UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4690
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEVEN VONDELL WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00278-RWT-2)
Submitted: June 30, 2015 Decided: July 9, 2015
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICES OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Leah Jo Bressack, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Vondell Williams was convicted, following a jury
trial, on four counts: interference, and conspiracy to interfere,
with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2012); possession and brandishing of a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2012); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). The district court
sentenced him to an aggregate term of 324 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Williams challenges several evidentiary rulings and the
reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
Williams first claims that the district court erred by
admitting into evidence transcripts from his coconspirator’s
sentencing hearing and thereby violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause. “[A] violation [of the Confrontation
Clause] may be found harmless on appeal if the beneficiary of the
constitutional error can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained[.]”
United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __
(U.S. June 11, 2015) (No. 14-10176), and petition for cert. filed,
__ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. June 12, 2015) (No. 14-10190); see United
States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 197 (4th Cir. 2005). A
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statement’s unconstitutional admission may be “harmless when the
[G]overnment introduced an abundance of other evidence and proved
parts of the defendant’s involvement without any use of [the
challenged] statement.” United States v. Gillion, 704 F.3d 284,
293 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted). We can assume the error occurred and “should avoid
deciding whether there was a violation of the Confrontation Clause
if any error was harmless.” Reed, 780 F.3d at 269.
Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Williams
guilty based solely on the unchallenged evidence presented by the
Government. An abundance of unchallenged evidence established
that Williams was one of the perpetrators of the robbery at issue,
and further evidence identifying him was unnecessary. Thus, even
if the district court erred by admitting the transcript in
contravention of the Confrontation Clause, such error was
harmless.
Next, Williams claims that the district court erred by
permitting hearsay testimony and unqualified or otherwise
impermissible expert testimony. We will not reverse
nonconstitutional error, such as this, if the Government
demonstrates that the error was harmless. United States v.
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Ibisevic, 675 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 2012). In the context of
nonconstitutional error,
the Government must demonstrate that the error did not
have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict. An appellate court does
not inquire into whether absent the error sufficient
evidence existed to convict, but rather whether we
believe it highly probable that the error did not affect
the judgment. Thus, we must be able to say, with fair
assurance, after pondering all that happened without
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.
We have identified three decisive factors in making
this determination: (1) the centrality of the issue
affected by the error; (2) the steps taken to mitigate
the effects of the error; and (3) the closeness of the
case.
Id. at 349-50 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the first two of these factors weigh in Williams’
favor, “[t]he final factor—the closeness of the case—is the single
most important factor in a nonconstitutional harmless-error
inquiry.” Id. at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1326 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The closeness inquiry involves assessing whether the
[unchallenged] evidence is not only sufficient to convict, but
whether it is sufficiently powerful in relation to the [challenged
evidence] to ensure the error did not affect the outcome.”
Ibisevic, 675 F.3d at 354 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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We conclude that the Government’s unchallenged evidence was
not only sufficient to find Williams guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, but also sufficiently powerful in relation to the evidence
Williams challenges that any error in the challenged rulings did
not affect the outcome. Thus, it is highly probable that any error
in admitting the challenged evidence did not sway the jury or
affect the outcome of the judgment. Because Williams’ claims of
erroneous evidentiary rulings necessarily would be only harmless
error, we affirm his conviction.
Lastly, Williams challenges the reasonableness of his
sentence. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111
(4th Cir. 2015). “First, we must determine whether the district
court committed any procedural error . . . .” Lymas, 781 F.3d at
111. “Only if we determine that the district court has not
committed procedural error do we proceed to assess ‘the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed,’” id. at 112 (quoting Gall,
552 U.S. at 51), under “the totality of the circumstances,” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51.
“[A] sentence within a properly calculated advisory
[Sentencing] Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable” on
appeal. United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2014)
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(internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant can only rebut
the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.”
Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). In
evaluating the sentence, we give due deference to the district
court because the district court need only “set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for [its decision].” Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
Williams contends that the district court committed
procedural error by failing to consider the application of the
§ 3553 factors to his case. This contention is belied by the
record. The district court specified § 3553 as the controlling
statute; stated that it was obliged to impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with
§ 3553(a)’s factors; and specifically referred to each factor
listed in § 3553(a) that was relevant to the instant case. See
United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). In applying
the § 3553(a) factors, the court individually assessed Williams’
case and the arguments he raised. We perceive no procedural
unreasonableness, and we conclude that Williams’ claim is
meritless.
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Williams’ claim of substantive unreasonableness is likewise
without merit. The district court heard Williams’ arguments
concerning application of the § 3553(a) factors to his case and
determined that those factors warranted a sentence at the high end
of Williams’ Guidelines range that ran consecutively to Williams’
existing sentence for an unrelated crime. Absent substantive
unreasonableness in the district court’s assessment, Williams’
mere disagreement with it is no basis for vacating his sentence.
See United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 531 (4th Cir. 2014).
Because Williams has pointed to no procedural or substantive error
that is not flatly contradicted by the record or otherwise without
merit, he has not overcome the presumption of reasonableness
accorded his within-Guidelines sentence. Accordingly we affirm
his sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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