Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #032
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of June, 2015, are as follows:
BY CLARK, J.:
2014-C -2362 RICHARD L. REYNOLDS v. ROBERT J. BORDELON III, ROBERT J. BORDELON
JR., USAGENCIES CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AUTOMOBILE CLUB
INTER-INSURANCE EXCHANGE, AND/OR AUTO CLUB FAMILY INSURANCE
COMPANY D/B/A TRIPLE A INSURANCE, NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INFINITY
DIVISION OF NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., A LUXURY CAR DIVISION OF
NISSAN MOTORS, INSURANCE AUTO AUCTIONS CORP., ABC INSURANCE
COMPANY, DEF INSURANCE COMPANY AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY C/W
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY AS SUBROGEE OF/AND
LINDA DUPUY v. ROBERT BORDELON AND USAGENCIES CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY (Parish of St. Tammany)
We find the petition alleges sufficient facts to support a breach
of contract cause of action. Thus, we reverse the judgment that
granted the exception of no cause of action and remand to the
trial court for consideration of the contract claim. We offer no
opinion as to the ultimate success of this cause of action or to
any defense thereto.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WEIMER, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
06/30/15
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2014-C-2362
RICHARD L. REYNOLDS
VERSUS
ROBERT J. BORDELON III, ROBERT J. BORDELON JR., USAGENCIES
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AUTOMOBILE CLUB INTER-
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, AND/OR AUTO CLUB FAMILY INSURANCE
COMPANY D/B/A TRIPLE A INSURANCE, NISSAN NORTH AMERICA,
INFINITY DIVISION OF NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., A LUXURY CAR
DIVISION OF NISSAN MOTORS, INSURANCE AUTO AUCTIONS CORP.,
ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, DEF INSURANCE COMPANY AND
XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY
CONSOLIDATED WITH
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
AS SUBROGEE OF/AND LINDA DUPUY
VERSUS
ROBERT BORDELON AND
USAGENCIES CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
CLARK, J.
We granted certiorari to determine whether Louisiana recognizes the tort of
negligent spoliation. For the reasons that follow, we hold that no cause of action
exists for negligent spoliation of evidence. Regardless of any alleged source of the
duty, whether general or specific, public policy in our state precludes the existence
of a duty to preserve evidence. Thus, there is no tort. Alternative avenues of
recourse are available within Louisiana’s evidentiary, discovery, and contractual
laws. Nonetheless, we remand for further consideration of the plaintiff’s petition,
finding sufficient facts were alleged by the plaintiff to state a potential breach of
contract claim.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 15, 2008, a multi-vehicle accident occurred in St. Tammany
Parish. The plaintiff, Richard Reynolds, sustained injuries and filed suit against
Robert Bordelon, III, the driver alleged to have caused the accident. The plaintiff
also asserted claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act against Nissan
North America (“Nissan”), the alleged manufacturer and distributer of the
plaintiff’s 2003 Infiniti G35, for failure of the airbag to deploy.1 Additionally, the
plaintiff’s petition alleged that his insurer, Automobile Club Inter-Insurance
Exchange (“ACIIE”) and the custodian of his vehicle after the accident, Insurance
Auto Auctions Corporation (“IAA”), failed to preserve his vehicle for inspection
purposes to determine whether any defects existed, despite being put on notice of
the need for preservation.
ACIIE and IAA each filed exceptions of no cause of action, arguing a claim
of spoliation of evidence requires “an intentional destruction of evidence for the
purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use” and the petition contained no
allegation of an intentional act by ACIIE or IAA. The trial court sustained the
exception but allowed the plaintiff to amend his petition within fifteen days to state
a cause of action pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 934. The plaintiff filed a First
Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages, which reads, in pertinent part:
5.
Plaintiff avers that shortly after the serious accident of March
15, 2008, giving rise to the instant matter the named defendants
herein, INSURANCE AUTO AUCTIONS CORP, acting upon
information and belief as the storage facility and/or as custodian of the
Petitioner’s vehicle on behalf of and/or in connection with
AUTOMOBILE CLUB INTER-INSURANCE EXCHANGE, d/b/a
“Triple A Insurance”, insurer of Plaintiff, RICHARD L. REYNOLDS,
both respectively failed to maintain custody and/or preserve Plaintiff’s
vehicle despite both Defendants being on notice by Plaintiff that the
vehicle was to be preserved as evidence for a lawsuit. Plaintiff avers
that defendants had notice that a lawsuit was likely and was going to
be pursued.
1
We addressed the merits of the underlying LPLA claims against Nissan in a separate opinion.
See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 14-2371, (La. ), _So.3d_.
2
6.
Plaintiff submits that the Defendants owed certain duties to
Plaintiff and are liable unto Plaintiff for their negligence resulting in
damages in the following non-exclusive manners:
A.) Defendants owed a duty unto the Plaintiff pursuant
to La. C.C. art. 2315, as they were respectively on
notice to prudently preserve, maintain, and to refrain
from any alienation or destruction of Plaintiff’s
vehicle to be utilized in a tort claim with Defendants
agreeing and understanding that the vehicle would be
maintained for purposes of litigation.
B.) Additionally, Defendants are liable unto Plaintiff as
their negligent actions cause[d] impairment of the
instant civil claims, as Plaintiff’s right to be free from
interference in pursuing and/or proving his products
liability claim is prejudiced giving rise to the loss of a
right and opportunity of Plaintiff.
C.) In connection with the above plead [sic] facts the
Defendants are further and/or alternatively liable unto
the Plaintiff for negligently spoiling the evidence as
Defendants owed Plaintiff a special and/or specific
duty to preserve the evidence in the following
nonexclusive particulars:
(i) Pursuant to Louisiana law including
La. C.C. art. 2315, and
(ii) Pursuant to an affirmative
agreement/undertaking and/or
understanding that the evidence be
preserved after being put on notice of
necessity to preserve for litigation
purposes; and
(iii) Pursuant to a special relationship as
between Plaintiff and Defendants,
arising through and in connection
with the insurer, AUTOMOBILE
CLUB INTER-INSURANCE
EXCHANGE’s, obligations and
responsibility to their insured as set
forth in section iv below; and
(iv) Pursuant to both written and verbal
contractual obligations to preserve the
vehicle and pursuant to the insurer’s
obligations to its insured per the
policy of insurance as well and/or
alternatively through any written
and/or otherwise documented
3
obligation arising between
INSURANCE AUTO AUCTIONS
CORP, acting upon information and
belief as the storage facility and/or as
custodian of the Petitioner’s vehicle
on behalf of and AUTOMOBILE
CLUB INTER-INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, insurer for Plaintiff.
7.
In connection with the above plead causes of action against
AUTOMOBILE CLUB INTER-INSURANCE EXCHANGE and
INSURANCE AUTO AUCTIONS CORP, Plaintiff seeks special
damages including but not limited to past, present and future medical
expenses, and past, present and future lost wages, as well as general
damages for his injuries sustained including but not limited to pain
and suffering, mental anguish and trauma, and disability, and all other
appropriate relief including but not limited to compensatory damages
that otherwise Plaintiff would have been able to present and prove but
for the negligent acts of Defendants as detailed above, as Defendants’
negligence results in serious prejudice to Plaintiff due to no fault of
his own.
In response, ACIIE and IAA again filed exceptions of no cause of action,
and ACIIE filed a motion for summary judgment, in the alternative. The trial court
denied the exceptions and the motion for summary judgment in light of an opinion
recently released by the First Circuit Court of Appeal, which discussed, in dicta,
the theory of “negligent spoliation.”2 The court of appeal denied writs, with one
judge on the panel noting the court “ha[d] not issued a studied opinion regarding
whether a cause of action exists for negligent spoliation of evidence.”3 This court
denied the writ application.4
A later decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeal was released, wherein
the concept of negligent spoliation was rejected, prompting ACIIE and IAA to
renew their exceptions of no cause of action.5 Both ACIIE and IAA ultimately
2
See Dennis v. Wiley, 90-0236 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/11/09), 22 So.3d 189.
3
Reynolds v. Bordelon, 10-0227,(La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/10), _So.3d_.
4
Reynolds v. Bordelon, 10-1719 (La. 10/29/10), 48 So.3d 285.
5
See Clavier v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 12-560 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/12), 112
So.3d 881, writ denied, 13-0264 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 384.
4
filed motions for summary judgment in the alternative. Based on Clavier, the trial
court sustained ACIIE and IAA’s exceptions of no cause of action. Further, the
trial court declined to give leave to the plaintiff to amend the petition, finding no
amendment could state a cause of action given the fact that the plaintiff conceded
there were no facts to support an allegation of intentional spoliation. Additionally,
the trial court denied the motions for summary judgment as moot. The court of
appeal rendered an opinion, affirming the trial court’s judgments, finding no cause
of action exists for negligent spoliation under Louisiana law.6 We granted
certiorari to definitively rule on the viability of negligent spoliation of evidence as
a cause of action in Louisiana.7
APPLICABLE LAW
As used in the context of the peremptory exception, a “cause of action”
refers to the operative facts which give rise to the plaintiff’s right to judicially
assert the action against the defendant.8 The purpose of the peremptory exception
of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining
whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. 9 No evidence
may be introduced to support or controvert the exception of no cause of action.10
The exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, and, for purposes of resolving
the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be
accepted as true.11 The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of
6
Reynolds v. Bordelon, 13-1848 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/19/14), 154 So.3d 570.
7
Reynolds v. Bordelon, 12-2362 (La. 2/27/15), 159 So.3d 1061.
8
Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, p. 7 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118; Everything on Wheels
Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1238 (La.1993).
9
Ramey, at 7, 869 So.2d at 118; Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc., 616 So.2d at 1235.
10
La. Code Civ. P. art. 931.
11
Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987, p. 4 (La.11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 349; City of New Orleans v.
Board of Commissioners of Orleans Levee District, 93-0690, p. 28 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237,
253.
5
the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought.12 Louisiana retains a
system of fact pleading, and mere conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by facts
will not set forth a cause or right of action.13 The burden of demonstrating that a
petition fails to state a cause of action is upon the mover.14 Because the exception
of no cause of action raises a question of law and the trial court’s decision is based
solely on the sufficiency of the petition, review of the trial court’s ruling on an
exception of no cause of action is de novo.15 The pertinent inquiry is whether, in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in the
plaintiff's favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief.16
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff contends the allegations contained in his petition are not limited
to the singular cause of action of negligent spoliation of evidence and that the
sufficiency of the petition should not be measured solely by the existence (or lack
thereof) of that specific tort. Rather, he avers the petition sufficiently describes
negligent conduct by ACIIE and IAA that is recoverable under claims ranging
from (1) impairment of a civil claim; (2) loss of a right or opportunity; (3)
detrimental reliance; (4) general negligence under La.Civ.Code art. 2315; and (4)
breach of contract. Thus, he argues that this court’s position on the viability of a
negligent spoliation cause of action in Louisiana is not dispositive of the issue. We
disagree with respect to his tort claims. At its heart, the petition prays for relief for
third parties’ acts of negligently destroying evidence. Whether the law recognizes
this type of relief is not a question of semantics. Rather, it is a legal inquiry that
12
Ramey, at 7, 869 So.2d at 118.
13
Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813, p. 6 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127, 131.
14
Ramey, at 7, 869 So.2d at 119; City of New Orleans, at 28, 640 So.2d at 253.
15
Fink, at 4, 801 So.2d at 349; City of New Orleans, at 28, 640 So.2d at 253.
16
Ramey, at 8, 869 So.2d at 119.
6
can only be analyzed within the framework of answering the sole issue of whether
Louisiana recognizes a claim for negligent spoliation.
In Louisiana, the foundation of any tort lies within the context of
La.Civ.Code art. 2315, which provides, “[e]very act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” Thus,
while “fault” is a broader term than negligence or intent, there still exists a limit as
to actual liability. Frank Maraist and Thomas Galligan, in their treatise on tort law,
explained:17
All theories of recovery, or categories of tort liability, are
“fault” in Louisiana, although they represent different levels of
blameworthiness or culpability. . . . [i]t may be helpful to imagine a
fault line similar to a number line. . . . At the left side of this line is the
actor who intentionally inflicts harm upon the victim. His or her
conduct is the law’s most blameworthy category of fault. Moving to
the right, one arrives at negligence, i.e., the actor knew or should have
known that his conduct presented an unreasonable risk of harm to
someone, and he or she failed to act reasonably to avoid that risk.
This, too, is fault, and “blameworthy” conduct, although less
“blameworthy” than the intentional tortfeasor’s act. Farther to the
right is the actor who could not foresee that his or her conduct would
expose another to harm, or whose conduct was reasonable under the
circumstances. He or she is, in the eyes of the moral philosopher,
blameless. Nevertheless, society may choose to impose the cost of the
harm upon the blameless actor rather than upon the victim. If so, in
Louisiana, he or she was at fault, although blameless. These places
along the “fault” line where the nonblameworthy actor might be or
might have been liable are vicarious liability, strict liability, and
absolute liability. On the far right is the actor who could not foresee
harm and/or who acted reasonably, and upon whom society does not
place the risk of harm caused by his conduct. This person is not at
“fault” nor blameworthy. There is simply no tort, although the
layman may quite incorrectly call the resulting harm a mere
“accident.”
Jurisprudentially, this civilian concept has been more readily applied within
the same context as negligence claims made in common law jurisdictions, wherein
the analysis is subdivided into four elements: duty, breach, causation, and
damages. The duty inquiry is central to our discussion on whether Louisiana
recognizes the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence.
17
Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 1.03 (2004).
7
While alternatively setting forth the general negligence theory of liability,
the plaintiff asks this court to recognize the cause of action where a specific duty
arose due to an agreement, contract, special relationship, or undertaking which was
formed between the parties specifically for the purpose of preserving the evidence.
Several appellate courts in Louisiana have followed this limited application of the
tort; however, we decline to do so and expressly refuse to recognize the existence
of the tort.18 This holding applies whether under a general negligence approach or
whether the source of the duty is readily apparent. Instead, we approach the duty
element of the negligence analysis from a policy perspective.
Maraist and Galligan explain the duty element as it relates to policy: 19
The general duty and the specific risk inquiries both involve
policy decisions on issues such as deterrence of undesirable conduct,
avoiding the deterrence of desirable conduct, compensation of
victims, satisfaction of the community’s sense of justice, proper
allocation of resources (including judicial resources), predictability,
and deference to the legislative will.
The policy considerations can compel a court to simply make a categorical
“no duty” rule regarding certain conduct. Examples of courts categorically
excluding liability for a specific group of claims or plaintiffs are: claims for failure
to act, injuries to unborn babies, negligent infliction of mental anguish, or purely
economic harm unaccompanied by physical trauma to the plaintiff or his
property.20 This court, in Hill v. Lundin, expanded on its role in determining
whether society is best served in recognizing a duty, and thus, a tort, stating:21
18
See e.g., Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So.2d 698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1995).
19
Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 5.02 (2004).
20
Id. This rule of exclusion is not without its exceptions. See Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So.2d
1151 (La. 1988) (wherein recoverable prenatal damage claims are discussed). Moreover, the no-duty rule for failure
to act claims has its own exceptions when there is a special relationship between the non-actor and the victim, such
as common carriers and their passengers, innkeepers and their guests, employers and their injured employees, jailers
and their prisoners, teachers and their students; and parents and their children. With regard to negligent infliction of
mental distress, Louisiana law does allow “bystander” claims. Last, the categorical bar against allowing tort
damages for pure economic harm has its exceptions as well, wherein appellate courts have addressed the issue on a
case-by-case basis and within the confines of a standard negligence analysis.
Despite the exceptions, the inclusion in our analysis of the categorical barring of these types of claims and/or class
of plaintiffs is to demonstrate the ability and the authority courts have in refusing to recognize a duty to prevent
certain conduct.
8
The same policy considerations which would motivate a
legislative body to impose duties to protect from certain risks are
applied by the court in making its determination. “All rules of
conduct, irrespective of whether they are the product of a legislature
or are a part of the fabric of the court-made law of negligence, exist
for purposes. They are designed to protect some persons under some
circumstances against some risks. Seldom does a rule protect every
victim against every risk that may befall him, merely because it is
shown that the violation of the rule played a part in producing the
injury. The task of defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its
policy aspects is one that must be undertaken by the court in each case
as it arises. How appropriate is the rule to the facts of this
controversy? This is a question that the court cannot escape.” Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stanford L.Rev. 60, 73 (1956).
Having established that the duty requirement can be analyzed in terms of
policy, we turn now to those policy considerations affected by our recognition (or
rejection) of the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence. As formulated by Maraist
and Galligan and listed above, the first of these factors is “deterrence of
undesirable conduct.” We find the act of negligently spoliating evidence is so
unintentional an act that any recognition of the tort by the courts would not act to
deter future conduct, but would, rather, act to penalize a party who was not aware
of its potential wrongdoing in the first place. This is particularly true in the case of
negligent spoliation by a third party, who is not vested in the ultimate outcome of
the underlying case, and thus, has no motive to destroy or make unavailable
evidence that could tend to prove or disprove that unrelated claim. This factor
weighs in favor of a no-duty rule.
Next, compensation of the victim is an important policy consideration. This
issue is strenuously debated nationally among those states that do recognize the
tort because damages are so highly speculative.22 Determining the expected
21
Hill v. Lundin and Associates, 256 So. 2d 620, 623.
22
See Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So.2d 429 (Ala. 2000), wherein the Alabama Supreme Court held
the proper measure of damages in a negligent spoliation of evidence case is the compensatory
damages that would have been awarded on the underlying cause of action, and not the
probability of success in the underlying action. Compare to Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710
A.2d 846, 853 (D.C. 1998), wherein the District of Columbia held the measure of damages in a
9
recovery in the underlying case---a case that was not fully adjudged on evidence
because that evidence was discarded---leaves room for substantial guess-work.
Moreover, Louisiana, as a comparative negligence jurisdiction, would also have to
factor in the likelihood of success of that underlying case since that would be the
measure of the proportional fault of the spoliator. Accordingly, the parties and the
trier of fact would be called upon to estimate the impact of the missing evidence
and guess at its ability to prove or disprove the underlying claim, resulting in
liability based far too much on speculation. We find these hypothetical and
abstract inquires weigh against recognition of the tort of negligent spoliation.
Another policy consideration is “satisfaction of the community’s sense of
justice.” Society’s sense of fairness is vital in determining whether a reasonable
person should have acted or not acted in a certain manner. Because the reasonable
person standard is inherent in the negligence analysis, it is prudent to ask whether
reasonable persons would expect certain behavior in certain situations and,
conversely, whether reasonable persons can be expected to be exposed to liability
in certain situations. This question factors in squarely with another policy
consideration: predictability. Thus, we will address these elements together.
Recognition of the tort of negligent spoliation would place a burden on
society as a whole, causing third parties who are not even aware of litigation to
adopt retention policies for potential evidence in cases, in order to reduce their
exposure to liability. There is simply no predictability in requiring preservation
and record keeping for unknown litigation. Moreover, broadening the delictual
liability for negligent spoliation would place restrictions on the property rights of
persons, both natural and juridical, insofar as the tort would act to limit the right to
dispose of one’s own property. These policy concerns are readily apparent in the
negligent spoliation of evidence case should be compensatory damages in the underlying case
adjusted by the estimated likelihood of success in the potential civil action.
10
facts before this court where ACIIE paid to the plaintiff what was owed under his
policy and received the title to the totaled vehicle. Then, IAA, in the normal course
of its business, received the vehicle and disposed of it by auctioning it to a salvage
yard for spare parts. To impose a requirement that all potential evidence be
preserved for possible future litigation would wreak havoc on an industry whose
very existence is sustained by destruction of possible subjects of litigation: totaled
vehicles. It is easy to imagine the trickle-down effect that a preservation policy
would have on insureds themselves; the longer an insurer or auction company is
required to store a vehicle, the higher the costs, and the more likely insurance
premiums would be increased to absorb those costs. Moreover, the delay in
proceeds being remitted to the insurer at the time of the auction prevents those
funds from being immediately available to offset the total loss payout the insurer
pays to the insured. Again, this practice could result in higher costs for the public.
Thus, these two factors, societal justice and predictability, weigh heavily against
broadening the delictual obligation for negligent spoliation.
Next, we look to the proper allocation of resources, including judicial
resources. Allowing a derivative tort invites litigation and encourages parties to
bring a new suit where the underlying suit was not successful. Again, this
derivative litigation could open the floodgates for endless lawsuits where the loss
is speculative at best. Additionally, it could create confusion for fact-finders,
particularly juries, inasmuch as it allows a trial within a trial. For instance, triers of
fact could be presented with the facts of the underlying case and also presented
with the facts surrounding the alleged destruction of evidence, causing
inconsistency and the potential for misunderstanding. Thus, this factor does not
favor recognition of the tort.
11
Last, we are called upon to consider any deference owed to the legislature.
This court, in limiting the application of the tort of interference with contractual
relations, has previously held:23
The framers conceived of fault as a breach of a preexisting obligation
for which the law orders reparation, when it causes damage to
another, and they left it to the courts to determine in each case the
existence of an anterior obligation which would make an act constitute
fault. 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, Part 1, §§ 863–865
(1959); Pitre v. Opelousas General Hosp., 530 So.2d 1151 (La.1988).
...
Portalis, the leading drafter of the Code Napoleon, clearly foresaw
that the code must constantly be applied to unexpected issues and
circumstances:
A code, however complete it may seem, is hardly
finished before a thousand unexpected issues come to
face the judge. For laws, once drafted, remain as they
were written. Men, on the contrary, are never at rest; they
are constantly active, and their unceasing activities, the
effects of which are modified in many ways by
circumstances, produce at each instant some new
combination, some new fact, some new result.
A host of things is thus necessarily left to the province of
custom, the discussion of learned men, and the decision
of judges.
The role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad
approach, the general propositions of the law, to establish
principles which will be fertile in application, and not to
get down to the details of questions which may arise in
particular instances.
It is for the judge and the jurist, imbued with the general
spirit of the laws, to direct their application. A.
Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis? 43
Tul.L.Rev. 762, 769 (1969) (Translation by Shael
Herman)
Thus, with regard to this final policy consideration before us, we find the
legislation on fault and tort law in Louisiana has left to the courts the task of
23
9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 231 (La. 1989)
12
determining the viability of certain causes of action. As such, we conclude that
legislative will does not require recognition of the tort of negligent spoliation.
Having considered all the policy factors under the duty element of the
negligence analysis in Louisiana, we reflect on one more concern: availability of
other avenues of recourse. California, a state that once pioneered negligent
spoliation, but subsequently reversed itself and now does not recognize the
existence of the tort, stated:24
We do not believe that the distinction between the sanctions available
to victims of first party and third party spoliation should lead us to
employ the burdensome and inaccurate instrument of derivative tort
litigation in the case of third party spoliation. We observe that to the
extent a duty to preserve evidence is imposed by statute or regulation
upon the third party, the Legislature or the regulatory body that has
imposed this duty generally will possess the authority to devise an
effective sanction for violations of that duty. To the extent third
parties may have a contractual obligation to preserve evidence,
contract remedies, including agreed-upon liquidated damages, may be
available for breach of the contractual duty. Criminal sanctions, of
course, also remain available.
...
In sum, we conclude that the benefits of recognizing a tort cause of
action, in order to deter third party spoliation of evidence and
compensate victims of such misconduct are outweighed by the burden
to litigants, witnesses, and the judicial system that would be imposed
by potentially endless litigation over a speculative loss, and by the
cost to society of promoting onerous record and evidence retention
policies.
We adopt this logic and write separately on the issue to discuss the
alternative remedies plaintiffs can seek in Louisiana. Discovery sanctions and
criminal sanctions are available for first-party spoliators. Additionally, Louisiana
recognizes the adverse presumption against litigants who had access to evidence
and did not make it available or destroyed it. Regarding negligent spoliation by
third parties, the plaintiff who anticipates litigation can enter into a contract to
preserve the evidence and, in the event of a breach, avail himself of those
contractual remedies. Court orders for preservation are also obtainable. In this
24
Temple Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal, 4th 464, 976 P.2d 223, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (1999).
13
particular case, the plaintiff also could have retained control of his vehicle and not
released it to the insurer, thereby guaranteeing its availability for inspection.
Furthermore, he could have bought the vehicle back from the insurer for a nominal
fee. Thus, we find the existence of alternate avenues for recovery further support
our holding.
CONCLUSION
Our review of the policy considerations lead us to conclude that Louisiana
law does not recognize a duty to preserve evidence in the context of negligent
spoliation. In the absence of a duty owed, we find there is no fault under
La.Civ.Code art. 2315 or under any other delictual theory in Louisiana.
Furthermore, the presence of alternate remedies supports our holding that there is
no tort of negligent spoliation of evidence. Accordingly, we agree with the lower
courts that there is no cause of action for this tort.
However, we are tasked with evaluating the petition to determine whether it
states any valid cause of action for relief. We find the petition alleges sufficient
facts to support a breach of contract cause of action. Thus, we reverse the
judgment that granted the exception of no cause of action and remand to the trial
court for consideration of the contract claim. We offer no opinion as to the
ultimate success of this cause of action or to any defense thereto.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
14
06/30/15
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2014-C-2362
RICHARD L. REYNOLDS
VERSUS
ROBERT J. BORDELON III, ROBERT J. BORDELON JR., USAGENCIES
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AUTOMOBILE CLUB
INTER-INSURANCE EXCHANGE, AND/OR AUTO CLUB FAMILY
INSURANCE COMPANY D/B/A TRIPLE A INSURANCE, NISSAN
NORTH AMERICA, INFINITY DIVISION OF NISSAN NORTH
AMERICA, INC., A LUXURY CAR DIVISION OF NISSAN MOTORS,
INSURANCE AUTO AUCTIONS CORP., ABC INSURANCE COMPANY,
DEF INSURANCE COMPANY AND
XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY
CONSOLIDATED WITH
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
AS SUBROGEE OF/AND LINDA DUPUY
VERSUS
ROBERT BORDELON AND
USAGENCIES CASUALTY INSURANCE COM
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT,
PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
WEIMER, J., additionally concurring.
I subscribe to the majority’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize the
legislative source of public policy which forms the basis of this court’s analysis of
negligent spoliation.
In a civil law system, the role of the judiciary is to evaluate statutory
authority in determining either to impose or not impose a duty.1 The plaintiff has
not pointed to any statutory authority, nor has statutory authority been found, to
establish a general duty for a third party to retain property which may be the
subject of litigation.
Although La. C.C. art. 2315, the fountainhead of tort liability, contains
broad terms, none of those terms directly addresses negligent spoliation.
However, the legislature further authorizes courts, when the legislature has not
spoken directly on a matter, to turn to custom for a solution.2 Failing to find a
solution from custom, courts are then authorized by the legislature to “proceed
according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and
prevailing usage.”3
In the present case, this court’s analysis has applied these codal principles
within the concept of making a policy determination. It is only where the
legislature has not spoken and there is no custom, or the legislature has deferred to
the judiciary that we are authorized to resort to equity for discerning policy. Thus,
I respectfully concur.
1
See La. C.C. art. 1 (“The sources of law are legislation and custom”); La. C.C. art. 3 (“Custom may
not abrogate legislation.”).
2
See La. C.C. art. 3.
3
La. C.C. art. 4.
2
06/30/15
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2014-C-2362
RICHARD L. REYNOLDS
VERSUS
ROBERT J. BORDELON III, ROBERT J. BORDELON JR., USAGENCIES
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AUTOMOBILE CLUB INTER-
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, AND/OR AUTO CLUB FAMILY INSURANCE
COMPANY D/B/A TRIPLE A INSURANCE, NISSAN NORTH AMERICA,
INFINITY DIVISION OF NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., A LUXURY CAR
DIVISION OF NISSAN MOTORS, INSURANCE AUTO AUCTIONS CORP.,
ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, DEF INSURANCE COMPANY AND
XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY
CONSOLIDATED WITH
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
AS SUBROGEE OF/AND LINDA DUPUY
VERSUS
ROBERT BORDELON AND
USAGENCIES CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons:
I agree completely with the majority decision and join in both its reasoning
and result. I write separately to emphasize that this Court’s recognition of a
negligent spoliation tort would create significant, and unnecessary, burdens on the
legal system. Permitting parties to bring negligent spoliation claims would
“inundate our justice system” with derivative tort litigation, see Temple Community
Hospital v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 228 (Cal. 1999), and, as my colleague
Justice Clark points out in the majority opinion, “wreak havoc” on the individuals
and entities impacted and the judicial system as a whole.
Richard L. Reynolds v. Robert J. Bordelon III, Robert J. Bordelon Jr., Usagencies Casualty Insurance Company, Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange, and/or Auto Club Family Insurance Company D/B/A Triple a Insurance, Nissan North America, Infinity Division of Nissan North America, Inc., a Luxury Car Division of Nissan Motors, Insurance Auto Auctions Corp., Abc Insurance Company, Def Insurance Company and Xyz Insurance Company C/W State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as Subrogee of/and Linda Dupuy v. Robert Bordelon and Usagencies Casualty Insurance Company
Combined Opinion