Opinion issued June 30, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00578-CR
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HOMERO YADO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 177th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1397026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State filed a petition in a Harris County juvenile court alleging that
Homero Yado, at age sixteen, engaged in delinquent conduct by committing
aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. On the State’s motion, the juvenile
court waived its jurisdiction and transferred the case to a criminal district court,
where Yado could be tried as an adult. There, Yado entered into a plea agreement
with the State. In keeping with that agreement, the trial court assessed Yado’s
punishment at ten years’ imprisonment, but it certified Yado’s right to pursue this
appeal of the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction.
On appeal, Yado contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to make the
specific findings required by section 54.02 of the Juvenile Justice Code and in
misapplying the factors set forth in that section to the evidence presented.
Pursuant to Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), we vacate the
judgment of the criminal district court and dismiss the criminal case.
Background
Approximately a month after Yado’s sixteenth birthday, he was apprehended
and charged with engaging in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated
robbery with a deadly weapon.
At the hearing on the State’s motion to try Yado as an adult, the trial court
heard testimony from a Houston Police Department officer and from Yado’s
mother and sister. The court also admitted exhibits containing psychological and
psychiatric reports summarizing evaluations of Yado’s competency and level of
maturity.
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Discussion
Under section 54.02 of the Juvenile Justice Code, a juvenile court may
waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to adult criminal
proceedings in district court if it finds that:
(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of
felony;
(2) the child was . . . 14 years of age or older at the time [of the
alleged] offense, if the offense is a capital felony, an aggravated
controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree[;]
and
(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court
determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child
before the court committed the offense alleged and that because
of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of
the child the welfare of the community requires criminal
proceedings.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a) (West 2014). In reaching its determination on
the third requirement, the juvenile court must consider:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property,
with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against
people;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of
procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the
juvenile court.
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Id. § 54.02(f) (West 2014). If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it must “state
specifically” in its order its reasons for waiver. Id. § 54.02(h) (West 2014).
In Moon v. State—decided after the juvenile court signed the transfer order
in this case—the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the specificity required in a
juvenile district court’s transfer order, as well as the standard of appellate review
applicable in an appeal from that order. See 451 S.W.3d at 44–48. Moon observed
that a juvenile court must balance the factors within section 54.02(f) of the
Juvenile Justice Code against the potential danger to the public posed by the
particular juvenile offender and the juvenile offender’s amenability to treatment.
Id. at 49. If the juvenile court decides to waive jurisdiction over the child, then the
statute directs it to “state specifically” in a written order “its reasons for waiver and
[to] certify its action, including the written order and findings of the court.” Id.
(quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(h)).
The State agrees that Moon is dispositive of this appeal. The transfer order
in this case suffers from the same defects identified in the order found deficient in
Moon. The order form used in this case is substantially the same as the one used in
Moon. The orders differ only in the content of the filled-in blanks identifying the
juvenile’s name and date of birth, the retention and identity of defense counsel,
confirmation of service of process on a parent, and the date and type of the felony
the juvenile allegedly committed. Like the transfer order in Moon, the order in this
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case makes no findings about the specifics of the alleged offense—here,
aggravated robbery—and finds no more than probable cause to believe that Yado
committed the offense alleged. See id.
The juvenile court made no case-specific findings of fact with respect to the
seriousness of the offense, Yado’s maturity and potential for rehabilitation, or the
prospects for adequate public protection. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f);
Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 50. In keeping with Moon, we hold that the juvenile court
erred in granting a waiver of jurisdiction based only upon a finding of probable
cause, without expressly determining the findings required by statute to support
certification of a juvenile to be tried as an adult.
Conclusion
We hold that the juvenile court erred in waiving its jurisdiction and
transferring Yado’s case to the criminal district court. Accordingly, as the parties
request, we vacate the district court’s judgment and dismiss the case; the case
remains pending in the juvenile court. See id. at 52 n.90.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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