DLD-244 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-1872
___________
LINWOOD WILKERSON,
Appellant
v.
CHARLES E. SAMUELS, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons;
SMOKER, Correctional Officer, LSCI-Allenwood;
SOLOMAN, Factory Manager, LSCI-Allenwood
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-12-cv-01462)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 18, 2015
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 23, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant Linwood Wilkerson (“Wilkerson”), an inmate at FCI-Allenwood
Medium, appeals the District Court’s order granting Correctional Officer R. Smoker’s
motion for summary judgment, entering judgment in favor of Smoker against Wilkerson,
and closing the case.1 Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Wilkerson filed a pro se complaint in the District Court alleging violations of his
civil rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971). We have previously described Wilkerson’s retaliation allegations against
defendant Smoker as follows:
Wilkerson alleged that Appellee Smoker, a supervisor in the UNICOR
factory in which Wilkerson worked at the Low Security Correctional
Institution Allenwood (“LSCI Allenwood”), verbally harassed him. In
response, Wilkerson filed a hostile work environment complaint with
prison officials. He maintained that the complaint was ignored and that
Smoker retaliated by filing a false incident report against him, resulting in
disciplinary proceedings; Wilkerson was found guilty of the incident and
lost his UNICOR job for six months. He also alleged that he was
transferred to a higher custody institution as a result of the disciplinary
proceedings.
1
The Court also dismissed the other defendants, but on appeal Wilkerson states that he
has abandoned any appellate issue concerning their personal involvement, and
accordingly pursues this appeal against only Defendant Smoker. We confine our
discussion to the claims against Smoker.
2
Wilkerson v. Samuels, 524 F. App’x 776, 777 (3d Cir. 2013).2 The key underlying (and
undisputed) facts concerning the incident report that Smoker filed are that, while working
at the prison factory, Wilkerson left a wood chisel behind in his tool box after Wilkerson
was called out for a visit, but that Wilkerson then reported to prison staff that he had
returned all of his tools, as prison regulations require. Wilkerson’s explanation is that he
left the wood chisel inadvertently and thus did not know it remained behind.
After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Wilkerson had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, had failed to produce sufficient
evidence to establish a retaliation claim, and that defendants had qualified immunity.
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion on multiple alternative grounds, and
Wilkerson timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s entry of summary judgment, viewing the underlying facts and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Wilkerson. See Ray v.
Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm on any basis that the record
supports. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
2
In that prior opinion, we affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded on the ground
that the District Court had erred in concluding that Wilkerson’s retaliation claim was
time-barred and was prohibited under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
3
The District Court did not err in entering judgment against Wilkerson on his
claims against Smoker because the record facts show that Wilkerson could not establish
his retaliation claim. To sustain a retaliation claim, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1)
he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered adverse action; and (3)
the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the
adverse response. See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002); Rauser
v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). With respect to causation, if the prisoner
makes a prima facie showing that his constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating
factor in the decision to discipline, the defendant then has the burden of showing that the
same disciplinary action would have been taken even in the absence of the protected
activity. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.
Here, the record shows that there is no disputable issue that Wilkerson would have
received the same disciplinary consequences irrespective of his constitutionally protected
activity. Wilkerson admits that he left a wood chisel (albeit, he says, inadvertently) in his
tool box in contravention of prison regulations, and he admits that he told the prison staff
that he had returned all of his tools when, in fact, he had not. That evidence of
Wilkerson’s guilt shows that Smoker’s actions in reporting Wilkerson were reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest in securing potential weapons and escape aids
and that—especially given that there were other witnesses to Wilkerson’s failure to return
his work tools—Wilkerson would have been charged regardless of his earlier grievance
filings about Smoker. See, e.g., Carter, 292 F.3d at 159 (affirming summary judgment in
4
favor of defendants on a retaliation claim when “the quantum of evidence” concerning
the prisoner’s misconduct showed that he would face disciplinary action regardless of his
protected activity). As a result, Wilkerson cannot establish a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether retaliation caused the adverse consequences he suffered, and the
District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Smoker on this claim.3
For these reasons, this appeal presents no substantial question and we will affirm
the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
3
Because Wilkerson’s inability to establish causation disposes of his claim, we need not
discuss the District Court’s other reasons for granting summary judgment in Smoker’s
favor.
5