COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00411-CR
MORRIS LANDON JOHNSON, II APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CR12645
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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A jury found Appellant Morris Landon Johnson, II guilty of delivery of one
gram or more but less than four grams of methamphetamine; Johnson pleaded
true to an enhancement allegation and the jury assessed his punishment at forty
years’ confinement and a $5,000 fine. The trial court sentenced him accordingly.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a), (c) (West 2010); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 12.42(b) (West Supp. 2014). Johnson timely perfected this appeal.
Johnson’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet
the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation
of the record demonstrating why there are, in counsel’s assessment, no arguable
grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). In
compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel notified Johnson of his motion to
withdraw, provided him a copy of the brief, informed him of his right to file a pro
se response, informed him of his pro se right to seek discretionary review should
this court hold the appeal is frivolous, and took concrete measures to facilitate
Johnson’s review of the appellate record by providing him with a copy of the
clerk’s record and the reporter’s record. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014). Johnson filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief raising
five points, many of which are unpreserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1.
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);
Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only
then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
2
We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and Johnson’s pro
se response. We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and
without merit; we find no preserved error in the record that arguably might
support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: June 18, 2015
3