Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael Strizic

2015 WI 57

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2014AP175-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Michael Strizic, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant,
v.
Michael Strizic,
Respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST STRIZIC

OPINION FILED: June 19, 2015
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
2015 WI 57
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2014AP175-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Michael Strizic, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant,
JUN 19, 2015
v.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Michael Strizic,

Respondent.

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.

¶1 PER CURIAM. This is a reciprocal discipline case
that comes before the court in a rather unusual posture.
¶2 Attorney Michael Strizic was admitted to practice law
in Wisconsin in 1975. His license is suspended for failure to
pay State Bar dues and failure to comply with continuing legal
education requirements. Attorney Strizic was also admitted to
practice law in Illinois in 1981. He is not licensed to
practice law in any other state.
No. 2014AP175-D

¶3 When an attorney licensed in Wisconsin has been
publicly disciplined by another jurisdiction, Supreme Court Rule
(SCR) 22.22 provides, in pertinent part:

(3) The supreme court shall impose the identical
discipline or license suspension unless one or more of
the following is present:

(a) The procedure in the other jurisdiction was
so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to
constitute a deprivation of due process.

(b) There was such an infirmity of proof
establishing the misconduct or medical incapacity that
the supreme court could not accept as final the
conclusion in respect to the misconduct or medical
incapacity.

(c) The misconduct justifies substantially
different discipline in this state.
¶4 In May 2013, Attorney Strizic was disciplined in a
jurisdiction——Arizona——where he is not licensed to practice law.
After finding that Attorney Strizic had failed to answer or

otherwise defend against a State Bar of Arizona disciplinary
complaint, the Arizona Supreme Court found that: (1) Attorney
Strizic exerted undue influence over a client to obtain an
unwarranted benefit for himself by preparing trust documents for
the client and including himself as a beneficiary; (2) Attorney

Strizic intentionally failed to comply with the Arizona
disciplinary investigation; and (3) Attorney Strizic held
himself out to the public as a licensed lawyer even though he
did not have an Arizona law license.
¶5 Based on these findings, the Arizona Supreme Court
concluded that Attorney Strizic had engaged in the unauthorized

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No. 2014AP175-D

practice of law, operated under a conflict of interest, and
failed to furnish information or respond promptly to an inquiry
or request from the State Bar of Arizona. The Arizona Supreme
Court stated that if Attorney Strizic had been an Arizona-
licensed attorney, disbarment would have been the appropriate
remedy. However, because Attorney Strizic was not licensed in
Arizona, a reprimand was the only available remedy, which the
court therefore imposed. See Matter of Olsen, 881 P.2d 337, 339
(Ariz. 1994) (disbarment warranted, but because respondent-
lawyer was not a member of the Arizona State Bar, the only
sanction that could be imposed was a censure (now a reprimand)).
¶6 In July 2013, Attorney Strizic moved to set aside the

Arizona court's report and order imposing sanctions, asserting
that he had not received notice of the Arizona disciplinary
proceedings and had not become aware of any disciplinary action
having been taken against him until late May 2013, when the
publication of the final judgment and order appeared on the
internet and was discovered by Attorney Strizic's son. The
motion further alleged that the Arizona disciplinary authorities
had been grossly misinformed about Attorney Strizic's
relationship with the decedent. In late July 2013, the Arizona
court denied the motion.
¶7 In January 2014, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)
filed a complaint against Attorney Strizic, seeking to impose
the discipline that the Arizona Supreme Court wanted to impose
(revocation), not the reprimand that the Arizona court had been

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No. 2014AP175-D

constrained to impose due to the fact that Attorney Strizic was
not licensed to practice law in Arizona.
¶8 In response to the OLR complaint, Attorney Strizic
effectively invoked two of the exceptions to reciprocal
discipline under SCR 22.22(3). He claimed: (1) that the
Arizona disciplinary proceedings were so lacking in notice as to
constitute a deprivation of due process; and (2) that the
Arizona disciplinary proceedings suffered from an infirmity of
proof establishing the alleged misconduct.
¶9 Because the resolution of these claims necessitated
findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court referred the
matter to a referee for a hearing. See SCR 22.22(5).
Catherine M. Rottier was appointed to serve as referee.
¶10 Shortly before the scheduled evidentiary hearing, the
OLR filed with this court a stipulation and no-contest plea.
Therein, Attorney Strizic stipulated to most, but not all, of
the facts alleged in the OLR complaint and its attachments.
Attorney Strizic also entered a plea of no contest to the two
counts of misconduct contained in the OLR complaint. Count One
alleged that Attorney Strizic was subject to reciprocal
discipline under SCR 22.22 "[b]y virtue of having received
public discipline imposed in Arizona for his violation of the
Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct." Count Two alleged that
Attorney Strizic violated SCR 22.22(1) by failing to notify the
OLR of his public discipline in Arizona within 20 days of its
effective date. The parties stipulated neither to the
discipline that the Arizona Supreme Court wanted to impose
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No. 2014AP175-D

(revocation) nor to the discipline that court did impose (a
reprimand). Instead, the parties stipulated to a 60-day
suspension.
¶11 To justify this deviation from the discipline imposed
by the Arizona court, the parties explained in their stipulation
that the OLR had obtained "newly discovered evidence
. . . during the pendency of the disciplinary action" that
"specifically contradict[ed]" the Arizona Supreme Court's
finding that Attorney Strizic had exerted undue influence over
his client. The stipulation did not, however, describe this
"newly discovered evidence" in any fashion. Upon request from
the referee, the OLR explained in an e-mail to the referee that

this "newly discovered evidence" derived from the OLR's review
of the Arizona probate file and its discussion with certain
witnesses.
¶12 The referee cancelled the scheduled evidentiary
hearing and, in late December 2014, filed a report that
recommended the discipline to which the parties had stipulated:
a 60-day license suspension. In her report, the referee
expressed concern about whether Attorney Strizic had received
notice of the Arizona disciplinary proceeding, saying:

While the evidence is clear that Strizic did not
receive actual notice of the disciplinary complaint in
Arizona, it is much less clear that the Arizona
procedure for mailing notice to the last known address
of a lawyer not licensed to practice in Arizona
constitutes "a deprivation of due process." Strizic
had his opportunity to present his case on the notice
issue to the Arizona disciplinary authorities and they
flatly rejected his arguments.

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No. 2014AP175-D

Nonetheless, the absence of actual notice to an
attorney threatened with the loss of his ability to
practice law is very troubling. No one should suffer
such a serious deprivation without being afforded a
real opportunity to provide a defense.
¶13 The referee went on to question whether the absence of
actual notice of the Arizona proceeding deprived Attorney

Strizic of a real opportunity to defend himself against the
charge that he had exerted undue influence over his client, and
the referee posited that, had Attorney Strizic received actual

notice of the Arizona disciplinary proceedings and defended
against them, he still would likely have emerged with a public
reprimand for his admitted ethical lapses, since Arizona's
options on sanctions were limited due to the fact that he had no
license to practice law in Arizona. The referee said, however,
that Attorney Strizic likely would not have emerged with an
order saying he would have been disbarred in Arizona if he had
been licensed to practice there.

¶14 The referee explained:

[I]t was not so much an infirmity of proof in the
Arizona proceedings as it was an absence of a defense
by Strizic, caused by his failure to receive actual
notice of the Arizona complaint.

The most serious allegation against Strizic in
the Arizona disciplinary proceedings is that he
exerted undue influence over a client to obtain
financial advantage for himself. This is the very
allegation against which Strizic could have offered
the most compelling defense. Had he done so, the
sanction order in Arizona might have read much
differently.

. . . .

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No. 2014AP175-D

[T]he record here does not demonstrate much
opportunity for Strizic to present his defenses in
Arizona. . . . Thus, the protections afforded by
SCR 22.22(3)(a) and (c) are triggered here.
¶15 The referee agreed with the parties that a 60-day
license suspension was appropriate. The referee further
recommended that Attorney Strizic be required to pay only one-
half of the costs of these proceedings.1
¶16 With this unique factual and procedural background, we
are now called upon to review the referee's report and the

stipulation which it approved.
¶17 Under SCR 22.22(3), in reciprocal discipline matters,
this court shall impose the identical discipline unless one of
the enumerated exceptions is shown. Our review of the record,
including the parties' stipulation and the referee's report,
leads us to conclude that the misconduct at issue in this case
justifies substantially different discipline than that imposed
by the Arizona Supreme Court. See SCR 22.22(3)(c).
¶18 Attorney Strizic admits to conduct in Arizona that, we
conclude, constitutes violations of SCR 20:1.8(c) (soliciting a
substantial gift from a client) and SCR 20:5.5(a)(1) (practicing
law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of
the legal profession in that jurisdiction). Attorney Strizic
also pled no contest in the stipulation to failing to notify the
OLR of his Arizona discipline within 20 days of the effective

1
The full costs of the proceeding are $1,546.02 as of
January 26, 2015.

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No. 2014AP175-D

date of that discipline, in violation of SCR 22.22(1). We
conclude that if the OLR had commenced a freestanding
disciplinary action rather than proceeding under the reciprocal
discipline rule,2 the admitted misconduct would warrant a 60-day
suspension of Attorney Strizic's Wisconsin law license.
¶19 As to costs, we agree with the referee that due to the
unusual nature of this case, Attorney Strizic should be
responsible for one-half of the OLR's $1,546.02 in costs, for a
total of $773.01.
¶20 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael Strizic to
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days,
effective the date of this order.

¶21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Michael Strizic shall pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation one-half of the costs of this proceeding, $773.01.

2
The OLR is not required to automatically invoke the
reciprocal disciplinary system whenever an attorney is publicly
disciplined in another jurisdiction. The statement in
SCR 22.22(2) that the OLR director "may" file a complaint
demonstrates that the director has discretion to file a
reciprocal discipline complaint, to file a de novo disciplinary
action, or to take no action at all. In this case, a de novo
disciplinary proceeding may have allowed the development of a
substantially different record than what was developed in
Arizona and may well have avoided various procedural anomalies.
Under the unique circumstances of this case, however, we choose
to embrace a practical solution and take the case as we find it
rather than ordering additional proceedings that would result in
further delay and increased costs. Accordingly, we approve the
60-day suspension under SCR 22.22(3)(c).

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No. 2014AP175-D

¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael Strizic shall
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been
suspended.
¶23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See
SCR 22.28(2).

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No. 2014AP175-D