UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4906
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENNETH EUGENE MCDANIEL, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:06-cr-00088-NCT-1)
Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015
Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ames C. Chamberlin, LAW OFFICES OF AMES C. CHAMBERLIN, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Eric Lloyd Iverson, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Eugene McDaniel, Jr., pled guilty in October 1996 to
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine
base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). The
district court originally sentenced McDaniel to 20 years of
imprisonment, followed by 10 years of supervised release. The
court subsequently lowered McDaniel’s sentence to 13 years.
McDaniel’s supervised release was revoked in 2006 and he was
sentenced to serve eight months’ imprisonment, followed by nine
years and four months of supervised release. McDaniel’s second
term of supervised release commenced in August 2007.
A second petition to revoke McDaniel’s supervised release was
filed in January 2014 and amended in October 2014. At the
revocation hearing, McDaniel admitted four of the five violations
listed in the petition: (1) failure to notify his probation
officer within 72 hours of a change in residence; (2) failure to
notify his probation officer within 72 hours of an arrest; (3)
twice testing positive for marijuana use; and (4) failure to work
regularly since July 2009. The court revoked McDaniel’s
supervision and sentenced him to 48 months’ imprisonment with no
additional term of supervised release. McDaniel appeals.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the
revocation sentence is reasonable. Although informed of his right
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to file a pro se supplemental brief, McDaniel has not done so.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We will uphold a district court’s revocation sentence unless
it falls outside the statutory maximum or is otherwise “plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th
Cir. 2006). Only if a revocation sentence is unreasonable do we
determine whether it is plainly so. United States v. Moulden, 478
F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In making this determination, we
strike “a more deferential appellate posture” than we do when
reviewing original sentences. Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The sentencing court “must consider” both the
policy statements and the applicable policy statement range found
in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, as well as “the
applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [2012] factors.” Moulden, 478
F.3d at 656; see also United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641
(4th Cir. 2013). A sentence within the policy statement range is
“presumed reasonable,” Webb, 738 F.3d at 642, though “the
sentencing court retains broad discretion to . . . impose a term
of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” Moulden, 478 F.3d at
657.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence
imposed is both procedurally and substantively reasonable; it
follows, therefore, that the sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire record and
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have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the district court. This court requires
that counsel inform McDaniel, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
McDaniel requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on McDaniel. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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