UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6309
LEON CHEATHAM,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM MUSE, Chairman Virginia Parole Board; HAROLD
CLARKE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:13-cv-00320-CMH-TRJ)
Submitted: June 19, 2015 Decided: July 6, 2015
Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Leon Cheatham, Appellant Pro Se. James Milburn Isaacs, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leon Cheatham appeals from the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Defendants in Cheatham’s 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012) action. Cheatham sued William Muse, Chairman of
the Virginia Parole Board (“Board”), and Harold Clarke, Director
of the Virginia Department of Corrections, alleging that he was
denied parole consideration in violation of his due process and
equal protection rights. The district court ruled that
(1) Clarke played no personal role in the case; (2) Muse could
not be liable for his supervisory actions; and (3) Muse was
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. On appeal,
Cheatham avers that (1) Muse was personally involved and not
entitled to immunity, and (2) the district court erred by
failing to consider the merits of his equal protection claim.
Cheatham does not challenge the dismissal of the complaint
against Clarke. Further, he does not challenge the application
or interpretation of the Virginia statute under which he was
found to be ineligible; instead, Cheatham claims only that “he
was treated differently from his co-defendant.”
Virginia’s “three-strikes” statute provides that “[a]ny
person convicted of three separate felony offenses . . . when
such offenses were not part of a common act . . . shall not be
eligible for a parole.” Va. Code § 53.1-151(B)(1). Cheatham
contends that both he and his co-defendant were convicted of the
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same offenses; while he was found ineligible for parole, his
co-defendant was found eligible, and Cheatham contends that
these findings cannot be reconciled as the two cases were
identical for these purposes.
Members of the Parole Board, who perform a quasi-judicial
function, are immune from suits for damages. See Franklin v.
Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 798 (4th Cir. 1977). However, in
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-84 (2005), the Supreme
Court held that a prison inmate may bring an action against
parole officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
challenging the procedures used in denying parole. Accordingly,
while Cheatham’s claims against Muse for damages were properly
dismissed as barred by Muse’s immunity, the district court erred
in dismissing Cheatham’s claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief which sought rulings requiring his eligibility for parole
review.
However, we find that Cheatham’s equal protection claim
against Muse, the only claim he pursues on appeal, is without
merit. “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a [prisoner]
must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from
others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal
treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th
Cir. 2001). Cheatham’s claim is reviewed under a “relaxed
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standard of scrutiny,” as prisoners are not a suspect class and,
moreover, Cheatham has not alleged any class that he is a member
of that his co-defendant is not. See Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d
686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989). We conclude that Cheatham has failed
to allege how the Board’s denial of parole consideration was the
result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
At most, Cheatham contends that Muse found him ineligible
for parole based on some unexplained personal dislike or
vendetta against him that Muse did not have against Cheatham’s
co-defendant. * Cheatham also points to Muse’s changing stories
on his co-defendant’s parole details as proof that Muse is
hiding something. While it appears that, in situations where
the state action complained of is discretionary in nature,
“treating like individual differently is an accepted
consequence,” Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591
(2008), in this case, Cheatham argues that Va. Code
§ 53.1-151(B)(1) does not implicate discretion and that the same
set of facts must result in the same conclusion.
As discussed above, Cheatham must provide allegations
sufficient to show that Muse intentionally or purposefully
discriminated against him. This is so because “[t]o prove that
*Muse contends that Cheatham’s co-defendant’s parole
eligibility was a mistake.
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a statute has been administered or enforced discriminatorily,”
and so violates equal protection rights, a plaintiff must show
“more . . . than the fact that a benefit was denied to one
person while conferred on another.” Sylvia Dev. Corp. v.
Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added). Instead, Cheatham must also specifically allege that
Muse intended to discriminate against him. See Townes v.
Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543, 552 (4th Cir. 2009).
Here, Cheatham alleges no facts that, if proved, would
demonstrate that Muse intentionally discriminated against him.
He never alleges any of the factors that “have been recognized
as probative of whether a decisionmaking body was motivated by a
discriminatory intent.” Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 819. For
example, Cheatham does not allege a “consistent pattern” of
arbitrary and inconsistent decisions by Muse, a “history of
discrimination” by him, a “specific sequence of events” leading
up to the Muse's ineligibility finding, or “contemporary
statements” by Muse evidencing intentional discrimination. Id.
In sum, Cheatham sets forth no facts--indeed no allegations--
supporting the contention that Muse intentionally discriminated
against him. At most, his allegations and evidence show
negligence, mistake, or a lack of care; however, there is
absolutely no showing of intentional discrimination, much less a
showing satisfactory to survive summary judgment.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court
granting summary judgment to Clarke and Muse. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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