14-2278
Ren v. Lynch
BIA
Cheng, IJ
A087 769 922
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
29th day of June, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
DENNIS JACOBS,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
HAI REN,
Petitioner,
v. 14-2278
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: H. Raymond Fasano, Youman, Madeo &
Fasano, LLP, New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Leslie McKay,
Assistant Director; Anna Nelson,
Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Hai Ren, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of a May 27, 2014 decision of
the BIA affirming an October 17, 2011 decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denying Ren’s application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Hai Ren, No. A087 769 922 (B.I.A. May 27, 2014),
aff’g No. A087 769 922 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Oct. 17, 2011). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for
the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528
(2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well
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established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
I. Adverse Credibility Determination
For asylum applications like Ren’s, governed by the REAL
ID Act, an IJ may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances . . . base a credibility determination on the
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or
witness’s account,” and inconsistencies in an applicant’s
statements and other record evidence “without regard to
whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at
163-64. Here, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is
based on substantial evidence.
Ren sought relief based on his claim that he was arrested,
detained, and beaten while attending an underground Christian
church in China. The IJ reasonably relied on an inconsistency
between Ren’s testimony and application concerning the beating
he suffered in China. Ren testified that he was beaten twice
while detained, but his application mentions only a single
beating. Ren stated that he forgot to mention the second
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beating in his application. The IJ was not required to accept
this explanation. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81
(2d Cir. 2005).
The IJ also reasonably relied on her observations of Ren’s
demeanor, including his evasive, nonresponsive answers to
questions concerning his employment in the United States. This
Court affords particular deference to the IJ’s observations of
an alien’s demeanor, and the record amply supports the IJ’s
finding that Ren gave evasive, nonresponsive testimony that
negatively affected his credibility. See Jin Chen v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2005); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
The IJ also reasonably relied on other, minor discrepancies
in the record. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64; Tu Lin v.
Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that IJ may
rely on cumulative effect of “collateral or ancillary”
inconsistencies in finding alien not credible (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Based on the inconsistency and demeanor findings, the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence. This finding was sufficient to dispose of Ren’s
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claims for asylum and withholding of removal based on past
persecution, as they relied on the same factual predicate. See
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
II. Pattern or Practice of Persecution
To show a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence
of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must show a
reasonable possibility that authorities in his country are
either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of them.
See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.
2008)(per curiam). An alien may make this showing by
“prov[ing] the existence of ‘a pattern or practice in his or
her country . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly
situated to the applicant.’” Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d
554, 564 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)).
To establish a pattern or practice of persecution against a
particular group, a petitioner must demonstrate that the harm
to that group is “so systemic or pervasive as to amount to a
pattern or practice of persecution.” In re A-M-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005); see also Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d
88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007).
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The IJ reasonably found that the Chinese government does
not have a pattern or practice of persecuting Christians who
attend underground churches. The 2010 State Department Report
reveals sporadic, localized harassment of underground
Christian groups. In some areas, local authorities approved
of underground church activities in spite of the official state
ban.
Based on this evidence, the IJ reasonably required
locality-specific evidence of persecution near Linjiang, Ren’s
home city; Ren submitted no such evidence. See Jian Hui Shao
v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 165 (2d Cir. 2008). Other than the
State Department Report, Ren submitted only three articles in
support of his pattern-or-practice claim. None of these
articles concerns Ren’s home province or indicates that the
Chinese government systematically persecutes Christians.
Considering the record as a whole, the agency reasonably
denied Ren’s pattern-or-practice claim. See Santoso v.
Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009)(per curiam). This
ruling was sufficient to deny withholding of removal based on
future persecution as well as to deny CAT relief, as both claims
relied on the same factual predicate. See Paul, 444 F.3d at
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156; Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523
(2d Cir. 2005).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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