MEMORANDUM DECISION Jun 17 2015, 8:23 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
A. David Hutson Gregory F. Zoeller
Hutson Legal Attorney General of Indiana
Jeffersonville, Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Richard Dean Martin, June 17, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
10A01-1409-PC-419
v. Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court.
The Honorable Daniel E. Moore,
Special Judge.
State of Indiana, Cause No. 10C01-1306-PC-9
Appellee-Respondent
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Richard Dean Martin appeals from the denial of his second petition for post-
conviction relief. Martin makes a number of arguments, which we restate as
follows: (1) the post-conviction court erroneously refused to vacate Martin’s
convictions based upon the trial judge’s failure to recuse herself; and (2) the
post-conviction court erred by finding that Martin did not receive the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. Finding that one of Martin’s sentences needs to
be revised and finding no other error, we affirm and remand with instructions to
revise Martin’s sentence on Count III to a thirty-year term, to be served
concurrently.
Facts
[2] The facts underlying Martin’s convictions were described by a panel of this
Court as follows:
In 2004, Martin began living with C.C. and her three children, which
included eight-year-old S.G. Over the next three years, Martin
repeatedly molested S.G. Two or three times per month, Martin
would enter S.G.’s bedroom late at night and kiss S.G.’s breasts or
vagina and rub his penis on her face, neck, shoulders, and vagina.
Each molestation lasted about ten to fifteen minutes.
Martin and C.C. ended their relationship in November of 2006, and in
February of 2007, S.G. told her mother about the molestations. C.C.
informed the Clark County Sheriff’s Department, which, in turn,
informed the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). The
DCS sent investigator Chris Yarbrough to interview C.C., S.G., and
Martin. Yarbrough informed Martin of S.G.'s allegations, and
Martin’s response “was very firm that [S.G.] doesn't lie.” While
Martin did not admit the allegations to Yarbrough, Martin did
acknowledge to Yarbrough that S.G. had “hunched” on Martin’s penis
one night when he was in bed with her, and that that “activity went on
for approximately one minute and he noted ... that he probably could
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have stopped that activity sooner than he did.” Yarbrough made a
report based on those interviews and submitted that report to the Clark
County prosecutor.
Martin v. State, No. 10A01-0812-CR-568, slip op. at 1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 20,
2009) (record citations omitted) (“Martin I”).
[3] The State charged Martin with six counts of class A felony child molesting.
Following a jury trial, the jury found Martin guilty as charged. The trial court
held a sentencing hearing on September 24, 2008, at which it found the
following aggravating circumstances:
The harm suffered by the victim was significant and greater than the
elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense;
Martin’s criminal history;
The victim was under the age of twelve years old;
Martin’s offenses were crimes of violence;
Martin was in a position of having care, custody, or control of the victim;
Martin threatened to harm the victim if she told anyone what he had
done.
The trial court found no mitigating circumstances. The trial court imposed
concurrent fifty-year sentences on all six convictions, for an aggregate sentence
of fifty years imprisonment.
[4] Martin appealed his convictions. On appeal, his attorney raised three issues of
fundamental error: (1) the admission of evidence regarding uncharged acts of
molestation against the victim; (2) the admission of the DCS investigator’s
testimony recounting Martin’s statement that the victim did not lie; and (3) a
jury instruction stating that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim was
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sufficient to support a guilty verdict. This Court affirmed. Martin I, slip op. at
3-11.
[5] On February 26, 2010, Martin filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing
that he had received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that there was
insufficient evidence supporting his convictions. The post-conviction court
denied Martin’s petition. He appealed that ruling to this Court, and we
affirmed. Martin v. State, No. 10A05-1110-PC-526 (Ind. Ct. App. June 1, 2012)
(“Martin II”).
[6] On March 29, 2013, Martin filed a motion for permission to file a successive
petition for post-conviction relief, which was granted. On May 30, 2013,
Martin filed his successive petition for post-conviction relief. In pertinent part,
Martin raised the following issues in that petition:
Martin was denied due process because he did not receive notice of
DCS’s substantiation of the molestation allegations.
The trial judge should have recused herself from the case because of an
attenuated familial relationship to the victim.
Trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to raise a venue issue; (2) not
impeaching the DCS investigator; (3) not raising a juror misconduct
issue; and (4) not attacking some of the convictions on sufficiency.
Appellate counsel was ineffective for (1) not raising a Blakely1 sentencing
argument with respect to some of his convictions; and (2) failing to make
arguments related to aggravators and mitigators.
1
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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After filing the successive petition for post-conviction relief, Martin filed a
motion for the trial judge to recuse herself, which she granted. At that point,
Special Judge Moore was appointed.
[7] The successive post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on Martin’s
petition on June 30, 2014. On August 28, 2014, the post-conviction court
granted Martin’s petition in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the post-
conviction court reduced two of Martin’s convictions to their presumptive
thirty-year terms based on a Blakely violation. The remainder of Martin’s
petition was denied. Martin now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] The general rules regarding the review of a ruling on a petition for post-
conviction relief are well established:
“The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of
establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). “When appealing from
the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position
of one appealing from a negative judgment.” Id. To prevail on appeal
from the denial of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that
the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a
conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.
Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). Further, the
post-conviction court in this case made findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post–Conviction Rule
1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal
conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be
reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ben–
Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (quotation omitted).
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Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014).
I. Recusal of Trial Judge
[9] First, Martin contends that his conviction should have been vacated because the
trial judge did not recuse herself until after he filed his successive petition for
post-conviction relief. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A) and Indiana Trial Rule
79(C) both require that a judge must recuse herself if she knows that the judge,
the judge’s spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, is likely to be a material witness in pending
litigation. “Third degree of relationship” is defined as “great-grandparent,
grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-
grandchild, nephew, and niece.” Ind. Judicial Conduct Terminology. If
recusal is mandatory pursuant to these rules, and if recusal does not occur, then
prejudice is presumed. Patterson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 90, 95 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010).
[10] In this case, the trial judge has a stepsister, Christine Devereaux. In 2000,
Devereaux married Dave Pinnick. Pinnick is the biological uncle of S.G., the
victim in this case. In 2002—six years before Martin’s trial—Devereaux and
Pinnick divorced. Although the trial judge met Pinnick during his marriage to
Devereaux, she never met any of his family, including S.G. It is undisputed
that the trial judge was wholly unaware of her attenuated connection to S.G.
until Martin filed his successive petition for post-conviction relief. Mandatory
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recusal was not required, inasmuch as the relationship between the trial judge
and S.G. did not qualify as a “third degree of relationship.”
[11] In his reply brief, Martin concedes that mandatory recusal was not required.
Instead, he argues that “[t]he only question is whether the subsequent discovery
of the relationship creates the appearance of partiality.” Reply Br. p. 4. In
considering this claim, we turn to our Supreme Court’s statements regarding the
requirement of recusal:
There is no question that a judge is required to disqualify himself or
herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. The Canon demands it. In addressing
those concerns the issue has been cast as “whether an objective,
disinterested observer fully informed of the facts underlying the
grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant
doubt that justice would be done in the case.” Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen,
764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985). As this court has recently stated,
the issue “is not whether the judge personally believes himself or
herself to be impartial, but whether a reasonable person aware of all
the circumstances would question the judge’s impartiality.” In re
Morton, 770 N.E.2d 827, 831 (Ind. 2002).
In re Wilkins, 780 N.E.2d 842, 845 (Ind. 2003).2
[12] Applying that test to the case before us, we cannot conclude that a reasonable
person, aware of all the circumstances, would question the judge’s impartiality.
The degree of relationship—a niece of a man married to the judge’s stepsister
2
Martin concedes that recusal is not a viable remedy in this case, inasmuch as the trial judge was unaware of
the salient facts until years after the trial had concluded. Instead, he suggests that the proper remedy for the
alleged appearance of partiality would be to vacate his convictions and remand for retrial. We decline to do
so.
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for only two years, with the marriage ending six years before Martin’s trial—is
extraordinarily attenuated. Indeed, it was so attenuated that the trial judge was
not even aware of it. The fact that the trial judge recused herself at Martin’s
request after he filed his successive petition for post-conviction relief does not
affect our analysis. There is no evidence whatsoever tending to establish that
this remote, past relationship in any way affected Martin’s trial. No reasonable
person would conclude otherwise. Consequently, we find no error on this
basis.
II. Assistance of Appellate Counsel
[13] Next, Martin argues that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.3 The rules regarding such claims are well established:
The standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel is the same as for trial counsel in that the defendant must show
appellate counsel was deficient in his or her performance and that the
deficiency resulted in prejudice. When evaluating an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two-part test articulated
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984). See Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). To
satisfy the first prong, “the defendant must show deficient
performance: representation that fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not
have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” McCary v.
3
Martin did not raise this claim in his first petition for post-conviction relief. The State concedes that he has
not waived the claim, however, because the attorney who represented him on direct appeal also represented
him during his first petition for post-conviction relief. See Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind. 1995)
(holding that waiver should not be applied “where the same attorney represents a defendant both at trial and
on appeal and does not raise on appeal the issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness”). Therefore, we will address
these arguments.
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State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052). To satisfy the second prong, “the defendant
must show prejudice: a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
Hollowell, 19 N.E.3d at 269.
A. Blakely v. Washington
[14] In 2004, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Blakely. Among
other things, Blakely held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
542 U.S. at 301. Our Supreme Court found Blakely applicable to Indiana’s
sentencing scheme in March 2005. Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 690 (Ind.
2005). In response, our General Assembly amended Indiana’s sentencing
statutes with an effective date of April 25, 2005. Consequently, Blakely must be
applied to offenses committed before April 25, 2005, and the amended advisory
sentencing scheme is applied to offenses committed after that date. Creekmore v.
State, 853 N.E.2d 523, 527-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), clarified on other grounds on
reh’g, Creekmore v. State, 858 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
[15] In this case, the trial court imposed enhanced fifty-year terms on Martin. It is
undisputed that a jury was not convened for the purposes of determining
aggravating circumstances. Therefore, for the offenses that occurred before
April 25, 2005, the then-presumptive thirty-year term must be imposed. The
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post-conviction court did just that for the first two counts. Martin argues that
the same should be done for the third count.
[16] As is common in child molesting cases, the State elected to charge these
offenses with general timeframes rather than specific dates. Therefore, Martin
was charged and convicted of molesting S.G. in (I) the winter of 2004, (II) the
fall of 2004, (III) the winter of 2005, (IV) March 2006, (V) the summer of 2006,
and (VI) November 2006. Martin argues that Count III’s “winter of 2005” is
sufficiently ambiguous that it cannot be determined whether the acts occurred
before or after April 25, 2005. We agree. And having reviewed the portions of
the transcript available in the record, it is still unclear whether “winter of 2005”
refers to January through March 2005, or December 2005. Inasmuch as this is
a fundamental constitutional issue, we will err on the side of preserving
Martin’s rights. Consequently, we remand with instructions to revise Martin’s
sentence on Count III to be a thirty-year term, to be served concurrent with the
remainder of his sentences.
B. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
[17] Martin argues that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to argue that
the trial court erroneously found certain aggravators and failed to find his
proffered mitigators. We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for an
abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified
on reh’g on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court can abuse its
discretion, among other ways, by finding aggravators or mitigators that are not
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supported by the record, omitting factors that are clearly supported by the
record and advanced for consideration, and finding factors that are improper as
a matter of law. Id. at 490.
1. Aggravators
[18] Turning first to the aggravators, we note again that the trial court found six
aggravating factors in this case:
The harm suffered by the victim was significant and greater than the
elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense;
Martin’s criminal history;
The victim was under the age of twelve years old;
Martin’s offenses were crimes of violence;
Martin was in a position of having care, custody, or control of the victim;
Martin threatened to harm the victim if she told anyone what he had
done.
Martin argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding the first,
second, and sixth aggravators. He implicitly concedes that the remaining
aggravators were proper.
[19] It is well established that a single aggravating factor may support the imposition
of both an enhanced and consecutive sentence. Field v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1008,
1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In this case, even if we omit the three complained-of
aggravators solely for argument’s sake, there are still three aggravators
remaining. And while all of Martin’s sentences were enhanced, they were also
ordered to be served concurrently rather than consecutively. In other words, he
is serving a 50-year term instead of a 300-year term. In our view, the remaining
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aggravators readily support the trial court’s decision to impose enhanced,
concurrent terms. Consequently, even if appellate counsel had raised this
argument in Martin’s direct appeal, it would not have succeeded; thus, he has
failed to establish prejudice. We decline to find ineffective assistance on this
basis.
2. Mitigators
[20] Next, Martin contends that his appellate attorney should have argued that the
trial court erred by declining to find his proffered mitigating circumstances.
Determining what is a proper mitigating circumstance is within the discretion of
the trial court. Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An
allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor
requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both
significant and clearly supported by the record. Id.at 272-73. There is no error
in failing to find mitigation when the mitigation claim is “‘highly disputable in
nature, weight, or significance.’” Id. at 272 (quoting Smith v. State, 670 N.E.2d
7, 8 (Ind. 1996)).
[21] Martin identifies three proffered mitigators for our review. First, he argues that
the fact that he “was a law-abiding citizen for a substantial period of his life”
should have been found to be mitigating. Appellant’s Br. p. 28. We cannot
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agree.4 In 1996 and 1997, when Martin was approximately twenty years old, he
was convicted of two separate felony theft charges. Martin was later charged
with prostitution in Kentucky, though the charge was eventually dismissed, and
has been arrested four times. He violated probation in 2001. He then began
molesting S.G. in 2004 and continued to do so several times a month for the
next two years. Martin was almost thirty-two years old at his sentencing
hearing in this case. For much of the first decade of his adult life, therefore,
Martin has had multiple contacts with law enforcement—which have not
dissuaded his continued criminal activity. We find no error in the trial court’s
declination of this mitigator.
[22] Second, Martin contends that it should be mitigating that “the circumstances
that led to the charge are unlikely to recur.” Id. at 28-29. Martin essentially
argues that because he is no longer in a romantic relationship with S.G.’s
mother, the circumstances that led to the repeated molestations are unlikely to
recur. The fact that he will no longer have an opportunity to molest S.G. does
not mean that he will no longer have opportunities to molest other children.
There is no basis in this record to conclude that the circumstances that led to
Martin’s convictions are unlikely to recur, and we find no error on this basis.
4
The presentence investigation report was not provided to the successive post-conviction court and is not
included in the record on appeal. In recounting Martin’s criminal history, we rely on the transcript from the
sentencing hearing.
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[23] Third, Martin argues that the fact that he would respond positively to probation
and that his character made him unlikely to commit crime in the future should
have been mitigating. To the contrary, the record reveals that he has violated
probation in the past. Martin directs us to evidence in the record indicating that
he had the support of his family and community and that he had familial
responsibilities that would prevent him from committing crimes in the future.
While we applaud Martin for building a life and a positive community for
himself, we cannot say that the trial court erred in declining to find this
mitigator given Martin’s prior probation violation and prior contacts with the
criminal justice system that have not yet dissuaded him from continuing
criminal activity. We find no error on this basis.
[24] Consequently, even if Martin’s appellate attorney had raised these issues on
direct appeal, the arguments would not have been successful, and he has failed
to establish prejudice. The post-conviction court did not err by finding that
Martin did not receive the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
[25] Martin raises two arguments for the first time on appeal: the first is that his
appellate attorney should have made a sentencing argument pursuant to
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) and the second is that appellate counsel should
have raised a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Martin did not make either of
these arguments to the post-conviction court during the successive post-
conviction relief proceedings. He did not include proposed findings of fact or
conclusions of law on these issues when he submitted his proposed findings and
conclusions to the post-conviction court. We can only conclude, therefore, that
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he has waived these arguments. Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1171 (Ind.
2001) (noting that it is well settled that issues not raised in the petition for post-
conviction relief may not be raised for the first time on post-conviction appeal).
[26] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in part and remanded
with instructions to revise Martin’s sentence on Count III to a thirty-year term,
to be served concurrently with the other sentences.
Najam, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.
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