J. S33006/15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
HERMAN GUNTHER, : No. 1749 EDA 2014
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, April 11, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0008316-2011
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. DONOHUE AND LAZARUS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 07, 2015
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following appellant’s conviction for
attempted sexual assault and stalking.1 Appointed counsel, Robert Trimble,
Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw, alleging that the appeal is wholly
frivolous, accompanied by an Anders brief.2 We will grant counsel’s
withdrawal petition and affirm the judgment of sentence.
On the morning of June 14, 2011, appellant accosted a female
employee of Max Studio Clothing Store on Walnut Street in Philadelphia. At
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3124.1 (attempt, sexual assault), and 2709.1
(stalking).
2
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
J. S33006/15
that time, appellant crudely asked the victim if he could perform oral sex on
her; he then pushed her against a counter, pulled her dress above her waist,
and grabbed her buttocks. Fortunately, the victim screamed and a passerby
came to her assistance. Appellant was subsequently charged with
attempted rape, attempted sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault,
indecent assault, simple assault, false imprisonment, stalking, harassment,
and defiant trespass.
On November 25, 2013, pursuant to an open guilty plea agreement,
appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault and stalking, and the
Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining charges. On April 11, 2014,
the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 6 to 12 years’ imprisonment
followed by 3 years’ probation. Post-sentence motions, which included a
motion to withdraw the guilty plea and a motion for reconsideration of
sentence, were denied on May 29, 2014, and a timely notice of appeal was
filed on June 16, 2014. In response to the trial court’s order to file a
statement of errors complained of on appeal, appellant’s counsel filed a
concise statement raising three issues: 1) whether the sentence was
excessive; 2) whether the court erred in denying appellant permission to
withdraw his plea; and 3) whether the court erred in denying appellant’s
motion for reconsideration of his sentence.
On August 27, 2014, appellant’s counsel filed in this court a motion to
withdraw as counsel and an Anders brief, wherein counsel states there are
-2-
J. S33006/15
no non-frivolous issues preserved for our review. “When presented with an
Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues
without first examining counsel’s petition to withdraw.” Commonwealth v.
Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing Commonwealth v.
Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc) (citation
omitted).
In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal
pursuant to Anders, certain requirements must be
met, and counsel must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural
history and facts, with citations to the
record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the
appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding
that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel
should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or
statutes on point that have led to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id., quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Our review of Attorney Trimble’s application to withdraw, supporting
documentation, and Anders brief reveals that he has complied with all of
the foregoing requirements. We note that counsel also furnished a copy of
the brief to appellant, advised him of his right to retain new counsel,
-3-
J. S33006/15
proceed pro se, or raise any additional points that he deems worthy of this
court’s attention, and attached to the Anders petition a copy of the letter
sent to appellant as required under Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d
748, 751 (Pa.Super. 2005). See Daniels, 999 A.2d at 594 (“While the
Supreme Court in Santiago set forth the new requirements for an Anders
brief, which are quoted above, the holding did not abrogate the notice
requirements set forth in Millisock that remain binding legal precedent.”).
As Attorney Trimble has complied with all of the requirements set forth
above, we conclude that counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements
of Anders.
Once counsel has met his obligations, “it then becomes the
responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the
proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the
appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5. Thus,
we now turn to the merits of appellant’s appeal.
The first issue put forward by counsel as having possible merit
contends that the sentence imposed was excessive, which raises the
discretionary aspects of appellant’s sentence. “It is firmly established that a
plea of guilty generally amounts to a waiver of all defects and defenses
except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of
sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea.” Commonwealth v.
Dalberto, 648 A.2d 16, 18 (Pa.Super. 1994), appeal denied, 655 A.2d 983
-4-
J. S33006/15
(Pa. 1995), cert. denied, Dalberto v. Pennsylvania, 516 U.S. 818
(1995). The Dalberto court went on to hold that the discretionary aspects
of sentence could be contested following a guilty plea only where the plea
was open and the terms of the sentence were not negotiated. Id. at 18-22.
As the instant sentence was the result of an open guilty plea, appellant may
challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
The right to appellate review of the
discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute
and must be considered a petition for permission to
appeal. [Commonwealth v.] Hoch, 936 A.2d [515
(Pa.Super. 2008)] at 518. An appellant must satisfy
a four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction
when challenging the discretionary aspects of a
sentence. We must consider:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely
notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue
was properly preserved at sentencing or
in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief
has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there
is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa.Super. 2015).
We agree with counsel’s analysis that appellant cannot present a
substantial question in this regard. The trial court announced at sentencing
that there was a pre-sentence report, and that it had considered it. (Notes
of testimony, 4/11/14 at 4, 16.) As such, the court is presumed to have
considered all relevant sentencing factors:
-5-
J. S33006/15
Where pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue
to presume that the sentencing judge was aware of
relevant information regarding the defendant’s
character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors. A pre-sentence
report constitutes the record and speaks for itself.
In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our
intention of engaging in an effort of legal purification,
we state clearly that sentencers are under no
compulsion to employ checklists or any extended or
systematic definitions of their punishment procedure.
Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence
report, the sentencing court’s discretion should not
be disturbed. This is particularly true, we repeat, in
those circumstances where it can be demonstrated
that the judge had any degree of awareness of the
sentencing considerations, and there we will
presume also that the weighing process took place in
a meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to
take the position that if a court is in possession of
the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at
hand.
Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). Consequently,
appellant can raise no claim that the court failed to consider any proper
sentencing factor.
We have also reviewed the sentencing transcript. There is nothing in
it that indicates that the trial court considered any improper sentencing
factor; thus, appellant could not raise a substantial question on that basis.
Finally, although appellant was subjected to consecutive sentences,
the aggregate sentence does not amount to a sentence that is clearly
unreasonable and meriting resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Dodge,
957 A.2d 1198 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 980 A.2d 605 (Pa. 2009).
-6-
J. S33006/15
In the second issue raised by the concise statement, appellant
contended that the trial court erred in not permitting him to withdraw his
plea. This issue is likewise frivolous. After a court has imposed a sentence,
a defendant can withdraw his guilty plea only where necessary to correct a
manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352
(Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014). There is
nothing here that indicates a manifest injustice.
To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently entered.
Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 522
(Pa.Super.2003). “[A] manifest injustice occurs
when a plea is not tendered knowingly, intelligently,
voluntarily, and understandingly.” Commonwealth
v. Gunter, 565 Pa. 79, 84, 771 A.2d 767, 771
(2001). The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure mandate pleas be taken in open court and
require the court to conduct an on-the-record
colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware
of his rights and the consequences of his plea.
Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789 A.2d 764, 765
(Pa.Super.2002) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 590). Under
Rule 590, the court should confirm, inter alia, that a
defendant understands: (1) the nature of the
charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the
factual basis for the plea; (3) he is giving up his right
to trial by jury; (4) and the presumption of
innocence; (5) he is aware of the permissible ranges
of sentences and fines possible; and (6) the court is
not bound by the terms of the agreement unless the
court accepts the plea. Commonwealth v.
Watson, 835 A.2d 786 (Pa.Super.2003). The
reviewing Court will evaluate the adequacy of the
plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting
plea by examining the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the entry of that plea. Commonwealth
v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378 (Pa.Super.2002).
Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered
-7-
J. S33006/15
a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and
the defendant bears the burden of proving
otherwise. Pollard, supra.
Id.
We have reviewed the guilty plea colloquy and find that the required
information was imparted to appellant. Moreover, there is nothing of record
that indicates that appellant’s plea was not tendered knowingly, intelligently,
voluntarily, and understandingly. Therefore, we agree with counsel that any
issue raised with regard to the court’s decision not to allow appellant to
withdraw his plea would be frivolous.
Finally, appellant’s concise statement contends that the trial court
erred in denying the motion to reconsider sentence. We have already
examined appellant’s sentence as to its discretionary aspects and found that
there is no possible challenge that raises a substantial question that the
sentence was not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. At sentencing,
the trial court noted its concern with appellant’s mental health issues, his
lengthy criminal history, and the need to protect the public from appellant.
(Notes of testimony, 4/11/14 at 16-18.) Moreover, the trial court was
apprised as to all sentencing factors. We see no basis whatsoever for finding
that the trial court erred in failing to reconsider its already well-considered
sentence. This issue is likewise frivolous.
In sum, we find this appeal to be wholly frivolous, and our
independent review of the entire record has not disclosed any other
-8-
J. S33006/15
potentially non-frivolous issues. Consequently, we grant counsel’s petition
to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/7/2015
-9-