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2015 Ark. App. 380
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
xo. CV-15-36
CENTERS FOR YOUTH & FAMILIES; Opinion Delivered Jt:ne 77, 2075
RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES;
ATA WORKERS' COMP - SI TRUST APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
APPELLANTS WORKERS' COMPENSATION
coMMrssroN [No. G4017 43)
JOYCE A. WOOD AFFIRMED
APPELLEE
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
The Arkansas'Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) determined that
appelleeJoyce A.
'Wood sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of
her employment. Appellants, Centers for Youth & Families, Risk Management Resources,
and ATA'Workers' Comp - SI Trust (collectively, CFYF), argue that the Commission erred
in determining that'Wood was performing employment services at the time of her injury.
'We
affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
'Wood testified that she had worked for Centers for Youth & Families as a part-time
receptionist for approximately three years.l According to'Wood, the atmosphere at her job
was "very laid back." She greeted members and answered the telephone, but she did not
' Wood was the only witness to testify.
2015 Ark. App. 380
always stay at the front desk. She would occasionally check on things in the kitchen or step
away to speak with members. AIso, because she worked only part time, she had no scheduled
'Wood testified that she took breaks needed and "as traffic allow[ed]."
breaks. as
OnJanuary 74,2074, 'Wood had clocked in at 8:00 a.m. From approximately 8:30 to
8:45 a.m., when there was a lull in the activiry around the front desk, 'Wood walked to the
vending machine to get a snack because she had not eaten breakfast. On her way to the
vending machine, 'Wood slipped on water in the hallway and fell, fracturing her pelvis.
According to'Wood, rypically, after going to the vending machine, she would immediately
retum to her desk where she could both eat her snack and perform her job duties.
At the conclusion ofthe hearing, the administrative lawjudge (AL) noted that'Wood
was "an extremely credible witness." In finding her injury compensable, the ALJ found that
'Wood did not have scheduled breaks; that she was permitted to leave the front desk
temporarily when business was slow to go to the vending machine; and that she would then
immediately retum to her desk to eat her snack. The ALJ concluded that Wood's actions in
only briefly leaving her desk benefited her employer, directly or indirectly. The Commission
afErmed and adopted the ALJ's opinion.
II. Standard of Reuiew
Under Arkansas law, the Commission is permitted to adopt the ALJ's opinion. Target
Corp. u. Bumgarner,2Ol5 Ark. App. 112, 455 S.W.3d 378. In doing so, the Commission
makes the ALJ's findings and conclusions the findings and conclusions of the Commission.
Id. Therefore, for purposes of our review, we consider both the ALJ's opinion and the
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2015 Ark. App. 380
In reviewing decisions from the Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable
inGrences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and
we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hill u. LDA ltasing, lnc.,2010
Ark. App. 271, 374 S.'W.3d 268. Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Su.,. Ark. Deu. Council,
Inc. u. Tidutell,95 Ark. App.27,233 S.W.3d 190 (2006). The issue is not whether we might
have reached a different decision or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary
6nding; instead, we affirm if reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion rendered
by the Commission. Id.
III. Argument on Appeal
CFYF argues that'Wood was responsible for answering the telephone and greeting
and signing in guests and that, because she had left her workstation at the time she was
injured, she could not have been performing employment services. CFYF maintains that
'Wood's
reason for walking to the vending machine was to get something to eat, which was
entirely personal in nature and unrelated to her work.
ry. Discussion
In order for an accidental injury to be compensable, it must arise out of and in the
course of employment. Ark. Code Ann. $ 11-9-102(4XAXi) (Repl. 2012). A compensable
injury does not include an injury that was inflicted upon the employee at a time when
employment services were not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. $ 11-9-102(a)(B)(iii). An
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2015 Ark. App. 380
employee is performing employment services when she is doing something that is generally
required by her employer. Cont'l Constr. Co. u. Nabors,2015 Ark. App. 60, 454 S.'W.3d762.
'We
use the same test to determine whether an employee is performing employment services
as we do when determining whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of
employment. Id. The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space
boundaries of the employment,2 when the employee was carrying out the employer's
purpose or advancing the employer's interest, directly or indirecdy. Id. Moreover, the issue
whether an employee was performing employment services within the course ofemployment
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Hudak-Lee u. Baxter Cnty.
Reg'l Hosp.,2077 Ark. 31, 378 S.W.3d77.
CFYF contends that this case is "clearly analogous" to Hill, supru, in which this court
afErmed a denial of benefits because the claimant's shoulder injury did not arise out of or in
the course of his employment as a truck driver for LDA Leasing. Although Hill was
responsible for his truck and its contents at all times, he left his truck at the loading dock to
use the restroom. Upon exiting the restroom, Hill went into a break room to get a snack
from the vending machine. While operating the machine, Hill was injured when his feet
slipped out from under him. This court reasoned that, at the time he was injured, Hill was
doing the exact opposite of what was required of him by failing to stay with his truck and
that he was not in a position to perforrn any of his job duties.
'Itis undisputed that'Wood was "on the clock" and on the employer's premises at
the time that she was injured.
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2015 Ark. App. 380
Hill k distinguishable.'W'ood was permitted to leave her workstation for various
reasons, including getting a snack from the vending machine, as long as the telephone was
not ringing and guests were not needing assistance. It was not uncommon for the employees
to get snacks from the vending machine supplied by the employer. After retrieving a snack,
'Wood could immediately resume herjob duties because she
could eat her snack at the front
desk, yet still answer the telephone and greet members as they arrived. The Commission
could reasonably conclude that'Wood's briefly leaving her workstation to get a snack did not
detract from her job duties, which benefited her employer, directly or indirectly. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that'Wood's actions were inconsistent with her employer's
interest in advancing the work. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commission's decision, we hold that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that
'Wood
was performing employment services when she was injured; therefore, we affirm the
award of benefits.
Affirmed.
GraowtN, CJ., and HIxsoN, J., agree.
Gil Ragon Owen, P.A., by: Jason A. Lee, for appellants.
Gary Davis, for appellee.
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