14-2048
Krasniqi v. Lynch
BIA
Elstein, IJ
A099 697 074/075/076
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE
32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A
PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 6th day of July, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 RALPH K. WINTER,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 PAL KRASNIQI, DILE KRASNIQI,
14 RAJMOND KRASNIQI,
15 Petitioners,
16
17 v. 14-2048
18 NAC
19
20 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
21 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22 Respondent.1
23 _____________________________________
1
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted
for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.
1 FOR PETITIONERS: Marialaina L. Masi; Stacy A.
2 Huber; Michael P. Diraimondo,
3 Melville, New York.
4
5 FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
6 Attorney General; Mary Jane
7 Candaux, Assistant Director;
8 Edward E. Wiggers, Trial Attorney,
9 Office of Immigration Litigation,
10 United States Department of
11 Justice, Washington, D.C.
12
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
14 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
15 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
16 is DENIED.
17 Petitioners Pal Krasniqi, Dile Krasniqi, and Rajmond
18 Krasniqi, natives of the former Yugoslavia and citizens of
19 Kosovo, seek review of a May 15, 2014, decision of the BIA
20 affirming an April 28, 2011, decision of an Immigration
21 Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and
22 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
23 Pal Krasniqi, Dile Krasniqi, Rajmond Krasniqi, Nos. A099 697
24 074/075/076 (B.I.A. May 15, 2014), aff’g Nos. A099 697
25 074/075/076 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 28, 2011). We assume
26 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
27 procedural history in this case.
2
1 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
2 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
3 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448
4 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of
5 review are well established. Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
6 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). The agency may,
7 “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a
8 credibility finding on inconsistencies in an asylum
9 applicant’s statements and other record evidence “without
10 regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s
11 claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534
12 F.3d at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s
13 determination that Pal was not credible.
14 The agency reasonably relied on numerous
15 inconsistencies in the record testimony. For example, Pal,
16 his wife Dile, and their son Rikard testified inconsistently
17 (in the instant proceeding and in Rikard’s separate removal
18 proceedings) regarding whether Rikard rescued Pal by car
19 after Pal’s alleged beating in February 2005 or whether
20 Rikard was out of town at the time and knew nothing of the
21 incident. Pal, Dile, and Rikard also testified
3
1 inconsistently regarding whether Pal went to the doctor’s
2 house for treatment or the doctor came to their house, and
3 whether Rikard was present for that treatment. Furthermore,
4 Pal testified that they were first threatened in 1999, Dile
5 testified that they were first threatened in 2001 or 2002,
6 and Rikard testified that they were first threatened in
7 2004. Dile testified that Pal and Rikard received most of
8 these threats on their cell phones, while Rikard testified
9 that Dile received all of the threats on their home phone
10 and that he had never personally received a threatening
11 phone call. The IJ was not compelled to credit their
12 explanation that Pal’s and Rikard’s diagnoses of post-
13 traumatic stress disorder explained their inconsistent
14 testimony because, as she determined, the inconsistencies
15 were too significant. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77,
16 80 (2d Cir. 2005).
17 Having questioned Pal’s credibility, the agency
18 reasonably relied further on Pal’s failure to provide
19 evidence corroborating his specific claims. See Biao Yang
20 v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Given the
21 inconsistency and corroboration findings, the agency’s
4
1 adverse credibility determination is supported by
2 substantial evidence, and is dispositive of asylum,
3 withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See 8 U.S.C.
4 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57
5 (2d Cir. 2006).
6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
7 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
8 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
9 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
10 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
11 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
12 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
13 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
14 FOR THE COURT:
15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5