IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0707
Filed July 9, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF J.S.,
Minor Child,
K.C., Father,
Appellant,
E.S., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Rose Anne
Mefford, District Associate Judge.
A father and mother appeal separately from the order terminating their
parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Michael S. Fisher of Fisher Law Office, Oskaloosa, for appellant father.
Diane Crookham-Johnson of Crookham-Johnson Law Office, P.L.L.C.,
Oskaloosa, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Ed Bull, County Attorney, and Amber N. Rivera, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Eric Palmer, Oskaloosa, for minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
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DANILSON, C.J.
The mother and father appeal separately the juvenile court’s termination of
their parental rights to their son, J.S. The mother maintains the Iowa Department
of Human Services (DHS) failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify J.S. with
the mother. The father maintains termination of his parental rights was not in the
child’s best interests. Neither parent disputes that the statutory grounds for
termination have been met. Because we find DHS made reasonable efforts to
reunify J.S. with the mother, termination is in J.S.’s best interests, and no
permissive factor precludes termination, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination
of parental rights.
Our review of termination decisions is de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33,
40 (Iowa 2010). We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings, especially
assessing witness credibility, although we are not bound by them. In re D.W.,
791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). An order terminating parental rights will be
upheld if there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under
section 232.116 (2015). Id. Evidence is “clear and convincing” when there are
no serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of law
drawn from the evidence. Id.
Iowa Code chapter 232 termination of parental rights follows a three-step
analysis. P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 39. The court must first determine whether a
ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established. Id. If a
ground for termination has been established, the court must apply the best-
interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for
termination should result in termination of parental rights. Id. Finally, if the
statutory best-interest framework supports termination of parental rights, the
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court must consider if any of the statutory exceptions set out in section
232.116(3) weigh against the termination of parental rights. Id.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to J.S. pursuant
to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b),(e),(h), and (l) (2013) and the father’s
parental rights to J.S. pursuant to sections 232.116(1)(b),(e),(h), (l), and (j).
Neither parent disputes that the statutory grounds for termination have been met.
Thus, any claim of error related to the statutory grounds has been waived. See
Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (“[O]ur review is confined to
those propositions relied upon by the appellant for reversal on appeal.”).
The mother maintains DHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify
J.S. with the mother. Specifically, the mother maintains reasonable efforts were
denied when DHS refused to allow J.S. to be placed with her in a family
treatment program that would address her mental health needs and her
substance abuse issues.
According to the mother’s testimony, she has struggled with drug addiction
for approximately sixteen years. In April 2013, DHS became involved with the
family for a second time. The mother tested positive for marijuana and
methamphetamine, and J.S. was removed from her care. During the pendency
of the case, the mother obtained at least four separate substance abuse
evaluations, each of which recommended drug rehabilitation treatment. The
mother entered four different treatment programs. She successfully completed
one of the programs during the summer of 2014, but the mother admitted she
used methamphetamine again afterward. The State filed a petition to terminate
parental rights on September 4, 2014—approximately seventeen months after
J.S. was removed from his mother’s care. The mother entered Jackson
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Recovery—the program that required J.S. to join her—on September 12, 2014.
On approximately October 1, 2014, the mother contacted DHS to ask if J.S.
could be placed with her at the program, and DHS refused. At the time, the
mother was only receiving one supervised two-hour visit per week and had used
methamphetamine less than one month before. We do not believe this
constitutes a failure of reasonable efforts to reunify J.S. with his mother. See In
re C.H., 652 N.W.3d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002) (“[W]hat constitutes reasonable
services varies based upon the requirements of each individual case.”).
The father maintains it was not in J.S.’s best interests to terminate his
parental rights. The father was incarcerated on April 23, 2013, shortly after J.S.
was removed from the mother’s care. There is no record of communication
between the father and J.S. since he became incarcerated. The father’s
tentative discharge date is September 28, 2024. Termination will enable J.S. to
achieve permanency. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (citing
In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially)
(noting the “defining elements in a child’s best interest” are the child’s safety and
the “need for a permanent home”)).
J.S. should not have to wait endlessly for parents to get their lives
together. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. Termination of both parents’ parental rights
is in the child’s best interests. Finding no factor in section 232.116(3) that
precludes it, we affirm the termination of the both the mother’s and father’s
parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.