 848 F.2d at 463-64. “The validity of the

warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that

result on remand is a “foregone conclusion.” 477 F.3d at 158.

- 61 -
the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and to

disclose, to the issuing Magistrate.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85.

“Those items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued

have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly

issued.” Id.

We conclude that, under the circumstances, the ICE agents

conducted a reasonable investigation of the Premises in

preparation for obtaining the search warrant, and further

conclude that the description of the Premises in the warrant did

not invalidate it. The agents placed the Premises under

surveillance, and such surveillance revealed that the Premises

was occupied by Umana, an illegal alien and El Salvadorian

citizen. Based on their surveillance of the Premises, the

agents reasonably believed that it was a single-family home, as

the picture of the Premises in the record depicts a small,

single-story home. The Premises has just one mailbox, with the

numbers “402” on it, (J.A. 524), and the land records search did

not reflect that the Premises was a multi-unit dwelling. The

investigation of the Premises and its description in the warrant

unquestionably complied with the dictates of Garrison

and Owens. Cf. United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir.

2011) (“‘[I]f the [multi-unit] building in question from its

outward appearance would be taken to be a single-occupancy

structure and neither the affiant nor other investigating

- 62 -
officers nor the executing officers knew or had reason to know

of the structure’s actual multiple-occupancy character until

execution of the warrant was under way, then the warrant is not

defective for failure to specify a subunit within the named

building.’” (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A

Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.5(b), at 581-82 (4th ed.

2004))). Accordingly, we reject Yanez’s claim that the warrant

was invalid because it identified the Premises as a single-

family home.

Yanez also claims that, once the ICE agents entered the

Premises and approached the bedroom occupied by her and Umana,

the agents should have known it was a multi-unit dwelling

because the bedroom door was locked. Upon this realization,

Yanez claims, the agents immediately should have terminated the

search in order to secure a search warrant for Yanez’s “separate

dwelling.” Petitioner’s Br. at 32.

The Supreme Court indicated in Garrison that “the validity

of the search of respondent’s apartment pursuant to a warrant .

. . depends on whether the officers’ failure to realize the

overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and

reasonable.” 480 U.S. at 88. “It is only after the police

begin to execute the warrant and set foot upon the described

premises that they will discover the factual mistake and must

reasonably limit their search accordingly.” Id. at 89 n.14.

- 63 -
Thus, we must determine whether the ICE agents should have

realized this alleged factual mistake during the search and

thus stopped the search at that time.

Yanez’s claim founders for the simple reason that the ICE

agents reasonably believed that the Premises was a single-family

home when they arrived at the locked bedroom door. A locked

bedroom door in a home does not necessarily mean or imply that

the home is a multi-unit dwelling. See United States v. Kyles,

40 F.3d 519, 523–24 (2d Cir. 1994) (permitting the search of a

locked bedroom inside a single-family home that did not

objectively appear to be a separate unit); United States v.

Ayers, 924 F.2d 1468, 1480 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A search warrant

for the entire premises of a single family residence is valid,

notwithstanding the fact that is was issued based on information

regarding the alleged illegal activities of one of several

occupants of a residence.”). Moreover, there is nothing special

or unusual about the bedroom door in this case that would have

put the agents on notice that it was an entrance to a separate

living unit. Along a similar vein, Yanez mentions nothing about

the interior of the Premises that would have led the agents to

believe that it was a multi-unit dwelling.

In any event, even if the ICE agents were somehow mistaken,

and we do not suggest or imply they were, we must make

allowances for “honest mistakes that are made by officers in the

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dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing

search warrants.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87. Unlike Garrison,

in which the officers clearly were confronted with two

apartments where they expected to find only one, nothing in this

case should have made it obvious to the agents that the warrant

was overbroad.

Yanez’s final claim concerning particularity is that the

search warrant is invalid because the affidavit did not list her

as an item to be seized. This claim is premised on her claim

that the warrant is invalid because the affidavit did not

identify the Premises as a multi-unit dwelling and, more

particularly, did not identify her separate dwelling unit as a

place to be searched. Since we have rejected the premises on

which this final claim rests, we reject this claim as well.

2

Yanez also argues that the timing of the execution of the

search warrant--5:00 a.m. instead of between 6:00 a.m. to 10:00

p.m.--violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Basically, Yanez

contends that the nighttime execution of a daytime warrant

violates the Fourth Amendment, absent consent or exigent

circumstances, which are not presented here. 15

15
Understandably, because the record must be viewed in a
light most favorable to Yanez, the government does not suggest
that exigent circumstances or consent excused the alleged
(Continued)
- 65 -
 a

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from

“unreasonable searches and seizures,” guaranteeing their right

“to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. That Amendment was specifically crafted

to thwart the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officers.

Our Founding Fathers intended to impede “the abuses of the

general warrants that had occurred in England and of the writs

of assistance used in the Colonies.” Steagald v. United States,

451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981). 16 General warrants and writs of

assistance bestowed upon the executing officials a high degree

of deference and, crucially, “provided no judicial check” on a

judicial officer’s determination that an intrusion into a home

or dwelling house was justified. Id. The Founders imposed that

missing “judicial check” by adopting the Fourth Amendment, which

requires neutral and detached judicial officers to assess

failure to timely execute the warrant.
16
A general warrant, utilized extensively in England before
the American Revolution, “specified only an offense . . . and
left to the discretion of the executing officials the decision
as to which persons should be arrested and which places should
be searched.” Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220. Similarly, a writ of
assistance, utilized extensively by the English in the Colonies,
“noted only the object of the search--any uncustomed goods--and
thus left customs officials completely free to search any place
where they believed such goods might be.” Id.

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whether probable cause has been shown for searches of persons,

houses, papers, or effects. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.

10, 13-14 (1948). If probable cause exists and is shown under

oath, then a judicial officer is entitled to issue a warrant,

authorizing the appropriate search.

Though the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable

searches of persons, houses, papers, and effects, dwelling

houses and residences are protected with special

jealousy. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013)

(“But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first

among equals.”). 17 The common law viewed “a man’s house as his

castle of defense and asylum,” warranting even greater

protection from intrusion. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,

931 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because an

individual’s expectation of privacy is “at [its] apex in one’s

home,” United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 146 (4th Cir. 2007),

warrantless searches of homes are unconstitutional under the

Fourth Amendment, Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,

403 (2006), absent some type of justification. In exceptional

17
The Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable
searches of “houses” extends to owners, boarders, and tenants of
homes, apartments, and other dwelling places. United States v.
Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 2007). The Fourth Amendment
also protects travelers in hotels and motels, relatives who
regularly stay in a residence, and overnight guests. Id.

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situations, law enforcement officers may be justified in

conducting warrantless searches of homes, particularly in

“exigent circumstances.” Id. at 403-04. 18 A warrantless search

of a home pursuant to an occupant’s voluntary consent is also

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219-23 (1973). Absent such

justification, however, warrantless searches of dwellings by

government agents are “the chief evil against which the wording

of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466

U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). The law is thus settled that the Fourth Amendment

shields individuals from warrantless intrusions into their

homes, even where probable cause otherwise exists to justify

searches. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1958).

Our nation’s historic aversion to the warrantless searches

of dwelling houses and residences reaches its zenith when such

searches are conducted at night. Nighttime searches have long

18
Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of
a home may include, by way of example: fighting a fire and
investigating its cause; preventing the imminent destruction of
evidence; engaging in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing felon;
rendering emergency assistance to an injured occupant; or
preventing an occupant from imminent injury. Stuart, 547 U.S.
at 403-04; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94
(1978) (“[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s
home or his person unless the exigencies of the situation make
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

- 68 -
been recognized as more intrusive than searches conducted during

the day. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477

(1971) (characterizing midnight entry into dwelling as

“extremely serious intrusion”). In fact, the Supreme Court has

deemed it “difficult to imagine a more severe invasion of

privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private

home.” Jones, 357 U.S. at 498. That proposition is valid

because, during the nighttime hours, searches of dwellings by

government agents tend to involve “rousing the residents out of

their beds, and forcing them to stand by in indignity in their

night clothes,” all of which “smack[s] of a police state lacking

in the respect for” individual privacy rights. Gooding v.

United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J.,

dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, warrantless nighttime searches of homes were characterized

by the second Justice Harlan as creating “a grave constitutional

question.” Jones, 357 U.S. at 499; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing

warrantless nighttime searches of dwellings as “evil in its most

obnoxious form”).

Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

implements the Fourth Amendment’s protections against

warrantless searches. Jones, 357 U.S. at 498. It provides that

a judicial officer must issue a search warrant if a federal law

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enforcement officer or an attorney for the government presents

an affidavit or other information showing probable cause to

search a property. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 41(b)(1). Additionally,

Rule 41 sets forth procedures controlling the time at which a

warrant may be executed, reflecting that “increasingly severe

standards of probable cause are necessary to justify

increasingly intrusive searches.” Gooding, 416 U.S. at 464.

Once issued, a warrant can normally be executed solely “in the

daytime,” between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., “unless the judge

for good cause expressly authorizes execution” during the night.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(ii). 19 Good cause for a nighttime

warrant might exist, for example, where necessary to prevent the

destruction of evidence. See United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d

1117, 1121 (6th Cir. 1978) (“The Rule recognizes that there are

times when a night search is necessary; if, for instance,

19
The relevant inquiry in determining when a search warrant
was executed is the time at which the search began, not when it
ended. See, e.g., United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164, 1167
(8th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, it is generally recognized that
law enforcement officers who properly execute a daytime warrant,
between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., may extend their
search into the nighttime hours. See, e.g., United States v.
Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 556 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because the
search of the Appellants’ home was commenced in the daytime, as
required by the warrant, the FBI agents reasonably could have
believed (if their actions after 10:00 p.m. could be considered
a search) that it was proper to continue the search into the
night.”); United States v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir.
1977) (“Searches which began during daytime and continued into
the night have been held not to violate [Rule 41].”).

- 70 -
execution would be impossible in the daytime or the property

sought is likely to be destroyed or removed before daylight.”).

Because of the separate, heightened burden of proof required for

issuance of a nighttime warrant, the existence of a daytime

warrant ordinarily does not justify a nighttime

search. O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1474 (10th

Cir. 1989).

b

That a nighttime search would be unconstitutional absent

consent or exigent circumstances if it was conducted under color

of a daytime warrant is not a novel concept. The Third and

Tenth Circuits have reached that very conclusion. See O’Rourke,

875 F.2d at 1474-75 (determining that nighttime search violated

Fourth Amendment despite daytime warrant); United States ex rel.

Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1968)

(same); United States v. Merritt, 293 F.2d 742, 746 (3d Cir.

1961) (same). In O’Rourke, the officers obtained a daytime

bench warrant to arrest a third party for contempt of court.

875 F.2d at 1467. The officers, however, entered the

plaintiff’s residence during the nighttime hours and conducted a

search, contravening the explicit terms of the warrant. Id.

In Boyance, two officers received reports that the petitioner

was suspected of committing a burglary. 398 F.2d at 897.

Thereafter, at 1:00 a.m., the officers sought a warrant to

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search the petitioner’s residence. Id. The judge issued the

warrant, which indicated on its face that the officers were only

to “search in the daytime.” Id. The officers disregarded the

terms of the warrant, however, and entered the petitioner’s

residence at 2:30 a.m. Id. Similarly, in Merritt, the

officers, after suspecting that the defendant was involved in

drug activity, obtained a warrant explicitly limited to the

daytime hours but executed it at the defendant’s apartment in

the nighttime. 293 F.2d at 743. In each of these cases, the

court ruled that the nighttime searches violated the Fourth

Amendment.

In reaching their determinations that the nighttime

searches violated the Fourth Amendment, the Third and Tenth

Circuits focused on the scope of authority conveyed by the

explicit terms of the search warrants. See, e.g., id. at 744

(determining that search warrant’s specific limitation “in the

daytime” was conclusive). Because each warrant authorized a

daytime search only, the warrant only could be executed during

daytime hours. As the courts of appeals emphasized, to

determine otherwise would “completely eviscerate the issuing

magistrate’s determination of reasonableness,” O’Rourke, 875

F.2d at 1474, and would “nullify the requirement of a prior

impartial determination that a particular search will be

reasonable,” Boyance, 398 F.2d at 898-99.

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 c

Beyond the Third and Tenth Circuits, it is notable that the

Attorney General has taken the position that a daytime warrant

does not convey authority to conduct a nighttime search. Jones,

357 U.S. at 496. In Jones, the prosecutors conceded in the

district court that, “by the time petitioner’s house was

searched [by law enforcement officers in the nighttime,] the

daytime search warrant had expired.” Id. As a result, the

Attorney General disclaimed to the Supreme Court that the

officers had sought to execute the daytime warrant when they

commenced their nighttime search. He contended, however, that

the search was nonetheless lawful because there was probable

cause to search the home. Id. Both the Fifth Circuit and the

Supreme Court accepted the Attorney General’s concession that

the nighttime search under color of a daytime warrant violated

the Fourth Amendment, and, thus, assessed whether the search of

a home without a warrant but with probable cause that contraband

would be found there violated the Fourth Amendment. See id.

(recognizing that officers’ “daytime search warrant had expired”

when it was executed in nighttime); Jones v. United States, 245

F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir. 1957) (“[T]he[] [officers] did not execute

the day[time] search warrant.”). The Court concluded that such

a search was not compatible with the Fourth Amendment, reasoning

that, if “federal officers [were] free to search without a

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warrant merely upon probable cause to believe that certain

articles were within a home, the provisions of the Fourth

Amendment would become empty phrases, and the protection it

affords largely nullified.” Jones, 357 U.S. at 498.

d

Following the persuasive decisions of the Third and Tenth

Circuits, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones where

the Court accepted that the government’s concession that a

nighttime search conducted pursuant to a daytime warrant

violated the Fourth Amendment, we hold that the nighttime

execution of a daytime warrant violates the Fourth Amendment,

absent consent or exigent circumstances. 20

In so holding, we note that our court, in an unpublished

20
Although the nighttime execution of a daytime warrant is
a Fourth Amendment violation, absent justification, some courts
have excused the execution of a search warrant past its
expiration date. These courts have inquired into whether the
probable cause that supported the warrant’s issuance continued
to exist at the time of the search. See, e.g., United States v.
Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2009) (deeming search
warrant valid forty-four days after expiration date because
“[p]robable cause to search was unaffected” by delay).
Executing a warrant beyond its facial expiration date where
probable cause remains present, however, is materially distinct
from seeking to execute a daytime warrant during the nighttime
where there is no showing that a nighttime search is required.
In the former scenario, the magistrate unquestionably would
reissue the warrant for the search because probable cause is
still present, while in the latter scenario, there is no basis
in which to conclude that the magistrate would issue, let alone
reissue, the warrant to authorize a nighttime search that is not
required.

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opinion, has treated a nighttime search conducted under the

aegis of a daytime warrant as a mere Rule 41 violation, rather

than as an unconstitutional search. See United States v. Davis,

313 F. App’x 672, 674 (4th Cir. 2009). In concluding that the

defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied, the Davis

court relied on precedent not involving an unauthorized

nighttime search, but rather on precedent that states that a

Rule 41 violation will result in suppression only if the party

seeking suppression suffered prejudice or the government

intentionally violated the rule. See id. (citing Hurwitz, 459

F.3d at 472 n.6). Some of our sister circuits have employed

that same standard in refusing to suppress evidence obtained

during unauthorized nighttime searches. See United States v.

Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1988); Searp, 586 F.2d

at 1124-25; United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 385-87 & n.14

(2d Cir. 1975). Those courts have considered factors such as:

whether good cause could have been shown for a nighttime warrant

had one been requested; whether the executing officers believed

in good faith they had authority to conduct a nighttime search;

whether the search was executed a short time before or after

nighttime; and whether the search was in fact more abrasive

because it was conducted in the nighttime. See Schoenheit, 856

F.2d at 76-77; Searp, 586 F.2d at 1124-25; Burke, 517 F.2d at

385-87 & n.14. For the reasons we espouse, we decline to follow

- 75 -
the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits or our

nonprecedential Davis decision. See Collins v. Pond Creek

Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e ordinarily

do not accord precedential value to our unpublished

decisions.”). Instead, we adhere to the well-reasoned decisions

of the Third and Tenth Circuits, and the Supreme Court’s

decision in Jones. 21

21
In United States v. Rizzi, 434 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 2006),
we held that 21 U.S.C. § 879 (“A search warrant relating to
offenses involving controlled substances may be served at any
time of the day or night if the judge or United States
magistrate issuing the warrant is satisfied that there is
probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and
for its service at such time.”) and not Rule 41(e)(2)(A)(ii)
(commanding executing officer to execute “the warrant during the
daytime, unless the judge for good cause expressly authorizes
execution at another time”) governs a search warrant issued in a
drug case. Id. at 671-75. We further held that § 879
authorizes a warrant in a drug case to be executed “day or night
so long as the warrant itself is supported by probable cause.”
Id. at 674. Of note, in rejecting the defendant’s
constitutional challenge to § 879 based on the argument that
§ 879 could not provide a blanket authorization for a nighttime
search, we noted that the “Supreme Court . . . has never held
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits nighttime searches, despite
the disapproval voiced occasionally by a Justice in dissent.”
Id. at 675. We further noted that “constitutionalizing a
standard for when warrants can be served would involve so many
variables that any rule would be difficult to articulate, much
less serve as a component protection of the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. We do not read our Rizzi decision as foreclosing the result
we reach here, namely, that a nighttime execution of a daytime
warrant, absent justification, violates the Fourth Amendment.
Rizzi involved a valid warrant that was validly executed at
night. Our case involves a valid warrant that was invalidly
executed at night. It is the invalid execution that rendered
the search here unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, not
the fact that a nighttime search took place. To be sure, for
(Continued)
- 76 -
 e

Applying the foregoing principles to Yanez’s Fourth

Amendment timing claim reveals that the 5:00 a.m. search of the

Premises violated the Fourth Amendment. Not only did the

magistrate judge specify that the search warrant was to be

executed in the daytime, he crossed out and explicitly rejected

the alternative option that would have allowed the search to

occur in the nighttime. Cf. Youngbey v. March, 676 F.3d 1114,

1125 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (determining that nighttime search was

reasonable under warrant explicitly authorizing search in

daytime or nighttime). There is no indication that the ICE

agents sought or were granted verbal permission by the

magistrate judge to execute the warrant during nighttime

hours. Cf. United States v. Katoa, 379 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 (10th

Cir. 2004) (finding nighttime search reasonable where judge who

issued daytime warrant authorized nighttime search during

subsequent phone call with officers). Nor is there an

indication that any new facts were developed, after the warrant

was issued, to support a nighttime search of the Premises. And,

as noted earlier, there is no evidence concerning the presence

Fourth Amendment purposes, the nighttime search here rendered
the search itself warrantless because the magistrate judge’s
reasonableness finding was premised on a daytime search; by
contrast, the nighttime search in Rizzi did not involve a
warrantless search.

- 77 -
of consent or exigent circumstances that would have justified

the nighttime execution of the daytime warrant.

Rather, the facts are that the ICE agents secured a daytime

warrant and decided to execute it during the nighttime,

exceeding the authority granted by the magistrate

judge. See United States v. Vigo, 413 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir.

1969) (reasoning that the “validity [of a daytime warrant]

required it be served in the daytime”). Because the magistrate

judge explicitly rejected a nighttime search, the warrant’s

daytime restriction must be construed against the

agents. See United States v. Kelley, 652 F.3d 915, 917 (8th

Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen police intend at the time they apply for a

warrant to execute the search at night, it is unreasonable under

the Fourth Amendment not to disclose that intent to the issuing

magistrate and to seek express authorization for the night-time

search.”).

At bottom, Yanez’s suppression motion implicates a simple

rule: a daytime warrant does not authorize a nighttime search.

The government implies that 5:00 a.m. essentially is “close

enough” to 6:00 a.m. in the eyes of the Fourth Amendment.

Notably, however, as John Adams observed in successfully

defending British soldiers charged in the Boston Massacre,

“[f]acts are stubborn things.” David McCullough, John Adams 52

(2001). And the stubbornest fact here is that 5:00 a.m. is not

- 78 -
6:00 a.m. At 6:00 a.m., the warrant sanctioned the ICE agents

to enter into the Premises. At 5:00 a.m., the warrant did not

permit such an entry. Because the nighttime execution of the

daytime warrant violated Yanez’s Fourth Amendment rights, as it

was executed without consent or exigent circumstances, we must

turn to the question of whether the agents egregiously violated

Yanez’s Fourth Amendment rights.

f

As noted above, the question of egregiousness turns on an

evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. There are two

circumstances that support Yanez’s egregiousness claim. The

first is that the Fourth Amendment violation occurred in her

home, where her privacy interests are strong. Jardines, 133 S.

Ct. at 1414. The second is that the entry occurred during the

night, a time of day jealously protected by the Supreme

Court. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 477.

On the other side of the ledger, several factors weigh in

the government’s favor. There is no evidence that the ICE

agents threatened, coerced, or physically abused Yanez, or

promised her anything for her cooperation. Unlike Umana and

Mendoza, she was never handcuffed and was allowed to remain at

the Premises following the search. There is no evidence of

diminished capacity on the part of Yanez, or that the

questioning of her was particularly lengthy. Also, there is

- 79 -
nothing in the record to suggest that the agents were motivated

by racial considerations, and there is no evidence of improper

intent on the part of the agents. 22

While the totality scales at this point tilt in the

government’s favor, two additional facts seal Yanez’s fate: (1)

the ICE agents prepared a valid search warrant; and (2) the

magistrate judge found the existence of probable cause to search

the Premises in the daytime. As to the validity of the warrant,

Agent Coker prepared a detailed and thorough affidavit laying

out the facts in support of probable cause to believe that

illegal aliens (and evidence of the harboring of illegal aliens)

would be found in the Premises during a search. Yanez makes no

challenge to the accuracy of the facts set forth in Agent

Coker’s affidavit, other than the description of the Premises as

a single-story, single-family home. Under such circumstances,

there simply is no doubt that the warrant was facially

valid. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)

(holding “that, where the defendant makes a substantial

preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and

intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was

22
Indeed, considering the circuit split on whether the
nighttime execution of a daytime warrant, without consent or
exigent circumstances, is a Fourth Amendment violation, it
cannot credibly be argued that the ICE agents in this case
intentionally violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Yanez by
entering the Premises an hour before the warrant permitted.

- 80 -
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the

allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of

probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be

held at the defendant’s request”). As to the presence of

probable cause, the facts set forth in the affidavit undeniably

support the magistrate judge’s probable cause

finding. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)

(defining the test for probable cause as “whether, given all the

circumstances . . . , there is a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place”). The agents conducted a painstaking surveillance

operation that produced evidence of a fair probability that

illegal aliens (and evidence of the harboring of illegal aliens)

would be found during a search of the Premises. Like the facial

validity of the warrant, Yanez makes no challenge to the

magistrate judge’s probable cause finding.

The presence of a valid search warrant supported by a

magistrate judge’s probable cause finding diminishes the degree

of the intrusion on a resident’s Fourth Amendment

interests. Cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981)

(noting that “[o]f prime importance in assessing the intrusion

[on the defendant’s privacy and liberty] is the fact that the

police had obtained a warrant to search [defendant’s] house for

contraband”). This is so because the magistrate judge has

- 81 -
“authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy” of the

persons residing in the place to be searched. Id.

In Cotzojay, the alien’s privacy interests continued to

remain at their zenith--the search took place at night in the

alien’s home and the ICE agents did not attempt to procure a

warrant. Because the agents never attempted to procure a

warrant, it is not surprising that the court there concluded

that a nighttime warrantless search was egregious where the

alien’s privacy interests were so compelling and the conduct of

the agents deplorable. But cf. Martinez Carcamo, 713 F.3d at

923 (holding that Fourth Amendment violation was not egregious

where ICE agents did not attempt to obtain a search warrant and

entered the alien’s home before approximately 6:00 a.m.).

However, in our case, Yanez’s privacy interests were lower than

those in Cotzojay and the conduct of the agents different. The

agents in our case had authorization to search, but not at

night. Thus, our case simply is not on the same plane

as Cotzojay.

Put another way, if law enforcement officers do not attempt

to secure a valid warrant supported by a magistrate judge’s

probable cause finding (as in Cotzojay), their conduct is more

egregious than law enforcement officers who take the time to

prepare a valid warrant and present it to a magistrate judge for

a probable cause finding. In the latter case, the law

- 82 -
enforcement officers’ conduct is less offensive--they have

sought and received authorization for a privacy interest

invasion--while in the former case, the law enforcement

officers’ conduct borders on abhorrent, which renders the

intrusion more severe and, hence, egregious. 23

Sensing that she suffered a “mere garden-variety” violation

of her Fourth Amendment rights, Garcia-Torres, 660 F.3d at 336,

Yanez claims her case for egregiousness is buttressed by the

excessive force used by the ICE agents in executing the warrant.

Unfortunately for Yanez, the force used by the agents was

reasonable.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that law

enforcement officers, when executing a search, “may take

reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own

safety and the efficacy of the search.” Los Angeles Cnty., Cal.

v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007). It is for this reason

that the Supreme Court has underscored that officers may detain

the occupants of the premises while a search is

23
Interestingly, had the ICE agents in Cotzojay obtained a
daytime warrant and executed it at night, the Second Circuit
would not have assessed the claim for Fourth Amendment
egregiousness because such claims in the Second Circuit are
analyzed under a Rule 41 harmless error analysis. See Burke,
517 F.2d at 385-87 & n.14 (applying harmless error analysis to
Rule 41 nighttime execution violation). The upshot of this is
that a nighttime execution of a daytime warrant is not a
constitutional violation, let alone an egregious constitutional
violation, in the Second Circuit.

- 83 -
conducted. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705. Such detentions, the

Court has noted, are appropriate “because the character of the

additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because

the justifications for detention are substantial.” Muehler v.

Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005). 24 “Inherent in Summers’

authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched

is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the

detention.” Id. 98–99.

Claims of excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, judging the

“reasonableness of a particular use of force . . . from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Generally, such claims require “a careful balancing

of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee

v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The force here at issue consisted of the ICE agents

24
The reasonableness of the seizure in Summers was
justified by three law enforcement objectives: (1) “preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found”; (2)
“minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”; and (3)
facilitating “the orderly completion of the search” with the
assistance of the detained occupants. 452 U.S. at 702–03.

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breaking down Yanez’s bedroom door, shouting “police” and “don’t

move,” pointing a gun at her, and leading her downstairs at

gunpoint to the living room couch. (J.A. 142). Summers

stresses that the risk of harm to officers and occupants is

minimized if the officers routinely exercise “unquestioned

command of the situation.” 452 U.S. at 703. Yanez was living

in a home that the agents, based on extensive surveillance,

suspected housed illegal aliens. For the safety of everyone

involved, including Yanez, the agents were authorized to

exercise unquestioned command of the situation by breaking the

locked bedroom door down, shouting “police” and “don’t move”,

and leading Yanez downstairs at gunpoint. (J.A. 142). Such

actions in securing the home ensured there was no danger to the

agents, the occupants, or the public. Once she arrived on the

couch, Yanez was subjected to no further exercise of force

during her detention, and, as noted, she was never handcuffed

during the encounter. Cf. Mena, 544 U.S. at 98 (upholding the

use of handcuffs during a two- or three-hour detention during

execution of search warrant for weapons). Moreover, weapons

were drawn no longer than necessary to secure the location in a

potentially volatile situation. Cf. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.

325, 335-36 (1990) (noting that a protective sweep may last “no

longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of

danger” and “no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and

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depart the premises”). The force used here by the agents

unquestionably was measured and by no means excessive (in the

constitutional sense or otherwise). As such, the amount of such

force does not help Yanez’s egregiousness claim based on the

timing of the search. 25

Our discussion of the totality of the circumstances leads

us to conclude that the Fourth Amendment violation here lacks

the severity necessary to support a finding of

egregiousness. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235. We hold that,

although the nighttime execution of the daytime warrant violated

25
Because we hold that the force used by the ICE agents was
measured and not excessive in the constitutional sense, we
reject Yanez’s stand-alone egregious Fourth Amendment violation
claim based on the amount of force used by the agents.
Moreover, to the extent that Yanez challenges the scope and
duration of her seizure on Fourth Amendment egregiousness
grounds, we reject this argument on the basis that her seizure
was reasonable in its scope and duration. Under Summers, law
enforcement officers are entitled to detain occupants of a
premises for the whole length of most warranted searches. 452
U.S. at 705 n.21 (acknowledging possible exceptions to the
Summers rule for “special circumstances” and “prolonged
detention[s],” implying that the general rule of routine
detention of residents of a house while it was being searched
for contraband pursuant to a warrant confers the power to detain
occupants for the length of such “routine” searches); see also
Mena, 544 U.S. at 98 (holding that the resident’s “detention for
the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because
a warrant existed to search [the premises] and she was an
occupant of that address at the time of the search”). In light
of the two- or three-hour detention of an innocent bystander
deemed “plainly permissible” by the Supreme Court in Mena, we
cannot conclude that Yanez’s seizure here became egregiously
unconstitutional over time. 544 U.S. at 98.

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Yanez’s Fourth Amendment rights, such violation was not

egregious under the totality of the circumstances. 26

Accordingly, both the IJ and the BIA correctly resolved this

Fourth Amendment claim against Yanez.

3

Yanez also argues that her statements to the ICE agents

were involuntary and, thus, were used against her in violation

of her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. See Bustos–Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th

Cir. 1990) (“Because deportation hearings must conform to due

process standards, however, an alien’s involuntary statements

cannot be used against him in a deportation hearing.”); see

also Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The

Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigration

proceedings, and evidentiary determinations are limited only by

due process considerations.”). To establish that her statements

were involuntary, Yanez “must show coercion, duress, or improper

action” by the agents that overbore her will. Puc–Ruiz, 629

26
We note that, even under the Ninth Circuit’s more alien-
friendly qualified immunity egregiousness standard, Yanez would
not prevail. As noted in Footnote 22, the law is unsettled on
the question of whether the nighttime execution of a daytime
warrant, without consent or exigent circumstances, is a Fourth
Amendment violation. Given the state of the law, it cannot be
said that the ICE agents in our case acted pursuant to the
“unequivocal doctrinal backdrop” necessary for a finding of
egregiousness under the Ninth Circuit’s more lenient
egregiousness standard. Martinez-Medina, 673 F.3d at 1035.

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F.3d at 779.

The allegations presented to the IJ failed to establish

a prima facie case of involuntariness. Yanez did not submit

evidence of promises, prolonged questioning, interference with

her right to counsel, or other indicia of coercion or duress

that might suggest that her statements were involuntary, and she

was never handcuffed during the entire episode. See Lopez-

Gabriel, 653 F.3d at 687 (“Without more, prompt questioning of a

handcuffed detainee by an armed and uniformed officer

without Miranda warnings, and questioning by ICE agents after an

arrest, are not sufficient to mandate a hearing or to justify

suppression in an immigration proceeding.”); id. (cases cited

therein). Accordingly, like both the IJ and the BIA, we must

reject Yanez’s Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause claim.

In so rejecting, we note that Yanez’s heavy reliance on the

Second Circuit’s decision in Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207 (2d

Cir. 2009), is misplaced. In Singh, the Second Circuit

suppressed a signed statement made during an interrogation

because the officers’ conduct “undermined the reliability of the

evidence in dispute.” Id. at 215 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). The court found that the alien was

questioned for four hours in a border inspection station “where

armed, uniformed officers were circulating,” was repeatedly told

he would be sent to jail, broke down and cried during the

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interrogation that occurred in the middle of the night, was

awake for twenty-four hours, and did not read the statement he

signed that contained admissions he allegedly had made. Id.

The court also noted that the interrogating officer persisted in

asking the alien the same question until he got the answer he

wanted. Id. at 216. Ultimately, the court found that the

statements at issue were “nuanced and susceptible to corruption”

and were therefore excludable. Id. According to the court, the

statements were not related to “simple, specific, and objective

facts,” such as “whether a person is a foreign citizen or has a

passport and valid visa.” Id. Because the statements were

unreliable, the court excluded them. Id. at 215.

Although the court in Singh discussed the egregious

violation exception in Lopez-Mendoza, id. at 215-16, the court

did not explicitly state whether the signed statement was

suppressed because there was an egregious Fourth Amendment

violation or because there was an egregious Fifth Amendment Due

Process Clause violation. In excluding the statements, the

court stated only that, “[e]ven assuming that the conduct here

was not ‘egregious,’ it nonetheless undermined the reliability

of the evidence in dispute.” Id. at 215 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court excluded the evidence

on the basis that the unspecified constitutional violation

undermined the probative value of the challenged evidence. Id.

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 The Second Circuit’s decision in Singh hurts rather than

helps Yanez’s cause. As noted earlier, Yanez does not challenge

the reliability of the evidence obtained as a result of the

alleged wrongful interrogation, which was the basis on which the

court in Singh suppressed the challenged statements. Moreover,

the circumstances surrounding the questioning of the alien

in Singh were decidedly more coercive than the questioning of

Yanez in this case. Unlike Singh, Yanez was questioned at home

for a brief period of time, and she was not repeatedly told she

would be taken to jail. Moreover, unlike the nuanced statements

in Singh, the questioning of Yanez was designed to obtain simple

and objective factual statements, which it did. Finally, unlike

the atmosphere in Singh, where the investigating officer

repeatedly asked the same question until he got the answer he

wanted, such was not the case here.

4

Finally, we turn to Yanez’s argument that the ICE agents

failed to follow five regulations, in particular, 8 C.F.R.

§ 287.8(a)(1)(iii) (regulating use of non-deadly force by

agents), 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c) (mandating advice concerning right

to counsel), 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (regarding authority to

briefly detain aliens for questioning), 8 C.F.R.

§ 287.8(c)(2)(i) (concerning power to arrest aliens), and 8

C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii) (explaining requirement for obtaining

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warrant prior to arresting alien). We have recognized that “an

agency’s failure to afford an individual procedural safeguards

required under its own regulations may result in the

invalidation of the ultimate administrative

determination.” United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 266 (4th

Cir. 1999). However, an administrative determination will not

be invalidated unless there is: (1) a violation (2) of a

regulation intended for the alien’s benefit (3) that causes

prejudice to the alien. Id.

We reject Yanez’s reliance on the five regulations at

issue. First off, 8 C.F.R. § 287.12 prohibits any construction

of Part 287 of the Code of Federal Regulations “to create any

rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any

party in any matter, civil or criminal.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.12. As

such, Yanez arguably suffered no prejudice. Cf. Navarro-Chalan,

359 F.3d at 23 (“Finally, even if § 287.3 were applicable and

were violated, INS regulations state that § 287.3 and the other

regulations in its subpart “do not, are not intended to, shall

not be construed to, and may not be relied upon to create any

rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any

party in any matter, civil or criminal.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). In any event, even assuming a

violation of the regulations in Part 287 creates an avenue for

suppression, Yanez’s regulatory claims are without merit, either

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because the regulation is inapplicable, see Oliva-Ramos, 694

F.3d at 286 (stating that formal proceedings do not begin until

a Notice to Appear is filed in immigration court, at which point

8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c) is triggered), or redundant to our prior

analyses, see 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(a)(1) (prohibiting excessive

force, which did not exist here), id. § 287.8(b)(2) (permitting

a brief detention for questioning if there is reasonable

suspicion that a person is an illegal alien--such suspicion

obviously was present and, in any event, Yanez’s detention was

permitted while the diligent search took place), id. § 287.8(c)

(circumscribing “arrests” to certain contexts--Yanez was not

arrested, but rather permissibly detained while the diligent

search was conducted).

III

For the reasons stated herein, we deny Yanez’s petition for

review.

PETITION DENIED

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