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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.J.K., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: R.J.W., III, FATHER No. 2679 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree entered August 15, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family
Court, at No: CP-51-AP-0000235-2013,
FID: 51-FN-001519-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2015
R.J.W., III, (Father) appeals from the decree entered August 15, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily
terminated his parental rights to his minor son, A.J.K. (Child). We affirm. 1
Father is the former boyfriend of H.K. (Mother). Mother and Father
separated shortly after the birth of Child in March of 2006. Since that time,
Father has had little involvement in Child’s life. On April 19, 2013, Mother
filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to Child.2 A
termination hearing was held on October 16, 2013. During the hearing, the
trial court heard the testimony of Mother; Stepfather; Mother’s mother, E.K.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
We note that our review of this fast-track matter was delayed significantly,
as the trial court did not forward the certified record to this Court until
December 19, 2014, over two months after its original due date of October
10, 2014.
2
Mother and her husband, S.M. (Stepfather), filed a petition for adoption at
the same time as the termination petition.
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(Maternal Grandmother); Father; and Father’s mother, M.W. (Paternal
Grandmother). The hearing then was continued until October 25, 2013. On
that date, the trial court interviewed Child in camera. On August 15, 2014,
the court entered its decree terminating Father’s parental rights. 3 Father
timely filed a notice of appeal on September 10, 2014, along with a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Father now raises the following issue for our review. “Did the [t]rial
[c]ourt err in terminating the parental rights of [Father] in that clear and
convincing evidence for terminating his parental rights did not exist?”
Father’s Brief at 6.
We consider Father’s claim mindful of the following.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
3
On October 25, 2013, the court entered an order requiring each party to
file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as a proposed
decree, within 30 days of the date that the termination proceedings were
transcribed. It is not clear from the record when the notes of testimony
were transcribed. However, the parties did not comply with the court’s
order until June and July of 2014.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Our courts apply a two-part analysis in reviewing a decree terminating
parental rights. As we explained in In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa. Super.
2007),
[i]nitially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). We need only agree
with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Section 2511(b), to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.
2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we
analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b),
which provide as follows.
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). To
meet the requirements of this section, “the moving party must produce clear
and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months
prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to
relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental
duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing In re
Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006)). The court must
then consider “the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct” and “the
post-abandonment contact between parent and child” before moving on to
analyze Section 2511(b). Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M.,
708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998)).
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This Court has emphasized that a parent does not perform his or her
parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development
of the child.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (quoting In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462
(Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 859 A.2d 767 (Pa. 2004)). Rather,
“[p]arental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith
interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the
parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult
circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). Critically, incarceration does not
relieve a parent of the obligation to perform parental duties. An
incarcerated parent must “utilize available resources to continue a
relationship” with his or her child. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,
828 (Pa. 2012) (discussing In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa.
1975)).
Instantly, the trial court concluded that Father “purposefully and
decidedly abdicated his parental role” with respect to Child, and that Father
“failed to vigorously work to insert and maintain himself in the life of the
child in a meaningful way.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/14, at 5
(unpaginated). Father argues that he made efforts to maintain contact with
Child by sending letters to Mother, and trying to contact her. Father’s Brief
at 9. Father also contends that both he and his parents were prevented
from seeing Child by Mother, as they feared she would call the police. Id.
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After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental
rights to Child. During the termination hearing, Mother testified that Father
and Child have never resided together. N.T., 10/13/13, at 34-35, 43.
Mother further explained that the last time she saw Father was in August of
2012, when he came to her home intoxicated and asked to see Child. Id. at
11, 36, 41, 46, 50. Mother stated that she did not permit Father to see
Child, as Father no longer had visitation rights due to a November 2011
custody order. Id. at 11-12, 29, 50. Mother called the police, who asked
Father to leave. Id. at 36-37, 46, 50-51.
Mother also was asked about Father’s involvement with Child during
the six-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition on April
19, 2013. Mother testified that she was not contacted by Father in any way
from October of 2012 until January of 2013. Id. at 15. Mother explained
that Father sent a letter asking for pictures of Child in January of 2013. Id.
at 15, 38, 43, 50, 52. Mother did not respond to the letter. Id. at 38.
Father had no further contact with Mother from January of 2013 until April of
2013. Id. at 12-15. Mother acknowledged that she changed residences in
September of 2012, and that her current address is confidential. Id. at 16,
40. However, she stated that she set up a forwarding address at the post
office, such that mail sent to her prior address would be directed to her
current home. Id. Mother also noted that Father has her cellphone number,
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and that this number has not changed in “[s]ix years or so.” Id. at 16-17,
41.
Maternal Grandmother testified that she resides in the same home
where she has lived for the past 34 years. Id. at 58-59. Maternal
Grandmother stated that Father lived in her home with Mother from
approximately November of 2005 until February of 2006. Id. at 58. Father
also knows Maternal Grandmother’s phone number. Id. at 59. Despite this,
Maternal Grandmother indicated that Father did not send any letters, call her
on the phone, or make any contact with her at all between October of 2012
and April of 2013. Id. at 59-60.
Father testified that Mother informed him in April of 2006 that he “will
never see [Child] again,” which prompted Father to file a custody petition.
Id. at 66, 105. Father was awarded visitation with Child twice per week,
which he attended consistently for a period four years. Id. at 67. Father
claimed that these visits stopped because Mother “just started to call the
cops if I went over there . . . .” Id. at 69. Father stated that he sometimes
tried to see Child when he was not scheduled to do so, but stated that
Mother would call the police during even his scheduled visitation periods.
Id. at 69, 100. Father stated that he at one point filed a contempt petition,
but that his petition was withdrawn because Mother relented and let him see
Child. Id. at 100-01. Father admitted that he last saw Child in 2011, and
that he lost his visitation rights because “I could not stay out of jail.” Id. at
99, 108. Specifically, Father testified that he was incarcerated at an
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unspecified time, and that he was released in approximately December of
2010. Id. at 81. Father again was arrested in June or July of 2011, and
was released on March 22, 2012. Id. at 74, 77, 80. Finally, Father was
incarcerated starting on May 30, 2012. Id. at 77. Father explained that he
was released on July 30, 2013, and that he now works detailing cars. Id. at
64, 77.
Father claimed that, while incarcerated, he would send letters to
Mother and Child “[m]aybe once a week” at Mother’s former address, and
that “I would show up and try to see my son” during the times when he was
not incarcerated. Id. at 70-71, 86, 107. Father stated that he had been
incarcerated for 16 or 18 months over the previous two years, and he sent
letters during “the beginning of the 18 months that I was incarcerated.” Id.
at 70, 84-85, 107. Father specified that the letters were sent “[b]efore I left
county, I was in the county for two months.” Id. at 85. Father also stated
that he sent letters during “the last six months” prior to the termination
hearing. Id. at 107. According to Father, he used to called Mother “all the
time” while he was incarcerated, but this stopped in July of 2012 because
Mother stopped answering her phone. Id. at 75-76, 93-94. Father reported
that Maternal Grandmother told him that “she would call the cops if I
contacted her” or Mother. Id. at 72, 94.
Paternal Grandmother testified that she visited with Child twice per
week for about five years. Id. at 112-13. She stated that Father “always
wrote letters to his son,” and that she used to sit and read letters to Child
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“all the time.” Id. at 117. However, a dispute arose concerning Father’s
payment of child support about two years prior to the termination hearing,
and Paternal Grandmother has not seen Child since that time. Id. at 113.
Paternal Grandmother testified that the last time she tried to see Child,
Mother told her to leave the property and called the police, and that “there’s
been cops called, I don’t know how many times when we went to go pick up
[Child].” Id. at 114, 118. Paternal Grandmother admitted that she has not
taken any steps to see Child since then. Id. at 114. Reportedly, Mother
also had informed Paternal Grandmother that Maternal Grandmother would
throw away any pictures that Father sent to Child. Id. at 117.
The record supports the finding of the trial court that Father has failed
to perform parental duties for a period of at least six months prior to the
filing of the termination petition. The court was free to accept Mother’s
testimony that Father sent only a single letter during the relevant six-month
period, asking for pictures of Child. This displays a “merely passive interest”
in the development of Child, and is not sufficient to prevent termination.
B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855. Moreover, even if the court were to credit
Father’s testimony, Father indicated that he did little, if anything, to
maintain a relationship with Child during the relevant time. Father stated
that he sent Child letters during the first two months of his most recent
incarceration, which took place well outside of the relevant period. Father
also stated that he sent Child letters within the six months preceding the
termination hearing, which overlapped the relevant period only by a few
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days. Moreover, while Father was incarcerated during this six-month period,
and, while both Father and Paternal Grandmother testified concerning
Mother’s efforts at preventing Father from seeing Child, these circumstances
do not excuse Father from endeavoring to perform parental duties. Id.;
S.P., 47 A.3d at 828. In order to maintain his parental rights, Father was
required to make a good faith effort at maintaining a relationship with Child.
B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855. He failed to do so.
We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). We have
discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.
Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,
if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or
her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-
interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
considered by the court when determining what is in the best
interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In this case the trial court concluded that Child has no bond with
Father, and that Father “has had no significant contact with the child for the
majority of his life.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/14, at 5 (unpaginated). In
contrast, the court found that Child has a “serious bond” with Stepfather,
who is “the only father the child knows . . . .” Id. Father argues that
termination is not in Child’s best interest because “there was nothing in the
record, which would indicate any beneficial effect for” Child. Father’s Brief at
9.
We again conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Mother testified that Child does not remember Father, and that Child instead
calls Stepfather “dad.” Id. at 19-20, 38-39, 42. Maternal Grandmother
testified that Child and Stepfather have a “[w]onderful” relationship. Id. at
60. She described Stepfather as “a father in every since [sic] of the word
other than biological.” Id. at 60-61. Stepfather agreed that he and Child
have a “great” relationship. Id. at 53-54. Stepfather stated that Child calls
Father by his first name, and that Child “knows his name, that’s pretty much
all he ever really says.” Id. at 55.
In contrast, Paternal Grandmother testified that, the last time she saw
Father and Child together, Child ran up to Father, and called him “dad.” Id.
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at 116, 119. According to Paternal Grandmother, Child has stated that “I
really, really, miss my dad, but he’s never coming back.” Id. at 119.
Paternal Grandmother indicated that Child “loves his father, it’s as simple as
that.” Id. at 116. Similarly, Father testified that he has an “[a]wesome”
relationship with Child, that he loves Child, and that Child “knows who I am.
He knows I am his father.” Id. at 73, 76. However, Father conceded that
Child “is in[]a better spot,” and that it would be best for Child to “stay with
his mother and [Stepfather]. I believe he’s in the best place that he could
be . . . .” Id. at 108, 110. Despite this admission Father indicated that “I
don’t want to lose him,” and “as far as me not being in his life, I don’t see
that as fair.” Id.
During his interview with the trial court, Child was asked who his
father is. N.T., 10/25/2013, at 7. Child responded with Stepfather’s first
name. Id. Child stated that he does not remember Father, but that he did
remember getting a present from Father’s parents when he was 4 or 5 years
old. Id. at 7-8. Child further stated that he would not recognize Father if he
were to see him now. Id. at 10.
Thus, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father and
Child do not have a bond, as Child does not remember who Father is. In
contrast, Child considers Stepfather to be his father. Under the
circumstances, it would serve Child’s needs and welfare for Father’s parental
rights to be terminated, as termination would permit Child to be adopted by
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Stepfather, and would provide Child with permanence and stability. We
discern no abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, because we conclude that Father’s claim does not entitle
him to relief, we affirm the decree of the trial court.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/23/2015
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